Trust and Development : The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance by Gao, Lin
  
 
 
 
Doctoral thesis 
 
 Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-
Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gao, Lin 
Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
 
Gutachter: 
1. Prof. Dr. Wolfram Elsner 
2. Prof. Dr. Christian Cordes 
 
September 2019 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
List of figures ............................................................................................................................ v 
List of tables ............................................................................................................................ vii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. ix 
 
Chapter 0: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
0.1 Issues under study ..................................................................................................... 1 
0.2 Structure of this thesis ............................................................................................... 5 
0.3 Methods applied ........................................................................................................ 6 
0.3.1 Comparison analysis ......................................................................................... 6 
0.3.2 Empirical analysis ............................................................................................. 6 
0.3.3 Agent-based modeling ...................................................................................... 8 
0.4 Expected contributions to scientific research .......................................................... 10 
Chapter 1: Thinking Trust Systemically in Socio-Economic Environment .............................. 12 
1.1 Trust ........................................................................................................................ 12 
1.1.1 Describing trust ............................................................................................... 12 
1.1.2 Characteristics of trust ..................................................................................... 13 
1.1.3 Types of trust ................................................................................................... 16 
1.2 On generalized trust ................................................................................................ 19 
1.2.1 Generalized trust and particularized trust, and trust in strangers: a revision of 
understanding .................................................................................................................. 19 
1.2.2 Group trust and generalized trust .................................................................... 21 
1.2.3 Formation and implementation of general trust .............................................. 23 
1.2.4 Experience and expectation ............................................................................. 27 
1.3 Measures and representation of (general) trust ....................................................... 29 
1.3.1 Measuring general trust at micro level using survey data ............................... 29 
1.3.2 Measuring general trust at macro level using survey data .............................. 31 
1.3.3 Measuring trust using the investment actions in a trust game ......................... 31 
1.3.4 Measuring social trust using the cooperation share in evolutionary game 
theoretical agent-based modeling .................................................................................... 32 
1.3.5 Representing micro trust using probability ..................................................... 33 
1.4 Trust at the micro level: both thoughts and behavior matter ................................... 33 
1.4.1 Thoughts and trust ........................................................................................... 33 
1.4.2 Behavior and trust ........................................................................................... 34 
1.5 Trust and trustworthiness ........................................................................................ 36 
1.5.1 Relation between trust and trustworthiness ..................................................... 36 
1.5.2 Individual and social costs of untrustworthiness ............................................. 37 
1.5.3 Correspondence and superposition of the role as a trustor and a trustee ......... 38 
1.5.4 Supply of and demand for trust and trustworthiness ....................................... 40 
1.6 Information acquisition and output: social learning and interactions...................... 41 
  
 
1.6.1 Types of behavior ............................................................................................ 41 
1.6.2 Types and filtering process of information ...................................................... 43 
1.6.3 Bandura (1977): Social learning theory .......................................................... 46 
1.6.4 Types of social learning ................................................................................... 47 
1.6.5 What to learn? – Social learning and trust and trustworthiness ...................... 48 
1.6.6 Examples of objects of (generalized) social learning: perspective of 
interpersonal relationships .............................................................................................. 50 
1.6.7 Learning channels: in and beyond individual immediate interaction network 52 
1.6.8 Distances and interpersonal relationships ....................................................... 54 
1.6.9 Networking micro to macro and heterogeneity of networks ........................... 58 
1.7 Spatial mobility and trust, and social mobility ........................................................ 61 
1.7.1 Geographical mobility ..................................................................................... 61 
1.7.2 Geographical mobility and trust ...................................................................... 63 
1.7.3 A short discussion on geographic mobility and social mobility, and social capital
 65 
1.8 Institutions ............................................................................................................... 65 
1.8.1 Categorization I of institutions: problem-solving, problem-avoiding, influence-
controlling and blame-apportioning ................................................................................ 66 
1.8.2 Manifestation of potential problems ............................................................... 67 
1.8.3 Deepness of institutions .................................................................................. 68 
1.8.4 Categorization II of institutions: value-type institutions and constructed 
institutions ....................................................................................................................... 68 
1.8.5 On the origin of institutions ............................................................................ 69 
1.8.6 On the diffusion of institutions ........................................................................ 71 
1.8.7 Reasons of conforming to institutions ............................................................. 75 
1.8.8 Trustworthiness as an institution and institutionalized trust............................ 77 
1.9 Three networks: Institutional networks, causality networks and information 
networks 79 
1.9.1 Institutional networks ...................................................................................... 79 
1.9.2 Causality network ............................................................................................ 81 
1.9.3 Personal information networks ........................................................................ 82 
1.9.4 Trust in the three networks .............................................................................. 86 
1.10 (Dis)Trust and economic transactions ..................................................................... 88 
1.11 Interim conclusion ................................................................................................... 91 
 
Chapter 2: Some Socio-Economic Aspects of China and Scandinavia ..................................... 95 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 95 
2.2 Population and network structures .......................................................................... 96 
2.2.1 Meaning of population to trust ........................................................................ 96 
2.2.2 Population size and composition of China and Scandinavia ........................... 99 
2.2.3 Social structure: China vs. the West .............................................................. 104 
2.2.4 Family structure: Denmark vs. China............................................................ 107 
2.2.5 Membership: China vs. Scandinavia ............................................................. 113 
2.3 Welfare, equality, change, expectations, and certainty .......................................... 122 
 
 
 
 
2.3.1 The Nordic welfare model: an overview ....................................................... 122 
2.3.2 Welfare policies in Scandinavia and China ................................................... 128 
2.3.3 Equality ......................................................................................................... 133 
2.3.4 Uncertainty .................................................................................................... 138 
2.4 Social mobility and geographic mobility in China ................................................ 140 
2.4.1 Social mobility .............................................................................................. 140 
2.4.2 Geographic mobility ...................................................................................... 143 
2.5 Social capital ......................................................................................................... 146 
2.5.1 What is social capital? ................................................................................... 146 
2.5.2 Elements of social capital .............................................................................. 147 
2.5.3 People and channels of acquiring social capital ............................................ 148 
2.6 Interpersonal trust.................................................................................................. 155 
2.6.1 General trust .................................................................................................. 156 
2.6.2 Trust in different kinds of people .................................................................. 160 
2.7 Other socio-economic performance ...................................................................... 165 
2.7.1 Performance of macro-economy ................................................................... 165 
2.7.2 Public security ............................................................................................... 172 
2.8 Interim conclusions ............................................................................................... 173 
 
Chapter 3: What Affect General Trust? Perspective from Norm-Conforming, Opinion Similarity 
and Geographic Mobility: Empirical Evidence from China ......................................................... 178 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 178 
3.2 Determinants of general trust: a new perspective ................................................. 180 
3.2.1 Impact of others’ behavior: breaching norms ................................................ 180 
3.2.2 Impact of others’ opinion .............................................................................. 184 
3.2.3 Geographical mobility ................................................................................... 184 
3.2.4 Other factors .................................................................................................. 185 
3.3 Data, variables and descriptive statistics ............................................................... 186 
3.3.1 Data set overview .......................................................................................... 186 
3.3.2 Variable selection and construction ............................................................... 186 
3.4 Econometric models and results ............................................................................ 191 
3.4.1 Ordered logit model ...................................................................................... 191 
3.4.2 (Multi)Correlation between explanatory variables ........................................ 192 
3.4.3 Regression results of ordered logit model ..................................................... 199 
3.5 Interim conclusions ............................................................................................... 211 
 
Chapter 4: Between Trust and Performance: An Information-driven Socio-Economic 
Mechanism on Directed Weighted Regular Ring with Agent-Based Modeling ............................ 213 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 213 
4.2 Interested parameters ............................................................................................ 215 
4.3 Experimental design .............................................................................................. 216 
4.3.1 Artificial society and network structure ........................................................ 216 
4.3.2 Initialization of agents’ attributes .................................................................. 216 
4.3.3 Micro-level process ....................................................................................... 218 
  
 
4.4 Results and analysis .............................................................................................. 228 
4.4.1 Baseline simulation ....................................................................................... 230 
4.4.2 Degree of embeddedness in social network .................................................. 230 
4.4.3 Mutation probability of payoff matrix ........................................................... 231 
4.4.4 Mutated payoff matrix ................................................................................... 232 
4.4.5 Probability of information diffusion in neighbors ......................................... 233 
4.4.6 Probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors ................................. 234 
4.5 Interim conclusions ............................................................................................... 235 
 
Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions, with Some Thoughts on Information, Education and 
Formal Institutions ........................................................................................................................ 237 
5.1 Summary and conclusions ..................................................................................... 237 
5.2 Some thoughts on information, education and formal institutions ........................ 244 
5.2.1 About information ......................................................................................... 244 
5.2.2 About education ............................................................................................ 245 
5.2.3 About formal institutions .............................................................................. 246 
 
Appendix A: Selected questions from CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B .......................... 247 
Appendix B: Resident population and inter-provincial immigration of selected 
provincial administrative divisions of P.R. China, 2010 ....................................................... 249 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 251 
 
 
 v 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1.1 Types of trust. ........................................................................................................ 18 
Figure 1.2 A possible relation of generalized trust and trust in strangers. ............................... 20 
Figure 1.3 Formation and implementation of general trust. .................................................... 26 
Figure 1.4 Experience and expectation. .................................................................................. 27 
Figure 1.5 Correspondence and superposition of the role as a trustor and a trustee in an 
interaction in a 2-person trust relationship. ..................................................................... 39 
Figure 1.6 The supply and demand of trust and trustworthiness. ............................................ 41 
Figure 1.7 Interaction information feedback between micro- and macro-level. ..................... 45 
Figure 1.8 Reciprocal determinism in psychological function of Bandura’s (1977) Social 
Learning Theory. ............................................................................................................. 46 
Figure 1.9 Social distance and social class. ............................................................................ 56 
Figure 1.10 Individual geographical mobility: short-time vs. long-time. ............................... 63 
Figure 1.11 (Dis)Continuous geographical distribution of population in an institution’s 
diffusion. ......................................................................................................................... 72 
Figure 1.12 Institutional diffusion with population mobility. ................................................. 74 
Figure 1.13 Formation of reputation. ...................................................................................... 76 
Figure 1.14 Reputation diffusors. ............................................................................................ 77 
Figure 1.15 An institutional network and its supporting psychological factors. ..................... 80 
Figure 1.16 Types of causality between two factors. .............................................................. 81 
Figure 1.17 Personal information networks without spatial mobility. .................................... 84 
Figure 1.18 Personal information networks with spatial mobility. ......................................... 85 
Figure 1.19 Trust and institutional network, personal information network and causality 
network ........................................................................................................................... 87 
Figure 2.1 One of the differences between the social life of the West and China. ................ 105 
Figure 2.2 Number of memberships in China. ...................................................................... 121 
Figure 2.3 Number of memberships in Sweden. ................................................................... 121 
Figure 2.4 Organisational chart of the financial structure of the Danish healthcare system. 131 
Figure 2.5 Subjective social stratum at 14 years old and currently. ...................................... 141 
Figure 2.6 Subjective socio-economic status compared with peers ...................................... 142 
Figure 2.7 Subjective socio-economic status compared with 3 years ago ............................ 142 
Figure 2.8 Frequency of meeting friends, relatives or colleagues, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden. ......................................................................................................................... 150 
Figure 2.9 Frequency of taking part in social activities compared to peers. ......................... 151 
Figure 2.10 Number of persons to whom one can discuss intimate or personal matters. ..... 152 
Figure 2.11 Social activities in leisure time, China. .............................................................. 153 
Figure 2.12 Occupations in social networks, China. ............................................................. 154 
Figure 2.13 Diversity of occupations in social networks, China ........................................... 155 
Figure 2.14 General trust in China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. ................................... 157 
Figure 2.15 General trust in China from CGSS. ................................................................... 158 
Figure 2.16 General trust of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 2002 – 2016. ........................ 159 
Figure 2.17 Trust in people of different relations, China vs. Sweden. .................................. 162 
 vi 
 
Figure 2.18 Trust in different kinds of people in social interactions without pecuniary benefits.
....................................................................................................................................... 163 
Figure 2.19 Classification of working-age population. ......................................................... 166 
Figure 2.20 Registered urban unemployment rate of China, 1997-2016. ............................. 166 
Figure 2.21 Unemployment rate of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 2000 – 2017. ............. 167 
Figure 2.22 GDP (current US$) of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 1960 – 2016. ... 169 
Figure 2.23 GDP annual growth of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 1961 – 2016. .. 170 
Figure 2.24 GDP per capital, PPP (current international $) of China, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, 1990 – 2016. ................................................................................................... 171 
Figure 2.25 Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year? – China. ................ 172 
Figure 2.26 And what about your immediate family – has someone in your family been the 
victim of a crime during the last year? – China. ........................................................... 172 
Figure 2.27 Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year? – Sweden. ............. 173 
Figure 2.28 And what about your immediate family – has someone in your family been the 
victim of a crime during the last year? – Sweden. ........................................................ 173 
Figure 4.1 An overall framework for micro-level process. ................................................... 219 
Figure 4.2 A flow chart for “Interaction, information diffusion and trust-updating” in each sub-
time period. ................................................................................................................... 220 
Figure 4.3 Baseline simulation. ............................................................................................. 230 
Figure 4.4 Comparing degrees of embeddedness in social networks. ................................... 231 
Figure 4.5 Comparing mutation probabilities of payoff structures. ...................................... 232 
Figure 4.6 Comparing mutated payoff matrices. ................................................................... 233 
Figure 4.7 Comparing probabilities of information diffusion in neighbors. ......................... 234 
Figure 4.8 Comparing probabilities of information diffusion in non-neighbors. .................. 235 
 
 
 
 vii 
 
List of tables 
Table 1.1 Impact of expectation and later facts on trust. ......................................................... 27 
Table 1.2 Forms of trust in two-party interactions and its main behavioral party. .................. 36 
Table 1.3 Possible mechanisms behind behavior: a perspective from internalized values. .... 43 
Table 1.4 Types of causality between two factors. .................................................................. 81 
Table 2.1 Population size of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 2000 to 2017. ............... 100 
Table 2.2 Population composition of Denmark. .................................................................... 100 
Table 2.3 Membership of the National Church of Denmark from 2011 to 2017. ................. 100 
Table 2.4 Immigrations and emigration of Sweden, 2011-2016. .......................................... 101 
Table 2.5 Chinese population and its composition, 2010 – 2016. ......................................... 103 
Table 2.6 Number of children 0-17 years old with siblings of Denmark, 2008-2017. .......... 109 
Table 2.7 Children 0-17 years old by family type and number of siblings in Denmark, 2008 & 
2017. .............................................................................................................................. 110 
Table 2.8 Membership in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. ................................................... 115 
Table 2.9 Membership in China. ........................................................................................... 117 
Table 2.10 Active or inactive membership in China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. ........ 119 
Table 2.11 Average membership, China and Sweden. .......................................................... 122 
Table 2.12 Percentage of expenditure on social protection in GDP ...................................... 126 
Table 2.13 Percentage of total expenditure on social benefits in total expenditure on social 
protection. ..................................................................................................................... 126 
Table 2.14 Social benefits by function, % of total benefits. .................................................. 127 
Table 2.15 Total expenditure on social protection per head of population, ECU/EUR. ........ 128 
Table 2.16 The amount of children and youth benefit in 2017.............................................. 129 
Table 2.17 Pension Index of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 2017 ......................... 132 
Table 2.18 Gini coefficients of market income (before taxes and transfers) of China, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. .................................................................................................... 135 
Table 2.19 Gini coefficients of disposable income (post taxes and transfers) of China, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. .................................................................................................... 135 
Table 2.20 Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income of Denmark, Norway and Sweden
....................................................................................................................................... 136 
Table 2.21 Gender gap index of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 2006 – 2017 ........ 137 
Table 2.22 Corruption perceptions indices of China, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, 2012-
2017. .............................................................................................................................. 140 
Table 2.23 Population of residence-registration inconsistency and floating population in China, 
2000 – 2016. .................................................................................................................. 145 
Table 2.24 Data existence of general trust in WVS and EVS for China, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden. ......................................................................................................................... 156 
Table 3.1 Variable selection and construction from CGSS 2013. ......................................... 189 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of micro variables from CGSS 2013. .................................. 190 
Table 3.3 Correlation between independent variables. .......................................................... 194 
Table 3.4 Partial correlation between explanatory variables. ................................................ 196 
Table 3.5 VIFs of explanatory variables. .............................................................................. 198 
 viii 
 
Table 3.6 Ordered logit regression (Core explanatory variables only).................................. 201 
Table 3.7 Ordered logit regression (Control variables only). ................................................ 202 
Table 3.8 Ordered logit regression. ....................................................................................... 203 
Table 3.9 Likelihood ratio test between ordered logit regressions. ....................................... 204 
Table 3.10 Testing parallel lines assumption for ordered logit regression using Brant test. . 205 
Table 3.11 Results of proportional odds model. .................................................................... 209 
Table 3.12 Likelihood ratio test: ordered logit model vs. partial proportional odds model. . 211 
Table 4.1 Weights of four kinds of information sources in ai’s trust-updating...................... 218 
Table 4.2 Trust-updating directions. ...................................................................................... 225 
Table 4.3 Parameter values. .................................................................................................. 229 
 
 
 ix 
 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Wolfram Elsner, who 
provided me with a guest Ph.D. student position in his chair in the Faculty of Business Studies and 
Economics of the University of Bremen, gave me advice on my Ph.D. study and promotion, brought 
me to EAEPE and ASSA conference several times, and made comments on the manuscripts of my 
thesis and reviewed through it.  
I wish to express my deepest gratitude and strongest love to my parents, Gao Wenfu and Gao 
Yingchun, who always give me their most unselfish love, and always support and encourage me.  
I am extremely grateful to Prof. Dr. Christian Cordes who gave me comments when I presented my 
work in IINO Seminar and IERP seminar in the Faculty, agreed to be my second supervisor, and 
reviewed through my thesis.  
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Torsten Heinrich for his seminar “Simulation Models” 
in the University of Bremen where I learnt the implementation techniques of agent-based modeling 
with programming language Python and for his comments on the premilitary version of one chapter 
of this thesis. I am also indebted to Dr. Georg Schwesinger, Dr. Tong-Yaa Su and Dr. Rebecca 
Schmitt for comments on the premilitary draft of one to two chapters of this thesis.  
I want to thank all my defense commission members, Prof. Dr. Wolfram Elsner, Prof. Dr. Christian 
Cordes, Prof. Dr. Shuanping Dai, Prof. Dr. Torben Klarl, Joshua Henkel and Mariia Shkolnykova, 
who spared time for my defense, from the bottom of my heart. I also would like to thank Dr. 
Mahmood Shubbak who attended my defense to support me. I wish to express my sincere gratitude 
to Prof. Dr. Shuanping Dai who gave me advice on my thesis after my defense. 
I also would like to thank IINO and IERP Seminar in the Faculty every Wednesday afternoon, very 
good platforms for Ph.D. students to give presentations, share ideas and collect comments.  
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the China Scholarship Council (CSC) for financial support 
in the first three years of my Ph.D. study.  
 
 
Gao, Lin 
Bremen, Germany 
 September, 2019
  
 
 
 
  
Chapter 0:  Introduction 
0.1 Issues under study 
The impact of non-economic factors on economic development/performance obtains more and more 
attention. This thesis unfolds tightly around “trust” which comes into the views of economists 
especially in the recent two decades (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997). 
A country’s economic development and prosperity benefit its people. – This is one of the reasons 
why the achievements of a country in economy are so desirable. However, as we see, the imbalance 
of economic development worldwide seems normal. One of the issues that economists continuously 
inquire and explore is from where economic growth comes and why socio-economic performance 
is different among countries. So far, many factors, including both hard and relatively soft ones, or 
in another criterion, both economic and non-economic ones, have been proposed and proved to 
influence economic performance, directly and/or indirectly. Traditionally, hard factors are more 
emphasized. Here, we just roughly refer to factors like geographical location, land, traffic conditions 
(like rivers, estuaries, etc.), climate, natural resources, capital, labor force and so on as “hard 
factors”. – They are all important and play a crucial role in a country’s economic growth or recovery. 
Let’s take natural resources as an example. Oil-gas industry is the mainstay industry in countries 
like Saudi Arabia, Russia and Norway. Incomes from the export of oil and gas account for a 
substantial proportion of their GDP and government fiscal revenues. The high-grade iron ore and 
rich forest resources in Sweden ever helped it get rid of poverty in the 17th – 18th century. The 
discovery of diamond in South Africa in the second half of the 19th century boosts its transition to 
an industrialized country. It is no exaggeration to say that rich natural resources can often provide 
“the first pot of gold” for a country especially at the early stage of economic soar. Other conditions 
being equal, rich natural resources are always a natural advantage for a country. However, a 
noticeable, and somewhat abnormal, phenomenon – “curse of resources” or “Dutch disease” – 
reveals other non-negligible factors.  
Relatively soft factors involve those based on knowledge and skills (such as human capital, 
technology, innovation and the like), institutions, historical events and so on. Why does diversity of 
economic performance continue even when nowadays materials and capital flow so fast around? – 
This is not only one of the motivations for North (1990, pp. 6-7) to dig into how institutions impact 
economic performance, but also one for other scholars from institutional economics, cultural 
economics, social economics and so on who attempt to search for answers from factors like 
institutions, culture, social environment etc. For example, what was along with the colonial activities 
of the Britain and Spain was the “exports” of their institutional arrangements. North, Summerhill 
and Weingast (2000) argue that it was the differences in shared belief system and institutional 
arrangements inherited from the British colonist and the Spanish that led to the different paths of 
political order and economic performance between North America and Latin America after their 
independence. Atlantic slave trade between the 15th and 19th century hurt the Africans both 
physically and psychologically, disrupted the normal course of African history, and has an extremely 
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negative impact on the economic development of Africa. The underdevelopment of Africa 
nowadays may attribute to the slave trade to a large degree. Also, apartheid (racial segregation) ever 
became an economic obstacle of South Africa. Other factors influencing economic development 
may also include international relation and geopolitics. Therefore, it can be said that a country’s or 
a region’s economic success is the result of the comprehensive influence of different factors. 
However, although there are many factors that may influence economic performance, obviously, 
different factors have a different effect on different countries, and each country has its own economic 
strengths and weaknesses. 
It is admitted that poverty could be a vicious circle to some extent. It is just like the Matthew Effect 
that the rich get richer, while the poor get poorer. Without enough wealth, a poor country cannot 
afford to import necessary materials by international trade, nor is it capable enough to provide its 
people with sufficient and relatively high-quality education, healthcare, public security, welfare, etc., 
nor can it develop technology, support innovation or increase the added value of products, nor may 
it be attractive to foreign investment. – These all have a negative impact on further economic 
development. In a word, even though materials and capital move fast globally, generally their 
destinations are less likely poor and backward countries. 
In spite of the many factors that affect the speed, quality and efficiency of economic development, 
as we have talked briefly and selectively above, this thesis more focuses on the social aspect. 
Economy is part of society. Just as what Granovetter (1985) argues, economic behaviors are 
embedded in society. Being separated from harmonious social environment, economic development 
and prosperity could not have been achieved or maintained. – This increasingly becomes a 
consensus as time passes. What is more, a society consists of humans. A notable phenomenon is 
that a substantial number of the determinants of economic performance are highly related to inter-
personal interactions. There is no doubt that a well-functioning society will be advantageous to 
economic development; in contrast, an ill-functioning one will definitely encumber it.  
Unequivocally speaking, it is trust that is going to be investigated in this thesis. Trust is one of the 
notable soft factors aforementioned. Usually, both the establishment and the maintenance of 
interpersonal relationships are not separable from trust. It permeates almost all aspects of human 
interactions, and affects our socio-economic life through directly influencing the willingness to 
interact or re-interact and the way of interactions. For example, in social activities, random 
interactions, business activities (such as, supplier selection), and production activities, consuming 
activities, and many other social and economic activities, trust all plays a crucial role therein. The 
benefits of relatively high inter-personal trust are obvious. For instance, it facilitates social and 
economic exchanges, boosts benign interactions like win-win cooperation, enhances social 
coherence, is conducive to overcome social dilemmas, saves monitoring cost, and so on and so forth. 
Trust here means a positive feedback of a trustworthy social environment, is the reflection of 
perceived trustworthiness, the expectation of not being deceived or not being treated unfairly, the 
belief of good moral quality of others and the expectation of the benevolence of potential interactors. 
Thus, trust here is not credulity, it has an experiential and informational foundation.  
However, we should not neglect the fact that in interactions, trust can not only be built, but also be 
damaged. Which outcome will be reached in the end depends on the interactions per se: Benign 
interactions could increase trust and the possibility of further interactions, while vicious ones could 
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lead trust to decline and decrease the willingness to interact in future. 
Trust has been a research topic in psychology and sociology for a long time. However, its impact 
on economy seems to get noticed and to become a hot point only in the recent two decades. So far, 
the empirical impact of trust (such as, general trust and inherited trust) on economic performance, 
either in a direct or indirect way, has been largely discussed (e.g., Algan and Cahuc, 2010; 
Beugelsdijk et al, 2004; Bjørnskov, 2012; Dearmon and Grier, 2009; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Lim, 
Morshed and Khun, 2018; Peiró-Palomino and Tortosa-Ausina, 2013; Whiteley, 2000; Zak and 
Knack, 2001, and so on). In general, most empirical research, as far as I know, tends to hold that 
interpersonal trust has a significant positive influence on economic performance. Therefore, 
research on trust and trust-relevant topics gets both more important and more necessary in the areas 
of study for economics.  
Having recognized the importance of trust in socio-economic life, some issues centering on trust 
should be clarified, explored and explicated. This thesis is going to cover from theory to 
phenomenon, from empirical analysis to simulation, and is intended to present rich contents of both 
depth and interest. 
Issue 1 is theoretical, is about trust per se and some other social and realistic factors that are not 
separable from trust. With trust being the research object, we should first of all have a relatively 
comprehensive and deep understanding of trust. In terms of trust per se, what is its nature? What 
characteristics does trust have? What are the subtle differences between some common types of trust 
in economic research? How does trust get generalized from various experiences and transmitted into 
expectation? How can we measure trust? – These are questions about the basics of trust. How is 
trust at the individual (micro) level from the perspective of a trustor? How is the relation between 
trust and trustworthiness? What are the costs of untrustworthiness for individuals and society in 
general? How is the role as a trustor and a trustee distributed in an interaction relationship? How 
should we understand the supply and demand of the uncountable, abstract trust and trustworthiness? 
– These are questions about the two corresponding concepts of trust and trustworthiness. What 
socio-economic factors or processes are essential for the trust mechanism in socio-economic 
environment? How do they per se function? How are they connected to trust and trustworthiness to 
constitute a complex socio-economic system in which individual and social trust evolve? – These 
are questions about the essential factors pushing the evolution of trust systematically. To disclose 
here first, the “essential factors” are information, social learning, networks of interpersonal 
relationships, geographical mobility, institutions, etc. Then, in terms of economic transactions, a 
specific form of interpersonal interactions, what effects does (dis)trust have on them? – This is a 
question about the relation between trust and economy from a micro perspective.  
Issue 2 is comparison or contrast, is about the differences between China and three Scandinavian 
countries1 – Denmark, Norway and Sweden – in several socio-economic aspects, besides trust and 
economic performance. Scandinavian countries like Denmark, Sweden and Norway achieve a 
relatively balanced development between economy and society, and an outstanding socio-economic 
performance among the current global economies. They are not only high-income economies; as we 
 
1 In this thesis, we do not distinguish Scandinavian countries from Nordic countries too much since three countries 
that this thesis mainly focuses on – Denmark, Norway and Sweden – are both Nordic countries and Scandinavian 
countries. 
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see, they also rank top in areas, such as, happiness, general trust and innovation.1 Specifically, 
Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and mainland China rank the first, the second, the fifth, the 
tenth and the seventy-ninth respectively among 155 countries and regions in the World Happiness 
Report 2017 (Helliwell et al, 2017). Scandinavian countries maintain a high proportion of generally 
trusting people, despite the decline of social trust in many other countries. According to Stolle and 
Nishikawa (2011), developed economies, such as the United States, Australia, France and Britain, 
were actually experiencing a decline of social trust by the end of 1990s. The European Innovation 
Scoreboard 2017 shows that Sweden, Denmark and Finland, which are all Nordic countries, are the 
top 3 innovation leaders in the EU-282 (European Commission, 2017a). Given that the comparison 
or contrast between China and the three Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden – 
is of interest here, how do China and the three Scandinavian countries perform in trust and economy? 
Socio-economic aspects of population, network structures, welfare, equality, geographic mobility 
and social capital3 are associated, or maybe even have a causal relation, as claimed in some 
literature, with social trust. What is the possible logic between those aspects and trust? What are the 
differences between China and the three Scandinavian countries in these aspects? How do China 
and the three countries perform in real data, if data is available?  
Issue 3 is empirical, is about the determinants of general trust. What factors empirically matter for 
trust, especially for general trust? – This is a question with high value of policy implication. Via 
empirical analysis, we can draw a conclusion on the relative importance of different determinants 
of general trust. Obviously, through improving those factors conducive to trust, not only trust per 
se, but also the whole performance of a society, can be improved to some degree, which contributes 
to constructing a harmonious society. As to the determinants of general trust, we should first 
recognize that personal trust after all works on personal psychology and that a change of trust to a 
large extent attributes to external information received. Put another way, trust is a combination of 
internal perception and external information. Three aspects – norm-conforming, opinion similarity 
and geographical mobility – are chosen for empirical analysis using data of China. Then, will the 
three aspects generate an expected impact on general trust, ceteris paribus, taking China as an 
example? However, the impact of geographical mobility would probably be absorbed by the former 
two to some degree, since spatial mobility could work via others’ norm-conforming behavior and 
the degree of opinion similarity with others. In other words, the former two are nearer to trusting 
psychology.  
Issue 4 is about simulating some socio-economic mechanism between micro trust and 
trustworthiness and macro socio-economic performance. Trust may influence willingness to interact 
or re-interact and trustworthiness may affect whether to behave nicely (e.g., cooperate) in an actual 
interaction. However, trust may be fragile; it can not only be built, but also be destroyed, in 
interactions, as aforementioned, and usually the latter process is easier. Moreover, an interaction 
may involve several decisions, like whether to interact, which strategy to use, et cetera, and may 
also happen between neighbors on the personal social network or non-neighbors. Information plays 
a considerable role in the change of individual trust, also mentioned before, including that either 
 
1 Of course, as to whether subjective survey questions are comparable is still disputable. However, there are reasons 
for us to believe that this kind of comparison is not meaningless. 
2 EU-28 is short for “the 28 member countries of the European Union”. 
3 The relation between trust and social capital will be explicated in corresponding chapter. For now, we just put it 
aside temporarily. 
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from interactions, personal or non-personal, or from non-interaction channels. Then, given that we 
would not like to keep the whole process too unrealistically simple, how can we integrate those 
considerations into that process in simulation? What is more, what is the role of, such as, 
embeddedness in social network, mutation probability of payoff matrix, mutated payoff matrix, 
proportion of high trust agents and probabilities of information diffusion within neighborhood and 
that among non-neighbors in the process from micro trust and trustworthiness to macro performance?  
The aim of this thesis is to answer these questions. 
0.2 Structure of this thesis 
In order to explain and explore the questions above, the main body of this thesis (namely, excluding 
the introduction and conclusion chapter) is going to be separated into four Chapters, where Chapter 
1 is the theoretical part, Chapter 2 the international comparison part, Chapter 3 the empirical part, 
and Chapter 4 the simulation part.  
Chapter 1 “Thinking Trust Systemically in Socio-Economic Environment” aims at Issue 1. It first 
discusses some basics of trust (Section 1.1 – 1.3), including the nature, characteristics and 
classification of trust, the distinctions and relations between general trust and particular trust, trust 
in strangers and group trust, the forming and implemented mechanism of general trust and the two 
key aspects therein (namely, experiences and expectation), and different measurements of (general) 
trust. Then, Section 1.4 from two aspects, namely thoughts (Sub-section 1.4.1) and behavior (Sub-
section 1.4.2), illustrates a trustor’s mental process of the formation of sense of trust or trust attitude 
after information containing others’ trustworthiness arrives and his / her corresponding trusting 
behavior. Note that this is only from the angle of a trustor, rather than a trustee. Section 1.5 illustrates 
trust and trustworthiness simultaneously (Section 1.5.3 – Section 1.5.4) after explaining the relation 
between them (Section 1.5.1) and stressing trustworthiness (Section 1.5.2).  
Having elaborated on trust and trustworthiness per se, this chapter systematically explains the 
realistic trust mechanism and dissecting those essential, decisive factors pushing the functioning of 
the trust mechanism and therefore underpinning the change and coevolution of trust and 
trustworthiness. Those crucial factors driving the trust mechanism are information (Section 1.6), 
social learning (Section 1.6), networks (Section 1.6), geographical mobility (Section 1.7) and 
institutions (Section 1.8). Then, trust is put into a large, complex, dense and realistic system 
interwoven by the three kinds of networks, namely, institutional networks, causality networks and 
personal information networks, after they are expounded respectively. (Section 1.9) At last, several 
effects of (dis)trust on economic transactions are discussed in detail. (Section 1.10) 
Chapter 2 “Some Socio-Economic Aspects of China and Scandinavia” aims at Issue 2. It compares 
or presents some selected aspects of China and three Scandinavian countries (namely, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden) with data, including population composition, welfare and taxation policies, 
general trust and social capital.  
Chapter 3 “What Affect General Trust? Perspective from Norm-Conforming, Opinion Similarity 
and Geographic Mobility: Empirical Evidence from China” aims at Issue 3. It empirically explores 
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the impact of others’ norm-conforming behavior, others’ opinion and geographical mobility on 
individual general trust using micro data from Chinese General Social Survey 2013 and the 
provincial data from the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China. Ordered logit regression 
is the first choice for econometric analysis because the dependent variable is an ordinal categorical 
one. Before regression, simple and partial correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors are 
calculated to detect the degree of (multi)collinearity between and among the chosen independent 
variables. Because ordered logit models are based on the parallel odds assumption, Brant test (Brant, 
1990) is applied to see whether any independent variable violates the assumption. Then, partial 
proportional odds model will be turned to after violation of the assumption is found. 
Chapter 4 “Between Trust and Performance: An Information-driven Socio-Economic Mechanism 
on Directed Weighted Regular Ring with Agent-Based Modeling” aims at Issue 4. It explores the 
evolution of interaction and cooperation supported by individual changing trust and trustworthiness 
on directed weighted regular ring though agent-based modeling. This agent-based model integrates 
fragility of trust, interaction decision, strategy decision, payoff matrix decision, interaction density 
and information diffusion. Marginal rate of exploitation of original payoff matrix and relative 
exploitation degree between the original and mutated payoff matrices are stressed in trust updating; 
influence of observing is introduced via imagined strategy; a relationship is maintained through 
relationship maintenance strength. The impact of degree of embeddedness in social network, 
mutation probability of payoff matrix, mutated payoff matrix, proportion of high trust agents and 
probability of information diffusion within neighborhood and that among non-neighbors on the sum 
of number of actual interactions and cooperation of all agents are probed on the base of a baseline 
simulation, respectively.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the whole thesis. 
0.3 Methods applied 
0.3.1 Comparison analysis 
Comparison analysis is mainly applied in Chapter 2 where population composition, welfare and tax 
policies, social capital, general trust, etc. between China and Scandinavia (mainly taking Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden as examples) are compared, or presented. It is the comparison in data 
concerning some or all of the four countries that is mainly used, besides some comparison in policies. 
0.3.2 Empirical analysis 
Statistical analysis, including both descriptive statistics and statistical inference, with the latter 
involving parameter estimation and hypothesis testing, is mainly applied in Chapter 3 in which 
determinants of general trust are studied empirically. In that chapter, both correlation/association 
analysis and regression analysis are utilized, and as to regression analysis, an ordered logit model 
and a partial proportional odds model are adopted for the model fitting. 
Ordered logit models can be treated as, actually it is, an extension of binary logistic regression. The 
former pertains to ordered response models and the latter binary response index models, and both 
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binary and ordered response models belong to discrete response models. Discrete response models 
are classified into generalized linear models (GLMs). GLMs got this name because they are derived 
and extended from linear models.  
For ordinary linear models, the dependent variable should be continuous. However, the dependent 
variable of generalized linear models is not limited to continuous variables; it can be categorical. 
For example, the values of the dependent variable of binary logistic regression models can be either 
0 or 1, and that of ordered logit regression models can be more than two ordered categorical values. 
What they are actually regressed is probability. 
The reason why generalized linear models can estimate the parameters of a model with a categorical 
dependent variable is that they, based on ordinary linear models, transform the conditional mean of 
the dependent variable using link functions. If we treat ordinary linear models as a particular case 
of generalized linear models, ordinary linear models are actually generalized linear models with a 
link of identity function and an error function of normal distribution. Relative to ordinary linear 
models, generalized linear models generalize the link functions to exponential family, such as 
binomial distribution, poisson distribution, and so on, rather than being limited to Gaussian 
distribution. For example, the link function of both binary logistic regression and ordered logit 
regression is logit and their error function is binominal function.  
As we know, under the condition of Gausian-Markov, estimators from Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimation (OLS) are the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE). However, as generalized linear 
models, ordered response models do not apply to OLS to estimate parameters because, obviously, 
the dependent variable of ordered response models is discontinuous, which violates the OLS 
hypotheses. Therefore, ordered response models are usually estimated via Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE). However, the maximum likelihood estimators of ordered response models do 
not have a close-form solution. – That is why they require numerical methods, such as Newton-
Raphson, to obtain a numerical solution. In addition, more observations are needed for estimating 
parameters in MLE than OLS, generally speaking. – That is why they require a relatively large 
sample size. 
Ordered logit models are also called proportional odds models because they potentially assume that 
the explanatory variables have the same impact on each category of the dependent variable. This 
means that the coefficients of each explanatory variable for each category of the dependent variable 
are the same and that the fitted lines for each category of the dependent variable are parallel. – This 
is why this assumption is called proportional odds assumption or parallel-lines assumption. The 
parallel-lines assumption can be tested via, such as, Brant test (Brant, 1990). However, “the test […] 
always results in rejection of the proportional odds assumption […] particularly when the number 
of explanatory variables is large […], the sample size is large […] or there is a continuous 
explanatory variable in the model […]’” (Strand, Cadwallader and Firth, 2011, Model 5). 
Given that the dependent variable is an ordinal categorical variable and that the first regression 
model coming to our mind is ordered logit regression, when the parallel-lines assumption is proved 
to have been violated, four options are usually adopted: 1) Sticking to ordered logit regression; 2) 
Changing to multinomial logit regression; 3) Turning to binary logistic regression; 4) Switching to 
a partial proportional odds model or non-proportional odds model (see also, e.g., Williams, 2006). 
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However, they, especially the first three, also have concomitant disadvantages actually (for details, 
see Section 3.4.3). Therefore, often, we need to analyze and weigh the pros and cons in practice. As 
aforesaid, a partial proportional odds model will be turned to then. 
With the development of the computation capability of computers, there emerge some pieces of 
statistical software and languages, such as SAS, SPSS, Stata, and R. For example, R-package MASS 
(Venables and Ripley, 2002), ordinal (Christensen, 2015) and VGAM (Yee, 2017) can estimate 
ordered response models. This thesis, specifically, Chapter 3, will mainly use VGAM package for 
regression analysis. 
0.3.3 Agent-based modeling 
Agent-based modeling will be utilized in Chapter 4 where the mechanism between micro trust and 
macro socio-economic performance on a directed weighted regular ring is the research topic.  
Agent-based modeling (ABM), literally, is based on agents that are on the micro level and their 
behavior and interactions in order to investigate the behavior on the system level. Thus, it is a kind 
of micro modeling in essence. The constituent units of the system under investigation are called 
“agents” that are autonomous. The agents are not definitely individual human; they can even be 
firms, or other organizations. – The nature of agents depends on what system is under investigation. 
In a word, the micro- and macro-level are two relative concepts. Classic agent-based models include, 
but are not limited to, Conway’s Game of Life (Gardner, 1970), the Segregation Model (Schelling, 
1971), Computer Tournaments (Axelrod, 1984), the El Farol Problem (Arthur, 1994), Artificial 
Stock Market (Arthur et al, 1996) and Sugarscape (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). 
Agent-based modeling is not only “a powerful simulation modeling technique”, but also a mindset 
(Bonabeau, 2002, p. 7280). That is true. As aforesaid, ABM via studying the micro individuals 
studies the system-level phenomena. Thus, this kind of models is able to provide micro-foundations 
for those macro-level phenomena, which is conducive to understanding the micro-macro link from 
the bottom up. Hence, ABM is well-suited to the study of emerging phenomena. 
An obvious advantage of ABM, relative to homogenous representative agent models, lies in its 
powerfulness in modeling heterogeneity. In fact, modeling heterogeneity is ABM’s very 
characteristic. ABM dedicates itself to portraying the different characteristics and their endogenous 
change of every single agent, the constituent units of the system under investigation of ABM, which 
can to the largest degree model heterogeneity in principle. Why heterogeneity is stressed? The 
occurrence of real-world phenomena may not be separable from heterogeneity which may 
contribute to making non-equilibrium normal. Put another way, many phenomena may not even 
happen among homogenous agents. – This perhaps should be the very meaning and necessity of the 
heterogeneity argument for real-world economics.  
The causes and mechanisms behind a real-world phenomenon could be intricate. What results in 
this complexity may be partly due to the interdependence between humans in society, noticeably, in 
decision-making and behavior. Relational complexity further leads to the vulnerability of the whole 
system. 
As to the design principle of model construction, many people may be indecisive between KISS 
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(Keep it simple, stupid) and KIDS (Keep it descriptive, stupid). According to Bonabeau (2002, p. 
7287), “a model has to serve a purpose; a general-purpose model cannot work. The model has to be 
built at the right level of description, with just the right amount of detail to serve its purpose”. In 
addition, simulation, relative to deterministic methods, has both advantages and disadvantages. 
According to Elsner, Heinrich and Schwardt (2015),  
The fundamental difference from exhaustive deterministic analysis of the whole system 
is that simulation does not attempt to investigate any possible state, let alone the 
possible relations between the states of the system. Rather, for a finite set of valid states, 
the behavior is traced to establish a general idea of the resulting trends. (p. 228)  
Additionally, they also provide the procedure of computer simulation which basically contains 7 
steps (Elsner, Heinrich and Schwardt 2015, p. 230).  
Agent-based models are often implemented by means of computer simulation. Hence, in terms of 
techniques, agent-based models are pieces of code in essence. Agent-based simulation can be 
implemented either via specialized software, like NetLogo, or more general programming language, 
such as, C and Python (for more platforms for agent-based modeling, see, e.g., Gilbert and Bankes, 
2002; Gilbert, 2008; Nikolai and Madey, 2009). For example, the agents in an agent-based model 
could be instantiated using “class” of object-oriented programming language Python (for examples 
of ABM using Python class, see, e.g., Elsner, Heinrich and Schwardt, 2015, Chapter 9; Isaac, 2008). 
What is more, Python will be adopted for agent-based simulation in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Agent-based modeling is computation-intensive. As to applications to human society, it simulates, 
such as, the individual characteristics, decision-making, behavior, interactions, social network, et 
cetera of every single agent in the system under investigation over a period of, say, hundreds of 
time-steps, and then repeats the whole process for, say, hundreds of times. One can imagine how 
much the computational and memory requirement increase as the size of the system under 
investigation increases and the mechanism involved gets more complex. As Bonabeau (2002, p. 
7287) figures out, “Although computing power is still increasing at an impressive pace, the high 
computational requirements of ABM remain a problem when it comes to modeling large systems.” 
Therefore, given the whole mechanism, we often have to weigh the size of the system under 
investigation against the time spent and the limited memory. However, according to my personal 
experience, such problems can be relieved to some, or even a substantial, degree via, such as, 
adopting a more memory-saving data structure and more time-saving programming design and 
algorithm, given the hardware condition. Of course, there also exists a trade-off between time 
complexity and space complexity. 
As to specific mechanism design, especially in economics, agent-based models often combine, such 
as, (evolutionary) game theory and complex network theory. Specifically, network theory can be 
used to simulate the topological structure which could clearly differentiate neighbors from non-
neighbors, and game theory can be adopted to simulate interactions between agents and their results. 
As well, the mechanism design of the agent-based model in this thesis also involves elements of 
game theory and network theory. 
Moreover, one key point to remember about simulation results is that “one must not make decisions 
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on the basis of the quantitative outcome of a simulation that should be interpreted purely at the 
qualitative level” (Bonabeau, 2002, p. 7287).  
0.4 Expected contributions to scientific research 
First, this thesis, specifically, the first chapter, establishes a comprehensive theoretical system in 
which trust changes. Specifically, trust, especially its change, is based on the perception of 
trustworthiness. This applies to different types of trustworthiness and their corresponding types of 
trust. Information reflecting trustworthiness plays a decisive role in trust changing. Not conforming 
to institutions is an important embodiment of untrustworthiness, and is therefore a significant factor 
causing distrust. At the same time, trustworthiness per se is an important institution of which the 
development follows the general law of that of institutions. Information process and social learning 
process overlap to a substantial degree. Through social learning, behavior can directly be acquired 
(such as trustworthy behavior); social learning can also change thoughts (such as change cognition 
to social environments), and then guides conscious behavior (such as trusting behavior according to 
trustworthiness). Information functions through personal psychology eventually. Social networks 
are where information is acquired, social learning is going on, behavior is output and information is 
diffused subsequently. This thesis, especially Chapter 1, the theoretical part of this thesis, links the 
series of factors or theories of trust, information, social learning, networks (including social 
networks and other form of networks), institutions, etc. and covers from individual thoughts and 
behavior, to interactions, to networks, and to multi-networks, which therefore makes up for the 
theoretical shortcoming that there is not that considerate and comprehensive theoretical mechanism 
in the current trust research in the economic field to some degree.     
Second, this thesis, especially Chapter 1, dissects and extends beneficially every single theoretical 
element involved and puts forward my own points of view (maybe innovative or from a perspective 
different from existing research) when establishing the comprehensive, systematical socio-
economic theory of trust. For several examples, when talking about trust, some types of trust are 
distinguished and discussed in depth and detail; when it comes to social learning, some 
corresponding pairs of its types are proposed; when taking about interaction networks, the concept 
of “interaction platforms” (Elsner and Schwardt, 2014) is extended; when talking about the reasons 
why people would like to conform to institutions, several reasons are added to the currently stressed 
factors; when talking about institutions, changeability of relatively advantageous role is proposed; 
when talking about the origin and diffusion of institutions, population continuity in geography is 
stressed, and so on and so forth. They not only play a role in the realistic trust system restored in 
this thesis, but also contribute to corresponding independent research. Additionally, the detailed 
discussion may also inspire other researchers.  
Third, Chapter 2 – 4 of this thesis explore different issues using different methods which have their 
own contribution. Chapter 2 mainly talks about Scandinavia and / or China in aspects of population, 
network structures, welfare, equality, geographic mobility, social capital, trust and other socio-
economic performance. It explains the possible logic between some of those aspects and trust, and 
presents and / or illustrates rich corresponding, latest available data of each aspect of Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and China. As far as I know, there has not been such an all-sided comparison 
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between China and the three Scandinavian countries with relatively new realistic data. This 
contributes to the comprehensive understanding of the four countries in many socio-economic 
aspects. Chapter 3 quantitatively, empirically explores the impact of others’ institution-conforming 
behavior, others’ opinion and geographical mobility on individual general trust using data from 
China. These aspects, especially the first two, have an essential impact on general trust. Such a 
perspective of empirical research is different from existing research. Chapter 4 explores the 
evolution of interaction and cooperation supported by individuals’ changing trust and 
trustworthiness on directed weighted regular ring though a relatively new method or technique – 
agent-based modeling – in economic research. This agent-based model integrates many realistic 
factors elaborated on in Chapter 1, such as, fragility of trust, interaction decision, strategy decision, 
payoff matrix decision, interaction density and information diffusion, etc. The whole process of 
designing and implementing the agent-based model requires a lot of time and effort. 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
12 
 
Chapter 1:  Thinking Trust Systemically in 
Socio-Economic Environment 
1.1 Trust 
1.1.1 Describing trust 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “trust” can be used as a noun, a verb or an 
adjective (Trust, no date). Taking its noun form as an example, several definitive records from the 
online Oxford English Dictionary are selectively presented here. As a noun, “trust” can represent: 
a) “Firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something; confidence or faith in a 
person or thing, or in an attribute of a person or a thing”; b) “Confident expectation of something; 
hope”; or c) “Confidence in the intention or ability of a customer to pay at a future time for goods 
or services supplied without immediate payment” (Trust, n., 2015). 
Many scholars have given their understanding of trust. For example, Coleman (1990, Chapter 5) 
considers trust from the perspective that the trustor gives the right of making a decision to a trustee 
whose decision will influence not only the trustee himself, but also the trustor. La Porta et al (1997, 
p. 336) think that Putnam’s (1993) opinion about trust is that “trust is a habit formed during a 
centuries-long history of ‘horizontal networks of association’ between people, covering both 
commercial and civic activities.” Sabel (1993, p. 1133) thinks that trust is “the mutual confidence 
that no party to exchange will exploit the other’s vulnerability”. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994, 
pp. 131-132) regard trust as “expectation of goodwill and benign intent”, and think that it is “based 
on the inference of the interaction partner’s personal traits and intentions”. Hardin (1996, p. 28) 
treats trust as “an unmoralized notion”, and thinks that “where there is trust that is justified there are 
increased possibilities for beneficial experience and action.” Brien (1998, p. 398) thinks that trust 
“involves a recognition of one’s vulnerability to the actions and choices of the trustee” and “involves 
importantly retaining this vulnerability by not attempting to erect barriers to protect one’s interests”. 
Nooteboom (2002, p. 37) thinks that “trust is a disposition towards trusting behaviour”. Uslaner 
(2005, p. 76) states that trust “is a value expressing the belief that others are part of your moral 
community.” Delhey and Newton (2005, p. 311) treat trust “as the belief that others will not 
deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is 
possible.” Stolle and Nishikawa (2011, p. 283) argues that “trust is one of the most fundamental 
pro-social attitudes”. Sapienza and Zingales (2012, p.124) think that trust is “the expectation that 
another person (or institution) will perform actions that are beneficial, or at least not detrimental, to 
us regardless of our capacity to monitor those actions.” Additionally, Colesca (2009, p. 8) also 
provides a table of several selected definitions of trust from other scholars.  
As we know, rich definitions of trust have been provided by scholars. Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 
pp. 135-139) notice the three angles (or standpoints) of seeing trust summarized by Worchel (1979): 
Chapter 1: Thinking Trust Systemically in Socio-Economic Environment 
13 
 
a) personality theorists; b) social psychologists; c) and sociologists and economists. The first group 
views trust from the perspective of individual personality which is to a large degree shaped by a 
person’s psychosocial development in his / her early life experience; the second group views trust 
from the perspective of interpersonal transactions in which trust could be created and destroyed; the 
third group views trust as an institutional phenomenon which generalizes personal trust (Lewicki 
and Bunker, 1995, pp. 135-139).  
However, as to the nature of trust, it would be better to comprehensively consider all the three 
perspectives aforementioned. Or put another way, trust is both reflected on individual psychology 
and embedded in society. An obvious difference of the three perspectives is the size-base involved. 
More specifically, when personality is stressed, trust is mainly focused on an individual person; 
when social (or other forms of) interactions are stressed, trust is focused on two or more persons; 
when institutions are stressed, trust is basically focused on the whole society. What is more, trust is 
event-related, as suggested by Deutsch (1958, cited in Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, pp. 137-138). 
Thus, no matter how large the size related to trust involved, a possible way that trust changes is that: 
the external information flows (acquired both within and beyond personal social network) impacting 
trust, if these information flows do influence one’s trust, eventually reach the psychological level 
and are transformed as individual cognition, emotion, attitude, opinion and so on; further, the 
adjusted individual trust is mapped into other future events of interactions with different (potential) 
trustees. In a word, trust is inner / psychologically established and destroyed. – This is the aspect of 
trust from individual psychology.  
On the other hand, trust is “an unavoidable dimension of social interaction” (Gambetta, 1988a, p. 
x). The meaning of trust becomes obvious when embedded in society. One important aspect of 
understanding trust is its social nature. In this sense, trust is essentially a social phenomenon, “is 
fundamentally a social process” (Uzzi, 1997, p. 45), and a “systemic social reality” (Lewis and 
Weigert, 1985, p. 967). If roughly classifying two kinds of relationships – human and nature, and 
human and human – it can be seen that trust is definitely strongly attributed to relationships between 
human and human, which is the reason why trust is embedded, generated, changed and destroyed 
in society. Factors from social environment should not be neglected. Thus, trust is embedded in 
society, is embedded in networks of various relationships (of different strengths). 
In addition, facing the various definitions of trust, Bhattacharya, Devinney and Pillutla (1998) detect 
a worth-noting problem existing in trust research. They think that “the problem with most definitions 
of trust is the researcher’s desire to make the concept too precise. This is appropriate when a 
construct must be measured empirically, but it may unnecessarily strangle the conceptual richness 
of the fundamental phenomenon” (Bhattacharya, Devinney and Pillutla, 1998, p. 462), which I agree 
with. Thus, when we are reminded or stressing some notable features by the “definitions” of trust, 
we should keep in mind that trust is trust itself; it is not anything else. 
1.1.2 Characteristics of trust 
(i) Conditional on trustworthiness 
The precondition of trust here mainly refers to perceived trustworthiness, or at least unperceived 
untrustworthiness. Just as what Nooteboom (2002, p. 38) argues, “It is very unusual, often a 
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pathology, to trust or mistrust indiscriminately.” Trustworthiness here can be either particular or 
overall; which one it is depends on which kind of trust it corresponds to. It is not only the true 
trustworthiness that conditions trust, but also how a person assesses trustworthiness. As will be 
explained more later, whether or not a person will trust depends largely on what (s)he thinks about 
the trustworthiness of others. A little more broadly speaking, one may tend to trust if there is no 
suspicious indication of untrustworthiness which causes distrust, which also implies that 
untrustworthiness is perceived by a trusting subject more obviously when (s)he distrusts. 
Think in an inverse way. If trust were not conditional, then feedback loop would not exist, and 
individual trust level would not change and would be constant forever independent of any externally 
reaching information, happenings, events, etc. This feature of trust reflects the adaptation of human 
beings to social environmental backgrounds. A person not adjusting his / her attitudes and “strategies” 
according to surrounding environments would probably get stuck in difficulties, troubles, risks, 
psychological pains, or even cannot normally live.  
(ii) Relying heavily on information 
As mentioned above, trust is conditional on trustworthiness. What is more, judgments of 
trustworthiness heavily rely on external information reflecting others’ trustworthiness, including 
that from personal interactions and that from interactions of others acquired via, such as, directly 
observing, word by mouth, watching news reports, etc., either about (a) particular other(s) or about 
disapproved behavioral phenomena (e.g., telecommunication fraud) existing in society. Information 
reflecting trustworthiness tends to increase trust, while information indicating untrustworthiness 
tends to decrease trust, given that information does have acted on the psychological level. Although 
the interpretation of external information about others’ trustworthiness may be kind of biased, the 
basic trend of trust and that of trustworthiness usually coincide. People may to different degrees 
react to (un)trustworthiness. 
The process of accumulating information about indications of (un)trustworthiness is one of 
continuously experiencing and learning. Most of the time, the construction of trust is event-driven. 
Imagine a situation: a meat-product processing company sells meat products processed with stale 
meat and then this scandal is exposed by mass media. Another example, when a kind of 
telecommunication fraud is exposed in social media, people would keep a wary eye on similar things 
they encounter. These events manifest the untrustworthiness existing in society and make people’s 
trust decline or make people unwilling to trust. The event-driven explanation applies to not only 
economic exchanges, but also social interactions.  
After external information arrives, people may also further process that information mentally, such 
as by virtue of association etc. Furthermore, all the information possibly reflecting others’ 
trustworthiness will be carried into further decisions involved in a future interaction. Put another 
way, decisions involved in a future interaction have a large bearing on the amount of one’s 
accumulated and possessed information about trustworthiness (for specific decisions that may be 
involved in an interaction, see, Section 1.4.2).  
(iii) Risk-relevance of ex ante trust in future personal interactions 
Many scholars have pointed out or implied that trust is risk-relevant. For example, both Mayer, 
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Davis and Schoorman (1995) and Rousseau et al (1998) figure out that trust causes vulnerability of 
the trustors to the actions of the trustees. Slovic (1993, pp. 675-676) also thinks that the pervasion 
of distrust is “strongly linked to risk perception”. Importantly, we should realize that when talking 
about risk-relevance, it actually implies risk involved in ex ante trust in future personal interactions, 
rather than in ex post trust or in non-personal interactions in which situations individual trust has 
probably been adjusted accordingly. First, interactions happened (personally experienced or 
observed) have already become deterministic, certain and unchangeable facts irrelevant to 
probabilistic issues or uncertainty. Second, direct risk of trusting behavior only exists and is of 
realistic meaning in future personal interactions that have not happened yet since not all phenomena 
involving trusting-trusted relationship would incur actual vulnerability. For example, when a person 
is watching a (living) judgment on TV in which (s)he has no personal relationship with, and (s)he 
doesn’t trust the confession of the plaintiff or the defendant. In this situation, the trusting-trusted 
relationship between the person who is watching TV and the plaintiff or the defendant involves no 
essential vulnerability.   
When it comes to the risk-relevance of trust, it typically involves uncertainty in future, asymmetry 
of information, and variability and diversity of human thoughts and behavior and so on. Hence, one 
cannot guarantee that everything, even in a local sense, has gone and will go in the way (s)he expects, 
nor can one guarantee nothing unexpected will happen. However, whether ex ante trust is risky 
depends on possessed information or knowledge about others’ trustworthiness and the qualitative 
coincidence of the perceived trustworthiness and the actual trustworthiness. Specifically, if 
possessed information to infer the degree of trustworthiness is enough to determine the quality of 
the trustee, either trustworthy or untrustworthy, and a right judgment is made, trust is almost not 
risky at all; only when information is not enough or a judgment is wrong is trust risky in essence.  
(iv) Slow to establish, fast to decline, and hard to rebuild 
As many of us have probably already perceived, it is slow for trust to establish, but fast to decline 
and hard to rebuild. First, establishing trust needs a successive process of information cumulation 
of some certain degree. If no unbearable untrustworthiness happens, trust will naturally establish. 
However, trust tends to swiftly react to trust-damaging behavior. Facing unbearable 
untrustworthiness, previous positive trusting attitude could quickly change to very negative. No 
wonder that Slovic (1993, p. 677) ever said that trust is “typically created rather slowly, but it can 
be destroyed in an instant by a single mishap or mistake.” Even worse, trust rebuilding can be even 
harder than trust establishing since previous unpleasant experiences etc. of untrustworthiness could 
have decreased trust to an ice point. It is no exaggeration to say that in the most extreme situation, 
it is even impossible for trust to rebuild. 
Untrustworthiness in interpersonal interactions usually contains trustees’ deliberate deception. Swift 
reaction to untrustworthiness to a large degree derives from the involved malevolence which people 
certainly cannot bear and are emotionally resistant, besides the material loss and possible directly 
corresponding mental loss, making people more averse to untrustworthy behavior. In a word, 
untrustworthiness per se is repulsive. No doubt that the intention behind others’ behavior has an 
especially important influence on the psychology of trustors. Trustors will generate corresponding 
emotions according to others’ intention. – This is also partly, if not completely, explained why there 
are seemingly irrational choices neglecting possible interests to trust.   
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Trust-rebuilding is difficult. The term “trust-rebuilding” per se implies that trust has ever been 
destroyed. That is, there has been negative information about trustworthiness, namely information 
reflecting untrustworthiness, leading to distrust. Put another way, negative trust making people tend 
to keep away from the relevant and possible untrustworthy actors. These memories of previous 
untrustworthiness and the current feeling, attitude and emotion when recollecting them will lead to 
emotional resistance. The starting point of trust-rebuilding is negative trust, while its aim is positive 
trust. – This fact per se reflects the difficulty faced trust-rebuilding. An absolutely necessary 
condition of trust-rebuilding is to substantially improve the corresponding aspects causing distrust. 
After trust is damaged, trust will not be rebuilt without indications to improve trustworthiness or 
actual actions or achievements of improving trustworthiness. Not to mention that there are people 
who would rather not trust the previous untrustworthy actors any more, in spite of the indications 
of the improvement of their trustworthiness, and not obtain the so-called possible potential interests 
because they may not treat them as valuable at all and, in addition, whether it will turn out to be 
interests is not certain yet. This situation per se reduces the number of trusting people. Moreover, 
after trust is improved, maybe it is not those who are hurt by untrustworthiness who trust, but those 
who have not or not much been influenced by untrustworthiness. In this sense, trust is not re-built.   
1.1.3 Types of trust 
According to whether the subject and / or object in a trust relationship is a human / humans, there 
could be four different situations, namely, both the subject and the object are a human / humans, 
either the subject or the object is a human / humans, and both the subject and the object are not a 
human / humans, leaving alone the possible issue whether non-humans do have trust and / or 
whether some people would treat some behavior of non-humans as trust since it is irrelevant and 
unimportant to this thesis. In most contexts, if not all, when people are talking about trust, the subject 
is always a human / humans. Given that the subject in a trust relationship is a human / humans, 
people may talk about trust in another person / other persons or something (non-human objects). 
However, I would like to figure it out first that trust talked about in this thesis is always interpersonal 
trust, unless explicitly specified, which means that both the subject and the object in a trust 
relationship are human-oriented. It should be noted that some scholars, e.g. Roth (2009), may treat 
interpersonal trust and general trust (a type / form of trust that will be introduced and discussed later) 
the same. But obviously I am not using interpersonal trust in that way. As said, I refer to trust among 
/ between humans as interpersonal trust, or just trust. Now, let’s have a look at how other scholars 
distinguish different types of trust. 
Williamson (1993) categorizes trust into calculative trust, meaning that the trustor’s entrusting the 
trustee depending on an expected utility calculation, and personal trust, meaning that the trustor 
thinks the decision of trusting the trustee is correct.  
Lewis and Weigert (1985) argue that an adequate conceptual analysis of trust requires recognition 
of its cognitive, emotional and behavioral dimension. Inspired by the first two dimensions of trust 
proposed by Lewis and Weigert (1985), McAllister (1995, p. 25) stresses two principal forms of 
interpersonal trust, one is cognition-based trust which is “grounded in individual beliefs about peer 
reliability and dependability”, and the other is affect-based trust which is “grounded in reciprocated 
interpersonal care and concern”.  
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Putnam (2000, pp. 136-137) distinguishes two kinds of interpersonal trust, namely thick trust and 
thin trust. Therein, thick trust is “embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent, and nested 
in wider networks” (Putnam, 2000, p. 136), while thin trust, a paraphrase of Rahn and Transue (1998) 
by Putnam (2000, p. 136), “can be viewed as a ‘standing decision’ to give most people – even those 
whom one does not know from direct experience – the benefit of the doubt”. In Putnam’s (2000, p. 
136) view, thin trust, social trust and generalized trust are synonymous. Thick trust relates more to 
personal experience, while thin trust does more with social community norms (Putnam, 2000, p. 
136). At the same time, he also reminds readers not to confuse social trust with political or 
institutional trust which are trust to government or other social institutions (Putnam, 2000, p. 137).  
Uslaner (2002, Chapter 2) distinguishes between strategic trust and moralistic trust, as well as 
between particularized trust and generalized trust. He thinks that moralistic trust is “trust in people 
whom we don’t know and who are likely to be different from ourselves” (Uslaner, 2002, p. 15). We 
can see that in his view, at least in basis and stability, moralistic trust and strategic trust are different. 
In terms of basis, moralistic trust is based on shared fundamental moral values, and moreover, one’s 
own general worldview is more important than how others treat him / her in shaping moral trust; by 
contrast, strategic trust is based on knowledge, on personal experiences, and it involves personal 
trust decision presupposing risk (Uslaner, 2002, pp. 16-18). In terms of stability, moralistic trust is 
quite stable, but is “more difficult to build than to destroy”, while strategic trust is fragile, and 
develops slowly (Uslaner, 2002, pp. 24-25).  
Generalized trust, according to Uslaner (2002, pp. 26, 28), is “the perception that most people are 
part of your moral community”, while particularized trust is “faith […] in our own kind” and “uses 
group categories to classify people as members of in-groups or out-groups”. Thus, the criterion for 
distinguishing generalized trust from particularized trust lies in the inclusiveness of one’s moral 
community (Uslaner, 2002, pp. 26-27). Besides, generalized trust is based on “both morals and our 
collective experiences”, namely moralistic trust, while particularized trust relies on trusters’ 
personal “experiences (strategic trust) or stereotypes” (Uslaner, 2002, pp. 26-27). Even so, 
generalized trust and moralistic trust are different things (Uslaner, 2002, p. 26).  
Leigh (2006, p. 268) also distinguishes two types of trust from the perspective of empirical research, 
that is, localized trust, which is “trust in those who live in the same neighbourhood”, and generalized 
trust, which is “trust in those who live in the same country”.  
Elsner and Schwardt (2015) distinguish between contextual trust and general trust. The two 
conceptions in their paper are based on what they call “interaction arenas” and “‘meso’-sized 
platforms” which are in essence sub-populations and their overlap. (Elsner and Schwardt, 2015) 
Contingent cooperation in particular interaction arenas provides “foundation for the emergence of 
contextual trust in that particular arena” (Elsner and Schwardt, 2015, p. 78). Different from 
contextual trust which is fostered in specific single arenas, “general trust is the transfer of this 
[contextual trust] to new, unknown arenas” (Elsner and Schwardt, 2015, p.78).  
Since generalized trust, as well as its comparison with particularized trust, has caught much attention 
in both theoretical and empirical research, further discussion about them will be made later sections 
(see, Section 1.2). 
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Below provides another three ways of categorizing trust which will play an important role in the 
formal modeling of a later chapter of this thesis (specifically, Chapter 4). First, according to the 
sequence of trust and a particular trust-influencing event (e.g., a particular interaction or a particular 
observation of others’ interaction), trust can be categorized as ex ante trust and ex post trust. Ex ante 
trust is trust before a particular trust-influencing event happens, and ex post trust is trust adjusted 
taking into account of the influence of an event. This kind of categorization mainly focuses on the 
change of trust before and after a trust-influencing event and therefore is from a dynamic perspective. 
Second, according to the way of acquiring trust-influencing information, trust can be categorized as 
personal-interaction-driven trust and observation-driven trust. If a change of trust is driven by 
information about others’ trustworthiness acquired from personal interactions, it is interaction-
information-driven trust; if it is driven by information acquired from non-personal interactions of 
others (such as, direct observation, from mass media, etc.), this is observation-driven trust. This kind 
of categorization concentrates on the difference of direct and indirect experiences which involves 
different costs and prices of information acquisition. Third, as always mentioned throughout the 
thesis, trust is based on information about others’ trustworthiness, which we can call information-
based trust. However, it is possible that some people’s trust, for something, some other people or 
general others, is mainly based on their belief of trustworthiness, which we can call belief-based 
trust. This kind of trust is relatively firm, and has relatively strong capacity to withstand negative 
information of trustworthiness. In addition, belief-based trust could also happen in the relatively 
stable stage of trust. It is not difficult to realize that the first two categorizations are both 
information-based. Additionally, the general trust talked in the thesis is information-based, rather 
than belief-based, if not specified (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 Types of trust. 
Trust
Information-based trust
Ex ante trust vs. ex post 
trust
Interaction-information-
driven trust vs. 
observation-information-
driven trust
Belief-based trust
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1.2 On generalized trust 
1.2.1 Generalized trust and particularized trust, and trust in strangers: 
a revision of understanding 
Generalized trust may be used in different “names” in different research, such as social trust (e.g., 
Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011), general trust (e.g., Elsner and Schwardt, 2014), and generalized trust. 
Basically, this thesis also treats the three terms as interchangeable. Similarly, particularized trust and 
particular trust are also treated as synonymous in this thesis. If viewed from the perspective of an 
individual in an interaction context, general trust can be treated as a person’s trust in the next and 
unspecified person whom (s)he will meet and interact with.  
General trust, as a specific type of trust, is often explained in contrast with another type of trust, 
making their meaning clearer. Besides the viewpoints of Uslaner (2002) mentioned above (see, 
Section 1.1.3), other scholars also give their understanding and / or explanation of generalized trust. 
Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994, p. 139) consider general trust, by contrasting it with knowledge-
based trust in their paper, as a positive “cognitive bias in the evaluation of (potential) partners” in 
the situation of imperfect information and “a belief in the benevolence of human nature in general 
and […] not limited to particular objects”. Besides, a widely accepted difference between general 
trust and particular trust is distinguished according to whether involving trust in strangers. For 
example, Delhey and Newton (2005, p. 324) think that “generalized trust is trust in people we may 
not know and who may not be like us”, while “particular trust is trust in people we know, or who 
are like us”. Additionally, some scholars merely limit general trust to trust in strangers. However, 
this way of distinguishing general trust from particular trust hinged on the attitude towards strangers 
seems not to touch the essence of these two concepts. Although general trust may involve trust in 
strangers, trust in strangers is not the criterion of general trust.  
Particularized trust vs. generalized trust and trust in familiars vs. trust in strangers are two different 
perspectives of classification. The key to distinguish generalized trust from particularized trust is 
whether the object of trust is specified. If the object of trust is specified, it is particularized trust; 
otherwise, it is generalized trust. The two terms do not together separate a certain scope of 
population into different sub-sets. By contrast, trust in strangers and trust in non-strangers (including 
trust in familiars) do. The reason why generalized trust and trust in strangers are often bound 
together could be attributed to the standard question of generalized trust in surveys (see, Section 
1.3.1) and the overwhelming quantity advantage of strangers in real life.  
Figure 1.2 presents a possible relation of generalized trust and trust in strangers based on five 
hypotheses: 1) The underlining scope of consideration is the total population of a society; 2) a person 
answers “Yes” to the question “Generally speaking, do you think most people can be trusted?”; 3) 
(s)he belongs to the total population under consideration, such as a country; 4) (s)he only has 
familiars and strangers, namely no other category other than familiars and strangers; 5) the 
population size, even not definitely specified, is a lot larger than the size of one’s familiars. In that 
figure, the dots in the square represent people; within the circle are one’s familiars, and beyond are 
his / her strangers; the slash separates the total population under consideration into those one trusts 
and those one does not, with its upper left representing those one trusts and its lower right those one 
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does not. Actually, there could be four possible situations: 1) the circle is in the trusted area, (the 
upper-left area of the slash); 2) more than a half circle is in the trusted area; 3) more than half a 
circle is in the distrusted area (the lower-right area of the slash); 4) the circle is in the distrusted area. 
It is the second situation that Figure 1.2 shows. In all the first three situations, generalized trust and 
trust in strangers do not coincide. Only in the fourth situation, they get the same answer. Objects of 
particular trust vs. general trust and trust in familiars vs. trust in strangers might overlap to some 
extent. In this sense, both general trust and particular trust may involve strong ties and weak ties. 
Moreover, when the scope of general trust is not all the people in a country, general trust and trust 
in strangers are more different. This is only the situation where it is supposed that the trusted most 
people can be figured out. Actually, the whole impression of general trust always forms without 
considering every single person in a population. As will be said, it is the overall impression like a 
process of sampling. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 A possible relation of generalized trust and trust in strangers. 
As said above, the key criterion for distinguishing between generalized trust and particularized trust 
is whether the object of trust is specified. This is determined by the implication of the two words, 
“generalized” and “particularized”. When explaining their distinct grammar, Uslaner (2002, pp. 27-
28) says that the grammar of generalized trust is “A trusts”, while that of particular trust is “A trusts 
B”, which I think is a both accurate and straightaway explanation. In this sense, group trust is also 
particularized trust since the object of trust is specified. Uslaner (2002, p. 28) also holds a similar 
view that group trust which classifies “people as members of in-groups or out-groups” is 
particularized trust. A typical characteristic of group trust is that some obvious common traits, such 
as geographical area, occupation, membership etc., of a certain scope of people have been labeled 
to those people, and those people are referred to as a whole. A common point of particular trust to a 
person and that to a group is that they both seem to be influenced by reputation which we can call 
personal reputation and group reputation, respectively. By contrast, generalized trust does not 
classify people. It blurs the boundary of possible classifications, the particulars, among people and 
consider them as a whole. In a word, it is a whole, comprehensive attitude, impression or assessment 
of the perceived trustworthiness of one’s own society where (s)he and many other people live 
together, not considering it as a belief.  
In addition, whether trust in strangers can be classified into group trust is somehow subtle, given 
the word “strangers” in the “trust in strangers” is a general reference. On one hand, strangers, in any 
scope, form a set or group all the people of which one does not know. In this sense, trust in strangers 
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resembles a group, particularized concept more since strangers as the trust object is specified. 
However, on the other hand, strangers treated as a group is different from what we usually call a 
group because this “group” does not have an obvious common characteristic, despite the fact that 
they are all people whom one does not know. It should also be noted that the preconception and the 
fact that untrustworthy behavior tends to be from strangers greatly affects one’s judgment of trust 
in strangers. 
Trust in strangers and whether generalized trust involves trust in strangers are two different questions. 
– This is a very important point. Trust in strangers as a type of trust is somehow particularized. But 
generalized trust almost, if not totally, definitively involves trust in those who are unspecified 
strangers, which is the connotation that the phrase, generalized trust, conveys to us. The two 
statements do not contradict and this is how strangers relate to generalized trust. The reason why 
the two terms are always bound together is that most people in the society are definitely strangers. 
However, it should be noted that “most people” here and that in the standard survey question of 
general trust – “Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted” – do not refer to the 
same range of people (as shown in Figure 1.2). 
As an overall estimation of trustworthiness of general others, one’s general trust does not have to be 
based on actually having dealt with most people within some scope. As we can guess, when one 
tells his / her general trust, it is probably not a judgment after having dealt with exactly most people 
since general trust refers to a very large scope, such as the population in a country. Thus, samples 
and the population should be well distinguished. In this sense, a person’s general trust is essentially 
a rough statistic no matter whether his / her sample (i.e., various pieces of information that one 
knows in society reflecting trustworthiness, including person-particular ones) is representative in a 
statistical sense. It could draw a wrong conclusion when statistical results are used to speculate the 
corresponding individual characteristic. Therefore, particular trustworthiness can contribute to the 
sample size of the estimation of general trustworthiness and general trust, but cannot be used to 
speculate particular trustworthiness. 
1.2.2 Group trust and generalized trust 
As said before, when talking about trust to a particular group, group trust is particular; but given the 
considered groups are all within the scope about which one would tell his / her general trust, when 
it comes to trust to a sufficient number of groups in different areas, all these group trust combined 
in some way may convey information like general trust to some degree since many more people are 
involved in, and after all, the person who tells different kinds of trust live together in the society 
with those groups which are parts of the general others. However, extracting information from 
various particular groups, as well as mass particular individuals, is not indispensable for one to tell 
his / her generalized trust. Image you are being asked the question about general trust now. You can 
also immediately choose an answer, probably without having actually dealt with most people in 
your country. In addition, it is also reasonable to some degree to view trust in a particular group as 
the general trust of the group. However, it should be noted that usually a group in group trust is a 
lot smaller in size than the scope of general trust, even when no definite scope (e.g. the country one 
lives in) is specified for general trust. What is more, usually, group trust does not include the person 
him / herself who gives a judgment, while general trust does. If a person of a country tells his / her 
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trust to people of another country, it is also group trust, rather than general trust. 
Group trust is closely related to group reputation or group stigma, and, furthermore, negative 
remarks are always related to stigma. Group stigma can be regarded as a kind of negative group 
reputation, it is a kind of prejudice, negative remarks, stereotype etc. Goffman ([1963] 1986, p. 3) 
uses stigma to “refer to an attribute that is deeply discrediting.” Goffman ([1963] 1986, p. 4) stresses 
three types of stigma, they are respectively “abominations of the body”, “blemishes of individual 
character”, and “tribal stigma”. However, Goffman ([1963] 1986, p. 3) figures out that only the 
undesirable attributes “which are incongruous with our stereotype of what a given type of individual 
should be” at issue. “A stigma, […] is […] a special kind of relationship between attribute and 
stereotype” (Goffman, [1963] 1986, p. 4). “The issue of stigma” only arises “where there is some 
expectation on all sides that those in a given category should not only support a particular norm but 
also realize it” (Goffman, [1963] 1986, p. 6). Obviously, negative impressions or remarks in group 
trust are related to Goffman’s ([1963] 1986) third type of stigma. Certainly, groups can be to some 
degree related to interaction platforms which will be discussed in more detail later (for interaction 
platforms, see Section 1.6.8). 
Information of trustworthiness of a specific group1 can be first-hand or non-first-hand information, 
and first-hand information, good or bad, of a group is acquired through actual interactions with 
people of that group. Suppose a person who is expressing his / her group trust in some group has 
his / her own group (say, group A) which is different from the group (say, group B) on which (s)he 
gives his / her opinions, and interactions are through a face-to-face way, rather than 
telecommunications. Then, there are three situations in which people of two groups can interact and 
people in one group can acquire first-hand information of trustworthiness about the other one: First, 
some people from group A go to group B and bring their impressions back to group A; Second, 
people of group B go to group A, and people of group A form some view of group B; Third, people 
of both the two groups go to a third place where they interact and people of group A form their 
opinions on people of group B. 
Then, people from group A who have interacted with people in group B carry the first-hand 
information about the trustworthiness of group B, and could bring it to other people in their group 
(group A), via personal interactions or media. The other people in group A who have never interacted 
with people of group B then get second-hand, more accurately, non-first hand, information from 
those who have in group A. Since what is going to be elaborated on is group trust of one group in 
another, diffusion of first-hand information within the information receivers’ own group, rather than 
in a third group, is focused on. Both how many people in group A have first-hand information about 
group B and its proportion may affect the views of receivers of second-hand information in group 
A on group B and the specific process of information diffusion. For an extreme example, suppose 
there is only one person has interacted with people in group B and his / her genuine impressions, 
 
1 Note that “trustworthiness of a specific group” here does not imply a collective behavior of that group reflecting 
trustworthiness, as can be seen in the subsequent contents. In fact, collective behavior of a group is not what is 
considered here, although it may also provide evidence for the evaluation of trustworthiness of that group. Same 
with general trust, the general impression of the trustworthiness of a specific group can also form by acquiring 
corresponding information (such as, via personal interactions) of the trustworthiness of not all individual persons in 
that group, which can be viewed as a sampling process and from which some similarity can be drawn, although the 
impression formed in this way could be biased. In a word, what is talking about in the section is not collective 
behavior of a group.  
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which could be a misunderstanding, on group B gets diffused in group A without exaggeration. It is 
not hard to imagine that all receivers of second-hand information will have the same information, 
given that there is no information distortion in the course of information diffusion. By contrast, 
when there are many people in group A who have interacted with people in group B before and 
therefore many have first-hand information, there could be two common situations: First, when one 
person with first-hand information is the first to express his / her opinions on group B, others in 
group A who also have first-hand information and similar opinions may be stimulated to follow-up 
to tell their similar experiences and views. In this case, receivers of second-hand information in 
group A may also tend to have a similar preconception. Second, different people express different 
opinions which usually turn out to be two almost opposite ones. In this case, receivers of second-
hand information in group A may get both the two views and decide which one to follow etc. 
It should be noted that after first-hand information is brought back from group B to group A, even 
when there is no intentional distortion, it is still possible that there is misunderstanding of the 
intentions and purposes of some behavior of the people in group B, especially when there is no 
sufficient understanding of local language, cultural background and other “tacit” knowledge within 
group B which cannot be directly inferred from presented behavior.  
1.2.3 Formation and implementation of general trust 
(i) From particular to general: experiences-oriented formation 
What one knows about the past may all affect his / her personal trust level to some extent. An 
underlined point here is experiences. A person not only has his / her personal practical experiences, 
but can also know something about others’ experiences; (s)he can not only know some experiences 
of his / her contemporaries, but also experiences of earlier generations via verbal communication, 
literal records, videos, etc. which transmit “habits of thought”. As admitted, traditions are 
transmitted from the distant past. A typical example of shared experiences is collective memory. It 
is admitted that no two persons have exactly the same life experiences, which leads different human 
individuals to have different habits of thought, and further, habits of behavior. Denzau and North 
(1994, p. 14) argue that, “the entire structure of the mental models is derived from the experiences 
of each individual - experiences that are specific to the local physical environment and the socio-
cultural linguistic environment.” Apart from the absolute differences of personal experiences, 
similar experiences or collective memory may push the generation of similar viewpoints.  
Trust is not a specific case of general trust; on the contrary, general trust is a specific case of trust. 
From an individual perspective, the generalizing process of trust can be treated as an inferred result 
from a sample of population to the whole population. Elsner and Schwardt (2014) provide a positive 
explanation of how trust gets generalized. They argue that the semi-conscious habituation of 
institutionalized cooperative behavior is “a pre-condition for […] a generalized trustworthiness to 
facilitate elevated levels of general trust” (Elsner and Schwardt, 2014, p. 124). They propose that 
general trust derives from “repeatedly experienced cooperative behavior” which constructs the 
foundation for contextual trust “in a habitual cooperative behavior pattern” (Elsner and Schwardt, 
2014, p. 124). Also, in a process of habituation, general trust develops from contextual trust in 
several meso-sized, maybe overlapping, arenas and platforms (Elsner and Schwardt, 2014). From 
what they analyze, it can also be seen that evidences of trustworthiness are marginally collected, 
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although general trust in their paper (Elsner and Schwardt, 2014) is not from an individual 
perspective. The evidences of trustworthiness are considered as representatives of a person’s 
inferred reality and construct his / her level of general trust.   
Therefore, the process of the generalization of trust is to a large extent experience-oriented, or 
backward-looking. After every trust-related event happens, it is marginally added into our mind. All 
the trust-related events happened so far, which happen before the current time point, construct the 
“raw materials” of an individual’s comprehensive assessment on something although we may not 
remember every detail. In our minds, we may via various mechanisms, such as classifying the events, 
“tidy” different events. Different events may also have different weights in its final impact on an 
individual’s trust attitude. Weights could be influenced by when those events happened, memory, 
what are valued, channels of information acquisition, psychological influences of those events, and 
so on. However, humans are not mechanically response to outer stimuli. We may have our own 
additional opinions, some further considerations, profound insights and rich imagination and 
association. 
General trust more or less can be considered as a kind of general and overall attitude toward a 
concept covering a relatively large range of persons, things, events or phenomena, rather than a 
particular object. Although the trust-related things probably come one by one, the roles of them like 
the samples which an individual can use to refer to his / her surroundings and form his / her general 
trust, maybe within boundaries. Why “maybe within boundaries”? For example, we have an overall 
impression on the social environment and generate general trust; we may also have general trust 
about an industry in which situation it is not appropriate to be applied to a single firm; we may also 
have general trust about a firm in which situation it is not appropriate to be applied to a single staff 
or whoever in that firm. All in all, general and particular are two relative concepts whose 
applicability depends on specific situations. Additionally, the attitude finally formed by an 
individual is not definitely reflects the reality, even in an approximate sense. It can also even be the 
total opposite to the reality. Different people may make different judgments on general 
trustworthiness because of different experiences and beliefs on humanity. The key point is the 
information possessed. Lack of key information could even result in a qualitatively opposite 
conclusion.   
(ii) From general to particular: expectation-oriented implementation  
If the process of the generalization of trust is backward-looking, experience-oriented, then the output 
of general trust is forward-looking, expectation-oriented. This general trust functions in a particular 
way in future time points. Specifically, as described above, various information outside comes into 
our brain and get filtered, classified and interpreted in our mind, then we comprehensively construct 
a general attitude of trust. When an actual action / interaction occurs, this general attitude of trust 
always manifests on a particular person, or different parties involved in a particular event, etc. For 
example, a person for particular times before gets information about existing problems about food 
service industry published via, such as, mass media or the Internet. Similar events happen 
subsequently. Then (s)he may form an overall impression about the trustworthiness of the whole 
food service industry. Further, when (s)he currently needs to make a decision on buying food, what 
his / her general trust affects is actually this future particular interaction. Another example, if one 
does not trust others in general, (s)he will tend to exude or betray his / her distrust to the particular 
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interactor in particular future interactions.  
It should be noticed that it is not comprehensive to consider trust (of all kinds) only to be related to 
the past or the future. Trust is a string sewing the past, the present and the future alone the time axis. 
Memory connects the past to the present, and imagination and expectation connect the future to the 
present. 
In summary, trust can be general; however, when really functioning, it is probably reflected in a 
particular way. That is, one can have a general attitude towards a collective, but his / her attitude is 
particularly implemented when transferred into specific interactions. Figure 1.3 presents the 
formation and implementation of general trust. 
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Figure 1.3 Formation and implementation of general trust. 
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1.2.4 Experience and expectation 
Experience and expectation are relative and dynamically change as time goes by. Treating “now” as 
the separation point, experience is about what is before now, while expectation, on contrast, is about 
future, about what is after now. An event on some future time point about which some expectation 
is made becomes the past and experience after that time point passes by. Future has uncertainty. 
However, after being experienced, uncertainty will turn into established facts and certainty. (See 
Figure 1.4) In a word, time will eventually change all expectation into experience gradually.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Figure 1.4 Experience and expectation. 
It should be noted that consistency of expectation and a later fact is not definitely going to increase 
trust. The impact of consistency of expectation and a later fact on trust also depends on whether the 
expected thing is desirable or undesirable. Then, there generate four specific situations: First, when 
the expected thing is desirable and the later fact confirm the expectation, it is conducive for trust to 
increase. Second, when the expected thing is desirable but the later fact refutes the expectation, it is 
disadvantageous for trust. Third, when the expected thing is undesirable and consistent with the later 
fact, it consolidates distrust. Fourth, when the expected thing is undesirable but in consistent with 
the later fact, it is beneficial to trust. (See also Table 1.1)   
Table 1.1 Impact of expectation and later facts on trust. 
In addition, personal experiences could correct the impression from information from non-personal 
experiences. This correction could be twofold: one is to strengthen previous impression when 
personal experiences and non-personal experiences coincide, the other is to weaken it when they do 
not coincide. 
(i) Types of experience  
(a) Childhood experiences vs. adulthood experiences  
  Consistency with facts 
   Consistent Inconsistent 
Expectations 
Desirable Increase Decrease 
Undesirable Decrease Increase 
Uncertainty 
Expectation 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty 
Expectation 
Expectation 
Now 
Now 
Now 
Past 
Past 
Past 
Certainty 
Certainty 
Future 
Future 
Future 
Experience 
Experience 
Experience 
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According to the different age stages, experiences can be roughly divided into childhood 
experiences and adulthood experiences. As we know, experiences in childhood have a large impact 
on personality and character shaping than those in adulthood. Moreover, negative childhood 
experiences, especially big ones, may even leave a psychological shadow or psychic trauma in 
someone.  
(b) Personal experience vs. non-personal experience 
Personal experience refers to what happen to oneself, while non-personal experience refers to what 
do not happen to oneself, but to others, of which one can acquire information via various 
informational channels. Personal experience can provide the most direct feelings, ceteris paribus. 
By contrast, feelings from non-personal experience could mainly derive from two perspectives: first, 
one imagines that what happened to others had happened to himself / herself; second, thinking what 
happened to others as / like a bystander. In addition, non-personal experience has a bearing on what 
Bandura (1977) called vicarious learning (see Section 1.6.3). Like personal experience, non-
personal experience has a big influence on personal attitude (e.g., trust attitude), opinion and 
behavior (e.g., trusting behavior). 
(c) Positive experiences vs. negative experiences 
One’s experiences can be positive or negative, not considering those with no obvious effect. If an 
experience is undesirable, has a negative impact on one’s psychology (e.g., causing a negative 
emotion) etc., it is negative; otherwise, if an experience is desirable, has a positive effect on one’s 
psychology etc., it is positive. Take individual trust as an example. Those experiences reflecting the 
untrustworthiness of others and making people generate a sense of distrust can be categorized into 
negative experiences. By contrast, the experiences making people form a sense of trust are positive 
ones. 
(ii) Types of expectation 
One’s expectation influences his / her current and future attitude and / or strategic behavior. Also, 
people’s expectation may be mutually influenced. Zucker (1986) distinguishes constitutive 
expectation and background expectation. Below, three pairs of expectation are classified from 
different criteria.  
(a) Positive expectation vs. negative expectation 
If what is expected is expected to develop towards a desirable direction, it can be referred as positive 
expectation; otherwise, it is negative expectation. Positive and negative expectation have a different 
impact on human psychology and could probably stimulate different human emotions and behavior. 
To a considerable degree, positive expectation derives from positive experiences, while negative 
expectation comes from negative experiences. 
(b) Self-based expectation vs. causes-based expectation 
According to whether an expectation is made in accordance with the behavioral carrier of a 
corresponding event, expectation can be categorized as self-based expectation and causes-based 
expectation. If expectation is made according to the nature of the carrier per se, it is self-based 
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expectation. For example, if you know that someone is untrustworthy about something, you will 
expect him / her probably not to keep his / her promise when (s)he makes one about that thing. This 
expectation is based on the characteristics of that person himself / herself. By contrast, if it is because 
something else happens that something is expected to happen, it is causes-based expectation. For 
instance, if a big and famous pharmaceutical company is involved into a scandal of the quality of 
medicine, you may expect the stock price of that company, given that the company is a listed one, 
or even the whole pharmaceutical industry in some cases, may go down at least in the following 
days in response to that piece of information. This kind of expectation is based on the impact of 
external causes on the behavioral carrier of an expected event.  
(c) Quantitative expectation vs. qualitative expectation 
Quantitative expectation, as literally shown, is expectation calculated through mathematical 
methods, which requires sufficient knowledge of the possible outcomes of the expected event and 
their probability distribution. By contrast, qualitative expectation is expectation through judging, 
intuitively or not, an event or person by and large. For example, does someone look like a good or 
bad guy? Is it good or bad intention that someone’s behavior betrays? Does someone more likely to 
behave trustworthily or not in some particular situation? In everyday life, what people much more 
turn to when they expect is qualitative expectation. This is mainly because qualitative expectation 
is considerably easy and time- and cost-saving to conduct, but sufficiently effective for daily 
decision-making. Reversely, quantitative expectation is more frequently used in professional fields 
where precision is required for, serious decision-making, etc.  
1.3 Measures and representation of (general) trust 
1.3.1 Measuring general trust at micro level using survey data 
“General trust” is individuals’ general trust. It is usually measured by the question, i.e., “generally 
speaking, would you say most people can be trusted” or some question similar, which can be found 
in various micro surveys, such as General Social Survey (GSS), World Values Survey (WVS), 
European Social Survey (ESS), European Values Study (EVS), Chinese General Social Survey 
(CGSS) and so on. In WVS and EVS, both the standard question and answer options are almost 
identical. For example, in WVS wave 6, the question is “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be careful in dealing with people?” with its answer 
containing two options: “1. Most people can be trusted”; “2. Need to be very careful”. Similarly, in 
EVS, the question is “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you need to need to be very careful in dealing with people” with its answer also containing two valid 
options: “1. Most people can be trusted”; “2. Can’t be too careful”. ESS asks the same question, but 
with a different answer type. In ESS 7, the question is “[…] generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The answer is 
an 11-point scale with 0 denoting “You can’t be too careful” and 10 representing “Most people can 
be trusted”. A common point of the general-trust questions in WVS, ESS and EVS is that no obvious 
scope is shown in these questions. As Glaeser et al (2000b, p. 815) point out, one of the interpretation 
difficulties existing in the standard question is “differences in interpretation of who comprises ‘most 
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people’”. Making up for this efficiency somehow, the CGSS 2013 question is “Generally speaking, 
do you agree that most people can be trusted in this society?” “In this society” here provides a scope 
for respondents. Additionally, its answer adopts a 5-point Likert scale with 1 representing “Strongly 
disagree”, 2 “Disagree”, 3 “Neither”, 4 “Agree” and 5 “Strongly agree”.  
About this standard question of general trust, we may wonder, such as: 1) What on earth the standard 
survey question of general trust actually measures. trust or trustworthiness. And whose trust and 
trustworthiness. 2) From which perspectives respondents would understand this question; 3) the 
scope of general trust. Is the scope widely enough to cover strangers?  
About the first issue, Putnam (2000, p. 137), Glaeser et al (2000b) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
all think that the standard survey question of general trust actually reflects trustworthiness, however, 
having different views about whose trustworthiness it is. Putnam (2000, p. 137) and Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002) believe that respondents according to the general others’ trustworthiness answer this 
question, while Glaeser et al (2000b), after conducting an experiment, demonstrates that it is the 
trustworthiness of respondents themselves that the standard survey question actually measures. On 
this issue, I hold the same opinion with Putnam (2000) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) that 
respondents in accordance with the trustworthiness of others in the society answer the question. This 
is also consistent with one of my opinions that trustworthiness provides basis for trust. 
As to the second issue, there could be at least two possibilities of which respondents answer the 
standard survey question of general trust. One is the sample-inference perspective from which 
respondents at first comprehensively feel the impression that their personal experiences, experiences 
of others that they have heard of, news reports, etc. leave on them, then infer the trustworthiness of 
the whole scope of people in their mind, and finally give an overall assessment. The other one is the 
belief perspective from which respondents just consider whether the statement “most people can be 
trusted” is probably true, without taking into account personal experiences etc. For example, one 
may firmly believe that most people can be trusted and will meet kind people in future, although 
(s)he already has many unpleasant experiences.  
For the third issue, both Knack and Keefer (1997) and Uslaner (2002, Chapter 3) think that the scope 
of the standard survey question of general trust is not limited to familiars. Specifically, Knack and 
Keefer (1997, p. 1256) argue that “The term ‘people’ is general enough that responses should not 
merely reflect expectations about the behavior of friends and family.” Uslaner (2002, Chapter 3; 
2005) demonstrates that the question does reflect trust in strangers. I agree with them by and large. 
In my view, given that respondents do consider a scope, rather than have in mind an ingrained 
preconception that most people in the world are kind, the scope which the question hints at, or which 
it leads respondents to consider, is definitely not limited to the small circle of familiars, although, 
rigorously speaking, we do not know exactly the scope and the weight of impact of different 
experiences etc. on the respondents’ overall assessment in their mind.  
Intuitively, the scope of general trust is definitely not too small. But some people may still be 
entangled in the exact percentage that the word “most” in the standard survey question of general 
trust presents. However, trying to determinate an exact number for the “most” does not seem to be 
wise since a word with approximate meaning was not created for exact expression. What we know 
is that “most” is definitely larger than 50%. 
Chapter 1: Thinking Trust Systemically in Socio-Economic Environment 
31 
 
Words representing quantity can be categorized into two types. One is for representing a specific 
number, such as one, two, three, etc. The other is for representing an unspecific number, and 
therefore a range of numbers, such as “most”, “about”, “approximately”, etc. Words representing 
specific number can be presented using words representing unspecific number; however, not vice 
versa. “Most” itself is for representing an unspecific number. Therefore, entangled in whether it is 
60% or 80% is neither meaningful nor necessary. In a word, words for presenting an unspecific 
number were not created for reversely inferring a specific number. 
1.3.2 Measuring general trust at macro level using survey data 
Generalized trust at macro level in empirical research is always calculated using generalized trust 
data at micro level in surveys. Specifically, in cross-country empirical analysis or in diachronic 
change of a particular country, generalized trust at a country level is represented by the share of 
respondents who answer “Yes” or choose a score above a certain chosen level (such as, the middle 
score) in a Likert-type option set to that standard survey question of generalized trust “Generally 
speaking, do you think most people can be trusted” in all the respondents in a country (e.g., Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). For example, given that there are only two options “Yes” and “No” to that survey 
question and that all the respondents of a country have given a definite answer, if in all the 1000 
respondents, 700 respondents answer “Yes”, then the generalized trust of that country is 70%. 
Another example, suppose there are five Likert-type options, namely “Strongly disagree”, 
“Disagree”, “Neither”, “Agree” and “Strongly agree”, to that question, and there are 700 out of 1000 
respondents of a country choose the latter two options. Then, the generalized trust of that country is 
treated as 70%. 
This method is easy to understand and operate, and to some degree of reasonability. However, both 
cross-country and diachronic comparison of general trust in this way may have inherent confusing 
aspects which cannot be solved, at least so far. As to cross-country comparison, it is possible that 
the respondents of a country may generally tend to higher report trust level than their true feelings 
out of some reason, while the respondents of another country may generally endow untrustworthy 
with events more weights.  
As to diachronic comparison, Putnam (2000) gives three possibilities behind changes of macro 
generalized trust:  
If fewer survey respondents nowadays say, ‘Most people can be trusted,’ that might 
mean any one of three things: 1) the respondents are accurately reporting that honesty 
is rarer these days; or 2) other people’s behavior hasn’t really changed, but we have 
become more paranoid; or 3) neither our ethical demands nor other people’s behavior 
have actually changed, but we now have more information about their treachery, 
perhaps because of more lurid media reports. (pp. 137-138) 
1.3.3 Measuring trust using the investment actions in a trust game 
In behavioral experiments, trust is also measured by investment actions in trust games. The 
prototype of the classic and famous trust game is the investing game proposed by Berg, Dickhaut 
and McCabe (1995).  
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The investing game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) is a two-person game implemented 
among university undergraduates. It requires anonymity and only one interaction because its aim is 
to investigate the role of trust as a reciprocal mechanism, which makes it necessary to exclude other 
possible reciprocal mechanisms involving reputations, contractual precommitments and punishment 
(Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) implement two 
experimental treatments, one is no history treatment, the other is social history treatment. Therein, 
the benchmark is the no history treatment (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). The basic process 
of the no history treatment is like this: each subject is given 10-dollar show-up fee, and all subjects 
are separated in two rooms (room A and room B). In the first stage, subjects in room A must decide 
how much of his / her 10 dollars is given to an anonymous partner in room B as an investment. This 
amount of money will then be tripled when being given to their anonymous partner in room B. In 
the second stage, subjects in room B decide how much of the money (s)he received (namely his / 
her partner’s tripled “investment”, not including his / her own 10-dollar show-up fee) to return to 
his / her partner in room A. The difference between the social history treatment and the no history 
treatment is that the subjects in the former treatment are informed of the summary results of the 
latter treatment (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995).  
In addition, based on this trust game designed by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), other scholars 
also made a meaningful exploration of trusting behavior in games (e.g., Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 
2004; Bohnet et al, 2008; Cox, 2009; Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats and 
Zingales, 2013). 
Many researches have explored trusting behavior based on this trust-game. As we have seen, 
behavior of giving some amount of one’s own show-up fee to an anonymous partner is treated as 
trusting behavior in trust-game experiments. However, it should be noted that a potential problem 
in this kind of trust-game experiments is whether the money-giving behavior, which is treated as 
trusting behavior, does reflect trust. Specifically, subjects in such an experiment may not treat the 
show-up fee as payment for participating in the experiment; they may more enjoy the whole process 
of the experiment and not much care monetary payment; they may not feel sad if no show-up fee is 
definitely left for their own. So, when they have to give up a proportion of the show-up fee as an 
investment, they do not think twice. Thus, the money-giving behavior will not reflect trust at all. 
1.3.4 Measuring social trust using the cooperation share in 
evolutionary game theoretical agent-based modeling 
In research involving game theoretical models, trust is often defined and measured based on 
cooperative behavior in a time period in the total population under investigation. For example, 
Wäckerle, Rengs and Radax (2014, p. 172) use “average share of cooperative actions within the 
whole population” to represent societal trust. However, it should be noted that trust and cooperation 
do not always coincide. Relatively speaking, trust places emphasis on psychology, while 
cooperation on behavior. Trust may drive cooperation, but cooperative behavior can also be out of 
other purposes or intentions. Thus, this way of measuring social trust is actually under the potential 
hypothesis that only trust can cause cooperative behavior. In addition, it should be noted in passing 
that what to use to represent trust in formal models to some degree has a bearing on what method to 
use.  
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1.3.5 Representing micro trust using probability  
In my view, the most fundamental function of individual trust lies in its impact on the willingness 
to interact. Willingness to interact is the premise of whether to interact. Without willingness to 
interaction, interactions would not happen, nor would the consequences from interactions, including 
desirable and undesirable ones. In terms of willingness to interact, there are basically two situations, 
one is the willingness to interact after knowing the partner’s personal quality; the other is after 
knowing some disapproved behavior and phenomena existing in society. Unless there are other 
purposes, people usually are unwilling to interact with those whom they do not trust in or in 
untrustworthy contexts / situations. Unwilling to interact because of distrust may be out of avoiding 
detected monetary, time, spiritual or affective losses etc. In normal situations, only when people 
have not detected danger of being intentionally viciously deceived is it possible for them to place 
trust.    
Based on this idea, we can presume that willingness to interact hinges on trust in formal models 
which contain human interactions and use probability which is between 0 and 1 to represent 
individual willingness to interact when individuals face each potential interaction so that (dis)trust, 
a psychological conception in essence, can be associated with different behavior that it leads to. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis will just in this way represent trust in an agent-based model. 
1.4 Trust at the micro level: both thoughts and behavior 
matter 
At the individual (micro) level, sense of (dis)trust is formed on the psychological level and through 
interactions functions on the social level. Thus, we should at the same time pay enough attention to 
both individual thinking process (namely, psychological or mental activities) related to trust and the 
possible impact of personal trust on future personal interactions since only emphasizing either 
psychological or interactional aspect is one-sided, and after all, antecedent personal or observed 
interactions delivering information of trustworthiness of others cannot have an actual influence on 
future personal interactions without functioning at individual psychological level.  
1.4.1 Thoughts and trust 
This aspect stresses the psychological or mental process of how a person in his / her mind processes 
information of others’ trustworthiness acquired through personal interactions or observed 
interactions of others. To understand human mind, Cosmides and Tooby (1997) elaborate on five 
principles applied by evolutionary psychologists inspired by biology. When explaining those five 
principles, they state that “the function of the brain is information-processing”, or put another way, 
is “to solve adaptive information-processing problems” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997, para. 29-30). 
The circuits in human brain in response to information from environment generate behavior 
appropriate to one’s environmental circumstances (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997). On psychological 
level, trust typically presents an inner process consisting of interpreting information, judging one’s 
trustworthiness, responding emotionally the judgment of trustworthiness, expecting the possible 
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results of future similar interactions, making decisions involved in future interactions etc. 
Sense of trust is established or destroyed based on a process of perception or thinking after the 
arrival of information containing others’ trustworthiness. After information of that sort is acquired, 
a person starts to interpret that information and makes a judgment of the quality of trustworthiness. 
Overwhelmingly most of the time, if not at any time, this process from the arrival of information 
delivering (un)trustworthiness to the perception or judgment of (un)trustworthiness is quite quick. 
Imagine the situation that when you see a pickpocket, you will immediately realize that the person 
is not trustworthy. Despite the very short time for judging, this judgment is crucial for trust. Criteria 
of judging trustworthiness consist of, but not limited to, traditional cultural values, social norms, 
moral norms, virtues, laws and so on and so forth which to a large degree are within the institutional 
sphere. Although people in different places may have different concrete judging criteria, the 
common point is that others’ (un)trustworthiness always results in one’s (dis)trust.  
To which degree a person would react to information delivering trustworthiness of others depends 
largely on personal preference, opinion, emotional attitude etc. which influence his / her final 
assessment of a particular trust-related event and people it involves. Thus, the same piece of 
information would have a different impact on people’s trust. Trust of those who are extremely averse 
to some kind of untrustworthy behavior would reasonably decrease to a larger degree than those 
who do not care it that much. Also, different kinds of events could to a different degree influence 
the trust of the same person. For example, a person who has more tolerance for being told lies may 
very much hate being picked pocket.  
What is more important, humans have the capability of reasoning, inference and association etc. 
which play a crucial role in a person’s trust in future similar situations and / or in other people with 
some kind of common and / or similar characteristics. For example, a person knowing the fact of 
the relatively rampant robbery in a city will expect a higher probability of being robbed when (s)he 
goes there and therefore will pay much more attention to his / her own belongings. As externally 
coming pieces of information are (continuously marginally) added through experience, personal or 
observed, how they are mentally processed, interpreted and integrated in his / her formed structured 
general idea could also change (such as, relieve or consolidate etc.) one’s opinion on the previously 
perceived reality.  
A person’s basic trust propensity is established and stabilized in his / her early life. The subsequent 
experiences could cause upward and downward fluctuations around one’s basic propensity. 
However, it does not mean one’s basic propensity of trust never changes. One possibility is that if 
one with high trust propensity is exposed for a certain time in a circumstance of low trustworthiness, 
(s)he would probably get less trusting.  
1.4.2 Behavior and trust  
This aspect emphasizes the impact of trust on behavioral outputs. Behavior, to a large degree, is an 
expression of the results of one’s thinking process. What should be noted here is that different 
thoughts could lead to the same or similar behavior, and likewise, different behavior could also 
derive from the same or similar thoughts. Therefore, inferring a unique thought or intention from 
some kind of behavior without any other information about the context is usually unreliable. 
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One way of the accumulated effect of trust comes from the interpretation of indications of 
trustworthiness and whether or not one has encountered or expects to encounter goodwill or 
benevolent behavior, or whether or not one has not encountered or expects not to encounter 
malevolent behavior. Generally, only when trust is transformed into objective trust-based behavior 
can the behavior causes realistic consequences in society and socially functions. 
(i) Forms of trust in two-party interactions 
In a specific trusting-trusted relationship involving two parties in real life, a person could basically 
act as either the trusting or the trusted party, or both at the same time. The situation in which each 
party acts as either role of the trustor and the trustee is unilateral trust, while the situation in which 
both parties act as both roles of the trustor and the trustee is bilateral mutual trust.  
What is more, a trusting-trusted relationship probably necessitates two steps from an interactive 
perspective, with a specific event being involved: the first is both parties agree to be involved in the 
event; the second is the specific implementation process of the particular event after agreement. 
Shortly put, namely before and during an interaction. (The ex post assessment is covered by the 
“thoughts” part.) Below, a role-embedded and process-split categorization is presented to 
understand different forms of trust in a trusting-trusted relationship in an interaction involving an 
event (see also Table 1.2). 
(a) The first form is a kind of unilateral trust in which the trusting and the trusted parties both agree 
to participate in some event, but only the trusted party is mainly involved in the later implementation 
and acts as the behavioral party (see, Table 1.2, (a)). An easily associated example of this form is 
principle-agent relationships. In a principal-agent relationship, the agent deals with what the 
principal pays him / her to do on behalf of the principal, which also makes the principal vulnerable 
to moral hazard from the behavioral party – the agent. For example, shareholders employ 
professional managers to daily manage their company, which forms a trusting-trusted relationship 
and in which situation the managers, the trusted party, are the main behavioral party in the following 
work.  
(b) The second form is also a kind of unilateral trust in which both the trusting and the trusted parties 
agree to be involved in an event, but mainly the trusting party takes part in its specific 
implementation (see Table 1.2, (b)). Imagine a situation that a person asks another person for “help” 
and the latter person agrees. Then whether the first person asking for “help” is good or not is crucial. 
If the first person is a good one and does only ask for help, the second person who trusts and acts as 
the behavioral party is safe and they both would probably have a pleasant experience. But if the first 
person is actually a fraud and asking for “help” is only an excuse for him / her to approach a target 
person, then the second person who trusts and acts as the main behavioral party may be exploited.  
(c) The third form is bilateral mutual trust in which both the trusting and the trusted parties agree to 
be involved in some event, take part in its later implementation, and, more importantly, at the same 
time have a dual identity of a trusting and a trusted party in the whole process of the event (namely 
including ex ante and during implementation) (see Table 1.2, (c)). For example, in a cooperative 
relationship based on mutual trust, both parties are behavioral parties in the subsequent cooperative 
process. 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
36 
 
Table 1.2 Forms of trust in two-party interactions and its main behavioral party. 
(ii) Several specific decisions involved in trust 
Personal interactions are the most important channel through which trustors show their trust attitude. 
An interaction involves a bunch of decisions, and as a trustor, one can influence and shape an 
interaction through those different decisions, which can be simply described as “1H+4W”, namely 
whether, who, how, when and where, where the first two will be incorporated in the simulation 
model in Chapter 4. Essentially, those decision-making processes are thinking ones, while their 
results will be in real-actions forms.  
(a) Whether Whether to take part in or exit from an interaction are two decisive steps for interactions 
to be the real ones. For example, if an individual expects the people in a given interaction will 
consider his / her interests, treat him / her fairly, and not exploit him / her, (s)he maybe would like 
to join in the interaction, ceteris paribus. In contrast, if one involved in some particular interaction 
feels being exploited, (s)he would discontinue the interaction and exit.  
(b) Who People can choose with whom to interact. Put another way, this is related to from whom 
one can get the expected behavior, such as trustworthy behavior, although with different 
probabilities. For example, if one expects the probability that A will lend him / her some money is 
greater than B, (s)he will ask A prior to B. Also, with whom to interact is related to reputation chain. 
(c) How This is related to through what way to guarantee a particular result of an interaction. Taking 
the lending money example above, the degree of trust may influence whether paying back the money 
is verbally promised or guaranteed by a formal contract.  
(d) When This implies how long an individual will really take an action in a particular interaction 
after (s)he decides sometime in future that (s)he will definitely join in it. This is something related 
to time lag. For example, after a new product is launched, person A and B both decide to buy one 
someday. However, in spite of some other constrains like income, if A has higher trust in the 
company and its products, or its technology than B who would like to wait until get some feedback 
from other users, A may buy one prior to B. 
(e) Where For example, one may feel safer if an interaction takes place where there are more people 
than elsewhere there are fewer. 
1.5 Trust and trustworthiness 
1.5.1 Relation between trust and trustworthiness 
The change of one’s trust, from a trustor’s perspective, is not unconditional, as aforementioned; 
trust is always based on perceived trustworthiness, or at least unperceived untrustworthiness. That 
  Behavioral party  
  The trustee The trustor Both trustor and the trustee  
Unilateral trust (a) (b)  
Bilateral mutual trust   (c) 
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means, people incline to recognize the degree of other people’s trustworthiness and trust those who 
are, or more likely are, trustworthy or who seem not untrustworthy. Hardin (2003, p. 82) argues that 
“our trust in another is essentially a matter of relevant knowledge about that other- in particular, 
knowledge of reasons the other has to be trustworthy”. “The best device for creating trust is to 
establish and support trustworthiness. […] without the latter, there is no value in trust” (Hardin, 
1996, p. 29).  
Some people may say that we only know the trustworthiness of whom we are relatively familiar 
with, but cannot make a judgment on that of whom we are not familiar with or even do not know. I 
do not totally agree with this opinion because it neglects the importance of other ways of information 
acquisition except relatively frequent personal interactions and human capabilities like observation, 
speculation, association, and so on. In a word, that remark does not consider human intelligence 
sufficiently. Actually, people can also make a judgment on the trustworthiness of those whom they 
do not know via appearance, behavior, environment, context, etc., combining with what they have 
already known about the society, as long as they don’t know nothing, although the judgment might 
be erroneous. Of course, one might not be trustworthy in every single thing and all the time, and so 
for trust. One’s trustworthiness may depend on specific events.  
Trustworthiness may come from both personal characteristics and the incentives of the structure of 
social interactions (Ostrom and Ahn, 2009), such as the incentives provided by formal institutions. 
Whether, how and to what degree institutions structure individual behavior after all lie in the 
individual himself / herself. It is widely accepted that external causes function via internal causes. 
Whether or not an institution emerges is largely determined by the degree to which it is internalized 
into individual thoughts and behavior, or even by behavior per se.  
Experiencing others’ trustworthiness gives a reference of one’s trusting behavior towards some 
particular person, although the particular person may not certainly be the one with whom (s)he 
creates the experience. The perception of others’ trustworthiness may not always be entirely 
consistent with the objective trustworthiness. Even so, trust and trustworthiness usually qualitatively 
coincide. 
In reality, trustworthiness may also react to trust. For example, when the trustworthiness of a 
trustworthy one is not cherished, (s)he may feel frustrated, which may lead to a decrease of his / her 
willingness to future interactions. Moreover, given people’s demand on interactions, if actual 
trustworthiness is always being questioned, there could be two effects: first, some people may keep 
trustworthy to show that they are indeed trustworthy; second, some people may even turn to 
untrustworthy behavior out of the thought that after all nobody trusts. However, it should be noted 
that the possibility that others’ real trustworthiness reacts to one’s trust has no universality. Thus, in 
a word, trust and trustworthiness may interact, however, with trust a lot more depending on 
trustworthiness. 
1.5.2 Individual and social costs of untrustworthiness 
Costs of untrustworthiness talked here is mainly from an interactive perspective. Costs of 
untrustworthiness can be both individual and social.  
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
38 
 
As individual costs, they are mainly reflected in three aspects: First, if an interaction happens but 
the other party, supposing an interaction only containing two parties, turns out to be untrustworthy, 
it will bring the trustor a direct loss, especially a pecuniary one because the purpose of those who 
deliberately deceive others is usually to gain monetary interests. Second, facing potential 
interactions, especially those initiated by the other party, the trustor would not be willing to interact 
at all or try his / her best to avoid interacting due to suspicion or worry of being deceived. Third, if 
an interaction is indeed needed or has to be carried on, especially those initiated by the trustor, the 
trustor could search for a reliable interactor in advance as preparation for the interaction. This 
process causes a high searching cost, mainly time cost. A monetary cost is also possible. For example, 
the trustor may via a qualified institution find a reliable interactor, exchanging money for time and 
information. In addition, what is more important, distrust may have an involution effect. Specifically, 
because of distrust, individuals tend to turn to personal social network more which is a network of 
family members, familiars, acquaintances etc. to mobilize their personal social capital. They intend 
to via personal social networks, including both their own social network and that of the people on 
their social networks, acquire information of potential trustworthy interactors and restrain 
untrustworthy behavior of future interactions.  
For a society, an untrustworthy social environment, prominently reflected in people’s searching for 
economic / monetary / pecuniary interests etc. via unacceptable ways such as not obeying various 
institutions (such as various norms, morals, laws, etc.) or exploit institutional loopholes (such as 
legal loopholes), is detrimental to the creation of value because people’s interactions in the society 
are more likely to be “zero-sum games” in which untrustworthy people tend to try their best to 
exploit others. In addition, Section 1.10 will particularly elaborate on the effect of (dis)trust on 
economic transactions which is a specific type of interactions.   
1.5.3 Correspondence and superposition of the role as a trustor and a 
trustee 
Every person is a combination trust and trustworthiness, although the two may not present in an 
interaction simultaneously. Let us have a look at the possible presenting combinations of one’s trust 
and trustworthiness with another person’s trust and trustworthiness. Then, six possible relationships 
may come to our mind, namely: a) person 1’ trust and person 1’ trustworthiness; b) person 2’ trust 
and person 2’ trustworthiness; c) person 1’ trust and person 2’ trust; d) person 1’ trust and person 2’ 
trustworthiness; e) person 1’s trustworthiness and person 2’ trust; f) and person 1’ trustworthiness 
and person 2’ trustworthiness. Let’s combine a) and b), and combine e) and f), then four 
relationships of two kinds exist between two persons: first, within a person, the relationship between 
one person’s trust and his own trustworthiness; second between two persons, a person’ trust and 
another person’s trust, a person’ trust and another person’s trustworthiness, or a person’s 
trustworthiness and another person’s trustworthiness.  
(i) Correspondence  
When embodied on two persons, trusting and being trusted are bound together in a trust relationship, 
with one not being able to exist without the other. This kind of correspondence leads to their 
appearance always as a pair. That is, it is of little point to stress one aspect neglecting the other. 
Correspondence means that the role of the trustor and the trustee are “acted” by different individuals, 
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which means an individual possesses only one of the two roles in a trust relationship. One person 
pays trust to the other and thus the former is the trustor and, correspondingly, the latter is the trustee. 
Obviously, in every interaction of 2-preson trust relationships, correspondence exists in unilateral 
trust relationships. 
(ii) Superposition  
Superposition means that the role of the trustor and that of the trustee are concentrated on a single 
individual, which means an individual actually possesses both the two roles. In social life, one is 
sometimes in an interaction a trusting person, by contrast, sometimes in another interaction is a 
trusted one, or simultaneously is both the trustor and the trustee in a single interaction. This kind of 
superposition of roles reflects the fact that others construct the environment of a particular individual 
and at the same time the particular individual also constructs the environment of others. In 2-preson 
trust relationships, superposition exists in bilateral trust relationships. Figure 1.5 also presents the 
correspondence and superposition of the role of trustor and trustee. 
 
 
 
 
a. Correspondence                   b. Superposition 
Figure 1.5 Correspondence and superposition of the role as a trustor and a trustee in an interaction 
in a 2-person trust relationship. 
More importantly, the meaning of the correspondence and superposition of the role as a trustor and 
a trustee is not only embodied in a single interaction; it is more reflected in multiple interactions. 
(Specifically, correspondence in different interactions and superposition in both any single 
interaction and different interactions.) So, the seemingly insignificant description above actually 
contains an important motivation for one’s sticking to trustworthiness, and therefore implies an 
important mechanism for the maintenance of social trust in the whole society. That is, one’s identity 
or role as a trustor and a trustee is changeable. This changeability of identities is reflected via two 
ways: One is that an interactor has different single identity in different interactions (and accordingly, 
other people are as the other role); the other is that every interactor has the two identities at the same 
in an interaction. Just imagine the situation: If the identity as a trustor and trustee could not change 
in inevitable interactions, those who are always act as a trustee would have enough incentives to 
behave untrustworthily to exploit others to get more interests, on condition that there is no 
punishment mechanism, that there are difficulties for punishments to implement, that punishments 
are relatively costly, and that the trustee does not have enough moral constraints on itself. One 
extreme example is the defective behavior in one-shot games. In contrast, changeability of identity 
as a trustor and a trustee is also an important reason for a person to cooperate in repeated games, 
besides other possible reasons such as good reputation. More broadly speaking, when it comes to 
institutions that covers a much larger sphere, changeability of people’s relatively advantageous role 
in various interactions is also an important factor for the generation and maintenance of institutions, 
Trustor       Trustee Trustor       Trustee 
Trustee       Trustor 
Single role of each person:           Double roles of each person: 
Interact Interact 
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which will be discussed in more detail in Section 1.8.5. 
In addition, a relative comprehensive and sufficient understanding of trust necessitates consideration 
of both the characteristics of the trusting party and that of the trusted party, namely the propensity 
of trust and the trustworthiness, as what Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) has suggested. In the 
point of view of Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995, p. 716), the characteristics of different trusted 
parties contribute to the reason why “a given trustor has varied levels of trust for various trustees”. 
From my point of view, this argument is also suitable for a certain degree of generalization. Put in 
another way, the trustworthiness of the trusted party not only acts upon particular trust, but also is 
an important ingredient of the reconstruction of one’s generalized trust. The general willingness of 
trust ready for the next interaction is constructed by one-by-one added piece of knowledge or 
information in the previous interaction or non-interaction experiences. In this sense, the past 
constructs the whole impression mapping into the present reality and speculated, imaginary future. 
This is an evolutionary way of thinking trust in the feedback loop. This impact gets much more 
obvious when one interacts with non-familiar persons. 
1.5.4 Supply of and demand for trust and trustworthiness 
It is not difficult to understand that from the perspective of an individual person, what I call the 
supply of trust means to trust, and the demand for trust means the demand for being trusted; the 
supply of trustworthiness means being trustworthiness while behaving, and the demand for 
trustworthiness means the demand for the trustworthy of others’ behavior. Thus, trustors supply 
trust and trustees supply trustworthiness; those who need being trusted have a demand for trust and 
those who require trustworthiness of others have a demand for trustworthiness. (See Figure 1.6) 
It should be noted that trust does not have to be reflected on behavior, although trustworthiness does; 
however, for behavior related to the supply of and demand for trust which has an influence on others, 
it is necessary to have a qualitative change with trust (i.e., not behave in some way out of distrust, 
but behave in that way out of trust.) because only in this way do the supply of and demand for trust 
make a realistic social sense. 
Although the two words “supply” and “demand” make economic scholars associate them with those 
in economics, and may not be able to get out of their economic way of thinking on the supply of 
and demand for goods, money and labor force in economics, I am not talking the supply of and 
demand for trust and trustworthiness strictly within the explanations in the economic sense; actually, 
I purely intend to express the meaning of “supply” and “demand” of daily use. Furthermore, the two 
words first have their meaning in daily use, then the meaning in economics; they are not bound to 
economics, although, of course, their meaning in economics are fundamentally based on their daily 
meaning. However, it should be noted that, if we have to explain the supply of and demand for trust 
and trustworthiness like in economics, goods, money and labor force are all concrete and countable 
or have been quantified, while, on contrast, trust and trustworthiness are not. Moreover, as we know, 
“supply” and “demand” in economics stress willingness and capability. As to trust, the acquisition 
of capability is relatively easy, even can be ignored. By contrast, “capability” is more important for 
trustworthiness since after all, sometimes some factors may limit the willingness of being 
trustworthy, even though people want to be trustworthy. 
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Figure 1.6 The supply and demand of trust and trustworthiness. 
Due to their abstract and uncountability, trust and trustworthiness at micro-level obviously cannot 
directly be added up to a macro-level number in the arithmetical way in the normal sense. However, 
it does not mean that people cannot feel or judge whether trust and trustworthiness is high or low 
because after all humans are intelligent and clever enough to deal with this matter. There are two 
situations that the supply and the demand of trust do not match: one is overall, and the other is 
structural. So are the supply and demand of trust and trustworthiness in the macro-level. 
As aforementioned, people do not have to determine an accountable quantity when comparing 
something; often, people can feel whether a quantity is high or low without specific numbers are 
listed in front. If one does want to compare trust or trustworthiness in the form of an exact number, 
one solution is to turn to interactions out of trust or trustworthiness which are accountable, even 
though, as we can realize, this method is not perfectly satisfactory. Suppose that an interaction can 
only be realized when both the two corresponding parties have a willingness to interact out of some 
reason, assuming there are only two parties involved. Then, the maximum of actual interactions will 
equal the smaller one of the willingness to interact reflected by trust and trustworthiness in the most 
ideal case. For example, the melamine event in 2008 in China, a dairy products contamination event, 
is always taken as an example by many scholars (e.g., Dai and Elsner, 2015) and media when talking 
about social trust. After the event, the public’s trust in China’s dairy industry plummeted. In this 
example, we do not quantify trust. Nor do we need to. Yet, we can truly feel an obviously big 
difference between the supply of trust from the Chinese consumers and the demand for trust from 
dairy producers after the event. 
1.6 Information acquisition and output: social learning and 
interactions  
1.6.1 Types of behavior 
Behavior can not only deliver the information of an actor’s trustworthiness, but also his / her degree 
of trust, and is the fundamental source of information of trust and trustworthiness. Therefore, it is 
necessary to discuss, say, the types of behavior to better understand its relation to trustworthiness 
and trust, especially the former. 
(i) Solo behavior vs. interactive behavior 
Behavior can be categorized as solo behavior and interactive behavior. Solo behavior here refers to 
behavior with no interactors, while interactive behavior has interactors. When acting as a way of 
Trustors Trustees 
Provide trust to 
Demand trustworthiness from 
Provide trustworthiness to 
Demand trust from 
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information output of personal trustworthiness, they both can reflect the trustworthiness of the actor 
himself / herself or of the behavior per se. Note that solo behavior may or may not have a relation 
with presenting trustworthiness. By contrast, interactive behavior is more likely to deliver 
information of trustworthiness of either actor. For example, the behavior that one who lives alone 
does cleaning at home, or that one paints in a park are both solo behavior, but not relevant to 
presenting trustworthiness. However, the solo behavior that a chemical plant discharges raw sewage 
into river to reduce costs from treating industrial wastewater, without considering the harmful 
consequences caused to the residents along the downstream of the river, will definitely cause the 
dissatisfaction of the residents with the plant, supposing that there is no “game” between the 
chemical plant and the supervising department. The reason why solo behavior can even cause 
people’s perception of the trustworthiness of some behavior lies in its externality, and the degree of 
the externality.  
Solo behavior does not have interactors. Then, if solo behavior does influence others, and even make 
others form a judgment of trustworthiness, its influence has to exceed the actor himself / herself. 
Put another way, externality is needed. By contrast, from the perspective of an arbitrary single actor, 
interactive behavior per se has already exceed the actor himself / herself since an interaction, as the 
term shows, needs at least two persons or two parties. Thus, when there is no obvious externality, 
interactive behavior only influences the two interacting parties, supposing there are only two parties 
involved; on contrast, when there is obvious externality, it may make more people form a judgment 
of trustworthiness, other than the two interacting parties. In a word, humans are behavioral 
interdependent.  
(ii) Internalization-based behavior vs. internalization-lacking behavior 
According to whether driven by internalized values, individual behavior can be categorized into 
internalization-based behavior and internalization-lacking behavior, with the former being values-
behavior consistent but the latter being values-behavior inconsistent or irrelevant. According to the 
online Oxford English Dictionary, values (2011) are “the principles or moral standards held by a 
person or social group; the generally accepted or personally held judgment of what is valuable and 
important in life”. Internalization is a process of accepting some values, norms, attitudes etc. and 
integrating them into one’s own values system so that (s)he can distinguish right from wrong, use 
them to judge ideas, behavior etc. and guide his / her own behavior. In my view, no matter how the 
values are acquired, as long as they are accepted and integrated into one’s own values system, they 
are internalized. Internalization-based behavior, as the term shows, is based on internalized values 
of behavior or rules of conduct, while internalization-lacking behavior could be purely imitating or 
material-motivated without recognizing and being guided by directly relevant internalized values. 
For example, suppose that telling lies is absolutely morally wrong (therefore we do not take into 
account the possible rightness of the so-called “white” lies). If it is because one disapproves of it 
and thinks it is not morally right that (s)he does not telling lies, not telling lies is an internalization-
based behavior for him / her; however, if (s)he has no moral concept about telling lies in his / her 
mind, or it is just because (s)he saw those who are telling lies get punished, not telling lies is then 
an internalization-lacking behavior. In addition, the methods and channels of acquiring or 
generating moral values, or more broadly speaking, institutions, are highly related to social learning 
which will be illustrated mainly in section 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 1.6.6 and 1.6.7. For some brief examples 
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here first, moral values can be acquired through personal interactions, others’ (such as parents or 
teachers) instructions, reading books of past ages or contemporary ones, etc. 
Certainly, there is another situation, that is, although one internally admits some values of behavior, 
(s)he may still betray those internalized values out of some kind of realistic reason or consideration, 
which also leads to values-behavior inconsistence, or put another way, another value dominates.  
Table 1.3 presents a more all-sided picture about from which mechanism different situations of 
values at the psychological level could generate different kinds of behavior at the behavioral level, 
assuming that there are only two kinds of internalized values, right or wrong, and two kinds of 
behavior, proper or improper. Specifically, right values can via internalization generate proper 
behavior and via considering some realistic reasons generate improper behavior; wrong values can 
via external reward-punishment mechanism lead to proper behavior and via a distorted 
internalization process generate improper behavior; in case of no values consideration involved, 
both proper and improper behavior can be generated via external reward-punishment mechanism. 
Table 1.3 Possible mechanisms behind behavior: a perspective from internalized values. 
Since in Table 1.3 external reward and punishment have been mentioned, then let us have a closer 
look at reward and punishment in passing. The reason why reward and punishment are often stressed 
is its possible impact on changing behavioral probability. Both reward and punishment, as we know, 
can be categorized as intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic reward or punishment is psychological self-
reward, which is a positive psychology, or self-punishment, which is a negative psychology, while 
extrinsic reward or punishment is imposed from extrinsic factors on individuals. Take punishment 
as an example. Intrinsic punishment could be guilty and conscience stirs, while extrinsic punishment 
could be material and monetary punishment. Admitted that it could reduce improper behavior, 
punishment may also have no effect. For example, some people would like to suffer punishment, 
rather than changing behavior out of some internalized principle, similar with reward. Thus, only 
when actors stick to no definite and firm internalized principles could it possible for reward and 
punishment alter individual behavioral probability. 
1.6.2 Types and filtering process of information 
Since trust is in general based on information about trustworthiness of others, a change of trust 
cannot be separated from information about trustworthiness. According to different criteria, 
information about others’ trustworthiness can be divided into different types. Specifically, (i) 
according to the types of behavior, it can be categorized as solo-behavior information and 
interactive-behavior information; (ii) according to whether oneself is involved in the event 
delivering information of others’ trustworthiness, it can be divided as involvement information and 
non-involvement information; (iii) according to whether a piece of information affects the particular 
       Behavioral level   
    Behave Not behave 
   Behave properly Behave improperly   
Psychological 
level 
Internalized values Values' right Internalization Realistic reasons --- 
  Values' wrong External reward and punishment Negative/distorted internalization --- 
No values background   External reward and punishment External reward and punishment --- 
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trust to the actor(s) involved or wariness only to the involved behavior per se, it can be sorted as 
individual-particular information and phenomenon information; (iv) according to the nature of the 
contents breached, it can be classified as information breaching individual preference and that 
breaching social preference (such as, of institutional type, like social norms, morals, etc.); (v) 
according to where people directly get the information, it can be distinguished as natural-person 
information and media information; (vi) according to the methods of acquiring information, it can 
be divided as personal-interaction information and observation information in the broad sense 
(including, such as, direct observation, word of mouth, news reports, etc.); (vii) according to the 
distance from the original information source, it can be categorized as direct (first hand) information 
and indirect (non-first hand) information. Figure 1.7 depicts the interaction information feedback 
between micro- and macro-level in which all kinds of information just mentioned are involved, 
except solo-behavior information. This figure embodies the meaning of the seemly unnecessary 
many categorizations of information above and the information filtration process below. 
Since trust is after all a psychological feeling and attitude, whether information about others’ 
trustworthiness will actually affect individual trust depends on whether it can successfully reach an 
individual and has an influence on individual psychology. Therefore, the filtering process is a 
crucial link for information to generate actual effects, given that a piece of information does have 
successfully reached a person. The filtering process here refers to shrugging off or excluding the 
effects of a reaching piece of information. It at least involves four situations: (i) (almost) no care, in 
terms of an information receiver’s personal subjective attitude; (ii) (almost) no relevance, in terms 
of the objective relevance between the situation that the information reflects and the information 
receiver; (iii) (almost) no importance, in terms of the objective or subjectively evaluated importance 
of the situation that the information reflects; (iv) (almost) no move, in terms of the information 
receiver’s psychological resistance to change his / her trust. Additionally, they all can also be 
regarded as special cases where some piece of information changes individual trust with no margin. 
Figure 1.7 also involves information filtration. 
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Figure 1.7 Interaction information feedback between micro- and macro-level. 
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1.6.3 Bandura (1977): Social learning theory 
Bandura, a famous psychologist, made a prominent psychological contribution in research of social 
learning. Social learning theory is a theory of explaining human behavior. In his Social Learning 
Theory, Bandura (1977) simultaneously stresses behavior and cognition, which breaks the previous 
studying tradition of behavior heavily influenced by mechanistic models, and therefore provides “a 
unified theoretical framework for analyzing human thought and behavior” (p. vi).  
Distinct from “the dichotomy of behavior as either learning or innate” (p. 16), Bandura (1977) 
argues that behavior, except for elementary reflexes, is acquired by learning, rather than being 
innately equipped with. According to Bandura (1977, pp. vii, 16), both direct experience and 
observation (put another way, observational experience or “socially mediated experience”) are 
channels of acquiring new behavioral / response patterns. Therefore, Bandura (1977, Chapter 2) 
treats learning by response consequences and learning through modeling as two origins of behavior 
accordingly. 
Bandura (1977, Chapter 3-5) categorizes regulatory systems of behavior as antecedent determinants, 
consequent determinants and cognitive control, with the first two being external influences and the 
third internal. Bandura (1977, pp. 96, 160) thinks that therein, consequent determinants “largely 
through their informative and incentive value” affects behavior, and, furthermore, both antecedent 
and consequent determinants “through intermediary cognitive processes” influence behavior. More 
importantly, “psychological function is a continuous reciprocal interaction between personal, 
behavioral and environmental determinants” (Bandura, 1977, p. 194), rather than functioning 
separately and independently. (See also Figure 1.8)  
 
Figure 1.8 Reciprocal determinism in psychological function of Bandura’s (1977) Social Learning 
Theory.  
Source: Author’s own illustration based on Bandura (1977, pp. 10, 194, 204). 
One of the most important contributions of Bandura’s social learning theory is that it “emphasizes 
the prominent roles played by vicarious, symbolic, and self-regulatory processes in psychological 
functioning” (Bandura, 1977, p. vii). Human thought, affect, and behavior can not only be affected 
by direct experience, but also by observation. (Bandura, 1977, p. vii) A big and obvious difference 
between learning by direct experience and learning by observation lies in their acquisition processes 
and learning costs. Learning through direct experience is a process of trial-and-error which could 
bring extremely undesirable consequences in some situations; on contrast, observational learning to 
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a large extent can avoid costs of errors, especially some dangerous ones (Bandura, 1977, pp. 12, 22). 
This view of stressing the impact of both direct and indirect experiences on learning is different 
from that of, such as, Mantzavinos, North and Shariq (2004, p. 76) who state that “learning is an 
evolutionary process of trial and error, and failure to solve a problem leads to the trail of a new 
solution.” In observational learning, information plays a crucial role. The reason why modeling can 
arouse learning is principally in virtue of informative function (Bandura, 1977, p. 22). Modeled 
events through observational learning “governed by four component processes”, namely, attentional 
processes, retention processes, motor reproduction processes and motivational processes, produce 
matching performances in people (Bandura, 1977, pp. 22-29). Additionally, even though people can 
acquire and change behavioral patterns through learning, it does not mean that they accept any 
behavior passively without principle. Bandura (1977, p. 128) states that “people hold firmly to 
ideological positions rather than undergo compliant behavior reversals.” Moreover, the self-
evaluative standards that people hold are not only for evaluating others, but also for themselves 
(Bandura, 1977, p. 134).  
1.6.4 Types of social learning  
Bandura (1977) emphasizes both learning through direct experiences and learning through 
observation, which distinguishes social learning according to different ways of acquiring 
information. It should be noted that the word “observation” in Bandura (1977) is used in a boarder 
sense than just seeing by eyes. Besides, social learning can also be categorized as follows according 
to different criteria.  
(i) Learning thought vs. learning behavior 
This categorization is according to the contents of learning. Considering the possible inconsistency 
between thought and behavior (see Section 1.4.2), learning can be categorized as learning thought 
and learning behavior. If what one person socially learns is not only a way of behaving, but also the 
directly corresponding thoughts (such as, values, moral principles, etc.) behind it which are 
internally accepted and internalized by him / her thereafter, this kind of learning is learning thought; 
if what (s)he learns is only the behavior, it is learning behavior.  
(ii) Forward learning vs. reverse learning 
According to the consistency of the behavior pattern between what a learner is learned and that of 
the person being learned, social learning can be categorized as forward learning and reverse learning. 
If one follows the behavioral pattern (s)he experiences, personally or observationally, it is forward 
learning; if (s)he behaves in the totally different way after learning, it is reverse learning. For 
example, if a person sees trustworthy behavior and learns to be trustworthy, it is forward learning. 
On contrast, if (s)he learns to be untrustworthy although what (s)he experiences is trustworthiness, 
it is reverse learning. – This somehow resembles psychological inversion in adolescents. Another 
example, if one sees others smoking and (s)he learns to smoke, this is forward learning; if (s)he 
conversely starts hating smoking, it is reverse learning.  
(iii) Learning from the same standpoint vs. learning from the counter-standpoint  
If a person has basically the same standpoint with the models from whom (s)he learns, this kind of 
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learning is learning from the same standpoint; otherwise, it is learning from the counter-standpoint. 
For example, if a vendor knows that other vendors give short weight and (s)he also does like that, 
this is learning from the same standpoint since (s)he and other vendors are engaged in the same kind 
of occupation and both behave from the standpoint of a seller. If a consumer knows that the 
phenomenon of short in weight exists among vendors and (s)he takes some measures not to contact 
with untrustworthy vendors or becomes warier when buying things, this is learning from the 
counter-standpoint because the consumer learns at the counter-standpoint of the sellers, namely as 
a consumer.    
(iv) Active learning vs. passive learning  
According to the activeness of a learner, social learning can be either active or passive. The meaning 
of the two kinds of social learning is relatively obvious. Active learning means that the learner learns 
voluntarily out of his / her own will, while, on contrast, passive learning is pushed by other, 
especially external, factors. 
1.6.5 What to learn? – Social learning and trust and trustworthiness 
People living in the human society get socialized from birth, in which process social learning plays 
an irreplaceable role. In the social learning theory, ways / channels of social learning (such as direct 
experiences, observation, etc.) occupy a very important position. As aforementioned, they are also 
ways of information acquisition, including information of others’ trustworthiness, as well as trust. 
All in all, what is of center importance is the acquisition of external information, knowledge, etc., 
together with possible according changes of thought and behavior under their influences. In my 
view, two prominent actual consequences of social learning lie in two aspects: One places emphasis 
on nurturing behavioral habits. First is nurturing relatively social behavioral habits. For example, 
people are instilled in mind what behavior is socially acceptable so that those behaviors can be 
gradually nurtured. These behaviors are usually institutional. Second is nurturing relatively personal 
behavioral habits, such as smoking or tiding stuff, etc. It is noteworthy that behavioral habits that 
have been nurtured could be inconsistent with, or even opposite to, those that are supposed to be 
learnt. (See Section 1.6.4, learning from the same standpoint vs. learning from the counter-
standpoint) The other places emphasize on providing information. In this case, although people have 
already received some piece of information, and formed some corresponding psychological or 
mental reaction such as an opinion, a feeling, etc., they do not nurture some habitual behavior. As 
to which action will be taken largely depends on their own decisions. It is noteworthy that behavior 
nurtured for adapting to the actual social environment and those required by institutions like moral 
norms may not be consistent, or even conflict. This also makes behavior diversify.    
Social learning of trust places emphasis on information acquisition and contingent reaction 
accordingly. It is prominently reflected by the pro-social attitudes of trust and its corresponding 
behavior premised on that no untrustworthiness is detected and by responding to trustworthiness of 
different degrees in thoughts and behavior adaptively. Social learning of trustworthiness put stresses 
on nurturing behavioral habits. It lies in in essence accepting and conforming to traditional values, 
morals, virtues, scruples and other principles that are approved of, accepted and acceptable in the 
society. Then, purely imitating behavior comes the second relative to those principles. 
Internalization of those values etc. means to admit them from the bottom of one’s heart, to 
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voluntarily be regulated and disciplined by them, and to conform to them. Of course, not all people 
behave under those socially desirable norms etc. Otherwise, no problem would happen in people’s 
interactions and the society would operate perfectly.  
In actuality, people will frequently find themselves in various trusting-trusted relationships in which 
they sometimes act as a trustor, sometimes as a trustee and sometimes simultaneously as both (see 
1.5.3), and in which they often need to decide how to behave. This fact guarantees that socially 
learning from both standpoints can successfully cause people’s attention, and further that people 
can learn from both standpoints. Most importantly, this kind of learning is a dual one in both 
thoughts and behavior. On one hand, people learn whether to be trustworthy or not and in which 
situations, although, generally speaking, being trustworthy is always morally desirable. Some 
people firmly conform to the norm of trustworthiness and are reluctant to do anything violating 
moral scruples. On contrast, out of some sort of reasons and values, some other people would like 
to and do behave in the opposite way. For instance, those who find from personal experiences or 
observations that selling fake products can make a quick money and cannot be externally punished 
may also do that. On the other hand, people also learn when to trust and when not to, especially in 
order to respond to known or detected (un)trustworthiness. For example, those who know that some 
merchant sells bad-quality goods will not trust or decreases their trust in that merchant.  
Learning essentially is through different events; or put in a different way, learning is essentially 
events-driven. People do not experience exactly the same events (Denzau and North, 1994), which 
may result in different interpretation of events and further different reflections. However, 
individuals could classify similar events and store them in their mind (for more learning models in 
the economic literature, see, e.g., Brenner, 2006).  
A complex loop of feedback between micro and macro is heavily relevant to the common impact of 
diverse types of individual and social learning of many heterogeneous individuals. The updating 
and persistence of an individual’s opinions and behaviors reflect the results of his / her accumulative 
individual and social learning practices and experiences. In social environment, an individual is both 
a subject and an object of learning. In the process of learning, individuals’ speed of learning varies 
when being a subject of learning. More specifically, individual willingness and capability of 
accepting a kind of thoughts/ideas/opinions/values and actions/behaviors are different; the degree 
of individual insights into what (s)he observes and experiences are different; individual imagination 
and association from the same event are also different. – These all have an important influence on 
what on earth information an individual really gets in the end.  
Generally, the scope of one’s learning is much larger than his / her interaction network. As we have 
already known, interactions are usually local, such as geographically local and social-distance local. 
However, the range of learning exceeds largely that of interactions. It can be geographically distant, 
socially distant, or even time distant (see, Section 1.6.6). In the process of these distant learning, 
various media play a crucial role since they are indispensable tools to expand individual horizon.  
Below some possible objects and channels of learning will be elaborated on, which may provide 
some specific research topics for others to study irrespectively or comparatively different influence 
of different learning objects and channels on trust. 
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No matter from which source people learn, the ultimate effect may all be reflected in his/her 
thoughts and behavior about his/her social life and their changes. What people learn is the wisdom 
of living in society from their angle which can give humans guidance and advice for their future 
interactions.  
1.6.6 Examples of objects of (generalized) social learning: perspective 
of interpersonal relationships 
As aforementioned, the functions of social learning lie in two aspects, one is information acquisition, 
the other is behavior nurturing. Different objects of learning may delivery different information to 
individuals and play different roles in constructing personality and different subtypes of trust in 
different life stages and different situations. Enumerating some objects of learning enlightens us 
about the forming and changing of individual trust.  
(i) Parents 
Early stages in life, such as childhood and teenage, are the crucial periods for a person to form 
personality, personal quality, values, etc. and to learn how to conduct. It can be said that experiences 
in early life have a great influence on the whole life. The reason why parents play so important a 
role in one’s early life is not separable from the fact that usually in his / her early life one stays with 
his / her socialized parents for the longest time and has the closest relationships with his / her parents. 
This is also the advantage of parents-children relationships from the perspective of social learning 
because they facilitate parents’ significant influences, both behavioral and linguistic, on their 
children through direct interactions, direct observation in the narrow sense, edification and 
instruction, information conveying. Thus, from the perspective of a child, his / her social learning 
from his / her parents more lie in direct learning (rather than indirect), learning thoughts and 
behavior, forward learning (rather than reverse), and learning from the same standpoint (rather than 
from the counter-standpoint). In addition, due to the natural generational relationship between 
parents and children, social learning from parents is of a nature of generational transmission. What 
children learn from their parents could also form pre-concepts about the society in children’s mind. 
As to trust and trustworthiness, parents’ influences on children are prominently reflected in three 
aspects due to their close relationship: first, cultivating the quality of trustworthiness; second, 
delivering information about trustworthiness in society; three, transmitting attitude of trust. (As for 
the children’s reaction to the information about trustworthiness in society, it is another matter.) Let 
us have a look at trust. trust accompanies one’s whole life, and is probably initially nurtured in one’s 
early life. Uslaner (2000), considering trust “as a value sets in early in life” (p. 574), argues that 
“trust doesn’t come from our social interactions. We learn it early in life from our parents, who 
impart to us a sense of optimism and a belief that we are the masters of our own fate” (p. 571) and 
“trusting adults with nurturing parenting styles have trusting children. And trusting young people in 
turn become trusting adults” (p. 574). Although Uslaner (2000) does not treat parents as objects of 
social learning, Uslaner (2000) admits that children’s initial trust propensity is established in their 
interactions with their parents or other people who raise them. Thus, from Uslaner’s point of view, 
the thought of trust of intergeneration transition can be seen. Furthermore, evidences from empirical 
researches reveal that there is an intergenerational transfer of trust, which means if parents have a 
higher individual trust level, their children tend to a have relatively higher individual trust level; and 
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vice versa (e.g., Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde, 2012; Rotenberg, 1995).  
(ii) Neighborhood 
The impact of neighbors has been noticed for a long time. Take Mencius, a great thinker and 
educator in the Warring States Period in ancient China, as an example. According to the records of 
the Biographies of Exemplary Women (In Chinese: 列女传; Pinyin: Liè Nǚ Zhuàn): When Mencius 
was a child, he and his mother lived near a cemetery. Then little Mencius learned what people did 
during a funeral and imitated them when playing. His mother then thought that this place was not 
suitable for her son to live and moved to somewhere near a marketplace. But little Mencius then 
learned peddlers’ hawking and imitated them when playing. His mother thought that the 
marketplace was either not an ideal place for her son to live and moved to somewhere near a school. 
Little Mencius then learned courtesy etc. His mother thought this is the very place for her son to 
live and then settled down there. When little Mencius grew up more, he studied the Six Arts, and 
finally became a great master. (Zhang, 2017, pp. 40-45) Mencius’s mother changed three living 
places in order to find an ideal neighborhood environment for her son. The reason why Mencius 
could become a great thinker and educator is largely relevant to his mother’s nurturing way and the 
good neighborhood environment his mother ever searched for him in his childhood.  
The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) is an experiment initiated by the US department of Housing and 
Urban from 1994 to 1998 to study the distinct various outcomes between individuals living in high-
poverty neighborhood and lower-poverty one (Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016). Recently, Chetty, 
Hendren and Katz (2016) use MTO to study the impact of neighborhood on children’s long-term 
outcomes, such as college attendance, earnings and other outcomes, since these children have 
reached the age of being able to enter adult labor market. Chetty, Hendren and Katz (2016) find that 
the children less than 13 when they moved to lower-poverty “are more likely to attend college and 
have substantially higher incomes as adults” (p. 899), “live in better neighborhoods themselves as 
adults” (p. 899) and “are less likely to become single parents themselves” (p. 899); however this 
impact is not embodied in those children who were more than 13 when they moved to lower-poverty 
neighborhood from high-poverty neighborhood. What is more, moving to lover-poverty 
neighborhood even has slightly negative influence (Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016). This research 
of Chetty, Hendren and Katz (2016) manifest the children’s exposure effect and disruption effects. 
Childhood is one’s crucial period for growing up. That is one of the reasons that the environment 
of one’s childhood has so large an influence.  
Neighborhood is a relatively stable local social environment. Usually, what people mean by 
neighborhood is in a geographical sense. Certainly, in academic research, people or objects with 
some direct relationship are often abstracted as neighbors. The prominent characteristic of 
neighborhood is the geographically short distance and / or the relative stability of neighbors. 
Furthermore, the meeting probability of people geographically near or in the same interaction circle 
in some other way is obviously higher relative to people geographically distant or in different 
interaction circles. This also makes possible the repeated interactions between people within some 
local interpersonal environment and repeated observations of neighbors, and further reinforces the 
social learning in neighborhood in repetition. Only in terms of information acquisition, neighbors 
are relatively stable, direct information sources. Usually, information, especially about 
trustworthiness, about neighbors can be acquired through direct personal interactions, direct 
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observations (in the narrow sense) and word by mouth. Moreover, information about neighbors is 
usually particular, which not only reflects one’s local environment, but also makes one know the 
personal quality of some particular neighbor, including trustworthiness, so that one knows how to 
deal with that neighbor and whether to approach or to keep far away from him / her. In terms of 
social learning, neighbors’ experiences provide relatively rich examples based upon which one can 
carry on both forward and reverse learning, and learning from both the same and the counter 
standpoint.     
(iii) Strangers 
In spite of the fact that the degree of strangeness or familiarity is continuous, suppose that people in 
the world are either familiars or strangers for someone. Then, let us classify strangers into two 
categories: one contains strangers who can become familiars in the end, while the other contains 
those who will not. Given a good relationship, strangers in the first category are potential resources 
of business opportunities, academic cooperation, emotional supports, and so on. The key point to 
get familiar with somebody is mutual understanding of some degree which is in essence a sufficient 
amount of information about that person. In terms of interactions, mutual understanding, from no 
understanding, is relevant to the frequency and time of interactions in general. Given the length of 
a period of time, mutual understanding increases with the frequency of interactions; likewise, given 
the frequency of interactions, mutual understanding increases with the length of an interaction 
period.  
What is intended to stress is strangers in the second category. Relatively speaking, people interact 
with strangers less than familiars in daily life, except those in occupations characterized by 
interacting with many strangers. However, strangers often relate to important aspects of people’s 
life. What is more, due to the absolutely large number of strangers, people often find themselves 
surrounded by strangers. Social learning from strangers can be via personal interactions, direct 
observations (in the narrow sense), word by mouth, and through different media. Take media as an 
example. What people hear from media is usually about strangers, usually those they will never 
have got a chance to interact. The value of those pieces of information more lies in knowing the 
existing phenomena in society, and in which industry, field, context, group, region, etc. than the 
personal quality of the exposed person(s), so that people know how to deal with similar events 
happening to them. Thus, social learning among strangers is often embodied in learning from the 
counter-standpoint as an opponent.   
1.6.7 Learning channels: in and beyond individual immediate 
interaction network  
As aforementioned, learning network is much larger than that of immediate interaction network, 
and usually it can be said that immediate interaction network is a subset of learning network. Thus, 
we roughly divide the channels of learning into immediate interaction and other channels. As the 
development of human civilization, we have already not been limited within geographically local 
learning. Below some non-interaction channels of generalized social learning which is beyond one’s 
immediate interaction network and makes learning much faster and much more possible will also 
be presented.  
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(i) Immediate interaction network 
Every individual is an “ego” in his / her / its interaction network. Within every individual’s 
immediate interaction network (immediate neighborhood), (s)he can both interact and observe his / 
her neighbors. In particular, when people face to face interact, the process of interaction can also be 
considered to overlap with the process of observation, for they can observe each other’s expressions, 
gestures and so forth which may deliver some extra information. For example, usually parents, 
relatives, friends and colleagues are all in one’s immediate interactive network. 
There is also probability that two agents have “interacted” with each other for a long time without 
having meeting each other. An example is, two geographically distant people for some working 
reasons need to communicate often with each other. However, they only “interact”, or to say 
communicate, via e-mails, and the like. In this situation, these people are “dragged” into each other’s 
immediate neighborhood in spite of with a long geographical distance.   
(ii) Temporary interactions   
Temporary interaction horizontally exceeds immediate social network.1 Often individuals interact 
with somebody only once or a few times, or a period which is subjectively not very long from one’s 
own point of view. This can be called, for example, temporary interactions. In this kind of 
interactions, an individual may have some preconceptions about his / her temporary partner. The 
preconceptions may come from some kind of “label” of his / her interactive partner. For example, 
one classified his / her previous experiences. When (s)he encounters a temporary interaction, (s)he 
may relate his / her partner in front of him / her to those who (s)he thinks share some kind of common 
characteristic with his / her present partner. They may also come from immediate perception about 
his / her partner, say, perception from just before and during communication.  
(iii) Observation 
Observation (in the narrow sense) can be both in a direct way and in an indirect way, namely direct 
observation and indirect observation. Direct observation here indicates the situation, say that some 
event happens nearby and one can witness the whole or part of, or even only have a glance of, the 
process of what is happening, which may cause, such as, sympathy or other emotions. Indirect 
observation needs some other intermediary, such as mass media, mobile terminals, internet and so 
on. As the development of technology and realization of innovative ideas, more and more 
intermediaries emerge allowing indirect observation at anywhere and at any time. Bandura (1971, 
p. 10) proposes that “considering the large amount of time that people spend watching televised 
models, mass media may play an influential role in shaping behavior and social attitudes”. 
(iv) Verbal delivered information 
Verbal delivered information can both vertical and horizontal. For vertical verbal delivered 
information, we mainly mean the information about previous generations. Linguistic form that 
reflects the practices of human ancestors and are verbally transmitted from our previous generations, 
and always coincide with and guide the decisions we contemporary humans make. For horizontal 
 
1 Same with Seltzer and Smirnov (2015), we do not treat this kind of temporary interaction with, such as, a stranger 
as the separated degree changing. 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
54 
 
verbal delivered information, we mainly mean how information is diffused within social network. 
Along social network, one can be informed of events both locally happening and even not locally 
happening. It should be figured out here that the realization of vertical verbal delivered information 
cannot be separated from the participation of horizontal verbal delivered information. For example, 
proverbs are a linguistic form that reflects the practices of human ancestors and are transmitted from 
our previous generations both verbally and via written records, and always coincide with and is of 
guidance meaning for the decisions we contemporary humans make. This is a vivid example of how 
later generations learn from earlier generations. Of course, proverbs can also be transmitted by 
record. 
(v) Written records 
Written records are also an important channel which thoughts and facts can be delivered by. Its 
influence prominently reflects on, such as, historical materials which to a large extent is one resource 
of keeping what construct collective memory.  
1.6.8 Distances and interpersonal relationships 
As aforementioned, interactions (including the decision of not to interact) is the important channel 
to deliver information about personal trustworthiness and trust attitude. Furthermore, in general, 
shorter distance and / or same interaction platform improve the probability of the occurrence of 
interpersonal interactions and therefore facilitate them. Therein, three types of distances and four 
types of platforms are distinguished. Below illustrates them respectively.  
(i) Distances 
(a) Geographical distance, as its literal meaning, refers to the spatial, locational distance between 
two (groups of) persons, in terms of interpersonal relations. Geographical range can be roughly 
categorized as local and distant. Geographical nearness provides convenience for frequent physical 
meetings since physical meetings across long geographical distances need more time and money 
costs. Furthermore, given the meetings are pleasant ones, frequent (or at least not rare) meetings 
benefit the establishment and maintenance of a relation, especially for non-consanguinity, ceteris 
paribus.  
(b) As to social distance, different scholars from different perspective to illustrate it (e.g., Park, 1924; 
Bogardus, 1925, 1947; Bourdier, 1989). Park (1924) defines social distance as “the grades and 
degrees of understanding and intimacy which characterize personal and social relations generally”, 
based on which Bogardus (1925) constructs a social distance scale. Bourdieu’s concept of social 
distance is not separable from his concept of social space, and is important for distinguishing 
different social classes. According to Bourdieu (1989), social space is an ensemble of “objective 
relations which are irreducible to […] interactions […]” (p. 16), and is a space of resources 
distribution. Therein, Bourdieu (1989) stresses four types of resources, namely economic capital, 
cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital, and endows social space with two dimensions, 
that is, the overall volume of capital and the structure of capital. Thus, social distance is the distance 
between two positions in social space, and therefore is the distance of different social classes, and 
represents the different resources that different agents etc. possess. “This [social] space is 
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constructed in such a way that the closer the agents, groups or institution which are situated within 
this space, the more common properties they have; and the more distant, the fewer.” (Bourdieu, 
1989, p. 16)  
Here in this thesis, social distance means the objective nearness of the social classes, social 
stratifications, social positions, etc. of two (groups of) persons. So, social distance here is somehow 
a vertical structure. There could be further stratifications in the same indicator of social distance. A 
person is more likely to form or to join in a common social circle with those who have a shorter 
social distance from him / her, ceteris paribus. Usually, people have social activities within their 
own social circle, and therefore, they are more likely to have an acquaintance with those from their 
own social circle. In addition, two persons with a shorter social distance are more likely to have the 
same standpoints and the consequent interest, and to understand each other better than two persons 
with longer one, ceteris paribus. In reality, different occupations may also be implicitly endowed 
with different social positions. People engaged in the same occupation are more likely to have an 
acquaintance with, interact with and know each other. For instance, a scholar is more likely to know 
more fellow scholars through participating in academic conferences of his scientific research field. 
Figure 1.9 presents a possible relation of social distances and social classes, with a social class 
containing several social stratifications, assuming that less people are in higher social classes and 
social stratifications and that there are three social classes in total in the society and each social class 
has three social stratifications. In general, people have a shorter social distance with those who are 
in the same social class and social stratification with them. However, a person in a higher social 
stratification of a lower social class may also have a short social distance with another person in a 
lower social stratification of higher social class.
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Figure 1.9 Social distance and social class. 
Notes: Size of the block of different social class represents the population size of each class. The 
smaller the number of a social class or stratification, the higher the position of the class or 
stratification in the society. 
(c) By psychological distance I mean the subjectively perceived mutual intimacy in the sense of 
affection based on psychological process and / or the similarity / difference in the way of thinking, 
especially psychological or mental process involving value judgments, moral principles etc. In a 
word, psychological distance is premised on psychological activities at the psychological level. A 
relatively short psychological distance is usually conducive to the establishment and maintenance 
of a long-term relationship. Of course, not all on the psychological level is good for the maintenance 
of a relationship. For example, it is usually impossible for a selfish person only caring for his / her 
own interests, which can be regarded as a kind of values of living, to get well along with another 
selfish person.     
It should be noted in passing that in literature, the boundary between and the range of geographical, 
social and psychological distance are often ambiguous. On one hand, sociologists may define social 
distance in a psychological way (e.g., Park, 1924; followed by Bugardus, 1925). On the other hand, 
in some works of social psychology, social distance is regarded as one of the dimensions of 
psychological distance. For example, Liberman, Trope and Stephan (2007) distinguish four 
dimensions of psychological distance, namely, temporal distance, spatial distance, social distance, 
and hypotheticality. However, this thesis obviously does not use the terms in that way; it insists on 
using “social distance” to represent social aspects and “psychological distance” psychological 
aspect because when some meaning is expressed into a term, it is better for the term to be more 
intuitive, admitting that the three kinds of distances relate to each other in some way. Specifically, 
geographical distance may relate to psychological distance: Those geographically living in the same 
region for a long time probably have integrated into local culture, customs etc. Social distance may 
relate to psychological distance: people in the same, such as, social class may make similar value 
judgments out of their standpoints. Geographical distance may relate to social distance: The rich 
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class and the poor tend to live agglomeratively in different districts of a local area. However, relating 
in some way is not a reason why a concept should belong to another.  
(ii) interaction platforms 
The title of this thesis gives special stresses on “‘deep’ network structure”. This concept tightly 
relates the conception of “meso”-sized interaction platforms and arenas in several papers of Elsner 
and Elsner et al (e.g. Elsner, 2007; Elsner and Heinrich, 2009; Elsner, 2010; Elsner and Heinrich, 
2011; Elsner and Schwardt, 2014; Elsner and Schwardt, 2015). In their papers, Elsner and Elsner et 
al accentuate the size dimension of the interaction platforms and arenas. Elsner (2007) argues that 
meso level, i.e. mid-sized groups, is a proper level on which institutional or structural emergence 
takes place. Elsner and Heinrich (2009) further dig into the co-evolution of an institution and the 
size of its carrier group by using a supergame of prisoners’ dilemma from a population perspective. 
However, argue Elsner and Schwardt (2015, p. 81), “it [the size of interaction arenas] is not about 
absolute size in terms of overall population but the ‘inner’ size structure of interaction arenas”.  
The word “structure” usually refers to a kind of spatial or proportional arrangements. How different 
interaction platforms are arranged generates a structure. Despite the size dimension, it is the 
interdependent individuals’ micro interaction processes that are carrying on on these interaction 
platforms. That a particular individual interacts across different platforms means different 
interaction platforms may contain some (at least one) same individuals; these platforms therefore 
overlap. Inspired by Elsner and Schwardt (2014), Dai (2015, pp. 100-102) classifies interaction 
platforms into four types, namely political platforms, economic platforms, social platforms and 
international platforms. However, I would like to provide another way of considering interaction 
platforms and, at the same time, the overlapping of interaction platforms. Note that this is not even 
a roughly exhausted classification of interaction platforms; it just provides different angles of 
thinking and understanding overlapping interaction platforms. Most importantly, same interaction 
platforms not only facilitate interactions; the platforms per se are where interactions happen. 
(a) Geographical-location-related platforms Geographical propinquity can form an interaction 
platform and increase the probability of interactions. As an individual moves to different 
geographical locations, (s)he encounters different interaction partners. Faster mobility enlarges the 
chance of encountering more strangers.  
(b) Organization-based platform People in the same organization have more opportunities to 
interact with each other. Take colleagues in the same company as an example, especially those in 
the same department or having direct superior-subordinate relationships. Their offices are usually 
in the same place or near to each other, and they are often deal with the same project together. 
Furthermore, working in the same place could also favor the establishment of personal relationships. 
(c) Social-roles-related platforms Multiplicity of a person’s social roles also provides possibilities 
of the overlap of interaction platforms. For example, a female can be both a mother and a teacher at 
the same time. As a mother, she interacts with her children and other people related to her 
responsibility as a mother; as a teacher, she interacts with her students, others teachers and other 
staff in her affiliation.  
(d) Events-related platforms Interaction platforms can vary depending on different events that an 
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individual deals with. When an individual is involved in an event, he enters the platform and 
interacts with others also involved in the event; when the event finished, the platforms dismisses. 
Thus, different events offer different interaction platforms. 
(e) Technology-based platform This kind of platforms is mainly for distinguishing from realistic 
social interaction networks. Supported by modern information technology, various on-line social 
platforms emerge, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn. In China, there are on-line social networks 
like Sina Weibo, and instant communication software like Tencent QQ and WeChat. These on-line 
social platforms overlap with realistic social networks and provide communication at any time 
anywhere. However, what is remarkable about on-line social platforms is that they supply more 
opportunities of communicating with and getting information about a lot more strangers.1 
(f) Era platform People can only physically interact with those in the same era. Living in the same 
era therefore provides an interaction platform for people of that age. They are the creators of their 
“current social situation”, certainly including the overall trust and trustworthiness environment, of 
their era.  
It should be noted in passing that not only one type of distance or interaction platform may relate to 
another type, but also a type of distance may relate to some type of platform. For example, short 
geographical distances could form a geographical-location-related platform, and a geographical-
location-related platform and an organization-based platform could also overlap. However, although 
some relation may exist between them, they do stress different aspects and are viewed from different 
perspectives, which leads to that they are not completely the same. Take geographical-location-
related platforms and organization-based platforms as an example. A geographical-location-related 
platform may be as large as a village, a town, or a city, while an organization may have branches in 
geographically distant cities.  
1.6.9 Networking micro to macro and heterogeneity of networks 
“Analysis of social networks is suggested as a tool for linking micro and macro levels of sociological 
theory.” Granovetter (1973, p. 1360) Broadly and roughly speaking, it is networks that connect 
micro- to macro-level, no matter what objects the micro-level individuals refer to and in which field 
they are, and make macro phenomenon more interesting. However, it does not mean that there are 
links directly connecting micro- and macro-level; it means that the interconnecting micro 
individuals form various realistic macro-level phenomena. – This is what I mean “networking micro 
to macro”. 
Granovetter (1985, p. 491) argues that it is social network of relationship that produces trust in 
economic life and sustains order.2 However, Granovetter (1985) also admits that network of social 
relationships does not guarantee the emergence of trust and the sustenance of order for certain; 
distrust, opportunism and disorder do exist in social networks, since “networks of social relations 
 
1 By the way, as the development of artificial intelligence, humans get more likely to interact with robots. For 
example, in March 2016, AlphaGo, an artificial intellectual chess computer program, played a match with Lee Sedol, 
a professional player in South Korean. It can be predicted that in future there would be more platforms based on 
technology. 
2 Note that Granovetter (1985) considers that institutional arrangements, general morality and social network of 
relationship function in different situations of economic life. 
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penetrate irregularly and in differing degrees in different sectors of economic life” (p. 491). That is, 
social networks may “be a necessary condition for trust and trustworthy behavior” (Granovetter, 
1985, p. 491), however, they are by no means a sufficient condition for trust and trustworthiness. In 
other words, trust is both established and destroyed in interactions. 
Network is an expression of relationships. Network theory stems from graph theory in mathematics. 
As we know, nodes and edges / links are the two basic elements of networks after abstraction. But 
I suggest that three elements there should be, that is nodes, edges or links, and flows (on the edges 
or links) because flows affect the strength of links. Certainly, those only with nodes but without 
edges are also treated as a kind of networks, networks with special forms, which are named 
“edgeless / empty graph” in graph theory. Although it is not impossible for this kind of networks to 
exist in reality, they often lack realistic interests; their meaning, or their practical values, lie in their 
representation as a network status. For example, they can be used to represent the status in which 
all relations are lost in network dynamic, or no relationship has been set up yet. However, strictly 
speaking, in my view, networks without links should not be called “networks” since they lack the 
form or pattern of networks. In this sense, edges are relatively important and deterministic for 
networks, and any connected objects can be abstracted as networks. 
All in all, realistic macro phenomena are usually inseparable from networks. Micro-level individuals 
within a scope are ones of various relationships. Only turning to the feedback between micro- and 
macro-level is not enough to explain the effects happening between them, even after adding more 
in-between layers, and the role of networks therein. Therefore, in order to better understand what 
happens between micro- and macro-level, four steps, or levels, are needed to explain how micro 
individuals generate macro phenomena under the effect of networks. The reason why networks are 
important is that they provide basis for interactions and conditions for changes of effect.  
Step 1: Endowment / Networking process 
Macro phenomena in human society are conditional on human activities, and human activities 
further depend on or constitute some network of relationships. Suppose that networks investigated 
are in human societies. Even when the preexist range of study is the same (namely, the same group 
of people), networks formed can also be different because the relationships represented by edges / 
links can be different, such as a network of friendships and kinships. Of course, it cannot be excluded 
the possibility that two different networks in which links are of different meaning might present the 
same visual pattern. This process combining edges / links with some particular meaning (some 
relationships investigated) with nodes (some set of individuals investigated) is “endowment process” 
or “networking process”. It endows links with different attributions onto nodes. This process would 
directly result in the next consequence – the formation of a network.  
Step 2: Micro effects 
Elementary effects on micro-level based on networks can be abstracted and simplified as those on 
arbitrary two nodes and the edge / link between them which determine whether an effect will 
generate, whether a generated effect is positive or negative / passive for some final macro 
phenomenon, and how strong is the generated effect. The generated micro effects can be concisely 
represented by some (in)equations which can be divided into three big categories: the first is 1+1<0, 
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which represents a negative effect for some final macro phenomenon; the second 1+1=0, which 
means no actual effect; and the third 1+1>0, which represents a positive effect. Further, in the third 
category, there are also three situations: the first is 1+1>2, which represents a reinforcement effect; 
the second is 1+1<2, a weakening effect; the third is 1+1=2, an aggregation effect.  
Step 3: Synthesization process 
A process is needed for numerous micro effects to form some macro phenomenon. – This is 
synthesization process. In this process, those micro effects generated in the last step synthesize in a 
series of ways such as offset (1+1=0), reinforcement (1+1>2), weakening (1+1<2), superposition 
(1+1=2), etc. Thus, this is also a process of changes of micro effects. Meanwhile, some structure or 
pattern will also present gradually in this process.  
Step 4: macro-level presentation 
At least three specific forms of macro phenomena could catch people’s attention: the first is some 
macro index embodied as a specific number; the second is the distribution of something among 
some macro scope; the third is some pattern like flow networks.  
Heterogeneity is pervasive. As mentioned, heterogeneity is a prominent characteristic of the 
complexity of the real world, just as what we observe and what our common knowledge describes. 
The reason why macro network phenomena are rich and constantly changing in reality lies in the 
driving of heterogeneity. In terms of the network domain, heterogeneity has already been able to 
from different perspectives be described in different ways.  
(a) Heterogeneity of nodes  
In terms of human individuals, they are different in cultural backgrounds, values, beliefs, attitudes, 
preference, education backgrounds, income, and so on. Also, their personal trust levels are not the 
same. Additionally, human individuals typically have different experiences which shape their 
mental modes (Denzau and North, 1994). Moreover, the rules and institutions which guide the 
behaviors are also different. In terms of economic entities, taking firms as an example, firms have 
distinct routines, governance structures, asset-liability levels, profitability, and so forth. 
(b) Heterogeneity of links  
Heterogeneity of links embodies in: 1) the nature of objective relations, such as kinships, superior-
subordinate relationships, colleague relationships, cooperative relationships and so on; 2) emotional 
strength of relationships in which the linked human individuals have short psychological distance; 
3) frequency of interactions and 4) topics delivered along the links.  
(c) Heterogeneity of flows  
The heterogeneity of flows includes three aspects: First, the contents of flows. As long as networks 
exist, various “flows” flow along the networks. “Flows” could be products (i.e. product networks), 
information, advices, diseases and so on. The nature, the quantity, the quality and the speed about 
the flows are diversified. Second, volume. The volume of flows is also an important embodiment 
of the strength of links. Third, direction. Given that each node of an investigated network has a 
Chapter 1: Thinking Trust Systemically in Socio-Economic Environment 
61 
 
unique, recognizable identity, the role of the direction of flows become more significant because it 
reveals where the target resources flow, which node gathers how many resources, who is a resource-
richer and who is not, etc. Moreover, the direction of flows will finally become a characteristic of 
nodes. 
(d) Diversity of game types / structures  
Note that because what is described is interpersonal network, there are interpersonal interactions, 
such as abstracted as games. Individuals are involved in different interaction or game types, rather 
than be engaged in a single type. Additionally, different interaction types may have different 
meanings and importance for the parties involved. If the payoffs acquired from a certain game type 
can be divided into material payoff and non-material payoff (such as spiritual payoff or emotional 
values et cetera), then non-material payoff may also play an important role which enters the 
perception of parties involved.  
(e) Heterogeneity of platforms  
Different platforms are constituted of individuals of different roles, are engaged in different events, 
and are supported by different mechanisms. The explanation of interaction platforms has been 
presented before (see section 1.6.8). 
(f) Heterogeneity of network structures  
Network structures are for time points. In other words, a network structure is the (observed) structure 
of some particular time point. Not all network structures change over time. Given a time period, it 
is possible that some network structures change with time, while some do not. Also, different 
network structures can lead to different evolutionary processes, if they do change over time, and 
macro performance, ceteris paribus. In reality, there could be a great variety of network structures. 
When comparing different network structures, some statistical indicators, such as diameter, degree 
distribution, cluster coefficient and so on, can be applied to investigate the properties (for detail 
introduction about various indicators of network structures, see e.g. Costa, Rodrigues, Travieso and 
Villas Boas, 2007; Jackson, 2008). Also, there are some special cases of types of network structures, 
such as, small-world networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and scale-free networks (Barabási and 
Albert, 1999). In reality, measuring network structures often encounter great difficulties because of 
the huge number of abstracted nodes in human society, which leads to a big challenge for the 
memory space and computing capability, and computing time. This is also a big obstacle for 
empirical research of networks.   
The main motivation of stressing the heterogeneity results from the huge power of combination. 
Various combination of heterogeneity generates diversity. It must be admitted that the above 
categories do not exhaust. However, they provide some meaningful perspectives and theoretical 
background before further comparison is presented in Chapter 4. 
1.7 Spatial mobility and trust, and social mobility 
1.7.1 Geographical mobility 
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This thesis treats spatial mobility and geographic mobility as interchangeable. Usually, geographical 
mobility implies exceeding a certain local area; it is mobility across different local areas. As to how 
large the local area is, there is no specific standard, and different research could have different 
treatments; it depends on what is under investigation. However, it is almost certain that at least one’s 
familiar neighborhood is local. Therefore, spatial mobility in this thesis refers to leaving one’s local, 
and often familiar, circumstance to another place for a period of time. There are three perspectives 
to view geographical mobility: First, from the perspective of a single geographically mobile person, 
individual geographical mobility refers to his / her change of geographical location. Second, from 
the perspective of a local area, geographical mobility refers to the process of people’s flowing into 
and out of the area. Third, from the perspective of a larger area which covers different local areas, 
geographical mobility may show an interest in the overall pattern of people’s mobility among 
different places. 
Basically, geographical mobility has two dimensions, that is, distance and time. Suppose there are 
only two situations for the distance dimension, long-distance mobility and short-distance mobility, 
and only two situations for the time dimension, long-time mobility and short-time mobility. Then, 
there generates four combinations, that is, long-distance and long-time geographical mobility, long-
distance and short-time geographical mobility, short-distance and long-time geographical mobility, 
and short-distance and short-time geographical mobility. In general, the longer one geographically 
moves, the more likely he will encounter different culture, social norms, values, etc., ceteris paribus; 
the longer time one geographically mobiles, the more necessary it may become for him / her to adapt 
to the new local life, ceteris paribus.  
Geographic mobility can be international mobility, internal mobility, inter-province mobility, intra-
province mobility, mobility from rural areas to urban areas, and so on and so forth. Therein, given 
some certain distance of geographical mobility, geographic mobility is more likely to be embodied 
as international mobility for people in territorially small countries than those in territorially large 
countries, in spite of possible institutional barriers (such as passports etc.) for entering other 
countries and a country’s geographical location on the earth; on contrast, for people in territorially 
large countries, internal mobility of the native born is more likely to be the form of geographic 
mobility. – This is determined by the natural relation between territorial area and possible domestic 
geographic distances.  
Geographic mobility can be out of different reasons or purposes, and can be of different lengths of 
time. For example, people may geographically move, long-distantly or short-distantly, for education, 
work, a travel, or even escaping a war. In terms of mobility of labor force, especially for traditional 
agricultural nations or regions, reduction of dependence on land, seasonality of agricultural 
production activities and increment of demand on labor force in other sectors all create conditions 
for labor force to mobile from rural areas to urban areas.  
For an individual person who geographically moves to another place, geographical mobility means 
a change of local interaction networks. Furthermore, relatively short-time mobility generates 
different individual interaction networks from relatively long-time mobility. Figure 1.10 presents 
the general difference between the individual ego-centric interaction network before and after a 
short-time and long-time geographical mobility. Usually, in a short-time geographical mobility, it is 
less likely for one to establish a firm relationship with others via occasional interactions, while in a 
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long-time mobility, it is much more likely due to more frequent interactions.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.10 Individual geographical mobility: short-time vs. long-time. 
Notes: Squares in period of the same length represent geographically different local areas. Arrows 
with a dashed line represent mobility. The two solid circles linked by an arrow across two different 
local areas is the “self” geographically moving from one area to another. Other solid circles linked 
with a solid line to the “self” represent relatively stable relationships established via frequent 
interactions, while the hollow circles linked with a dashed line to the “self” represent temporary 
relationships established via occasional interactions. 
When viewed from the perspective of a particular local area, geographical mobility relates to the 
size of inflow and outflow population and the (average) length of time of their stay in that place. 
Generally, the larger the flowing population of a place and the shorter the average time of their stay 
there, the higher its mobility. When studying the impact of population mobility on some social 
indicator of the inflow area, which state the inflow place will present is related to the total population 
of the inflow place, the speed of population mobility, the proportion of the inflow population in the 
total population, the structure of the inflow population, and so on. Furthermore, when it comes to 
the possible influences of geographical mobility on people of the local area, two perspectives should 
be distinguished, that is, the perspective from the local people of the inflow place and that from the 
inflow people. Thus, how geographic mobility may affect trust can also be viewed from those two 
perspectives. Local people and inflow people may have different, or even opposite, views and 
attitudes about the same thing.  
1.7.2 Geographical mobility and trust 
Some scholars argue that a high rate of population mobility (including immigration and internal 
migration / urbanization) could cause trust to disrupt (e.g., Zucker, 1986). In much the same vine, 
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some scholars also realize that trust in big cities is lower than that in smaller cities or small towns 
(e.g., Putnam, 2000, pp. 138-139; Glaeser et al, 2000). In general, whether geographic mobility will 
result in distrust and to what degree could be affected by many factors, such as mobility rate of a 
place, identity as a local person or an inflow person, percentage, diversity and characteristics of non-
local (inflow) people, tolerant / embracing attitude to diversity (traditionally or not) and 
inclusiveness, perceived changes from a relatively low mobility rate to a relatively high one, 
internationalization degree of a country (if the place under investigation is a country), personal 
experience, sufficiency and availability of various resources and public services, public security, 
strength of fighting to crimes, police force, and so on and so forth. Below summarize three deep 
reasons for geographical mobility’s leading to distrust. 
According to the nature of trust problems, there could be three kinds of trust decline that geographic 
mobility may cause. One is distrust from different background mindsets, values, cultures, approved 
behavior etc., given that people conform to their own social norms etc., the relief of which requires 
resocialization in the new local life or construction of a modified / new local culture in order to have 
a harmonious common life, otherwise segregation may happen. According to the online Oxford 
English Dictionary, socialization (2009) is “the process of forming associations with others; spec. 
the process by which a person learns to function within a particular society or group by internalizing 
its values and norms”. Therein, values (2011), also according to the online Oxford English 
Dictionary, are “the principles or moral standards held by a person or social group; the generally 
accepted or personally held judgment of what is valuable and important in life”. (Re)Socialization 
requires some amount of time and effort; put another way, it requires learning costs, admitting that 
individual learning willingness and speed are different. When a person goes to a distant, culturally 
different place, given there are enough interactions with the local people and (s)he has enough 
willingness to learn how the local people behave, his / her behavior will more or less be influenced 
by the local people. Resocialization is thus a process from consciously behaving following the local 
people to habitually behaving, and further to taking it for granted. Of course, it is also possible that 
similar people tend to live in relatively small concentrated communities. As said, in general, a long 
geographic distance often relates to a large cultural distance. Heterogeneity, differences or 
dissimilarities in local cultural environments, cultural backgrounds, mindsets, values or standards 
of justification of behavior could cause dissatisfaction, debates, conflicts, etc. accompanying distrust. 
Zucker (1986) argues that it is because population mobility violates background expectation on 
which “a world known in common” and creating common expectations is based. Furthermore, 
according to the length of time staying in inflow place, the necessity of adapting to the new local 
life is different. For example, usually, mobility for work is relatively long-time while mobility for 
travel is short-time. Specifically, living for a relatively long time in the inflow place requires more 
integration in the local culture, approved behavior, etc., otherwise inflow population may feel like 
a fish out of water. On contrast, temporary stay in the inflow place much more likely requires 
adjustments neither in one’s mindset nor that in his / her behavior. 
However, relative to internal population mobility, the first situation is more likely to happen in 
international mobility since people of a country, except one with a quite short history, has integrated 
for a long time, which means that common culture, values, etc. have been established and 
internalized. Normally, internal mobility relatively to a much less degree involves conflicts of 
background culture, values, etc.; people’s standpoints may play a relatively prominent role (the 
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second situation). Different standpoints could lead to different opinions. Imagine the different 
distributions of public resources between local people and inflow people.  
The third one is from widely disapproved behavior that the bad intentionally do in places of a large 
population and high mobility in order to get fraudulent gains since that two factors (namely, large 
population and high population mobility) seem to create natural conditions for deliberately 
dishonest behavior and usually to be exploited by the bad. Additionally, another noticeable and 
considerable point is that big cities or urban areas are also attractive to “bad” people from different 
places who are intentionally to harm, deceive or defraud others. Although not every stranger could 
do harm to others, the bad are more likely from strangers. – This is the basic attitude of supporting 
the idea that do not trust strangers. People tend to avoid potential harm rather than achieving a 
potential benefit of the same amount. Moreover, in many situations, the possibility of being harmed 
and that of attaining a potential benefit are different. 
1.7.3 A short discussion on geographic mobility and social mobility, 
and social capital 
From an individual perspective, social mobility refers to one’s mobility to a social class or 
stratification different from his / her current one within a society, and usually involves the change 
of his / her, and even his / her family’s, social position and financial status. Individual geographic 
mobility and social mobility are not irrelevant to each other. Increase of social mobility may require 
geographic mobility in reality. In other words, people may chase an increase in social mobility by 
virtue of geographic mobility. For instance, geographic mobility from a rural area to an urban area 
for education or a job is often for achieving a better socio-economic status. In this sense, spatial 
mobility is an adopted means for social mobility.  
The number and strength of relationships are two important aspects of individual social capital.1 
Individual geographic mobility could either increase or decrease individual social capital. On one 
hand, long-time and -distant individual geographic mobility may force previous individual social 
relationships to fade out, and even to break down. – This is the more common case. On the other 
hand, on the premise that (s)he takes some measures to maintain various relationships in different 
places, individual geographic mobility could increase his / her number of social relationships for it 
connects trans-regional social networks, and therefore increases the possibility of obtaining 
potential resources from different local ego-centric social networks.  
1.8 Institutions 
Institutions are for guiding behavior, i.e. behavior-oriented, and behavior conveys information. 
Whether others conform to institutions is an extremely important factor influencing a person’s 
judgment on others’ trustworthiness, forming a trusting attitude and implementing trusting behavior. 
Veblen ([1899] 2005, pp. 143-144) deems that “the institutions are, in substance, prevalent habits 
of thought with respect to particular relations and particular functions of the individual and of the 
 
1 As to social capital, Chapter 2 will present a far more comprehensive and deeper discussion. So, this chapter will 
temporarily not go much into it.  
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community”.1 Bush (1987, p. 1076) thinks that “an ‘institution’ may be defined as a set of socially 
prescribed patterns of correlated behavior”. Denzau and North (1994) consider institutions as 
shared mental models. Once some generally approved institution forms, it is like an interpersonal 
tacit agreement most of the time which is unnecessary to figure out specially before every social 
interaction. North (1990) distinguished two kinds of institutions, namely formal institutions and 
informal institutions. Dai (2015, p. 117) categorizes institutions as three levels: fundamental 
institutions (level 1), constitutional institutions (level 2) and operational institutions (level 3).  
1.8.1 Categorization I of institutions: problem-solving, problem-
avoiding, influence-controlling and blame-apportioning 
When facing interaction problems, or potential interaction problems, people often turn to institutions. 
Institutions therefore have a “problem” basis. The first approach of categorizing institutions in this 
chapter is from the perspective of the functions, or the purposes, of institutions, and is problem-
oriented essentially. At the same time, they are also the incentives for people to form or create 
institutions. In short, institutions can be classified as problem-solving institutions, problem-avoiding 
institutions, influence- / problem-controlling institutions and blame-apportioning institutions. This 
way of classification is of practical importance because it makes people think about which kind of 
institutions has been breached and in which aspect trust can be improved. 
Problem-solving institutions are for resolving problems after problems happen. Therefore, they are 
a kind of ex post methods. A problem-solving institution could be temporarily effective, 
permanently effective, or problem-weakening. However, in many situations, peoples do not want to 
solve problems after they have already happened; On the contrary, people would like to first take 
some actions to avoid the occurrence of problems. Institutions for avoiding problems ex ante are 
problem-avoiding institutions. The key point of problem-avoiding is correctly recognizing what 
behavior causes problems and what does not. According to the different nature of problems, some 
problems might be more appropriate to be resolved after happening, while some other are more 
suited to be prevented in advance. Two important criteria of whether to solve them ex post or to 
avoid them ex ante are the relative feasibility and the relative costs and prices of the two. 
One plausible reason explaining why people are problem-avoiding is human imaginative capability 
(imagination), associative capability and inferential capability, which are different from predictive 
capability. These capabilities play an important role in human decision-making and future actions, 
since people can image and infer how some event is going to unfold and evolve, how some other 
persons will behave, what problem will arise if (s)he does something in what way, what results will 
be caused to him, and so on. Also, one may imagine how to prevent some problem from happening 
even though the happening of something undesired is uncertain or bound to happen. That is to say, 
human beings tend to construct a future situation in their mind, and will try to avoid problems arising 
in their imaginatively and mentally constructed scenes.  
Influence- / Problem-controlling institutions are for dealing with the influences caused by problems 
happened. Ex post influences of problems that they are trying to control may include the scope, 
 
1 Although in The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, Veblen ([1899] 2005) from a 
negative perspective elaborates on institutions, the quintessence of thoughts of his theory is also applicable to the 
positive aspect of institutional explanation. 
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degree, time of duration, etc. of influences. The aim of institutions of this kind is to reduce the 
damage caused before a problem-solving scheme has been devised, before a problem is eventually 
solved, or when a problem actually cannot be solved at all. It should be noted that whether an 
expected controlling effect can be achieved or not and to which degree are not guaranteed, although 
the original intention of those institutions is controlling the influences derived from various 
problems.  
As problem-solving ones, blame-apportioning institutions are also for dealing with problems 
already happened. This kind of institutions is often relatively concrete. It may cover whether to 
apportion blame and how to. For example, in which link has a problem been generated, and which 
of the bad consequences is the worst? Problem-apportioning institutions actually emphasize the 
aspect of punishment of institutions. However, it should be kept in mind that the actual underlying 
criterion should still be those desirable, abstract values such as justice, fairness, and so on. For an 
institution to be a blame-apportioning one, some basic elements may be required: a) the discoverer 
or whistleblower of a problem; b) directly responsible individual(s); c) investigators; d) 
responsibility judges; e) (a) punishment-implementing party / parties.     
1.8.2 Manifestation of potential problems  
As explained before and as what we have admitted and would admit, the emergence of institutions 
is largely rooted in problem-solving and problem-avoiding. Therefore, an explanation of the 
manifestation (or exposure) of problems is expected to be of some illuminating meaning.  
In many situations, a series of actions can get something recurrent done without explicitly telling 
the actors right from wrong. The actors involved in doing that thing seem to have unuttered or even 
unutterable knowledge (“tacit knowledge”) which can guide them to do that thing well and even 
perfectly well. It seems that the actors currently involved and involved before reach some tacit 
consensus so that hitherto nothing impeding from reaching satisfactory results happen. Analogous 
to incomplete contract, it may not always be realized that establishing some kind of relatively 
explicit and formal “institutions” is necessary until some problems do happen and probably would 
still happen in future. However, it is not always the same persons that do something and, at the same 
time, the unrealized potential problems do exist, but it does not mean some problems will not happen 
forever. One trigger lies in when something involves a marginally added, new person. (s)he may 
neglect the explicit “consensus” within the previous group and arouses some previously potential 
problem without preventive measures and causes some unsatisfactory result. The results are 
unsatisfactory may be because it causes relatively big ex post cost; it may be because it disturbs the 
normal procedures that get something done and may have a relatively big accumulative risk of a 
series of small problems; or it may simply be because that the actors involved think the problems 
have a bad influence on the reflection of their prudent work style, and so on. All in all, the 
manifestation (or exposure) of problems arouses the demand of some explicit institutions to be 
established. The explicit institutions may be built via verbal consensus and admission, and be 
verbally transmitted to the (generalized) marginally added persons (The “marginally added” here 
does not definitely refer to “added one by one”; thus it means to some degree a generalized 
“marginal added”.); may via some relatively formal but not absolutely formal channels of being 
written down, such as written in paper and then passed it to others. It can be said that to some degree 
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institutions are particular-subject-independent in particular situations, in the sense that it cannot only 
apply to currently involved persons, but also later coming ones. Hence, the manifestation (or 
exposure) of some previously potential and unrealized problems is an important link in the 
generation and emergence of institutions. Without the link, a particular institution may never be 
perceived as necessary to be established. And further, as the continuous manifestations of new 
problems, the network of institutions is woven more densely. 
However, the continuous manifestations of new problems or continuously happening old problems 
do not definitely stimulate willingness or perception of necessity to establish some institution. It 
may also depend on the attitude towards them, the insights caused by them, the nature of the 
problems, and so forth.  
1.8.3 Deepness of institutions 
Here three levels of problem-solving and -avoiding are presented. They may be different in 
timeliness, effect and mechanism. However, it should be figured out that these differences may not 
be absolute. Different levels of problems-solving and -avoiding may fit different problems at 
different time in different situations. Which level to choose requires specific, comprehensive 
consideration. At the same time, enough attention should be paid to the para-function of these 
methods.  
Shallow pre-problems This method “solves” or “avoids” a problem without really touching the 
problem per se. Hence, this method does not thoroughly settle or avoid (or prevent) the problem, 
and the problem may just be temporarily inhibited but will recur in future. One advantage of this 
method is that it probably gets effective in a quite short period and in a direct way. We may in many 
situations need or actually apply this kind of problem-solving or -avoiding method, such as when 
the consequents of some problem is not serious, or when we do not have enough time to spent on 
the problem, when it is not suitable to touch the problem, or when we do not in fact realize the 
method is relatively too superficial to solve or avoid the problem downright, et cetera.   
Just at problems This method “solves” or “avoids” (or “prevents”) directly on the problem itself, 
which means the problem is touched. This is a usual way we deal with some problem. The time 
needed for this method to get effective may depend on the nature of the problem. This method, 
actually, can be said to be “local” since it usually focuses on the problem and does not much care 
other related things. Therefore, the problems settled via this way may still recur since it is a local 
method of problem-solving or problem-avoiding (or problem-preventing). 
Under problems This method has profound insights into the nature of the problems and their deep 
causes. Thus, this method pierces the problems. Undoubtedly, this method probably consumes 
longer time to get effective than the two methods above. However, at the same time, the effects of 
this method would be more thorough and persist longer. The mechanism of the method is to 
coordinate factors underpinning the problems.  
1.8.4 Categorization II of institutions: value-type institutions and 
constructed institutions 
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(i) Values-type institutions    
Values-type institutions are institutions that are per se values as well. Take fairness, justice, 
trustworthiness and the like as an example. They are all desirable values, but they are also treated 
and have been functioning as norms. They are cherished social wisdom and firm collective 
psychological preference formed in the interpersonal interactions in social life in the long human 
history, and are also passed from generation to generation. One characteristic of institutions is that 
they propose requirements, especially behavioral ones, on others. Once institutions are violated, 
people’s feelings are hurt more or less. Moreover, values-type institutions are ubiquitous in social 
life and therefore involve behavioral requirements for every other, which shows the large scope of 
its influences, even though actually we cannot compel others to conform to those interaction 
principles, and at any time, we do internally hope or require others to. Besides, values-type 
institutions do not have definite and fixed punishment mechanisms. At the same time, they are also 
of fundamental guiding importance for constructed institutions which will be introduced latter. This 
kind of institutions is not the same with what North (1994) calls “informal institutions”. In addition, 
not all unwritten norms are informal institutions, because they can still be concrete.  
Institutions are all established on values, but not all values can become or be treated as institutions. 
Values can be roughly categorized as individual / personal values and collective / social values. 
However, not all of the later type of values can directly function as institutions. Institutions require 
a certain proportion of supporters. But it does not mean some value having many supporters can 
become values-type institutions. Many people may hold the same individual / personal values, such 
as health is more important than earning money. However, that kind of values only requires self. 
One requiring any other not to sacrifice health to earn money is usually not reasonable. Whether a 
random other earns money on sacrifice of health is not relevant to him / her. It does not have an 
impact on his / her interactions. Put another way, it has no externality. Of course, that one requires 
his / her family members not to do like this is another case. Values-type institutions more or less 
require requirements on others. Take trustworthiness as an example. Even though we actually cannot 
force others to be trustworthy, and at any time, we do hope or require others to be inside. When we 
encounter untrustworthy behavior, we may get angry, upset, disappointed, etc.  
(ii) Constructed institutions  
Institutions hinge on psychological requirements on behavior. Values are formed psychologically 
and mentally and are a kind of psychological preference. However, not all values supporting 
institutions are values-type institutions. There are other psychological activities and processes, such 
as reverence towards nature, praying for the good things to happen etc., which (may be values or 
not) cannot directly be treated as institutions, but act as underpinning principles for institutions as 
well. Institutions consciously created based on various thoughts which cannot be directly treated as 
institutions are constructed institutions. Constructed institutions reflect those abstract principles in 
mentality, but are presented in concrete forms. They are constructed for concrete situations, 
functions, etc. and usually have a specific application scope. 
1.8.5 On the origin of institutions 
As we know, institutions in human society rely on humans as their carries. Their generation, 
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diffusion and prevalence all are inseparable from human acceptation, at least non-repulsion, and 
implementation in thought and behavior. Thus, the population base of an institution is not the sole 
criterion for its existence and degree of prevalence. Of course, a threshold in a population, which is 
the minimum number in a population, may be required for an institution to exist (e.g. Elsner and 
Heinrich, 2009; Elsner and Heinrich, 2011). However, it should be noted that, different (types of) 
institutions may require different population thresholds.  
(i) Behavioral requirements on others  
Who use behavioral principles, to regulate whom? The answer contributes to the understanding of 
the nature and origin of institutions to some degree. According to the difference of implementing 
subjects, self-discipline and other-discipline should be distinguished. Obviously, self-discipline 
means one uses behavioral principles to guide his / own behavior, while other-discipline means 
others, rather than himself / herself, use behavioral principles to regulate his / her behavior. 
Furthermore, according to the objects that behavioral principles point to, disciplining self and 
disciplining others should be distinguished. Disciplining self, as literally shown, means that 
behavioral principles are used only to guide and control the behavior of one’s own, while 
disciplining others means that they are used to regulate others. Concerning disciplining self and 
disciplining others, different people may present different tendency, as well as different cultural 
groups. Some people more like to restrain their own behavior first, while some other people always 
require more on others’ behavior. 
Behavior of humans in society usually has externality, which means that normally, people’s 
behavior influences others (see also Section 1.6.1). In my view, the most essential cause of the origin 
of institutions could be attributed to behavioral requirements on others, although people often cannot 
force others to behave following institutions ex ante actually. Put another way, disciplining others 
actually essentially drives the generation of various institutions. However, it should be noted in 
passing that behavioral requirements on others is of course not the repertoire of institutions; but it 
is their core, indispensable part.  
About how to treat others, Confucius advocates putting oneself in others’ shoes by stating that “己
所不欲，勿施于人” (Pinyin: jǐ suǒ bú yù, wù shī yú rén) which in English means that “What you 
do not wish others to do unto you, do not do unto them”1 (translated by Ku, 1898, p. 138). Put 
another way, it means that if you do not want to be treated in some way, do not treat in that way 
others. It should be noted that “others” here means general others.  
(ii) Changeability of the relatively advantageous role in various interactions 
The reason why institutions can form spontaneously in equal interactions and be accepted broadly 
in society is the changeability, or the non-fixity, of the relatively advantageous role in various 
interaction situations in daily life. More importantly, this changeability or non-fixity is certain and 
inevitable. One cannot always be in the relatively advantageous position in equal interaction 
relationships and has opportunities to exploit opponents. This situation thus leads to one’s 
 
1  子贡问曰：“有一言而可以终身行之者乎？”子曰：“其恕乎！己所不欲，勿施于人。”——《论语·卫灵公》 
Translated into English is: A disciple of Confucius enquired: “Is there one word which may guide one in practice 
throughout the whole life?” Confucius answered, “The word ‘charity’ is perhaps the word. What you do not wish 
others to do unto you, do not do unto them.” (Translated by Ku, 1898, p. 138) 
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behavioral requirements on opponents, especially when (s)he is in the relatively disadvantageous 
position in interactions, that they ought not to seek inappropriate profits relying on their relatively 
advantageous position. This requires a just treatment for the same person in different positions of 
relative advantage and relative disadvantage to prevent oneself from being exploited. What is more, 
opponents in interactions are also not fixed. In the broadest situation, anyone in society can even 
become a potential opponent in future. This further requires behavioral requirements even on all the 
people in society. However, given equal interpersonal relationships and the changeability of 
relatively advantageous role in interactions, the “double-standard” behavior only requiring others 
excluding oneself is unfair and impossible for others to accept. Hence, one also has to contribute to 
the desirable social environment, such as by conforming to some widely accepted institution and 
giving up opportunities to exploit others. In the end, a principle supported by a sufficient number of 
people may generate as an institution. Besides, this is also one reason why people would like to 
follow institutions.         
1.8.6 On the diffusion of institutions 
(i) Without population mobility 
Given a population large enough relative to an institution’s biggest possible influence, when there 
is no long-distant mobility, communication or correspondence, continuity of geographical 
distribution of population, meaning that people geographically concentrate, rather than living too 
spread around by small groups or being separated by large natural barriers like mountains or oceans, 
which precludes people’s daily local interactions, is a very advantageous condition for an institution 
to diffuse and prevail and plays a crucial role in the course, ceteris paribus. Local interactions 
(including verbal communication, instructions, modeling, etc.) and continuity of geographical 
distribution of population guarantee a gradual diffusion of an institution from a person to another in 
continuous local areas of short distance.  
Suppose there is a population among which an institution generates and can influence throughout. 
Figure 1.11 presents how an institution gets diffused in an area with continuous and discontinuous 
geographical distribution of population respectively. In Figure 1.11 a, people in circle 1 can interact 
with those in circle 2, and those in circle 2 can interact with those in circle 3, and so on. By this 
logic, the institution gradually diffuses to larger scopes of population through everybody’s local 
interactions. Without being obstructed by any natural barrier, it can diffuse until its influence fades 
out in the most ideal case. On contrast, in Figure 1.11 b, the population is separated into two sub-
populations by a large mountain which precludes the institution to reach and to be accepted by more 
people, although it still has enough influence. Additionally, different institutions are likely to 
generate on the two sides of the natural barrier. 
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b. Discontinuous geographical distribution of population 
Figure 1.11 (Dis)Continuous geographical distribution of population in an institution’s diffusion. 
(ii) With population mobility 
An institution can also get diffused through population mobility. For an institution to diffuse in the 
inflow place, there are two possible ways. One is naturally gradual diffusion. In this way, it is 
necessary for the inflow population to reach some certain scale (e.g., size and share) to have an 
impact. The other is active promotion. It is crucial especially when there is not a sufficiently large 
scale of inflow population since people after all have initiative and can act consciously and 
purposefully. What is more, for both approaches, the inflow institutional carriers should stay in the 
inflow place for an enough long time so that the institution can take effect there. 
The strength of an institution’s influence can be different within the scope of the institution’s 
influence, and there could be different variants of the institution. Just like although Chinese eat tofu 
pudding (a Chinese food), the Northern Chinese prefer a salty flavor, while the Southern Chinese 
prefer a sweet one. A key point to understand the possible consequences of population mobility on 
some institution within the area of the institution’s influence is the strength difference of the 
institution between the outflow and inflow local areas. Given that there are strength differences of 
some institution in some dimension and that population mobility happens between two places where 
institutional strength differences exist in a relatively obvious way, there could be two possible kinds 
of consequences: First, the institutional difference between the mobile population and the local 
people of the inflow place get narrow, by one group’s institutional characteristics approaching the 
other. Second, both the mobile population and the local people of the inflow place keep their own 
institutional characteristics, without being affected by each other. 
Population mobility does not definitely bring horizontal diffusion, which is different from passing 
from generation to generation, of some institution the population are carrying into their inflow area 
where other people reside. Suppose the institution(s) that the inflow population is going to bring are 
different from those of the people living in the inflow place, and that the institutions of the two 
Institution A Institution B 
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parties are holding are not totally incompatible as fire and water. Then, in general, there are three 
big categories including four specific situations. First, co-existence. In this situation, each group 
(namely the inflow population and the local people of the inflow area) keeps their own institutional 
characteristics without being influenced by each other. Second, unilateral influence. This category 
contains two situations. One is that some inflow institution gets diffused in the inflow place, the 
other is that the inflow population gradually abandons some institutional characteristic. Third, 
mutual influence and integration. In this situation, both groups learn from each other and integrate 
what the learn into their own previous institution system, driving the new institution system of the 
inflow area to evolve. In general, the first situation in the second category and the third category are 
relatively conducive to institutional horizontal diffusion and evolution.     
An institution’s prevalence could at least present three kinds of patterns in terms of its spatial 
structure from generation to diffusion. First, single-point radiation. It refers to the pattern that an 
institution generates merely in one area, but gradually expands from the center to its close 
surrounding areas. Although the institution comes into existence only in one place, as long as its 
influence and radiation effect are large enough, it can still expand to as more people as possible 
based on local interactions in population of continuous geographical distribution even without long-
distant population mobility.  
Second, multi-points outburst. It refers to the pattern that an institution generates in different places 
independently. This is also a way for an institution to prevail, even with no continuous distribution 
of population, no great influence, or no population mobility. The reason why the same or similar 
institutions can generate in different places separately may be that those places all face the same or 
similar problems, which reflects the fact that those problems are easily-happening ones and hence 
quite common in human society.  
Third, diffusion in virtue of population mobility. This pattern depends on those people who move 
from a place with some institution to another without it carrying characteristics of that institution. 
An institution can also prevail via population mobility even with discontinuous geographical 
distribution of the population in the headstream of the institution or not very strong influence. Given 
that an institution is diffused in the inflow place, population mobility combines the two effects 
mentioned above. That is, it can either gradually diffuse in the inflow place, if there is only one 
inflow place, or it can be brought into different places, which benefits a multi-points outburst of the 
institution and further diffusion in each place. (See Figure 1.12)  
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Figure 1.12 Institutional diffusion with population mobility. 
Notes: The solid circle in each set of concentric circles represents the center of an institution. A set of concentric circles represents the scope of the influence of an 
institution. The outer the circle, the weaker the influences of its institution. – That is why the relatively outer circles are gradually dashed more or less in the figure. The 
more circles a set of concentric circles has, the larger the influence of an institution. The larger the overlapping area of two sets of concentric circles, the larger the 
influences of their institutions on each other in that area. The direction of arrows represents the direction of population mobility. Small solid circles at the tips of arrows 
represent people that move to where the small solid circles are.    
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1.8.7 Reasons of conforming to institutions 
Axelrod (1986) summarizes eight mechanisms of supporting norms, that is respectively metanorms, 
dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership, law and reputation. Posner (1997) 
summarizes four incentives for obeying social norms: a) “Some norms are self-enforcing” (p. 365); 
b) “Some norms are enforced by the emotions” (p. 365); c) “Norms are also enforced by expressions 
of disapproval, by ridicule, and in extreme cases, by ostracism” (p. 366); d) “Norms that are 
internalized are obeyed out of a sense of guilt or shame” (p. 366). I would say that Axelrod (1986) 
and Posner (1997) have already enumerated most possible reasons for conforming to norms, or all 
kinds of institutions in a more general sense. Besides, four extra possible reasons for obeying norms 
are going to be added here.  
First, in normal situations, complying with norms is easier and more convenient to carry out. Norms, 
the guiding principles of behavior, have already nurtured via a long-time training, and the required 
behavior of norms is the first reaction coming into mind when facing various particular situations. 
In normal cases, what a person intentionally breaching norms first realizes before conducting wrong 
is what is normally / morally right. (s)he then could take that right behavior as a reference and 
conceive a wrong way. In this sense, conforming to norms avoids extra thinking processes such as 
how to benefit from breaching rules, what the concrete implementing steps of it are, etc. Actually, 
as we know, conforming to rules will achieve a win-win consequence which not only benefits self, 
but also others because given behavioral rules of a particular situation, it saves time for considering 
how to behave in every single situation every time.  
Second, obeying norms makes one the right party all the time undoubtedly and is conducive to 
formally safeguarding rights and interests in normal cases. Out of this consideration, those 
encountering others’ bad behavior would prefer sticking to the normally right principles, and even 
not implement private punishment or revenge like tit-for-tat, except keeping far away from the bad 
guys. By doing so, even when they will face public opinion or resort to law, they will still be the 
morally right and supported party. On contrast, those breaching norms will be morally unsupported, 
or be sanctioned by law and / or suffer pressure from public opinion.  
Third, obeying norms also kind of implies exchange for others’ norm-obeying behavior. One’s 
conforming to norms shows his / her sincerity that (s)he cares for the interest of others, such as with 
whom (s)he interacts, expecting others to treat him / her in the same way out of principles and 
goodwill of fairness and reciprocity.  
Fourth, changeability of relatively advantageous role in interactions pushes people to obey norms. 
This point has also been mentioned in Section 1.8.5.  
Reputation 
Now, let us talk about reputation as a reason for conforming to institutions, as well as establishing 
and maintaining interpersonal trust. Suppose that the subject of owning some reputation and that of 
trusting are different. That is, what is going to talk about is the influence of somebody or something’s 
reputation on his / her / its future interactions and on the trust of some other people to him / her / it. 
In general, conforming to institutions brings good reputation of corresponding aspects and among 
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corresponding people accepting the institutions; good reputation further brings more beneficial and 
profitable interaction opportunities. Therefore, establishing and maintaining good reputation is one 
of the significant reasons for restraining one self’s behavior within some institutional requirements. 
Good reputation represents trustworthiness of some aspect. In other words, trustworthiness is 
positive reputation. No doubt that good reputation benefits the establishment and maintenance of 
trust relationships, while bad reputation does not because people may even have no willingness to 
interact with those with bad reputation of some aspect, especially when people can choose 
interaction partner.  
The impact of information about trustworthiness on trust is emphasized throughout this thesis. In 
fact, reputation works through information mechanism. In other words, reputation forms, either 
good or bad, in the course of information spreading, admitting that everybody’s judgment may not 
be totally the same since the amount of information faced, the standpoints, etc. are different. Thus, 
understanding reputation benefits from understanding information. Reputation chain is different in 
length and radiation range for different reputation-spreading ways. Specifically, mouth-by-mouth-
spread reputation has a smaller radiation range and longer chain, while media-spread reputation has 
a much larger radiation range and shorter chain since the length of a reputation chain and the 
radiation range of the first link of reputation diffusion are to some degree substitutional. In this sense, 
media-spread reputation flattens reputation spreading to a large degree.     
Reputation forms under the impact of both the reputation-owner and spreaders. Figure 1.13  
presents the formation of reputation and Figure 1.14 shows reputation diffusors except the reputation 
owner. Reputation owner can either depend on diffusors (excluding the reputation owner) to spread 
reputation, or actively self-publicizing or self-marketing via some way to build reputation of some 
aspect, such as, as a promise or a signal. Self-publicizing / -marketing is usually adopted when 
intended to consolidate the size of direct interactors and to attract, or at least not to frighten away, 
those who have not ever interacted with the reputation owner. In the course of the formation of some 
reputation, what is spread may be faithful to or distort the facts. The formation of reputation depends 
on direct interactors as the initial main force of reputation spreading at first. However, the influence 
of reputation involves potential and new, in-depth interactors and non-interactors, rather than only 
among direct and long-term interactors, which is the very importance of reputation.  
 
Figure 1.13 Formation of reputation. 
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Figure 1.14 Reputation diffusors. 
1.8.8 Trustworthiness as an institution and institutionalized trust 
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) summarize different antecedent factors of trust from different 
scholars with a table and stress three main characteristics (or three factors) for perception and 
evaluation trustworthiness of the trusted party, namely ability, benevolence and integrity. It can be 
found that trustworthiness actually has a thick institutional foundation, both formal and informal 
institution and especially the informal ones. One’s trustworthiness to a large extent reflects the 
degree of solidification of some kind of behavioral principle that guides the thinking and actual 
behavioral ways. Whether the values of the trusting party and the trusted party coincide matters a 
lot in the evaluation of trustworthiness. For example, if the trusted party complies with the 
universally proved values, such as “fairness”, it will have a large effect on trustworthiness 
perception of the trusting party. Of course, as facing other abstract values and human emotions, 
different persons have varied evaluations of “fairness”. The requirement of fairness may vary with 
different standpoints, which is actually a complicated coordination issue. However, many specific 
situations do exist that people find not very tough to make a coincident or similar fairness judgment 
across the involved parties or for other parties to make a fairness judgment about the involved parties 
on a particular event.  
Since trust is so important, what is the basis of trust? After all unconditional trust is rare and trust 
needs to rest on something. As the opposite face of trust, trustworthiness plays an important 
supporting role. Trust and trustworthiness are relative. We may find that the real source sustaining 
trust comes from the mechanisms supporting trustworthiness, even though it is always subjectively 
perceived trustworthiness.  
The mechanism supporting trustworthiness can be roughly classified as internal mechanism and 
external mechanism. When a human individual can bound himself within trustworthiness, it 
indicates that he approves the opinion that human should be trustworthy; when a human individual 
approves that human should be trustworthy from the point of his values, he will tend to behave 
trustworthily.  
It can be said that trustworthiness, the same with honest et cetera, is a kind of informal institutions. 
Trustworthiness acquired pervasive social approval at the level of values. One of the evidences is 
that people usually averse to persons who, for example, always cheat, do not keep their promise, do 
not have serious and responsible attitude for their work, and so on, since these are all manifestations 
of untrustworthiness. It should be figured out here that nobody would be all the time trustworthy in 
all situations. If a person is a trustworthy one is a qualitative assessment. At the same time, it is 
accepted that generally everybody has the discretion to choose what to do and what not to do, which 
Reputation 
diffusors (except 
reputation owner)
Direct interactors
Acquire direct, 
first-hand 
information
Non-interactors Acquire second-hand information
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is not necessary to influence his received personality evaluation from his interacting partners. What 
is more, the complexity of humanity also does not allow us to make an either-or evaluation of good 
of bad.  
If it can be said that institutions are the habit of thoughts and behaviors (Veblen, [1899] 2005, pp. 
143-144), institutionalized trust makes trust, both from thoughts and behaviors, somewhat a habit 
which implies the propensity to trust. Apart from the innate propensity of trust, if it does exist, 
distinguished between different individuals, “institutionalized trust” can be enhanced by 
trustworthiness which is essentially an informal institution and often reinforced by means of formal 
institutions. In a society in which trustworthiness is carried out to a high level, trust is accordingly 
conducted since there is no reason for an individual not trust in a trustworthy and orderly operating 
social environment. Gradually as time passes by and the frequency of trustworthiness stabilized, an 
individual’s trust level also gets stabilized since there is no extra risk in terms of his current trust 
level or he does not even perceive or predict any risk that he cannot be to tolerant to. Furthermore, 
he would integrate trust into his habit, or put another way, he would get habituated to trust, which 
can be said that trust is institutionalized for him. 
Emphasizing trust without trustworthiness guaranteeing or stressing trust without its change 
according to the change or difference of trustworthiness is actually neglecting the human abilities 
of processing information and social learning and the nature of human adaptation. What is more, 
giving a prominent role of unconditional trust and, at the same time, underlining the changeability 
of trust according to information or signals of trustworthiness will to a large degree lead to logic 
contradiction.  
Hence, institutionalized trust never simply unilateral trust; it implies contains two aspects, namely 
trust and trustworthiness, and has profound foundation in institutions (specifically in informal 
institutions) and the interaction of trust and trustworthiness. Thus, for a high level of trust to 
maintain, individuals, as the carrier of behavioral subject of both trust and trustworthiness, should 
be mutually trust when involved in the same interaction.  
It should also be pointed out here that trust is not only a passive response; it also acts as an active 
incentive. Similarly, trustworthiness, which is a relative aspect of trust, is not merely a stimuli; it at 
the same time plays as a response. The specific sequence depends of which of trust and 
trustworthiness needs to be the first-movers, or maybe they almost simultaneously happen. For an 
example, when an individual who need to trust ex ante, he in his mind may know deeply that trust 
can arouse reliable response.  
As aforementioned, most of time, voluntarily implemented institutions always require approve in 
one’s values and their almost corresponding reflection on one’s behaviors; on contrast, relatively 
non-voluntarily implemented institutions may only regulate behaviors, which does not stress much 
on behavioral subjects approve on the layer of values. Thus, to what degree an informal institution 
is internalized largely depends on the degree to which the related values are inner approved and, 
further, to which one would like to voluntarily implement that institution and let that institution 
govern his/ her behavior.    
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1.9 Three networks: Institutional networks, causality 
networks and information networks 
1.9.1 Institutional networks1 
An institutional network is a network on which various institutions are as nodes and relations 
between institutions are as links. The crux of understanding institutional networks is how 
institutions are linked with each other since it is pretty straightforward concerning what are the 
nodes on an institutional network.  
The generation of institutions benefits from supports from psychological factors. As analyzed before, 
psychological factors underpinning constructed institutions can roughly be categorized into two 
kinds, one is values which are also institutions, and the other is those that brace constructed 
institutions without being institutions themselves. What is more, values-type institutions and 
constructed institutions together make up the institutional level. Therefore, there are two typical 
connecting methods on the institutional level, one is between values-type institutions and 
constructed institutions, the other is between constructed institutions.2 Values-type institutions and 
constructed institutions are connected via various values. Take fairness and laws as an example. 
Fairness is always treated as an important value orientation, as well as a norm in life, and laws, 
according to my categorization, are constructed institutions and are normally established based on 
the principle of fairness. In this case, fairness as an abstract value links itself as a value-type 
institution and laws as constructed institutions. Constructed institutions are connected via the scopes 
in life they are regulating. For instance, regulations of stocks offering and exchanges are linked with 
those of futures exchanges because stocks and futures are all financial products and the regulations 
of stocks and futures exchanges are all regulations in the financial field. Furthermore, laws of 
securities, which involve stocks, bonds, etc., and laws of company are also connected because they 
all belong to economic laws.  
Figure 1.15 presents an institutional network and its supporting psychological factors. It should be 
noted that the links between factors at psychological level and constructed institutions and those 
between constructed institutions are of different forming mechanisms. The links between 
psychological-level factors and constructed institutions are of a causal nature, which means that a 
psychological-level factor comes first, the causal link starting from the psychological-level factor 
the second, and a consequent constructed institution the third. By contrast, the links between 
constructed institutions are of equal nature, which means that given two constructed institutions, if 
their pointed objects are related, a link between them exists. 
 
1 Dai (2015) also wrote a monograph on networks of institutions.  
2 Note that the possible relations, if exist, between values-type institutions are not considered here.  
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Figure 1.15 An institutional network and its supporting psychological factors. 
Different from the understanding of an institutional network in which links between institutions are 
emphasized, the crux of understanding of evolution of an institutional network lies in the generation, 
change and disappearance of the nodes, namely the institutions, on an institutional network. For 
values-type institutions, their generation, change and disappearance depend on themselves as values. 
However, it does not mean that the values can change without reason. Their changes also require 
stimuli of external information.  
By contrast, for constructed institutions, there are two types of evolutionary drivers. One is from 
changes of those psychological factors supporting constructed institutions (including those values 
which can directly be treated as institutions and other psychological factors bracing institutions). 
When those psychological factors have substantial changes, they will contradict existing constructed 
institutions based on the previous them. If the undesirable influences that the contradiction arouses 
are big enough, the changes of the underlying psychological factors will push the constructed 
institutions based on the previous them to make corresponding adjustments and changes. The other 
is from changes of reality, given that psychological factors supporting constructed institutions have 
no obvious changes. For example, with the rise and flourish of the Internet, not only laws specific 
to the Internet have been promulgated; other laws, which are constructed institutions, have also 
made corresponding adjustments in order to adapt to the new reality.    
However, the temporarily effective method is imperfect and incomplete and new problems may still 
happen, which leads further demand for more problem-solving methods and the network of 
Institutional level 
Constructed institutions 
Psychological level 
Values-type institutions Some other psychological factors 
supporting constructed institutions 
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institutions would also get denser.  
1.9.2 Causality network 
One reason that makes a social phenomenon complex lies in causality. Various and possibly endless 
factors function through the intricate network of relations of causes and effects. On this intricate 
network of causal relations, a factor may act as a reason, an intermediary / bridging factor or a result 
on a considered chain of causality. Which specific role it is acting depends on which segment on the 
complex network of causality and which direction are under investigation. The change of a single 
factor could be caused by more than one relatively direct factors, and could also generate more than 
one relatively direct consequences. It should be noted in passing that, given the objective causality 
network, the more accurately one considers, the more intricate the network presenting in his / her 
mind due to more considered factors as nodes and the consequent corresponding causal and effect 
relations as links. Moreover, as a specific form of complex networks, the complex network of 
causality could also be multi-level. For example, micro-level factors could generate macro-level 
results. Certainly, there could be more minute classifications according to different purposes. This 
multi-level attribute undoubtedly also makes the causality network more complex.        
Let’s now consider the possible types of causality of two factors on the complex causality network. 
Suppose a causal segment between A and B on the causality network, and basically treat A as the 
starting cause and B the effect. Then, from A to B can be direct or indirect causality, unidirectional 
or bidirectional causality. Therein, “indirect” means that there is at least one intermediary factor 
between A and B. It should be noted in passing that “direct” or “indirect” may not be absolute on 
causality network; It is possible that a previously latent factor is found to be the bridge between two 
other factors with a causal relation. Therefore, there are four situations of the causality between A 
and B: unidirectional direct causality, unidirectional indirect causality, bidirectional direct causality 
and bidirectional indirect causality (see also Table 1.4 and Figure 1.16). Note that on the causality 
network, there are probably more than one path from A to B in the social settings, and from B to A 
if inverse paths exit. 
Table 1.4 Types of causality between two factors. 
  Direct Indirect 
Unidirectional Unidirectional direct causality Unidirectional indirect causality 
Bidirectional Bidirectional direct causality Bidirectional indirect causality 
Unidirectional direct causality:  A       B   
Bidirectional direct causality:   A       B 
Unidirectional indirect causality:  A       X1 (      X2       …       Xn)       B 
Bidirectional indirect causality: 
X11(     X12      …      X1n) 
A                                            B 
(X21      X22      …      X2n) 
Figure 1.16 Types of causality between two factors. 
Notes: In bidirectional indirect causality, it is possible that some (or all) of the upper factors (X11, ..., 
X1n) and the lower ones (X21, ..., X2n) are the same. 
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Now, let’s have a close look at trust on the complex network of causality. When investigated as a 
psychological result on a segment of a causal link, trust is certainly not caused by only one specific 
direct reason; on the contrary, it can be directly affected by many different factors, although what 
influence trust can be uniformly called “information about others’ trustworthiness”. It is the variety 
of external information about others’ trustworthiness that makes a person know what trust is and 
causes his / her trust to change at the psychological level. For example, when others do not fairly 
treat you, you distrust; when others do not keep their promises, you distrust; when others tell lies, 
you distrust; when others have a substantial divergence of opinion with you, you distrust, and so on. 
– These are all specific reasons from which people can perceive others’ trustworthiness from a 
personal perspective.  
Likewise, trust as a cause can also generate more than one specific, relatively direct consequences 
which we can uniformly call “willingness to interact” from a personal perspective. For example, 
from a personal perspective, a person’s distrust in some product could probably depress his / her 
willingness to buy it, ceteris paribus (for the impact of trust in economic transactions, see Section 
1.10); his / her distrust in the voting process of political system could also decrease his / her 
willingness to vote, ceteris paribus, etc. Moreover, given a specific final factor influenced by trust 
and an intermediary factor between them, both direct impact of trust on the final factor and the 
indirect impact via the intermediary factor could exist at the same time. Take economic growth and 
consumption as an example. General trust may influence economic growth directly bypassing 
consumption, and at the same time indirectly via influencing consumption which has an impact on 
economic growth as well. Furthermore, a factor influenced by trust may also affect trust. For 
example, general trust affects economy and economy may also affect general trust in some way. 
Therefore, it is hard to figure out which particular causal path dominates since all paths are 
functioning together.  
Trust can also play an intermediary role in a specific causal link. In this case, deeper causes – put 
another way, a longer causal link – are needed for explanation. Thus, factors that influence trust 
should also be integrated into the explanation. Recall what the thesis is always stressing. Various 
external information about others’ trustworthiness underpins the changes of a person’s trust which 
subsequently across other factors affect macro socio-economic performance.  
In a word, complex causality is an important embodiment of the complexity of the real world, which 
should get noticed, although it is impossible that the complex network of causality is exhausted. 
However, causality is undoubtedly an eternal theme for human to understand the world. 
1.9.3 Personal information networks 
A personal information network refers to a network made up by channels of a person’s acquiring 
information. On a personal information network, two kinds of nodes should be distinguished, one 
is non-media type including individual persons and the other is media type, and links represents the 
existence of information flows. Channels of acquiring information can be categorized as three types, 
one is personal interactions, the second one is direct observations in the broad sense (here verbally 
delivered information is included), and the third is indirectly required information via media.  
When there is no spatial mobility, except the spatial mobility of people working for media, 
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individual persons can only via media require information of other areas. When spatial mobility 
exists, people from a place to another can not only directly acquire information of their current local 
area, but can also be as information sources which can deliver information of their previous local 
areas to the people in the new one.   
Using ellipses to represent local areas, quadrates to represent medias, arrows and straight lines to 
stand for information flows, circles filled with black, grey and white to respectively stand for an 
example person, people whom (s)he can interact with (and therefore can also directly observe, be 
instructed by, etc., of course) and people whom (s)he can only directly observe (which means (s)he 
do not interact with them), and dashed circles to represent other people in his / her local area whom 
(s)he even hardly observe, Figure 1.17 presents a personal information network without personal 
spatial mobility and Figure 1.18 shows one with personal spatial mobility, assuming that a person 
of a local area cannot directly acquire information of another local area if he / he has never been 
there before and there is only one person who spatially mobiles. In Figure 1.17, when the example 
person stays in his / her local area, (s)he can acquire information from people around him / her and 
media (global or local ones). In Figure 1.18, when (s)he moves from his / her local area to another 
place, (s)he can not only acquire information from people and local media in his / her new local area 
and global media, but also from people or local media in his / her previous local area.  
In addition, direct personal information sources can also be either temporary or long-term. (For 
types of information, see Section 1.6.2) For instance, if one gets some piece of information from a 
person whom (s)he has only met once and will almost not meet again, that person is a temporary 
direct information source for him / her; by contrast, if (s)he always watches some news program 
which has been and will broadcast for a long-time to acquire information, the program is then his / 
her long-term direct information source. 
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Figure 1.17 Personal information networks without spatial mobility. 
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Figure 1.18 Personal information networks with spatial mobility. 
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1.9.4 Trust in the three networks 
Actually, the basic ideas and many details about the relationship between trust and the three 
networks have been consciously elaborated on in the former parts. Normally, trust is in essence 
based on trustworthiness. Before further elaboration, it should be noted in passing that the often-
mentioned trustworthiness has two “identities”: one is as an institution; the other is as a personal 
quality.  
Trustworthiness per se is an institution, and therefore exists in the institutional network. People 
generally have requirements for others’ trustworthiness. It has transcended purely personal 
preferences and becomes a social norm, an institution. According to the aforementioned 
classification of the institutions, trustworthiness is a value-type institution and provides basis and 
guiding principle for many constructed institutions. For example, many law provisions are for 
guaranteeing the trustworthiness of people involved in corresponding events, avoiding 
untrustworthy behavior beforehand or punishing untrustworthy behavior. People’s requirements for 
others’ trustworthiness are therefore reflected on those of various institutions for trustworthiness. In 
the institutional network, given that trustworthiness is always desirable, not only directly disobeying 
trustworthiness per se as a value-type institution, but also breaching other value-type institutions 
and constructed institutions based on trustworthiness will finally result in a psychological sense of 
distrust. On contrast, following institutions can generate trust. Directly disobeying trustworthiness 
is embodied on those various specific situations which have not been covered by constructed 
institutions and can be made a judgment by the people involved themselves. In a word, breaking 
institutions leads to distrust.  
Then, information reflecting others’ trustworthiness via the various information channels in the 
aforementioned personal information network reaches individuals. These pieces of information will 
finally take effect on the psychological layer. People tend to trust those who they think are 
trustworthy, or at least not those who they think are not. People would according to perceived 
trustworthiness of others take different actions. As mentioned before, there are numerous specific 
reasons resulting in (dis)trust, and (dis)trust can also lead to different concrete behavior or 
consequences. Personal behavior (including no behavior) further is passed on as information 
containing the actor’s own trust attitude and trustworthiness. – These all exist in the causality 
network. Therein, trust can act as both a cause and an effect. However, a very noteworthy and serious 
point is that those factors that happen to be characteristics of (dis)trustors cannot be causes of 
(dis)trust. Imagine a society which discriminates those who are tall. Tall people get discriminated 
because of their height, and become distrusting. Then, discrimination, as an unfair treatment, is the 
true cause of distrust, rather than height. It is even absurd to treat height as a cause of distrust in this 
case. In addition, Figure 1.19 presents trust in the three networks. 
 
 
Chapter 1: Thinking Trust Systemically in Socio-Economic Environment 
87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.19 Trust and institutional network, personal information network and causality network 
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1.10 (Dis)Trust and economic transactions 
Indeed, just as what we can feel, and as mentioned throughout this thesis, trust has a nonnegligible 
impact on every aspect of social life in the broad sense, such as economic life, political life, social 
life in the narrow sense, etc. Yes, other forms of human life can all be treated as part of social life 
because they are all specific lives in human society. One of the effects of (dis)trust on economic life 
and the whole consequent economic performance lies in economic transactions which is going to 
be focused on below.  
As we know, the term “economics” was first used by Xenophon ([Approx. 362 BC] 1897), an 
ancient Greek historian, who endowed its meaning with household management. In modern world, 
economy is mainly reflected in the division of labor, the production for the purpose of exchanges 
and the exchanges per se in society. Mass division of labor requires purchase (namely, exchanges), 
rather than producing for self-use, since after all limited time and energy make it impossible for one 
to master all the knowledge and skills of producing all of what (s)he needs and desires in the modern 
life. (Certainly, not only demand can create supply, but also supply can also create demand.) Further, 
the division of labor gets more and more elaborate in the modern market economy. What is bound 
to result in is the increase of economic transactions, ceteris paribus. Previous sections of this chapter 
have already talked about the impact of individual trust on interpersonal interactions, and economic 
transactions are one type of human interactions. However, although the impact of trust on economic 
transactions can be acquired from that on general interactions, it is not targeted for economic area. 
Below is going to specifically elaborate on the impact of trust on economic transactions. Note that 
what is going to be discussed is all on the hypothesis that (dis)trust results from perceived 
(un)trustworthiness of others. For example, general (dis)trust is caused by perceived general 
(un)trustworthiness; some particular (dis)trust is caused by some perceived particular 
(un)trustworthiness. Put another way, (dis)trust is basically qualitatively well-founded, has 
(un)trustworthiness as the basis. Certainly, perceived (un)trustworthiness could be different from 
actual (un)trustworthiness, even qualitatively.  
Economic prosperity is to a considerable degree embodied in the prosperity of economic 
transactions. For example, many people are engaged in transaction activities; there is a rich variety 
of merchandise; there are a great number of transactions, etc. In commodity economy, honesty and 
trustworthiness are the basic and fundamental principles for maintaining exchanges, ceteris paribus. 
Only having perceived suppliers’ honesty and trustworthiness or at least having not perceived their 
dishonesty or untrustworthiness can demanders always trust. In a word, trust based on honesty and 
trustworthiness facilitates economic exchanges. As Arrow (1974, p. 23) says, “trust has a very 
important pragmatic value […]. Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely 
efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair reliance on other people’s word.” Without 
trustworthiness of suppliers and trust of demanders based on trustworthiness, products and services 
cannot be successfully and smoothly sold, excluding the situation in which consumers are not 
trustworthy, such as paying with counterfeit money. However, untrustworthy behavior in economic 
transactions, for example, suppliers of goods or services, for short-term interests, do not provide 
goods and services of good quality, leads to that goods and services do not meet the use value or 
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standard supposed to have, and violate the principle of fair trade, and may even threaten the health 
and life security of consumers. – This makes consumers perceive malevolence, and generate distrust. 
Marx says, “The leap taken by value from the body of the commodity, into the body of the gold, is, 
as I have elsewhere called it, the salto mortale of the commodity. If it falls short, then, although the 
commodity itself is not harmed, its owner decidedly is.” (Marx, [1867] 2011, p. 119) Therefore, 
interpersonal trust based on trustworthiness is the basis for the long-term prosperity of economy. 
From the perspective of consumers of goods and services, especially individual consumers of final 
commodities and services, the impact of trust crisis on transactions are mainly embodied on 7 
aspects. (Certainly, even not for final commodities and services, the below aspects can also be 
involved.) These 7 aspects could be related to each other, and even are inseparable. In fact, in one 
word, distrust to a large degree leads the transactions’ recession to individual consumers’ self-supply, 
or to concentrate to fewer suppliers in essence. 
(a) Compression effect  
Distrust could lead to a decrease of willingness to transact, which is reflected in the decrease of 
transaction frequency of the distrusted commodities and services. For example, if one knows that 
the processing course of (semi-)finished noodles are not hygeian, (s)he would reduce his / her 
consumption; If one knows that some fruit not easy to preserve is spayed on some harmful chemical 
to keep it fresh, (s)he would reduce its consumption; if one knows that usually the cooking process 
in restaurants is not hygeian, food materials are not fresh, (s)he would try his / her best to reduce 
going to restaurants for meals. It is noticeable that actually the compression effect of economic 
transactions may be inseparable from the vertical and cross substitution in the substitution effect 
which are going to be introduced later. 
(b) Substitution effect 
The substitution effect of economic transactions is in essence transaction transfer, meaning that the 
object of a transaction changes from a commodity or service to another. Substitution effect of 
economic transactions caused by distrust can be categorized as horizontal substitution, vertical 
substitution and cross substitution. Horizontal substitution refers to changing from the consumption 
of a commodity or service to another on the same consumption link. For example, strawberries and 
apples can both be directly eaten, and suppose that there are only these two kinds of fruit. A 
consumer at first wants to buy some strawberries. But it is said that strawberry vendors use harmful 
chemicals to make strawberries stay fresh longer, and that this behavior is quite common. On 
contrast, there is no similar negative information about apples. Then, the consumer may harbour 
misgivings about the consumption of strawberries, and would reduce its consumption and turn to 
apples. Vertical substitution refers to changing from the consumption of some commodity or service 
to that of some other commodity which individual final consumers can use to make what they want 
by themselves. This type of substitution is somewhat analogous to the relationship of upstream and 
downstream on a supply chain. Vertical substitution would result in a decrease in a series of some 
future transactions, which is also the consequences distrusting individual consumers attempt to 
achieve. For example, one buys a little noodle machine, instead of finished noodles, in order to make 
noodles at home because the processing course of finished noodles may not be hygeian. Cross 
substitution refers to changing from the consumption of some commodity or service to that of some 
other commodity which individual final consumers can use to make a horizontal substitution of 
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what they previously want by themselves. For example, a person at first wants to eat noodles, but 
finally (s)he buys a little baozi (Chinese food) machine, if there is, instead of finished noodles. 
Substitution effect of economic transactions could result in a decrease of the substituted goods or 
services, although it could lead to an increase of the substitutes to some degree. Therein, the latter 
two, namely vertical substitution and cross substitution, are both means of internalizing transactions. 
Note that the precondition of substitution effect is that the substitutes can be trusted in some sense. 
(c) Brand-reliance effect  
General distrust could result a concentration of consumption to brand products. This effect is based 
on the belief that firms with an established brand would provide and continue to provide good 
commodities and services for their own established reputation and long-term interests. Thus, under 
the condition that individual financial status allows, consumers would choose brand products to 
avoid encountering untrustworthy transactions. Of course, choosing brand products does not 
definitely mean that other non-brand products are of ill-quality, although brand products are thought 
to be better in some sense by consumers. However, if it is because of general distrust that one turns 
to brand products, it is a case of another nature. Hence, distrust is one reason that consumers may 
concentrate in brand products, but it is not the only one. This is different from brand loyalty. 
However, if even previously trusted brand products are exposed to scandals, the whole industry 
which the brand products belong to would get notorious. 
(d) Searching effect 
Searching effect means that consumers would spend time, efforts and / or even money into searching 
for trustworthy sellers before purchasing in order to buy commodities or services with normal 
quality and use value. When sellers are generally untrustworthy, randomly selecting a seller cannot 
guarantee meeting a trustworthy one to a large degree. Then, searching for evidences of which seller 
can be trusted becomes necessary. After meeting a trustworthy seller, consumers would probably 
replace general trust with particular trust in future. In this sense, the brand-reliance effect mentioned 
above can be a kind of time-saving searching effect to some degree.  
(e) “Experts” effect 
“Experts” effect is mainly embodied in two aspects: one is that one becomes an “expert” himself / 
herself, the other is to turn to a real expert. Therein, the first situation is of special meaning and 
importance here. “One becomes an ‘expert’ himself / herself” means that to accumulate 
corresponding knowledge by oneself in order to find commodities or services of well-quality among 
numerous commodities and services. There are two situations of becoming an “expert” by oneself: 
One is accumulating corresponding knowledge of making something by oneself; the other is 
accumulating corresponding knowledge of discerning the false from the genuine or the bad from 
the good for directly buying something. When people know there exists much untrustworthy 
behavior in economic transactions, they would consciously learn various relatively professional 
knowledge in order to via more sufficient knowledge and information reduce the possibility of 
encountering untrustworthy behavior in economic transactions and increase that of encountering 
trustworthy behavior accordingly. Hence, the essence of “experts” effect is to increase knowledge 
and information concerning corresponding products and services per se. 
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(f) Self-provision effect 
Self-provision effect is mainly reflected in transacted services of which the rate cannot be further 
separated. It refers to that a consumer, out of distrust, would rather use something of his / her own 
to replace or assist part of a package service. Take staying in a hotel as an example. If people know, 
from such as news reports, that some hotels, even high star ones, cannot guarantee changing a clean 
bed sheet, quilt cover and pillowcases for every customer, they may take some measure by 
themselves, such as taking a bed sheet etc. of their own. If people know that some customers do 
some disgusting things with the kettle, such as boiling underwear or urinating inside it, provided by 
hotels for each room, they would rather take a kettle, maybe a collapsible one, by themselves.  If 
people know that hotels do not even disinfect the bath in each room for each customer, they may 
take some disposable plastic covers especially for a bath, given that they do want to use the bath, 
rather than the shower, in hotels. Therein, the first two examples are replacement effect, and the 
third one is assistance effect. Self-provision effect may and may not bring new transactions. Follow 
the three examples just mentioned. If the bed sheet etc. a hotel customer takes are not bought 
especially for staying in hotels, self-provision effect does not bring new transactions. By contrast, 
if the collapsible kettle or plastic covers are bought especially for travelling and staying in hotels, 
then it does incur new transactions. Anyway, distrust incurs what is unnecessary.  
(g) Mismatch effect  
Mismatch effect is also usually associated with transacted services of which the rate cannot be 
further separated. It refers to that a consumer would rather use a package service as less as possible, 
even when needed, out of distrust, which results in a mismatch of the rate paid for a service and the 
service actually being able to use. Still take staying in a hotel as an example. As we know, hotels 
usually equip every room with a kettle. The rate of staying a hotel room for one night covers the use 
of the kettle, and the hotel would not reduce the rate for anyone who does not use the kettle in the 
room since the rate is not further separable. However, a customer may decide not to use it to boil 
some drinking water, although (s)he needs to, because (s)he may worry that other previous 
costumers may have done some disgusting things with the kettle, such as boiling underwear or 
urinating inside it, as one may learn from news. The mismatch effect is somewhat like compression 
effect. The difference between them is that the former is compressing within a single inseparable 
transaction, while the latter is compressing the frequency of transactions.  
1.11 Interim conclusion 
This chapter systematically considers trust in the realistic socio-economic environment where many 
factors, such as information, social learning, networks of interpersonal relationships, geographical 
mobility, institutions, etc., function on trust through some way, underpin the change of trust and the 
co-evolution of trust and trustworthiness, and further are reflected on corresponding economic 
performance.  
First, some basics of trust (Section 1.1 – 1.3) are illustrated. Individual trust is an attitude based on 
one’s perception of trustworthiness of other people or things. Trust has some characteristics: it is 
conditional on trustworthiness; it relies on information; ex ante trust in future interactions is risk-
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relevant; and it is slow to establish, fast to decline and hard to rebuild. Individual general trust is 
one’s overall assessment of the trustworthiness of unspecified others in the society. From the 
perspective of an individual person, the difference between general trust and particular trust lies in 
whether the trust object(s) is / are specified; The difference between general trust and group trust 
lies in whether there is a definitive or clear characteristic or criterion to define a certain group; and 
the most subtle difference between general trust and trust in strangers lies in whether there is the 
explicit distinction of the distance of personal relationships. The generalizing process of trust can 
be treated as a subjective referring result from a sample of population to the whole population. The 
generalization process of trust is to a large extent experience-oriented, or backward-looking, while 
its output is expectation-oriented, or forward-looking. Trust can be general; however, when 
functioning, it is probably reflected in a particular way. After being experienced, uncertainty will 
turn into established facts and certainty. The impact of the consistency of expectation and a later 
fact on trust also depends on whether the expected thing is desirable or undesirable. Experience can 
be categorized as childhood and adulthood experience, personal and non-personal experience, and 
positive and negative experience. Expectation can be positive or negative, self-based or cause-based, 
and quantitative or qualitative. Existing measures of (general) trust include measuring general trust 
using micro-level or aggregate macro-level survey data, measuring trust using the investment 
actions in trust games, measuring social trust using the cooperation share in evolutionary game 
theoretical agent-based modeling, and representing micro trust using probability. 
Then, it discusses trust from the perspective of an individual trustor (Section 1.4) and considers trust 
and trustworthiness simultaneously (Section 1.5). From the perspective of a trustor, thoughts stress 
the mental process of processing information of others’ trustworthiness. Personal preference, 
opinion, emotional attitude etc. to a large degree influence one’s reaction to the information 
reflecting trustworthiness. Moreover, human capabilities of reasoning, inference and association etc. 
also play a crucial role in a trustor’s trust in future similar situations and / or in other people with 
common or similar characteristics. Besides, behavior, also from the perspective of a trustor, 
emphasizes the behavioral expression or output after processing the information of others’ 
trustworthiness in mind. Every interaction, as the most important channel for a trustor to display 
trust attitude, involves a bunch of decisions. Not only others’ trustworthiness is the basis of one’s 
trust, but also one reacts to others’ trustworthiness. Moreover, it is also possible that one may adjust 
his / her trustworthiness according to others’ trustworthiness. Untrustworthiness not only causes 
individual costs for others, but also social costs. In a 2-person trusting-trusted relationship, the role 
of a trustor and that of a trustee represent either correspondence or superposition, which contains an 
important motivation for one’s sticking to trustworthiness, and therefore implies an important 
mechanism for the maintenance of social trust in the whole society. When it comes to trust and 
trustworthiness in a society, the concepts of the supply of trust and trustworthiness and the demand 
for trust and trustworthiness are needed. Although trust and trustworthiness are unaccountable and 
abstract, it does not mean that the supply of and the demand for trust and trustworthiness cannot be 
compared. 
Then, this chapter pays the most attention to information (Section 1.6), social learning (Section 1.6), 
networks of interpersonal relationships (Section 1.6), geographical mobility (Section 1.7) and 
institutions (Section 1.9), which are several essential, decisive factors pushing the functioning of 
the trust mechanism and underpinning the change and coevolution of trust and trustworthiness. 
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One’s behavior delivers information of his / her trust and trustworthiness. Behavior can be either 
solo or interactive, or either internalization-based or internalization-lacking. Interactive behavior 
much more easily delivers information of trustworthiness of either actor than solo behavior. Whether 
solo behavior will present trustworthiness lies in its externality, and the degree of the externality. 
Moreover, the key to distinguish internalization-based and internalization-lacking behavior is the 
consistency of one’s values and behavior. Information reflecting others’ trustworthiness is crucial 
for one’s trust. Information can be categorized as solo behavior or interactive behavior information, 
personal interaction or non-personal interaction information, individual-particular or phenomenon-
particular information, natural-personal or media information, or personal interaction and 
observation information, and direct and indirect information. Social learning is an important channel 
for acquiring both thoughts and behavior, including trust and trustworthiness. Social learning can 
be direct or indirect learning, forward or reverse learning, learning from the same standpoint or from 
the counter standpoint, and active or passive learning. It can be from parents, neighbors or even 
strangers. Immediate interaction networks, temporary interactions, observation, verbal delivered 
information, written records can all become channels for social learning. A shorter distance – 
geographical, social or psychological – facilitates interactions. So does being involved in the same 
interaction platform. Interaction platforms can be formed based on geographical locations, 
organizations, social roles, events, technology, or era. Flows should also be treated as a basic 
element of networks, besides nodes and links. For micro individuals generate macro phenomena, 
four steps, namely endowment / networking process, micro effects, synthetization process and 
macro-level presentation, may be experienced. The reason why macro network phenomena are rich 
and constantly changing in reality lies in the driving of heterogeneity. The heterogeneity of networks 
may be embodied on nodes, links, flows, game types / structures, interaction platforms, and network 
structures. Geographical mobility changes individual local interaction network, and has a time and 
distance dimension. Three kinds of trust decline may be caused by geographical mobility: different 
background mindsets, different standpoints, and the coexistence of large population and high 
mobility creating conditions for untrustworthy behavior. In addition, geographical mobility may 
also accompany social mobility. 
Others’ not conforming to institutions is a non-negligible cause for one’s distrust. First, institutions 
can be established for problem-solving, problem-avoiding, influence- / problem-controlling and 
blame-apportioning institutions, which is from the perspective of the purpose of institutions and is 
of practical importance for trust (re)building. Problems are the prime target of institutions usually, 
which requires the manifestation of problems. Institutions centering on problems may be generated 
at different depths of problems. Besides, institutions can also be classified as values-type institutions 
and constructed institutions. Trustworthiness per se is a values-type institution. In terms of the origin 
of institutions, behavioral requirements on others and the changeability of the relatively 
advantageous role in various interactions play an important role. In terms of the diffusion of 
institutions, continuous geographical distribution of population and population mobility favor the 
diffusion of institutions. An institution’s prevalence from generation to diffusion presents three 
patterns of special structure at least, that is, single-point radiation, multi-points outburst and 
diffusion in virtue of population mobility. Besides the reasons stressed by Axelrod (1986) and 
Posner (1997), people may also conform to institutions because complying with institutions is easier 
and more convenient, makes one the right party in normal cases, implies an exchange for others’ 
institution-obeying behavior, or is motivated by the changeability of the relatively advantageous 
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role in various interactions. Among all the reasons, reputation outstands for its strong dependence 
on information process. It can be said that trust and its change are in an interwoven system composed 
of institutional networks, causality networks and personal information networks.  
Economic transactions are a specific form of interpersonal interactions. In economic transactions, 
individual (dis)trust may cause a series of effects through which trust influences economy. These 
effects are respectively compression effect, substitution effect, brand-reliance effect, search effect, 
“experts” effect, self-provision effect and mismatch effect. Therein, substitution effect can be 
horizontal, vertical or cross. 
  
Chapter 2:  Some Socio-Economic Aspects 
of China and Scandinavia 
2.1 Introduction 
Obviously, China and the three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, are 
different in many aspects. They are different in population size: By 2017, the Chinese population is 
approximately 1.4 billion, the Danish population is about 5.75 million, Norwegian 5.3 million and 
Swedish 10 million. They are different in ethnic composition and ethnic diversity: China is a 
multiethnic nation, with 56 ethnic groups in total out of which 55 are ethnic minorities, except 
foreign immigrants; By contrast, the three Scandinavian countries are a lot less ethnically diverse 
than China. They are different in religious belief: Most Chinese do not have religious faith, while 
most people in the three Scandinavian countries belong to Protestantism. They are different in 
ideology: China is a socialist country with Chinese characteristics, while the three Scandinavian 
countries are capitalist countries. They are different in the stage of economic development: China is 
currently an economically developing country, with a rapid economic growth, while the three 
Scandinavian countries are already economically developed countries. They are different in the 
balance of regional development within country: China presents large gaps in regional economic 
development, with the eastern and coastal regions being more economically developed than the 
middle ones and the middle areas more developed than the western ones, and with the urban areas 
being more developed than the rural ones. By contrast, the regional development in the three 
Scandinavian countries is much more balanced and even. They are different in territorial area, 
geographical location and climate; They are different in cultural tradition, history, value system and 
life style… 
Although there are many different aspects between China and Scandinavia, this chapter is not 
intended to cover all of them. Instead, it will focus on several social and economic aspects that relate 
to trust and reflect the characteristics of China and Scandinavia, besides trust itself. Moreover, rich 
corresponding data mainly about China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden will be presented 
throughout this chapter. However, it should be noted that this chapter is not going to examine any 
data relation possibly existing between or among trust and socio-economic performance and other 
related factors; what it aims to is to introduce or discuss some possible realistic factors and 
mechanisms among them first and then further present or compare directly, closely relevant real 
data of both Scandinavia and China where relevant data is available.  
This chapter contains 8 sections, except the chapter introduction: Section 2.2 is about population, 
network structures and memberships. This section firstly discusses several points of what population 
possibly means to social trust and presents data of population size and population composition 
(mainly about religion, immigration and ethnic groups) of China and Scandinavia. Following this, 
it compares social structures (here similar with “network structures”) between China and the West. 
Thirdly, it compares family structure and voluntary membership between China and Scandinavia. 
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Last, it introduces in brief the Huji system in China and presents data about floating population in 
China. Section 2.3 is about welfare, equality, change, expectations, and certainty. Scandinavia is the 
main role of this part. This section introduces briefly the Nordic model, its possible socio-economic 
results, etc. in general. It also introduces some specific welfare policies in Denmark, as well as in 
China. Besides, equality, which involves equality / equity in values, wealth or income equality 
resulted from welfare and taxation policies, and gender equality are also included. Section 2.4 is 
about social mobility and geographic mobility in China, which also involves the Huji system of 
China. Section 2.5 is about social capital. This section discusses the definition, forms, dimensions, 
elements, etc. of social capital. Besides, it also presents different possible measures of social capital 
of China and Scandinavia which could reflect social capital in various aspects. Section 2.6 is about 
trust building. This section shows possible ways of building trust and data of both general trust and 
trust in people of different closeness and / or occupations; Section 2.7 is about socio-economic 
performance. This section includes unemployment rate and relevant data of GDP and public security 
of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Section 2.8 is interim conclusions. 
What are going to be presented in this chapter are usually of theoretical and / or empirical interest 
in terms of their possible impact on social (general) trust and / or economic performance in academic 
research. However, it should be noted that due to complex interactions among various and rich social 
factors, on the path to trust, some factors may be closer to trust than other factors. Thus, it may turn 
out that the ever claimed effect of some of them on social trust is refuted in some empirical research. 
But it may be still of much interest to have a look at them and discuss possible paths from them to 
social trust and / or economic performance, especially when we take Scandinavia and China as main 
cases in particular. Additionally, it should be noted that there may be other factors or mechanisms 
(as have been and will be discussed in other chapters) that play a more essential role than these ones. 
Anyway, let us have a look at and discuss them first taking Scandinavia and China as main cases. 
2.2 Population and network structures 
2.2.1 Meaning of population to trust 
Humans are the subjects of interactions in human society. In interpersonal interactions, trust can not 
only be generated, but also be destroyed. Having a look at the total population at a certain level and 
its composition or structure is valuable for at least three reasons:  
First of all, taking a society as the level of consideration, the more people a society has, the more 
possibly interpersonal interactions happen, ceteris paribus. Information of trustworthiness of others 
from direct (personal) interactions or interactions of others is an essential source for one’s trust in 
others to change (i.e., increase or decrease). Thus, more people usually mean more of that kind of 
information. This is sort of like sampling; each piece of information which can be used to infer the 
trustworthiness of others of a certain scope is like an observation. Certainly, whether one’s trust will 
finally increase or decrease after receiving that kind of information depends on the nature of an 
interaction, or put another way, on whether the interaction is trust-reinforcing or trust-damaging. 
Nowadays, a lot more information about others’ trustworthiness can be obtained through various 
media, and those pieces of information further influence people’s social trust.  
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Second, the impact of racial, ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity or dissimilarity on social trust is often 
a topic in academic research. Therein, many works conclude that racial, ethnic or linguistic 
heterogeneity has a negative association with social trust. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2002) explore the determinants of general trust using data of the United States. Their empirical 
research reveals that “both individual experiences and community characteristics” (p. 207) affect 
general trust, and, what is more, that those living in more racially heterogeneous communities tend 
to have lower general trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Leigh (2006) explores “the determinants 
of localised trust and generalised trust” (p. 278) using data of Australia on individual, neighborhood 
and regional level. He concludes that in Australia, both localized trust and generalized trust are 
negatively affected by linguistic and ethnical heterogeneity, with linguistic heterogeneity having a 
negative impact on localized trust for both natives and immigrants, and on generalized trust only for 
immigrants (Leigh, 2006). However, You (2012) holds another opinion about whether heterogeneity 
per se does matter that much for social trust as shown in previous empirical research. You (2012, p. 
702) argues that “fairness of political and legal institutions affects people’s incentives for trust and 
trustworthiness and that individuals’ perceptions of fairness of the society directly affects their trust 
in other people”. You (2012) considers fairness in three aspects, namely distributive, procedural and 
formal justice, respectively taking income distribution, democracy and corruption as a proxy. You 
(2012) examines the impact of fairness and heterogeneity (in terms of, such as, income, ethnic and 
cultural diversity) on social trust in virtue of a multi-level hierarchical logit model (individual person 
level and country level) across 80 countries and concludes that the three indicators of fairness are 
significantly positively associated with social trust and matters more than homogeneity or 
heterogeneity per se for social trust. In addition, in empirical research, heterogeneity is usually 
calculated like Herfindahl index. 
The embodied distrust related to heterogeneity is in fact the so-called group trust, which is a kind 
of generalized particular trust in essence, because it distinguishes people into different big 
categories.1 The reason for heterogeneity to damage trust could be different between “during 
interactions” and “with no previous interactions”. During interactions, it may be different acceptable 
values and behavior in different culture that result in distrust. Without any interaction before, it may 
be the stereotype of heterogeneous others that results in distrust. Moreover, if no trust-damaging 
things are done according to heterogeneity, distrust reflecting heterogeneity will also diminish, or 
even not present.  
Therefore, it is possible that racial, ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity is not going to damage trust. 
There are so many factors in human society that could find their way to influence social trust. 
However, many therein may not be relatively substantial ones, and other factors could be closer and 
have a more direct and certain influence. A key fact to remember is that whether heterogeneity (such 
as, ethnic or linguistic) within a country has an impact on trust and to which degree are determined 
by the degree of integration of an investigated area and the attitude that people there have to diversity. 
Where people relatively embrace diversity, or have more tolerance to heterogeneity, and live in 
harmony with dissimilar others, heterogeneity would not have a significant effect on interpersonal 
trust. People living in countries traditionally composited with different ethnic groups may not care 
much about different ethnics since different ethnic groups have integrated well along history and 
 
1 For the discussion of group trust, see Chapter 1. 
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ethnic differences have become quite ordinary in life. The reason why linguistic heterogeneity could 
negatively affect trust is not difficult to understand. Besides any possible implicit differences in 
cultural habits and mindsets behind linguistic heterogeneity, difficulties in understanding other 
languages could result in a substantial reduction in possible information received. When people 
cannot infer others’ intention and are swayed by negative stereotypes, trust would be low without 
doubt. Anyway, in a word, fairly treating others is always an effective way for heterogeneity not to 
damage interpersonal trust. 
Third, there is a perception that social trust in big cities seems to be lower than that in smaller towns 
or villages in rural areas. For example, Putnam (2000, pp. 138-139) notices that inhabitants in big 
cities express less social trust than those living in small towns. Glaeser, Henderson and Inman (2000) 
find that the social trust, as well as fairness perception, in big cities of the U.S. with population more 
than 1 million is far lower than that in cities below that size. What big cities face in many aspects 
are like what large population countries do. Relative to small towns or villages in rural areas, big 
cities obviously have a much larger and denser population. Therefore, an ordinary person relatively 
has a much lower percentage of people (s)he knows well in big cities and a higher percentage of 
strangers around. Besides, population in big cities is always more diverse, in terms of, such as, 
wealth, occupations, identities, social classes, etc., which is in the same vein as countries with a 
larger population. More importantly, big cities, which are always of economic, political and / or 
traffic importance, always attract more resources and more people from different places to 
concentrate there and display relatively high mobility. Additionally, continued high speed 
development and a larger population create further stresses for the provision of public services, 
which may result in severe competition for resources like public education and health care. The 
course and consequences of competing for limited, insufficient resources may result in distributive 
unfairness. 
One may have such an experience that when going to a big city, especially a strange one, (s)he often 
keeps a warier eye on the behavior of others nearby and becomes more suspicious when dealing 
with others. But this worry is not out of no reason since economically developed and population-
dense big cities are also attractive to the bad. They prefer big cities since, often, big cities are more 
likely to create naturally good conditions and opportunities for them to intentionally and deliberately 
conduct trust-damaging behavior, such as, pickpockets, robs, frauds, etc., partly due to the higher 
density and mobility of population in big cities. In economics, scholars would explain this as one-
shot games and lacking of reputation chains. However, it does not mean that information cannot 
work. For example, personal or told experiences or news reports could all spread the dark side of 
society. This involves how people get familiar with and recognize particular untrustworthy behavior, 
rather than particular untrustworthy persons, which may result in adverse consequences. Moreover, 
with the development of media and the Internet, it gets more convenient for people to acquire 
information, of both good and bad phenomena existing in society. Strengthening public security and 
fighting to crimes are necessary measures. However, the police force is also usually much stronger 
in big cities within a country. 
In addition, in countries with some religious tradition, religion has ever played a crucial role in 
shaping their people’s mind and values. Certainly, it cannot be excluded the possibility that at the 
beginning of the formation of new religious branches, some pioneers explain some religious classic 
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or propose some claims out of some appeals in order to rationalize some aspects that are disapproved 
of by the mainstream religious branch. It can be said that ideas formed under the influence of religion 
before have already been integrated into and become an inseparable part of their culture, and reflect 
some aspects of their national character and ethos. In addition, even within the same religion, people 
embracing different branches could present dissimilar characters. In his disputable monograph, 
Weber ([1930] 2005) elaborates on the influence of the religious ideas of Luther’s conception of the 
calling and worldly asceticism of Protestantism after the Reformation, especially embodied in 
Calvinism, on the development of capitalism spirits. More recent scholars also have noticed the 
different influences of different religions or religious branches. For example, inspired by Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), La Porta et al (1997) consider Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and Muslim 
as hierarchical religions and empirically demonstrate that hierarchical religions are significantly 
negatively associated with general trust. However, You (2012) finds that the previous significantly 
positive association of Protestants with social trust relative to no-religion people becomes 
insignificantly negative after adding into model variables such as “ethnic minority status, political 
trust, voluntary organizational membership, and two variables that reflect perceptions of fairness” 
(p. 714), which indicates no advantage of Protestants in social trust. In addition, You (2012) also 
shows that Catholics has a significant negative association with social trust, and Orthodox has an 
insignificant negative association with social trust after adding those variables aforementioned.  
2.2.2 Population size and composition of China and Scandinavia 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden are not only geographically close, but also culturally similar. All the 
three countries belong to both Scandinavian and Nordic countries.1 Therein, Denmark and Sweden 
are also members of the European Union, but not members of the Euro Area, while Norway is 
neither a member of the European Union nor the Eurozone. Additionally, they all have Protestant 
tradition.  
Danish population in data 
Denmark has 43,560 square kilometers excluding Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and it adopts 
constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democracy as its form of government. (Denmark.dk, 
no date b) From January 1st, 2000 to January 1st, 2017, Denmark saw a continuous increase in its 
population size from about 5.33 million to about 5.75 million (see Table 2.1). At the beginning of 
the third quarter of 2017, the population size of Denmark reaches 5,760,696, which is about 15 
thousand more than the beginning of the fourth quarter of 20162 (Statistics Denmark, 2017b; see 
also Table 2.2). Therein, at the beginning of the third quarter of 2017, about 13.06% of the Danish 
population are immigrants or descendants from other countries (see Table 2.2). The contemporary 
religion in Denmark got influenced by the Protestant Reformation between the 16th and 17th century 
when the Evangelical Lutheran Church became the National Church of Denmark. Nowadays, 
Protestants remain the predominant religious group in Denmark with a proportion more than 75% 
in the Danish population, despite the proportion of members of the National Church has seen a fall 
from 80.37% in 2011 to 75.87% in 2017 (See also Table 2.3).  
 
1 “The Nordic Region consists of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, as well as the Faroe Islands, 
Greenland, and Åland.” (Nordic Co-operation, no date a, para. 1) 
2 Population at the first day of the quarter.  
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Table 2.1 Population size of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 2000 to 2017. 
 Denmark Norway Sweden 
2000 5,330,020 4,478,497 8,861,426 
2001 5,349,212 4,503,436 8,882,792 
2002 5,368,354 4,524,066 8,909,128 
2003 5,383,507 4,552,252 8,940,788 
2004 5,397,640 4,577,457 8,975,670 
2005 5,411,405 4,606,363 9,011,392 
2006 5,427,459 4,640,219 9,047,752 
2007 5,447,084 4,681,134 9,113,257 
2008 5,475,791 4,737,171 9,182,927 
2009 5,511,451 4,799,252 9,256,347 
2010 5,534,738 4,858,199 9,340,682 
2011 5,560,628 4,920,305 9,415,570 
2012 5,580,516 4,985,870 9,482,855 
2013 5,602,628 5,051,275 9,555,893 
2014 5,627,235 5,107,970 9,644,864 
2015 5,659,715 5,166,493 9,747,355 
2016 5,707,251 5,213,985 9,851,017 
2017 5,748,769 5,258,317 9,995,153 
Note: Population on January 1st of each year. 
Data source: Eurostat. 
Table 2.2 Population composition of Denmark.1 
  2016 Q4 2017 Q1 2017 Q2 2017 Q3 
Persons of Danish origin 5,007,524 5,007,197 5,005,623 5,008,076 
Immigrants from western countries 238,564 237,707 241,289 239,528 
Immigrants from non-western countries 330,388 332,874 336,351 338,214 
Descendants from western countries 26,670 27,138 27,618 28,078 
Descendants from non-western countries 142,380 143,843 145,289 146,798 
Total  5,745,526 5,748,769 5,756,170 5,760,694 
Note: Population at the first day of each quarter.  
Data source: Statistics Denmark (2017a; 2017b). 
Table 2.3 Membership of the National Church of Denmark from 2011 to 2017. 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Member of National Church 4469109 4454466 4430643 4413825 4400754 4387571 4361518 
Total population 5560628 5580516 5602628 5627235 5659715 5707251 5748769 
% protestants 80.3706 79.8218 79.0815 78.4368 77.7558 76.8771 75.8687 
Notes: Data of member of national church and total population is the number on January 1st of each 
year. Row “% protestants” is author’s own calculation. 
 
1 The data of the total number of the Danish population can be found at “Population and Population Projections” on 
Statistics Denmark (2017b). The data of Denmark’s immigrants can be found at “Immigrants and Their Descendants” 
on Statistics Denmark (2017a). The data of Danish origin can also be calculated via the two links in the two 
references via customizing data. 
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Data source: Statistics Denmark. 
Norwegian population in data 
Norway is a typical county with a relatively large territory and a relatively small population size. It 
has 324,000 square kilometers (Statistics Norway, 2016, p. 42). According to data from Eurostat, its 
population has grown steadily from 4,478,497 on January 1st, 2000 to 5,258,317 to January 1st, 2017, 
increasing about 17.41% (see Table 2.1). This figure has increased to 5,277,762 at the end of the 
2nd quarter of 2017 (Statistics Norway, 2017f). Most people in Norway lived in urban settlements 
as of January 1st, 2016, representing as high as nearly 81% of the total population of Norway 
(Statistics Norway, ©no date). In addition, nearly 1/3 of the inhabitants of Norway concentrate in 
Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger/Sandnes, Trondheim and Drammen which are the five largest urban 
settlements in Norway (Statistics Norway, ©no date). There are a total of 883,751 immigrants and 
Norwegian-born to immigrants parents as of January 1st, 2017, accounting for 16.8% of the total 
population of Norway (Statistics Norway, 2017c). Therein, 724,987 are immigrants and 158,764 are 
Norwegian-born to immigrant parents (Statistics Norway, 2017c). As of January 1st, 2017, 217,241 
persons of the Norwegian population are with refugee background, accounting for 30.0% of all 
immigrants to Norway and 4.1% of the whole Norwegian population (Statistics Norway, 2017e). 
The scale of internal migration between counties is 145,232 as of 2016, the internal migration within 
counties is 118,563, and internal migration between municipalities is 241,362 (Statistics Norway, 
2017d). A total of 3,758,070 people are members of the Church of Norway in 2016 excluding 
emigrated members (Statistics Norway, 2017b), decreasing 1.09% compared with 2015 and 6.19% 
compared with 2011 respectively, accounting for 72.08% of the total population of Norway on 
January 1st, 2016. At the beginning of 2016, the second biggest religion in Norway is Christianity, 
representing 349,083 people and about 6.70% of its whole population (Statistics Norway, 2017g). 
The third biggest religion is Islam, accounting for about 2.84% of the Norwegian population at the 
beginning of 2016 (Statistics Norway, 2017g). 
Swedish population in data 
From January 1st, 2000 to January 1st, 2017, the Swedish population increases from 8,861,426 to 
9,995,153 (see Table 2.1). In July 2017, the Swedish population has increased to 10,065,389 
(Statistics Sweden, ©2017). From 2011 to 2016, more and more people immigrated in Sweden. (See 
Table 2.4) Between January 1st, 2015 and January 1st, 2016, 163,005 people immigrated into Sweden 
and 45,878 people emigrated from Sweden (Statistics Sweden, 2017b; see also Table 2.4) As to 
January 1st, 2016, the domestic migration within Sweden is 1,405,594 (Statistics Sweden, 2017a), 
accounting for 14.27% of the total Swedish population at that time. 
Table 2.4 Immigrations and emigration of Sweden, 2011-2016. 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Immigrations 96 467 103 059 115 845 126 966 134 240 163 005 
Emigrations 51 179 51 747 50 715 51 237 55 830 45 878 
Note: Data is that on the first day of a year. 
Source: Statistics Sweden. 
Chinese population in data 
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Table 2.5 presents data of the population of the Chinese mainland, including composition by gender 
and by residence, from which we can see that by the end of 2016, Chinese population reaches about 
1.38271 billion. The proportion of male in the total population decreases annually from 51.27% in 
2010 to 51.21% in 2016. The proportion of urban residences in the total population increases to 
57.35% in 2016 from 49.95% in 2010.  
China is a unified multi-ethnic country with 56 ethnic groups, with Han people being the ethnic 
majority and the other groups being ethnic minorities. According to the Sixth National Population 
Census of China in 2010, Han people accounts for 91.51% of the total population of the mainland 
China (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2011a). The largest five 
ethnic minorities in the 2010 Census are Zhuang, Hui, Manchu, Uyghur and Miao, respectively.  
In addition, most Chinese do not have religious faith. According to the Chinese General Social 
Survey (CGSS) 2015, 87.88% of the 10,968 Chinese respondents say that they have no religious 
faith, and only 12.12% claim they have.
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Table 2.5 Chinese population and its composition, 2010 – 2016.  
(10000 persons) 
Year 
Total 
population 
(year-end) 
Male % Male Female % Female Urban % Urban Rural % Rural 
2010 134091 68748 51.27 65343 48.73 66978 49.95 67113 50.05 
2011 134735 69068 51.26 65667 48.74 69079 51.27 65656 48.73 
2012 135404 69395 51.25 66009 48.75 71182 52.57 64222 47.43 
2013 136072 69728 51.24 66344 48.76 73111 53.73 62961 46.27 
2014 136782 70079 51.23 66703 48.77 74916 54.77 61866 45.23 
2015 137462 70414 51.22 67048 48.78 77116 56.10 60346 43.90 
2016 138271 70815 51.21 67456 48.79 79298 57.35 58973 42.65 
Notes: Population at year-end refers to population at 24 o’clock on December 31th of each year. In addition, the total population of each year in this table does not 
cover the population of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macau Special Administration Region and Taiwan province and overseas Chinese. In addition, “for 
the year […] 2000 is the census year estimates; the rest of the data covered in” this table has “been estimated on the basis of the annual national sample surveys of 
population. […] Total population and population by sex include the military personnel of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the military personnel are classified 
as urban population in the item of population by residence” (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2017, p. 31). 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook – 2017 (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2017, p. 31) 
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2.2.3 Social structure: China vs. the West 
(i) Liang Shuming1 (1949): No group life in China vs. prevalent group life in the West 
Liang ([1949] 2005, p. 43) compares the social structure of a society to the skeleton of its whole 
culture and believes that two regions with similar social structures in a period tend to have similar 
cultures. He shares his insight into the contrasts between the West and China in the aspect of social 
structure: An obvious distinction between the two is that the former relatively pays more attention 
to group life and individual persons, while the latter attaches more importance on families (Liang, 
[1949] 2005, Chapter 3-5). In addition, he also gives a figure which compares this difference in the 
social life between the West and China, which is presented in Figure 2.1 after being translated from 
Chinese into English (Liang, [1949] 2005, p. 71). In fact, China is lack of group life, which is in 
sharp contrast to the prevalent group life in the Western societies (Liang, [1949] 2005, Chapter 3-
4). 
Issues centering on the relation between groups and individual persons has been a recurrent theme 
in the debates for a long time in the Western history, as well as in every aspect of their modern social 
and economic life (e.g., Liang, [1949] 2005, pp. 43, 59). It can be concluded from the research of 
Liang ([1949] 2005) that the long existence of debates or struggles on these kinds of issues in the 
Western societies actually has its causes in history and social structure. To a large extent, it can be 
said that the life of the Westerners is not separable from various groups. In terms of group size, 
Liang ([1949] 2005, p. 49) says that religion may have ever played a remarkable role in the transition 
of small groups to large ones that transcend families in the West, in spite of other factors. – That is 
why Liang ([1949] 2005, pp. 46-48) regards religion as the watershed of Chinese culture and 
Western culture. It is the different influences of the religious tradition of the West and the Confucian 
tradition which is not religious of China that make the West and China diverge in group life (Liang, 
[1949] 2005, pp. 46-48). Most, if not all, groups in the West have clear and well-defined boundaries, 
with in-group members enjoying in-group rights over those outside the group – that is why a group 
is a group – which is quite distinct from China where group life, in the sense of the West, does not 
play a role as important as families (e.g., Liang, [1949] 2005, p. 51).  
 
1 Chinese tradition of human names puts family name / surname first, ahead of given names, which is totally different 
from most western countries where the surname is put last. Since both Liang Shuming (i.e., 梁漱溟 in Chinese) and 
Fei Xiaotong (i.e., 费孝通 in Chinese) below are Chinese, Liang and Fei are their family name respectively, rather 
than Shuming and Xiaotong. Their names are temporarily written following Chinese tradition in this section, and 
will change to English style in the references. 
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Figure 2.1 One of the differences between the social life of the West and China.  
Notes: Author’s own translation from Chinese into English, including the original notes: “1. Font 
size indicates relative importance; 2. Arrows indicate direct inter-relationship; 3. Dotted lines 
indicate that a relationship is not very clear.”  
Source: Liang ([1949] 2005, p. 71). 
(ii) Fei Xiaotong (1947): Cha xu ge ju of Chinese society vs. tuan ti ge ju of the Western societies 
Fei ([1947] 2017) also insightfully notices the distinction between the social structure of China and 
that of the West which shows the different forms of social organizations between them. Similar to 
Liang, the pattern which is composed of groups presented in the Western societies, which is in stark 
contrast to that of China, catches Fei’s attention. In his famous book 乡土中国 (pinyin: xiāng tǔ 
zhōng guó), which was published as a book based on his publication of a series of essays and of 
which the book title was translated from Chinese into English as From the Soil: The Foundations of 
Chinese Society by Hamilton and Wang (Fei, [1947] 1992), Fei ([1947] 2017) depicts the social 
structure of China as 差序格局 (pinyin: chā xù gé jú), while describing that of the West as 团体格
局 (pinyin: tuán tǐ gé jú). 格局 (pinyin: gé jú) means “pattern”; in 差序 (pinyin: chā xù), the first 
character, 差 (pinyin: chā), emphasizes difference and the second, 序 (pinyin: xù), order/sequence; 
团体 (pinyin: tuán tǐ) means “groups” (see also, Fei, [1947] 1992, p. 19). In that book, Fei ([1947] 
2017) uses two metaphors to explain the two concepts, 差序格局 (cha xu ge ju) and 团体格局 
(tuan ti ge ju), vividly. When explains tuan ti ge ju in the West, he says:   
Western societies are somewhat like the way we collect rice straw to use to cook our 
food. After harvest, the rice straw is bound into small bundles; several bundles are 
bound into larger bundles; and these are then stacked together so that they can be carried 
on shoulder poles. Each piece of straw belongs in a small bundle, which in turn belongs 
in a larger bundle, which in (turn) makes up a stack. The separate straws, the separate 
bundles, and finally the separate stacks all fit together to make up the whole haystack. 
In this way, the separately bound bundles can be stacked in an orderly way. (Fei, [1947] 
1992, p. 61)1 
In western society, these separate units are organizations. By making an analogy 
between organizations in Western societies and the composition of haystacks, I want to 
indicate that in Western society individuals form organizations. Each organization has 
its own boundaries, which clearly define those people who are members and whose 
 
1 For the original Chinese, see, Fei ([1947] 2017, pp. 26-27). 
The West China 
Group 
Individual  person Individual     person 
Group 
Family Family 
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who are not. (Fei, [1947] 1992, pp. 61-62)1 
In one respect, my analogy is not too appropriate. An individual may join several 
organizations, but it is impossible for a straw to be in several bundles at the same time. 
That is the difference between people and straws. (Fei, [1947] 1992, p. 62)2 
When talking about cha xu ge ju in Chinese society, he says: 
[...] In my opinion, the ambiguity indicates the difference between our (Chinese) social 
structure and that of the West. Our pattern is not like distinct bundles of straws. Rather, 
it is like the circles that appear on the surface of a lake when a rock is thrown into it. 
Every one stands at the center of the circles produced by his or her own social influence. 
Everyone’s circles are interrelated. One touches different circles at different times and 
places. (Fei, [1947] 1992, pp. 62-63)3 
Social relationships in China possess a self-centered quality. Like the ripples formed 
form a stone thrown into a lake, each circle spreading out from the center becomes 
more distant and at the same time more insignificant. With this pattern, we are faced 
with the basic characteristic of Chinese social structure […]. (Fei, [1947] 1992, p. 65)4 
According to Fei ([1947] 1992, p. 70), cha xu ge ju, which is the fundamental and basic structure of 
Chinese rural society, is “a network composed of each individual’s personal connections” where 
individual social relationships are “an accumulation of personal connections”. On contrast, in the 
Western tuan ti ge ju, “personal relationships depend on a common structure. People attach 
themselves to a preexisting structure and then, through that structure, form personal relationships.” 
(Fei, [1947] 1992, p. 71) Note that Hamilton and Wang translated Fei’s (1947) concept of cha xu ge 
ju as “the differential mode of association” and tuan ti ge ju as “the organizational mode of 
association” (Fei, [1947] 1992). 
Although the work of Liang (1949) and Fei (1947) were done about 70 years ago, they still have 
significant referential value and provide enlightenment nowadays, and help us understand better the 
Chinese society and the Western ones. Many differences between modern China and the modern 
West are probably due to their distinct fundamental structures, development paths and culture that 
diverged a long ago, rather than simply being attributed to “developed” or “undeveloped”, or “fast 
progress” or “slowly progress” (see also, Liang, [1921] 1999, pp. 71-72). The Westerners attach 
themselves to preexisting groups, while Chinese attach to preexisting relationships; In the West, the 
boundary of various groups that one belongs to is clearly defined, while in China, each “ripple” of 
one’s relationship network is elastic. – These are both what Liang (1949) and Fei (1947) convey to 
us. In consideration of the quite different social structure presented in China and the West, it 
becomes obvious that using the thinking way of Western groups to explain some Chinese 
phenomenon is not appropriate. 
We can understand Fei’s (1947) “ripples” metaphor for cha xu ge ju like this, although it is rather 
 
1 For the original Chinese, see, Fei ([1947] 2017, p. 27). 
2 For the original Chinese, see, Fei ([1947] 2017, p. 27). 
3 For the original Chinese, see, Fei ([1947] 2017, p. 28). 
4 For the original Chinese, see, Fei ([1947] 2017, p. 30). 
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intuitive already: each person attaches different degrees of importance on his/her personal 
relationships with others. The importance that a person subjectively attaches to others gradually 
descents along his/her ego centric network from the innermost circle to the outermost. In other words, 
any radius at the same time presents depth or thickness of a relationship. The smallest circle shrinks 
to a point of a person in the West, while most of the time, it at least contains a couple of people for 
Chinese. Usually, in the eyes of Chinese, the innermost circle is family. By the way, as what Fei 
([1947] 2017, pp. 27-28) figured out, the character “family” in Chinese has elasticity to some extent.  
(iii) Attachment of appropriate emotions, attitudes and behavioral styles to preexisting relationships 
A certain type of interpersonal relationships contains not only the relationship itself, but also 
involves some kind of appropriate emotions, attitudes or behavioral styles that should (admittedly 
to a large degree and further willingly) be associated with it. I call this phenomenon existing in 
interpersonal interactions the emotional and behavioral attachment of interpersonal relationships. 
People may say that Chinese behave according to preexisting relationships. This is because Chinese 
attach certain emotion, attitude or behavioral style to certain relationship, and preexisting 
relationships to a large degree determine how to treat the person on the other end of a relationship 
and how to behave or react in some concrete situation or context where that person is involved. This 
kind of emotion, attitude or behavior is somehow morally compulsive, but not in an absolute sense 
for outsiders. Take how we should treat our parents and our friends as two concrete examples. In 
the former relationship, one should have filial piety or filial respect to his / her parents. In the latter 
relationship, if two persons are good friends, most of the time one would like to try his / her best to 
help the other, although it may cause him / her trouble or harm his / her own benefits. Put another 
way, in relatively close relationships, one would be more willing to sacrifice for the other. Someone 
would say that it is because one expects that his / her friend will do something reciprocally in future 
that (s)he helps his / her friend. Indeed, people often reciprocate, as a way of conforming to this 
informal institution of interpersonal interactions. However, the norm of reciprocity should not be 
intentionally utilized for taking advantage of others afterwards. Intentionally giving or providing 
something to a certain person in order to make that person not able to refuse subsequent 
requirements is not approved by people. Obviously, this is not a real friendship and this fake 
“friendship” cannot be maintained long, nor can it be turned into a real one.  
2.2.4 Family structure: Denmark vs. China 
Families are basic and important social units. Families are the first place where new-born babies get 
socialized. Thus, family structure reflects the most intimate and closest social network of individuals. 
Moreover, family members are an important source of individual social capital. What we focus on 
here about family structure is mainly number of siblings. The more siblings one has, the more social 
capital (s)he may occupy, ceteris paribus.  
Table 2.6 provides data of number of 0-to-17-year-old children in Denmark with different number 
of siblings from 2008 to 2017. It can be seen that most Danish children have at least one sibling. 
The percentage of Danish children with at least 1 sibling in total is between 78.97% and 79.55% 
from January 1st, 2008 to January 1st, 2017, and with at least 2 siblings, the percentage accounts for 
between 30.18% and 30.98% (see Table 2.6). Table 2.7 presents comparison data in 2017 and 2008 
0-to-17-year-old Danish children with different number of siblings from different type of family. In 
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both years (namely, 2017 and 2008), children with 1 sibling and both parents constitute the largest 
proportion, reaching about 37.44% in 2017 and 37.25% in 2008, respectively.   
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Table 2.6 Number of children 0-17 years old with siblings of Denmark, 2008-2017. 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
No Siblings 248616 249594 251160 250309 249392 247135 245226 244486 245466 247116 
1 sibling 590653 590569 589511 587880 584907 579828 574085 570931 569632 569041 
2 siblings 281543 283272 283403 283625 280896 278318 274879 272411 270831 271156 
3 siblings 69680 69520 68024 66496 65288 63679 62513 61416 60851 60388 
4 siblings 17007 16414 16109 15905 15006 14644 14158 13856 13982 13825 
5 siblings 5211 5046 4761 4408 4452 4501 4247 4387 4145 4185 
6 siblings 1684 1818 1589 1604 1610 1442 1541 1521 1541 1495 
7 siblings or more 1090 972 953 805 738 754 775 886 1012 1016 
total 1215484 1217205 1215510 1211032 1202289 1190301 1177424 1169894 1167460 1168222 
siblings >= 1 966868 967611 964350 960723 952897 943166 932198 925408 921994 921106 
% siblings >= 1 79.55 79.49 79.34 79.33 79.26 79.24 79.17 79.10 78.97 78.85 
siblings >= 2 376215 377042 374839 372843 367990 363338 358113 354477 352362 352065 
% siblings >= 2 30.95 30.98 30.84 30.79 30.61 30.52 30.41 30.30 30.18 30.14 
Note: Data is that on January 1st of each year.  
Source: Statistics Denmark.
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Table 2.7 Children 0-17 years old by family type and number of siblings in Denmark, 2008 & 2017. 
Family type Living away 
Father and mother /  
Both parents 
Single Mother 
  
Mother and Partner 
  
Single Father 
  
Father and Partner 
  
Year 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 
No Siblings 12812 14006 133832 139489 63758 59348 16662 19517 17283 13567 2769 2689 
1 sibling 2574 2635 437340 452826 85156 84544 30459 38118 9370 8472 4142 4058 
2 siblings 447 394 214968 220856 31154 31571 18350 22814 2733 2293 3504 3615 
3 siblings 51 97 44604 51484 7971 8853 5616 7026 507 432 1639 1788 
4 siblings 22 14 9354 12009 2435 2603 1336 1703 126 80 552 598 
5 siblings 1 12 2835 3495 909 1095 281 398 44 51 115 160 
6 siblings 5 1 1046 1237 311 288 89 103 20 11 24 44 
7 siblings or more 8 1 741 838 172 158 58 48 0 8 37 37 
Note: Data is that on January 1st of each year. Proportion of children with 1 sibling and from family with both parents in 2017 is 37.44%, while in 2008 this figure is 
37.25%. 
Source: Statistics Denmark. 
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Contemporary China has a different family structure from Denmark. Besides some exempt special 
situations (such as many ethnic minorities or remarriage), generally, those who are born in 1980s 
and 1990s probably have no sibling. This is because of the gradual implementation of family 
planning, mainly in the form of one-child policy, in China since 1970s which is intended to ease the 
pressure on the economic situation at that time and the economic growth from high population 
growth rate, and to coordinate the development of population and socio-economic resources. Below 
introduces the general change of family planning in China in brief without specifying much about 
formally allowed special situations. 
On July 8th, 1971, late marriage and family planning were highly advocated in a report on family 
planning (see, People’s Republic of China. State Council, 1971). In 1978, family planning was 
written into the 1978 Constitution (People.cn, 2015). On September 25th, 1980, one-child policy, 
which advocates that a couple gives birth to only one child, was formally issued and implemented 
(People.cn, 2015). In September, 1982, family planning was issued as a basic state policy (People.cn, 
2015). On December 29th, 2001, the Law of Population and Family Planning of P.R. China was 
issued (People’s Republic of China. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2001). 
However, as China steps into an aged society and the population dividends in China decrease, family 
planning has gradually shifted from one-child policy to universal two-child policy from 2002 on. 
From 2002, two-child fertility policy was gradually implemented for couples where both the 
husband and the wife are from a single-child family. In 2013, two-child fertility policy was further 
relaxed for couples where either the husband or the wife is from a single-child family. In 2015, 
universal two-child policy came into effect.  
In 1990, when the fourth National Population Census was conducted, the average number of family 
members of households was 3.96 (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 
2001a). In 2000, when the fifth National Population Census was carried out, that number decreased 
to 3.44 (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2001b). When the sixth 
National Population Census was performed in 2010, that number further fell to 3.10 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2011b). That series of numbers roughly 
reflects the change in the family structure in China under the family planning for several decades in 
profile.  
However, although the current family planning policy (universal two-child policy) advocates giving 
birth to two children, the willingness of many married childbearing women, especially of ordinary 
financial situation (namely, not very rich), to give birth to a second child is not strong, quite reluctant, 
or even resistant. Several realistic considerations are behind this kind of attitude. Note that these 
considerations may be not only behind the negative attitude to a second child, but also to the first 
one: 
Raising costs of a child In China, especially in big cities, costs of raising a child could be quite high, 
for which a couple may feel that their current and / or visible future’s financial condition of family 
may not be able to support another child. The first financial pressure for this may come from daily 
costs. Besides other daily costs, infant milk powder that young couples believe of good quality is 
probably expensive. Additionally, some families may feel necessary to employ an experienced 
maternity servant, which is not cheap, either. The second may be from education. High-quality 
education resources in China are relatively scare, and their distribution is quite unbalanced 
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nationwide. In order for a child not to be left behind by or to be more excellent than peers (put 
another way, to be more competitive) and further to have a good future, a lot of money needs to put 
into support for a child’s education, such as engaging excellent tutors or participating courses of 
private educational companies, attending various interest-oriented classes and buying reference 
books of all subjects and all equipment that may facilitate learning, which an ordinary family could 
probably not afford all.  
Caring for aged parents In China, traditionally, parents and children are mutually supported and 
assisted during their lifetime. When a child is young, parents raise him / her; and when parents get 
old, adult children care for them. Caring for aged parents is out of both love and filial piety, and is 
traditionally considered as a virtue and humanity in China. What is more, adult children are quite 
willing to care for their aged parents in general. The Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2015 
asks a question about caring for aged parents that “Who do you think should be mainly responsible 
for caring for aged people who have son(s) and / or daughter(s)?”1 with four options, 1) the 
government, 2) the son(s) and / or daughter(s), 3) the aged people themselves, and 4) the government, 
son(s)/daughter(s) and the aged people themselves should be equally responsible (see, CGSS 2015, 
Question A41). Therein, 49.36% of the 10,968 Chinese respondents, the largest proportion, choose 
“son(s) and /daughter(s)”, 33.93% think that the three parties should be equally responsible, 9.51% 
say that “the government” should, and 6.32% choose “the aged people themselves”, besides 0.88% 
did not give an answer. The traditional idea of caring for aged parents means that the costs for this 
are mainly digested within family. However, the family planning policy during the recent decades 
objectively puts more pressures on adult children to care for their aging or aged parents. As said 
before, people born in 1980s and 1990s have no sibling in general (special regulations excluded). 
This means that a childbearing couple born during that two decades have 5 people to support, 4 aged 
parents (two of the husband and the other two of the wife) and a child, which would probably 
discourage young couples of an ordinary, not rich family from raising a second child.  
Employment discrimination Many private companies may not want to employ females who plan to 
get married or pregnant at the early stage of the first term of labor contact (say, three years), although 
the types of work and jobs are not naturally unsuited to females, since otherwise, it would impose 
the so-called extra labor costs or possible interrupts on the daily operation of the companies due to 
female employees’ various leaves, such as the maternity leave. In extremely cases, some companies 
may even take some measures to compel pregnant female employees to “voluntarily” resign because 
they would not actually work in a period and may not have much passion in work after giving birth 
or have to spend more energy and time in caring for their babies. Thus, as the implementation of the 
universal two-child policy in China, employers have shifted to prefer female job-seekers who 
already have two children or who have claimed not to give birth to a child within one or two years, 
only in terms of female job-seekers, having further improved their “standard” or doorsill in 
employing females. Therefore, the physiological structure of females for giving birth unfortunately 
becomes a disadvantage in job-searching and has a negative impact on their career development. 
Fortunately, China has realized the seriousness of this problem and taken action to protest the rights 
of female job-seekers in job-searching.  
Therefore, in terms of policy-making, it may not be able to achieve the expected effect of protecting 
 
1 Author’s own translation from Chinese to English.  
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the rights and interests of females in job-searching if measures are taken only from the female side; 
it would be more effective if something can be done from the male side as well, because even though 
more welfare is provided to female employees, female employees could not actually benefit from it 
if they are excluded from the consideration of companies or if they compromise themselves not to 
have a baby in order to get a job, which would lead to the welfare for female employees in vain. 
Those welfare policies supplied from the female side are in an absolute sense to caring about females, 
while those from the male side could relatively reduce the difference caused by gender. So, the key 
point is to level off the supposed relative advantage of male employees relative to female ones. For 
example, a possible way could be to somehow equalize the marriage leave and maternity / paternity 
leave between male and female employees, and to establish more child-care centers. This could 
expectedly reduce gender discrimination in job-searching. However, when taken into reality, the 
interest of different parties, such as, employees, companies and the country, should be considered, 
coordinated and balanced comprehensively. But the basic idea of that train of thought could be 
effective. 
It is not hard to discover that those issues aforementioned mainly worry those who have pressure 
from money, career, time or energy; the rich much more would like to and actually give birth to 
more children. In order to improve the current situation, much could be done from the level of policy 
supply, based on economic development. 
2.2.5 Membership: China vs. Scandinavia  
Membership reflects relatively formal individual social network. Moreover, civil participation, such 
as voluntary membership, is also treated as a measure of social capital of a society (e.g., Putnam, 
2000). Scholars draw different conclusions about whether membership has an impact on trust. For 
example, Knack and Keefer (1997, p. 1251) show that formal memberships “is not associated with 
trust or with improved economic performance”. On contrast, You (2012) shows that voluntary 
membership is significantly positively associated with general trust, although it is not the main 
purpose of his paper.  
Table 2.8, Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 present the membership of China, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden in surveys. They may reflect the group life, and further, the social structure to some extent, 
of these four countries. Therein, the first two tables are about membership, while, to be more specific, 
the third table is about active or inactive membership. The data is from the European Values Study 
(EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS). 
I will not elaborate on these tables. (Just note that, for the correspondence relation between EVS 
waves and WVS waves, see Table 2.24.) However, by simply observing these tables (Table 2.8, 
Table 2.9 and Table 2.10), it is not difficult to discover that, by and large, the Chinese interviewees 
are less apt to participate in those various groups compared with the other three countries. Moreover, 
it can also be inferred from these three tables that the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish interviewees 
are more apt to take part in more than one group relative to the Chinese ones. This inference is not 
groundless. The reason is that, as we can see, on the one hand, most proportions of membership in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden in these tables (Table 2.8, Table 2.9 and Table 2.10) are larger than 
those of China to a substantial degree; on the other hand, just with a rough estimation, the value that 
the sum of the percentages of any column of membership of Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 
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excess of the percentage of those who belong to no organizations subtracted from 100% is much 
larger than that of China. This also provides evidence for the phenomenon and the opinions of Liang 
(1949) and Fei ([1947] 1992) to some extend that the Western societies have social structures of 
tuan ti ge ju and pay more attention to group life. 
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Table 2.8 Membership in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Do you belong to:…? Waves Denmark Norway Sweden 
social welfare service EVS 1 47/1182=3.98% 138/1051=13.13% 68/954=7.13% 
 EVS 2 57/1030=5.53% 135/1239=10.90% 80/1047=7.64% 
 EVS 3 67/1023=6.55% no observations 214/1015=21.08% 
 EVS 4 180/1499=12.01% 94/1090=8.62% 101/1187=8.51% 
religious organization EVS 1 43/1182=3.64% 94/1051=8.94% 84/954=8.81% 
 EVS 2 69/1030=6.70% 139/1239=11.22% 107/1047=10.22% 
 EVS 3 122/1023=11.93% no observations 717/1015=70.64% 
 EVS 4 926/1499=61.77% 135/1090=12.39% 134/1187=11.29% 
cultural activities EVS 1 73/1182=6.18% 69/1051=6.57% 124/954=13.00% 
 EVS 2 129/1030=12.52% 167/1239=13.48% 133/1047=12.70% 
 EVS 3 170/1023=16.62% no observations 271/1015=26.70% 
 EVS 4 334/1499=22.95% 132/1090=12.11% 153/1187=12.89% 
labour unions EVS 1 496/1182=41.96% 368/1051=35.01% 419/954=43.92% 
 EVS 2 505/1030=49.03% 517/1239=41.73% 613/1047=58.55% 
 EVS 3 556/1023=54.35 no observations 633/1015=62.36% 
 EVS 4 833/1499=55.57% 436/1090=40.00% 294/1187=24.77% 
political parties EVS 1 77/1182=6.51% 150/1051=14.27% 129/954=13.52% 
 EVS 2 67/1030=6.50% 172/1239=13.88% 106/1047=10.12% 
 EVS 3 68/1023=6.65% no observations 105/1015=10.34% 
 EVS 4 103/1499=6.87% 85/1090=7.8% 60/1187=5.05% 
local community actions EVS 1 no observations no observations no observations 
 EVS 2 51/1030=4.95% 33/1239=2.66% 23/1047=2.2% 
 EVS 3 63/1023=6.16% no observations 95/1015=9.36% 
 EVS 4 113/1499=7.54% 23/1090=2.11% 23/1187=1.94% 
third world development 
or human rights 
EVS 1 40/1182=3.38% 37/1051=3.52% 33/954=3.46% 
EVS 2 29/1030=2.82% 63/1176=5.08% 97/1047=9.26% 
EVS 3 42/1023=4.11% no observations 159/1015=15.67% 
EVS 4 133/1499=8.87% 124/1090=11.38% 100/1187=8.42% 
environment, animal rights EVS 1 64/1182=5.41% 46/1051=4.38% 32/954=3.35% 
 EVS 2 no observations no observations no observations 
 EVS 3 134/1023=13.10% no observations 119/1015=11.72% 
  EVS 4 234/1499=15.61% 60/1090=5.50% 97/1187=8.17% 
professional associations EVS 1 163/1182=13.79% 152/1051=14.46% 69/954=7.23% 
 EVS 2 125.1030=12.14% 202/1239=16.30% 125/1047=11.94% 
 EVS 3 113/1023=11.05% no observations 149/1015=14.68% 
 EVS 4 198/1499=13.21% 138/1090=12.66% 83/1187=6.99% 
youth work EVS 1 116/1182=9.81% 85/1051=8.09% 55/954=5.77% 
 EVS 2 48/1030=4.66% 73/1239=5.89% 97/1047=9.26% 
 EVS 3 68/1023=6.65% no observations 71/1015=7.00% 
  EVS 4 119/1499=7.94% 32/1090=2.94% 32/1187=2.70% 
sports/recreation EVS 1 no observations no observations no observations 
 EVS 2 345/1030=33.50% 407/1239=32.85% 336/1047=32.09% 
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Do you belong to:…? Waves Denmark Norway Sweden 
 EVS 3 338/1023=33.04% no observations 367/1015=36.16% 
 EVS 4 610/1499=40.69% 321/1090=29.45% 252/1187=21.23% 
women’s groups  EVS 1 no observations no observations no observations 
 EVS 2 17/1030=1.65% 36/1239=2.91% 30/1047=2.87% 
 EVS 3 22/1023=2.15% no observations 35/1015=3.45% 
  EVS 4 40/1499=2.67% 33/1090=3.03% 23/1187=1.94% 
peace movement  EVS 1 no observations no observations no observations 
 EVS 2 22/1030=2.14% 18/1239=1.45% 32/1047=3.06% 
 EVS 3 8/1023=0.78% no observations 16/1015=1.58% 
 EVS 4 10/1499=0.67% 9/1090=0.83% 15/1187=1.26% 
organization concerned 
with health 
  
EVS 1 no observations no observations no observations 
EVS 2 60/1030=5.83% 153/1239=12.35% 22/1047=2.10% 
EVS 3 41/1023=4.01% no observations 66/1015=6.50% 
EVS 4 112/1499=7.47% 108/1090=9.91% 37/1187=3.12% 
consumer groups EVS 1 16/1182=1.35% 10/1051=0.95% 41/954=4.30% 
 EVS 2 no observations no observations no observations 
 EVS 3 no observations no observations no observations 
 EVS 4 no observations no observations no observations 
other groups  EVS 1 no observations no observations no observations 
 EVS 2 111/1030=10.78% 237/1239=19.13% 196/1047=18.72% 
 EVS 3 147/1023=14.37% no observations 254/1015=25.02% 
 EVS 4 168/1499=11.21% 224/1090=20.55% 220/1187=18.53% 
none EVS 1 425/1182=35.96% 279/1051=26.55% no observations 
 EVS 2 197/1030=19.13% 233/1239=18.81% 157/1047=15.00% 
 EVS 3 160/1023=15.64% no observations 44/1015=4.33% 
  EVS 4 106/1499=7.07% 226/1090=20.73% no observations 
Notes: The data used is from all the waves, also the first four waves, of the European Values Study 
(EVS). Taking the question used here in the fourth wave as an example, the question asks, “Please 
look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say a) which, if any, 
do you belong to? […]”. Besides “do not know” and “no answer”, there are only two options: one 
indicates “belong” and the other “not belong”. Note that the question and the organizations provided 
under that question in the first wave are slightly different from the corresponding questions of the 
other three waves. The data set used is the integrated values surveys 1981-2014. In most cells of the 
table above, the dividend, namely the number before “/”, is the number who mention that they 
belong to a particular organization, and the divisor, namely the number after “/”, is the sample size 
of a country in a particular survey wave. 
Data source: European Values Study (EVS, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2016).
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Table 2.9 Membership in China. 
Do you belong to: …? Waves China 
social welfare services WVS 2 37/1000=3.7% 
 WVS 4 29/1000=2.90% 
religious or church organizations WVS 2 14/1000=1.40% 
 WVS 4 36/1000=3.60% 
education, arts, music or cultural activities WVS 2 73/1000=7.30% 
 WVS 4 22/1000=2.20% 
labour unions WVS 2 17/1000=1.70% 
 WVS 4 69/1000=6.90% 
political parties or groups WVS 2 351/1000=35.10% 
 WVS 4 83/1000=8.30% 
local community action  WVS 2 6/1000=0.60% 
 WVS 4 15/1000=1.50% 
third world development or human rights  WVS 2 6/1000=0.60% 
 WVS 4 4/1000=0.40% 
conservation, environment, animal rights groups  WVS 4 12/1000=1.20% 
professional associations WVS 2 257/1000=25.70% 
 WVS 4 12/1000=1.20% 
youth work  WVS 2 92/1000=9.20% 
 WVS 4 11/1000=1.10% 
sports or recreation WVS 2 44/1000=4.40% 
 WVS 4 32/1000=3.20% 
women's groups  WVS 2 31/1000=3.10% 
 WVS 4 33/1000=3.30% 
peace movement  WVS 2 5/1000=0.50% 
 WVS 4 9/1000=0.90% 
voluntary organizations concerned with health WVS 2 16/1000=1.60% 
 WVS 4 27/1000=2.90% 
other groups  WVS 2 20/1000=2.00% 
 WVS 4 0/1000=0.00% 
none WVS 2 330/1000=33.00% 
Notes: The data set used is the longitudinal date set of the World Values Survey which contains all 
the six waves at present of WVS from 1981 to 2014. China is in wave 2 to wave 6. However, in 
terms of the question about membership, wave 2 and wave 4 adopts different way of answering 
from wave 3, wave 5 and wave 6, besides different target organizations. To be specific, the question 
about membership in wave 2 and wave 4 contains two options, while that in wave 3, wave 5 and 
wave 6 contains three, except “do not know” and “no answer”. Here in this table, we current only 
present what wave 2 and wave 4 ask. For example, in wave 4, it asks, “Please look carefully at the 
following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?” 
Except “do not know” and “no answer”, there are two options: one indicates “belong” and the other 
“not belong”. Note that the organizations contained in the question about membership in wave 2 
and wave 4 are also slightly different. In the third column of the table above, the dividend, namely 
the number before “/”, is the number who mention that they belong to a particular organization, and 
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the divisor, namely the number after “/”, is the sample size of a country in a particular survey wave. 
Additionally, this table does not contain waves with no observations of China or sub-questions that 
are not asked in a particular survey. 
Data source: World Values Survey (Inglehart et al, 2014b, 2014d) 
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Table 2.10 Active or inactive membership in China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Are you a …? Wave   China     Norway     Sweden   
    Active member Inactive member Not a member Active member Inactive member Not a member Active member Inactive member Not a member 
Church or religious 
organization  
WVS 3 Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey 94/1127=8.34% 267/1127=23.67% 765/1127=67.88% 78/1009=7.73% 211/1009=20.91% 700/1009=69.38% 
WVS 5 55/1991=2.76% 144/1991=7.23% 1767/1991=88.75% 85/1025=8.29% 303/1025=29.56% 637/1025=62.15% 67/1003=6.68% 476/1003=47.46% 454/100345.26% 
WVS 6 24/2300=1.04% 93/2300=4.04% 2161/2300=93.96% no observations no observations no observations 66/1206=5.47% 450/1206=37.31% 681/1206=56.47% 
Sport or recreational 
organization  
  
WVS 3 151/1500=10.07% 91/1500=6.07% 1258/1500=83.87% 263/1127=23.34% 180/1127=15.97% 683/1127=60.60% 267/1009=26.46% 179/1009=17.74% 544/1009=53.91% 
WVS 5 126/1991=6.33% 204/1991=10.25% 1645/1991=82.62% 278/1025=27.12% 154/1025=15.02% 593/1025=57.85% 294/1003=29.31% 144/1003=14.26% 562/1003=56.03% 
WVS 6 55/2300=2.39% 179/2300=7.78 2066/2300=89.83% no observations no observations no observations 290/1206=24.05% 143/1206=11.86% 770/1206=63.85% 
Art, music or 
educational 
organization  
WVS 3 86/1500=5.73% 90/1500=6.00% 1324/1500=88.27% 168/1127=14.91% 77/1127=6.83% 881/1127=78.17% 126/1009=12.49% 97/1009=9.61% 765/1009=75.82% 
WVS 5 117/1991=5.88% 165/1991=8.29 1689/1991=84.83 129/1025=12.59% 79/1025=7.71 817/1025=79.71% 128/1003=12.76% 120/1003=11.96% 752/1003=74.98% 
WVS 6 34/2300=1.48% 150/2300=6.52% 2113/2300=91.87% no observations no observations no observations 170/1206=14.10% 121/1206=10.03% 910/1206=75.46% 
Labor Union  WVS 3 88/1500=5.87% 229/1500=15.27% 1183/1500=78.87% 175/1127=15.53% 355/1127=31.50% 596/1127=52.88% 129/1009=12.78% 499/1009=49.45% 362/1009=35.88% 
 WVS 5 89/1991=4.47% 161/1991=8.09% 1720/1991=86.39% 139/1025=13.56% 365/1025=35.61% 520/1025=50.73% 97/1003=9.67% 488/1003=48.65% 415/1003=41.38% 
  WVS 6 21/2300=0.91% 154/2300=6.70% 2123/2300=92.30% no observations no observations no observations 141/1206=11.69% 408/1206=33.83% 635/1206=52.65% 
Political party WVS 3 96/1500=6.40% 117/1500=7.80% 1287/1500=85.80% 36/1127=3.19% 138/1127=12.24% 952/1127=84.47% 47/1009=4.66% 102/1009=10.11% 840/1009=83.25% 
 WVS 5 117/1991=5.88% 130/1991=6.53% 1729/1991=86.84% 44/1025=4.29% 131/1025=12.78% 850/1025=82.93% 29/1003=2.89% 80/1003=7.98% 888/1003=88.53% 
 WVS 6 43/2300=1.87% 146/2300=6.35% 2108/2300=91.65% no observations no observations no observations 39/1206=3.23% 109/1206=9.04% 1052/1206=87.23% 
Environmental 
organization 
  
WVS 3 36/1500=2.40% 39/1500=2.60% 1425/1500=95.00% 10/1127=0.89% 65/1127=5.77% 1051/1127=93.26% 22/1009=2.18% 106/1009=10.51% 860/1009=85.23% 
WVS 5 87/1991=4.37% 113/1991=5.68% 1769/1991=88.85% 13/1025=1.27% 61/1025=5.95% 951/1025=92.78% 9/1003=0.90% 93/1003=9.27% 894/1003=89.13% 
WVS 6 12/2300=0.52% 49/2300=2.13% 2238/2300=97.30% no observations no observations no observations 20/1206=1.66% 115/1206=9.54% 1064/1206=88.23% 
Professional 
association 
WVS 3 34/1500=2.27% 56/1500=3.73% 1410/1500=94.00% 101/1127=8.96% 189/1127=16.77% 836/1127=74.18% 52/1009=5.15% 109/1009=10.80% 828/1009=82.06% 
WVS 5 36/1991=1.81% 97/1991=4.87% 1832/1991=92.01% 77/1025=7.51% 181/1025=17.66% 764/1025=74.54% 62/1003=6.18% 137/1003=13.66% 796/1003=79.36% 
WVS 6 9/2300=0.39% 44/2300=1.91% 2244/2300=97.57% no observations no observations no observations 67/1206=5.56% 138/1206=11.44% 974/1206=80.76% 
WVS 3 43/1500=2.87% 48/1500=3.20% 1409/1500=93.93 102/1127=9.05% 216/1127=19.17% 808/1127=71.69% 66/1009=6.54% 156/1009=15.46% 766/1009=75.92% 
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Are you a …? Wave   China     Norway     Sweden   
    Active member Inactive member Not a member Active member Inactive member Not a member Active member Inactive member Not a member 
Humanitarian or 
charitable 
organization 
WVS 5 69/1991=3.47% 86/1991=4.32% 1810/1991=90.91% 126/1025=12.29% 198/1025=19.32% 700/1025=68.29% 98/1003=9.77% 229/1003=22.83% 672/1003=67.00% 
 WVS 6 10/2300=0.43% 37/2300=1.61% 2251/2300=97.87% no observations no observations no observations 133/1206=11.03% 226/1206=18.74% 840/1206=69.65% 
Consumer 
organization  
  
WVS 3 Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey 
WVS 5 Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey 
WVS 6 9/2300=0.39% 47/2300=2.04% 2243/2300=97.52% no observations no observations no observations 67/1206=5.56% 282/1206=23.38% 847/1206=70.23% 
Self-help groups, 
mutual aid groups 
WVS 3 Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey 
WVS 5 Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey Not asked in survey 
WVS 6 16/2300=0.70% 64/2300=2.78% 2217/2300=96.39% no observations no observations no observations 46/1206=3.81% 50/1206=4.15% 1100/1206=91.21% 
Any other WVS 3 32/1500=2.13% 190/1500=12.67% 1278/1500=85.20% 165/1127=14/64% 182/1127=16.15% 779/1127=69.12% 186/1009=18.43% 162/1009=16.06% 637/1009=63.13% 
 WVS 5 1/1991=0.05% 1/1991=0.05% 1987/1991=99.80% 128/1025=12.49% 144/1025=14.05% 752/1025=73.37% 202/1003=20.14% 164/1003=16.25% 538/1003=53.64% 
  WVS 6 2/2300=0.09% 16/2300=0.70% 2118/2300=92.09% no observations no observations no observations 190/1206=15.75% 119/1206=9.87% 869/1206=72.06% 
Notes: The data set used is the longitudinal date set of the World Values Survey which contains all the six waves at present of WVS from 1981 to 2014. Denmark is not 
in any of the six waves of the WVS. In wave 3, wave 5 and wave 6 of the World Values Survey (WVS), the answering of the set of membership questions contain three 
options, namely “Active member”, “Inactive member” or “Don’t belong”, except “Do not know” and “No answer”. Take wave 6 as an example. In terms of the 
membership question, it asks, “Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member 
=, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?” In most cells of the table above, the dividend, namely the number before “/”, is the number who 
mention that they belong to a particular organization, and the divisor, namely the number after “/”, is the sample size of a country in a particular survey wave.  
Source: World Values Survey (Inglehart et al, 2014c, 2014e, 2014f).
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Take China and Sweden as two examples. Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 present the distribution of how 
many voluntary organizations the respondents of these two countries are in respectively as an active 
member, an inactive member and not as a member using data from WVS 6, which provides more 
intuitive and solid evidence for the inference above that Swedish are more apt to take part in more 
groups and to be active in groups than Chinese. In fact, obviously, similarly strong constructs would 
generate between China and Denmark or Norway in the pattern of membership when compared 
using comparable data.  
 
Figure 2.2 Number of memberships in China. 
Notes: Author’s own calculation and illustration based on WVS 6. There are 2300 observations from 
China in total in WVS 6. 
Data source: World Values Survey 6 (Inglehart et al, 2014f). 
 
Figure 2.3 Number of memberships in Sweden. 
Notes: Author’s own calculation and illustration based on WVS 6. There are 1206 observations from 
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Sweden in total in WVS 6. 
Data source: World Values Survey 6 (Inglehart et al, 2014f). 
Table 2.11 presents the average active membership, average inactive membership, average 
membership and average non-membership of China and Sweden based on WVS 6. Swedish 
respondents on average take part in about 2.81 voluntary organizations, while this number for 
Chinese respondents is only 0.53. Therein, Swedish respondents in about 1.02 organization on 
average act as an active member. On contrast, Chinese respondents only in about 0.11 organization 
on average play an active role.  
Table 2.11 Average membership, China and Sweden. 
  China Sweden 
Average active membership 0.1022 1.0191 
Average inactive membership 0.4257 1.7919 
Average membership 0.5278 2.8109 
Average non-membership 10.3835 8.0779 
Notes: Author’s own calculation based on WVS 6. The number of observations of China is 2300, 
and that of Sweden is 1206. For the original survey question, see the questionnaire of WVS 6, 
questions V25 – V 35.  
Data source: World Values Survey 6 (Inglehart et al, 2014f). 
Two reasons may explain why Chinese respondents participate fewer voluntary organizations than 
the Scandinavian countries. One is that the voluntary organizations appearing in the questionnaires 
are not quite common ones in China. The second is that Chinese are not as keen as people in the 
other countries in participating in formal organizations. They like more making friends freely in 
informal interactions, rather than intentionally joining in various groups.  
Why people would like to join in various groups? Besides, such as, possible interests, cultural habits 
or inclination, and curiosity, people joining in the same groups are likely to have similarities in 
views or standpoints. What is more, often, it is for finding more people sharing similar opinions that 
many people decide to become a member of a certain group. Surely, it cannot be excluded that some 
people may pretend to have similar opinions or standpoints with other group members or 
accommodate other group members’ general opinions or standpoints so as to successfully join in a 
certain group on account of finding himself / herself some affiliation / belonging more rapidly. Yet, 
whether it is due to same standpoints or because of joining in order to joining in, it is no doubt that 
groups bring people sense of belonging which makes them feel or appear not too much unique since 
they are not the only person who has some particular view. Moreover, when expressing standpoints 
or opinions, they then seem to have strong emotional support behind. Certainly, this kind of 
emotional support from belonging to groups may not be needed by everyone, since, after all, there 
are still many people who do not mind or feel worried having or expressing their somehow 
uncommon, unique and challenging views or inclination without opinion-sharing people.  
2.3 Welfare, equality, change, expectations, and certainty 
2.3.1 The Nordic welfare model: an overview 
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It is not exaggerated to say that the three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
as well as other Nordic countries, are outstanding representatives of modern welfare states. The term 
“the Nordic/Northern countries” which is used to refer to the five countries of Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden, was invented in the 1930s to replace the term “Scandinavia” after the 
independence of Finland and Iceland on account of the similarities of the five countries in history, 
culture and economy (Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). In addition, “the term ‘welfare state’ […] 
probably derives from the German” “Wohlfahrtsstaat” (Hayek, [1960] 2011, p. 373). In fact, the 
initial construction of welfare states in Scandinavia was influenced by Germany to a large degree. 
The emergence of the phenomenon, not the concept, of the Nordic model dates back to the 1930s, 
although it first appeared as a “model” in a book title as late as 1987 (Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). 
By the way, there is another opinion on the emerging time of the Nordic model, that is it emerged 
“in the wake of World War II” (Nordic Co-operation, no date b, para. 2) and “is based on need and 
circumstances” (Nordic Co-operation, no date b, para. 3). In welfare states, the well-being of their 
citizens is ensured and maintained by the states in some way to a large extent. A prominent and 
distinguishable characteristic of the Nordic Model is universality which tries to take into account 
every citizen in the country. What is more, besides universalism, Pedersen and Kuhnle (2017) think 
that there are another three characteristics or components of the Nordic model, namely stateness, 
equality and forms of democratic governance. It should be noted that the specific policies 
implemented by different countries within the Nordic Europe are also not the same. Therefore, 
Andersen (2015, p.15) reminds that “the model is defined in terms of overall objectives and not in 
terms of specific policies”.  
Is a welfare state an encumbrance or a boost for economic performance? This question involves the 
actual or potential trade-off between efficiency and fairness. People who are against the welfare 
states, such as scholars or politicians with neoclassical tradition, may argue that the Nordic model 
is not sustainable in the long-run. Indeed, the disadvantages of the extended welfare states are 
obvious. For example, they may encourage free-riding behavior of sluggards who benefit from the 
universal welfare policies but do not work. – This is harmful to labour force participation rate. In 
this case, more burdens will be imposed on the fiscal revenues of governments at each level within 
a country, which will threaten the implementation of those universal welfare policies. If the 
proportion of free-riders is high enough, the governments will not be able to make ends meet or 
have a too big financial deficit. Then, it will definitely have an adverse effect on the sustainability 
of the whole working of welfare policies.  
However, this worry has not been proved to be quite true at least in the Scandinavian countries. 
People often compare Scandinavian countries to bumblebees because the contrast between their 
generosity in welfare provision and excellent economic achievements just resembles bumblebees 
that can fly quite well with even disproportionate body weight and wing size (e.g., Svendsen and 
Svendsen, 2016, p.1). Moreover, these “bumblebees” (except Iceland) successfully survived the 
2008 global financial crisis. 
The co-existence of universal welfare and good economic performance may pertain to the structures 
of tax revenues and expenditures. From the revenue side, for example, the Nordic countries levy 
relatively high personal income tax, while their corporate tax is relatively low, which is good for 
firms. From the expenditure side, Andersen (2015, p. 17) decomposes public expenditures and their 
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financing, and terms, for simplicity, some therein “active” and others “passive”. For example, he 
regards “labour market relevant education” as active (Andersen, 2015, p. 17). The active 
expenditures, “if financed by the least distortionary modes of taxation”, are conducive to economic 
performance, while the passive ones are not (Andersen, 2015, p. 17). Andersen (2015, p. 17) 
suggests subsequently that when discussing the role of welfare states in economic performance, 
structure of public expenditures should be taken into account. He points out that it is because “the 
Nordic countries […] have a stronger orientation of their expenditures towards active spending” 
that they present good economic performance (Andersen, 2015, p. 18).  
It should be noted that the Nordic model has not been never challenged, and that the Nordic welfare 
model itself is also changing (e.g., Kuhnle, 2000; Andersen, 2015, p. 15). It also ever encountered 
difficult times in economy during 1970s – 1990s to different degrees, and had to implement 
adjustments and reforms of welfare policies during that period accordingly. For example, negatively 
influenced by the first oil crisis in the 1970s (specifically, 1973 – 1974), the unemployment rate in 
Denmark ever soared, which put much pressure on Denmark to reform public finance and welfare 
in 1980s (Kuhnle, 2000). Norway also “experienced an economic setback around 1990” (Kuhnle, 
2000, p. 212). However, benefits from its oil and gas sector made Norway relatively economically 
solid, which put less pressure on Norwegian welfare reform (Kuhnle, 2000). By contrast, Sweden 
experienced a relatively severe economic recession in the early 1990s, with unemployment rate 
increasing rapidly and GDP decreasing, which pushed up the proportion of social expenditure in 
GDP (Kuhnle, 2000). – These constructed the economic background of the welfare reforms in the 
Nordic countries. By and large, the general trend of the welfare reforms in Nordic countries in the 
1990s is cuts and retrenchment. In this sense, good economic performance ensures the 
implementation of comprehensive and generous welfare policies, while economic depression cannot 
persistently afford generous welfare.  
As mentioned before, a deadly defect of comprehensive and generous welfare of the Nordic model 
could be its vulnerability to lazy people or free riders. Accordingly, some policy adjustments 
pointing to this weakness were carried on in the 1990s’ Nordic welfare reforms. For example, in 
terms of employment, it is stipulated that only those who are active in job searching or activation 
programs can be covered by some certain welfare, unless they are unable to support themselves 
(Andersen, 2015, p. 19). In this sense, those welfare policies have a positive effect on economic 
growth. That arrangement guaranteeing labor market participation and employment rates is 
conducive to the solution of the threaten from unemployment to the maintenance of the Nordic 
model, and to the co-existence of economic growth and generous welfare in the Nordic countries. 
Then, it is clear that potential welfare crisis can be alleviated by relatively low unemployment rate 
which is an important source of tax revenues, given the relatively normal operation of economy. In 
addition, training programs during a temporary unemployment period can not only help the 
unemployed finding a job and accumulate human capital for individual persons at an aggregate level, 
but can also be used as opportunities for industrial reconstruction when necessary.  
High welfare needs sufficient government revenues to support, and tax is usually the biggest source 
of government revenues in general. When it comes to sustainability of welfare states, revenues and 
expenditures are always two cut-in points to consider. The maintenance of universal welfare policies 
calls for sufficient tax revenues. Sufficient tax revenues are not separable from high labour force 
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participation, especially for the Nordic countries where governments levy a relatively low 
proportion of cooperate tax. Welfare policies just in turn encourage participation in the labour 
market. – This generates a virtuous cycle conducive to welfare sustainability in turn.  
Despite, there are still some backwards in efficiency in the welfare states, including the Nordic 
welfare countries. One example is health care, although fees for treatment and medicine can be 
covered to a large degree. Specifically, an appointment for seeing a doctor may not be arranged very 
in time, such as several weeks or months later when a patient could either self-cure or miss the best 
time for treatment. Certainly, this case may partly relate to the insufficiency of medical staff and the 
system of medical care. 
The large public section and universal welfare provided in the Nordic countries often make people 
relate these countries to socialism. However, even people originally from the Nordic countries do 
not agree (e.g., Andersen, 2015, p. 42). First of all, socialism is associated with a substantial position 
of state ownership / public ownership / government ownership of the means of production in some 
measure. In this sense, the Nordic countries are not socialist countries since private ownership 
accounts for an absolutely large proportion and is the mainstay of their economies. Additionally, the 
Nordic countries have relatively high economic freedom worldwide. Andersen (2015) also 
expresses a similar opinion with the statement that:  
Given the large public sector and the organized labour markets, it is often claimed 
that Nordic countries are semi-socialist countries adopting “policies against markets”. 
This is not an accurate description of the private sector and therefore of what in 
economics jargon may be termed product markets. Fairly liberal policies have been 
pursued, and state intervention in the form of state-owned companies and the like 
has not played a large role in comparative perspective. The Nordic countries are 
better characterized as following a social-liberal model with a liberal private sector 
and extensive social objectives catered for through market institutions and the public 
sector. (p. 42) 
The Scandinavian countries are all countries with a population of small size which is also 
homogenous to a large degree. A homogenous society usually shares similar historical and cultural 
tradition, and has similar thinking way or mindset, social norms and values which result in behaviors 
that are more socially acceptable and inhibit conflicts. These create conditions for social trust and 
social harmony since others behave in ways which one thinks morally right or acceptable. 
The reasons why the institution of comprehensive and generous welfare state can be implemented 
and maintained in the Nordic countries at least lie in four aspects. First, historical reason. The 
absolutist regimes ever existing in Scandinavia in the seventeenth century was rather weak 
compared with the rest of Europe (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011). Second, values basis. Values, such 
as “compassion, tolerance and the conviction that all humans are of equal worth” (Nordic Co-
operation, no date b, para. 4), provide values basis for the Nordic welfare model. Third, economic 
basis. Economic growth provides material basis for the implementation of high welfare. Forth, 
ruling party. Social democratic party, which is the advocates of extended welfare state, has either 
been the ruling party or formed a coalition government with other parties for a long time since 1930s 
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in the Nordic countries.1 For example, the cumulative time that Swedish social democratic party is 
not the ruling party in Sweden from its establishment in 1889 to 2018 is only as short as 22 years. 
In addition, economic growth provides material strength for it. 
The generous welfare in the Scandinavian countries is attractive and enviable, especially for middle 
class citizens and residents or below. However, it is not suitable that the whole model is rashly 
introduced by other countries. First, different countries have different specific realistic situations. 
Implementing generous welfare blindly without considering the facts of a country is risky. Second, 
the model itself is also not perfect; the Nordic countries also adjust in the course of discovering and 
solving various problems, such as the aging of the population. As said, the model requires sufficient 
economic development as material support, besides possible values basis. Thus, the key point for a 
country is to have a clear understanding about its current situation when making or reforming 
welfare policies, which means there is a trade-off between policy choices. For example, borrowing 
debts to maintain high level welfare without adjustments according to specific situations while 
economy is sluggish is not sustainable to a large degree. However, it should be noted that such 
statements do not imply that other countries cannot learn experience from the Nordic model.  
Table 2.12 shows the percentage of expenditure of social protection in GDP of Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden from 2004 to 2015. In general, Denmark spends the largest proportion of its GDP on 
social protection, followed by Sweden. By contrast, that percentage of Norway is the lowest among 
the three countries. In 2015, Denmark, Norway and Sweden respectively spent 32.3%, 27.9% and 
29.2 of their GDP on social protection.   
Table 2.12 Percentage of expenditure on social protection in GDP 
geo\time 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Denmark 29.9 29.5 28.4 29.1 28.9 32.7 32.4 32.1 32 32.5 32.8 32.3 
Norway 25.4 23.4 22.1 22.1 21.8 25.5 25.2 24.8 24.5 25.1 26 27.9 
Sweden 29.8 29.5 28.6 27.4 27.7 30.1 28.6 28.2 29.3 30 29.5 29.2 
Data source: Eurostat. 
Table 2.13 presents the percentage of total expenditure on social benefits in total expenditure on 
social protection in Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 2004 to 2015. It can be seen that in all 
these three countries expenditure on social benefits almost accounts for the whole total expenditure 
on social protection and that the percentage is larger in Norway and Sweden than in Denmark. In 
2015, 98.13% of the total expenditure on social protection went to total expenditure on social 
benefits in Norway, 98% in Sweden and 96.33% in Denmark.  
Table 2.13 Percentage of total expenditure on social benefits in total expenditure on social protection. 
geo\time 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
1
 The general election is held every four years in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Specifically, according to Article 
32 in Part IV of the Constitutional Act of Denmark, “The Members of the Folketing shall be elected for a period of 
four years” (Denmark. Folketinget, 2013, p. 14). According to the Constitution of Sweden, “Ordinary elections to 
the Riksdag are held every four years (IG 3.3) in September (RA 2:1)” (Sweden. Sveriges Riksdag, 2016, p. 51). 
Similarly, according to Article 54 of the Constitution of Norway, “Elections shall be held every fourth year. They 
shall be concluded by the end of September.” (Norway. Stortinget, 2018, no page) In addition, the current ruling 
party in Denmark is the coalition government consisted with the Liberal Party (Venstre), Liberal Alliance and 
Conservative People’s Party (Denmark.dk). The current ruling party in Sweden since its general election in 2014 is 
the Social Democratic Party, and Sweden will hold the general election in September, 2018.  
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Denmark 97.12 97.2 97.31 96.56 96.87 96.69 96.66 96.66 96.44 96.22 96.24 96.33 
Norway 98.37 98.06 98.07 97.81 97.7 97.86 97.91 97.98 97.96 97.96 98.07 98.13 
Sweden 98.06 98.05 98.05 97.95 98.01 98.17 98.11 98.11 98.07 98.13 98.07 98.00 
Data source: Eurostat. 
Social benefits contain 8 functions, namely benefits for sickness / health care, disability, old age, 
survivors, family / children, unemployment, housing and social exclusion n.e.c., respectively. Table 
2.14 presents the fraction of each of these functions in total social benefits in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden from 2004 to 2015. For all the three countries, expenditure on old age and sickness / health 
care act as the largest two functions of social benefits, with expenditure on old age being the largest 
for Denmark and Sweden through 2004 to 2015 and old age taking place for sickness / health care 
to be the largest part in Norway in 2011. Then, disability and family / children account for the third 
and fourth largest part in total social benefits. Benefits for unemployment and survivors respectively 
take the fifth and sixth place for Norway and Sweden. However, in 5 out of 12 years from 2004 to 
2015, expenditure on survivors in Denmark exceeds that on unemployment.  
Table 2.14 Social benefits by function, % of total benefits. 
geo\time 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sickness/Health care 
Denmark 20.58 20.72 21.58 21.53 22.21 21.89 21.34 21.19 21.12 20.33 19.98 20.19 
Norway 32.79 31.91 32.42 32.47 32.47 32.41 31.29 30.57 30.19 30.04 30.13 30.01 
Sweden 26.81 26.15 26.3 26.34 26.18 25.35 25.06 25.68 25.54 25.38 26.06 26.24 
Disability 
Denmark 13.88 14.42 14.91 13.66 13.71 13.34 13.53 13.3 13.44 13.18 12.87 13.04 
Norway 18.59 19.01 18.79 18.65 17.61 17.15 17.36 17.28 17.03 16.61 16.06 16.41 
Sweden 14.79 15.15 15.01 15.23 14.9 14.2 13.6 13.07 12.54 12.17 11.97 11.67 
Old age 
Denmark 37.17 37.51 37.87 36.28 36.98 35.78 35.49 36.23 36.78 36.8 37.28 37.18 
Norway 28.41 29.38 29.82 30.3 30.74 30.17 30.59 31.9 33.13 34.04 34.79 34.78 
Sweden 36.56 37.1 37.28 38.5 39.64 40.38 40.56 41.19 41.82 42.34 42.02 41.92 
Survivors 
Denmark 0.03 0.03 0.03 6.12 5.29 5.89 4.72 4.69 4.26 5.8 6.99 6.57 
Norway 1.31 1.3 1.26 1.24 1.25 1.18 1.16 1.19 1.12 1.04 1.01 0.97 
Sweden 2.2 2.13 2.08 2.03 1.95 1.86 1.74 1.61 1.52 1.41 1.29 1.17 
Family/Children 
Denmark 13.03 12.93 13.14 13.34 13.57 13.31 12.9 12.36 12 11.63 11.22 11.17 
Norway 12.44 12.43 12.72 12.93 12.81 12.73 12.76 12.78 12.65 12.56 12.38 11.91 
Sweden 9.54 9.62 10.08 10.31 10.52 10.24 10.49 10.62 10.55 10.5 10.59 10.46 
Unemployment 
Denmark 9.47 8.58 7.21 4.27 3.57 5.01 6.2 6.11 6.17 5.87 5.2 4.88 
Norway 3.12 2.67 1.76 1.29 1.87 2.81 3.22 2.73 2.46 2.26 2.26 2.43 
Sweden 6.23 6.09 5.51 3.84 3.04 4.18 4.61 3.93 4.12 4.25 3.84 3.67 
Housing 
Denmark 2.39 2.4 2.3 2.28 2.24 2.14 2.15 2.22 2.25 2.2 2.21 2.26 
Norway 0.59 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.6 0.61 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.46 
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geo\time 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sweden 1.78 1.76 1.73 1.66 1.6 1.52 1.55 1.53 1.59 1.56 1.61 1.55 
Social exclusion n.e.c. 
Denmark 3.45 3.4 2.96 2.51 2.43 2.63 3.67 3.91 3.99 4.19 4.25 4.71 
Norway 2.75 2.73 2.64 2.54 2.68 3 3.02 2.94 2.86 2.92 2.88 3.03 
Sweden 2.1 2 2.01 2.08 2.16 2.27 2.4 2.35 2.32 2.39 2.62 3.32 
Data source: Eurostat. 
Table 2.15 shows how many Euro EU-28, Euro area – 19, Euro area – 18, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden are spent on social protection of each person of population from 2004 to 2015. All the three 
Scandinavian countries spend a lot more than EU-28 or Euro area – 19/18 average, especially, 
Norway, about more than a half higher. Sweden spent least among the three countries, however, still 
about 3000 or 4000 euro higher than EU-28, or Euro area – 19/18.  
Table 2.15 Total expenditure on social protection per head of population, ECU/EUR. 
geo\ 
time 
EU (28 
countries) 
Euro area 
(19 
countries) 
Euro area 
(18 
countries) Denmark Norway Sweden 
2004 --- 7363.52 7425.24 12694.41 14393.76 10969.69 
2005 --- 7431.7 7491.75 12902.19 14488.04 11059.91 
2006 --- 7513.87 7572.8 12854.68 14736.56 11161.31 
2007 --- 7600.01 7657.13 13294.34 15200.71 11043.68 
2008 6764.55 7738.13 7795.63 13225.55 15703.54 11027.58 
2009 7219.4 8243.12 8304.28 13955.23 16452.44 11337.47 
2010 7279.66 8303.39 8364.75 14219.88 16685.69 11238.12 
2011 7264.52 8289.42 8350.33 14074.45 17119.84 11226.33 
2012 7279.72 8295.2 8355.45 14062.68 17455.52 11513.78 
2013 7331.34 8355.21 8415.73 14417.54 17766.62 11804.34 
2014 7391.24 8451.96 8512.32 14806.24 18138.1 11805.74 
2015 --- --- --- 14710.01 18562.4 12132.27 
Data source: Eurostat. 
2.3.2 Welfare policies in Scandinavia and China 
Since the three Scandinavian countries are quite known for their Nordic model and are envied by 
many other countries, this section will take the welfare system of Denmark as an example and 
introduce its family / children policy, health care policy and pension in brief. 
i) Denmark 
Family / Children1 
The welfare for family / children contains, such as, children and youth benefit (namely, family 
allowance), children care and maternity benefit. Let’s only have a slightly close look at children and 
 
1 This part is referred to the Your Social Security Rights in Denmark (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 6-16). 
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youth benefit and maternity benefit. 
In general, those who have any children under 18 years old and live in Denmark or is a citizen of an 
EU/EEA (namely, the European Union and the European Economic Area) country but work in 
Denmark are entitled to children and youth benefit, besides other possible requirements. The amount 
of child and youth benefit, which is tax-free, depends on the age of the target child and the income 
of its parents (its custodian and his/her spouse). For example, given that the income of the parents 
of a child is under DKK 749,000, a child under 2 years old is entitled to DKK 4,491 every quarter 
in 2017; a child between 3 and 6 years old can receive DEE 3,555 each quarter; 7-14 years old, 
DKK 2,796; 15-17 years old, DKK 932 (see also Table 2.16). However, “[…] you and your spouse’s 
child and youth benefit is reduced by 2% of the amount of your incomes in excess of DDK 749,000 
(in 2017).” (European Commission, 2017b, p.8)  
Table 2.16 The amount of children and youth benefit in 2017.  
Your child's age Child benefit (tax-free) 
0-2 years DKK 4,491 per quarter (in 2017) 
3-6 years DKK 3,555 per quarter (in 2017) 
7-14 years DKK 2,796 per quarter (in 2017) 
15-17 years DKK 932 per quarter (in 2017) 
Source: European Commission (2017b, p. 8). 
Maternity benefit is in essence maternity / paternity leave with financial support, which resembles 
paid leave but is of course not limited to wage / salary earners. Both parents with their own child or 
an adopted child are entitled to this benefit before their child reaches 9 years old. In the former case, 
a mother is entitled to a total of a 50-week leave with “a maximum of DKK 4,245 per week before 
tax” in 2017, and a father a total 48-week leave (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 14-15).   
Old age pension 
The Danish pension system can be divided into three types, that is, the statutory pensions, 
occupational pensions and individual pensions, respectively (Borger.dk, no date a). Therein, the 
mandatory pensions cover the National pension scheme and ATP lifelong pension (namely, the 
Danish Labour Market Supplementary Pension), a mandatory occupational pension, with the former 
including public basic pension and supplementary pension benefit (Borger.dk, no date a; OECD, 
2017). Or put another way, the Danish pension system in 2016 contains four parts, that is, public 
basic pension, supplementary pension benefit, mandatory occupational pension – ATP and 
compulsory occupational pension schemes, respectively (OECD, 2017). 
The National pension is provided by the public finance. In terms of coverage, the public basic 
pension is more universal than supplementary pension benefit. Danish nationals reaching the public 
retirement age and non-Danish citizens meeting certain required conditions can all apply for public 
basic pension (see, European Commission, 2017b, p. 39). On contrast, supplementary pension 
benefit is means tested, and is provided to pensioners who have financial difficulties in life (OECD, 
2017). ATP contributions are compulsory for the employees in both public and private labor market, 
but voluntary for the self-employed (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 39-40). For employees, the 
contributions to ATP lifelong pension are shared by both the employer (or the state for employees 
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in the public market) and the employee (Border.dk, no date b; European Commission, 2017b, p. 39). 
Note that it is according to how long employees work that the ATP contributions are paid for, rather 
than how much they earn. Additionally, ATP lifelong pension is also given to pensioners when they 
reach retirement age (Border.dk, no date b). Different from the three types of pensions 
aforementioned, individual pension schemes are provided by companies or banks (Border.dk, no 
date a). 
Health care 
The healthcare in Denmark covers public healthcare, sickness benefit, home care service and care 
of close relatives (for detail information, see, e.g., European Commission, 2017b, pp. 17-29). Take 
public health care as an example. Those who are residents of Denmark, work in Denmark but are 
from EU/EEA/Switzerland, or stay temporarily in Denmark are all entitled to public healthcare in 
Denmark, in spite of holding different kinds of health insurance cards (European Commission, 
2017b, p. 18). Expenditure reimbursements, cover a wide range of treatments and medicines (e.g., 
European Commission, 2017b, pp. 18, 20). For example, according to the 2016 rate, as long as 
dedication in a year is equal to or more than DKK 935, it is possible to get reimbursement; 60% of 
the annual expenditure on medicines for children under 18 years old can get reimbursed (European 
Commission, 2017b, pp. 19-20). The reimbursement system of medicines contains general 
reimbursement and individual reimbursement (Danish Ministry of Health, 2017, p. 44). How much 
a patient will be reimbursed hinges on his / her annual consumption of medicine (Danish Ministry 
of Health, 2017, p. 44). The healthcare system runs on the national, regional and municipal level 
(Danish Ministry of Health, 2017, p. 4). Denmark consists of 5 regions covering 98 municipalities 
(see, Danish Ministry of Health, 2017, p. 5). The regions and the municipalities are governed by 
councils at the corresponding levels and of which the members are elected every four years (Danish 
Ministry of Health, 2017, pp. 4-5). Denmark from two aspects supports its health and social services: 
first, general taxes provide financial support; at the same time, a system of central government block 
grants, reimbursements and equalization schemes also provides support (Danish Ministry of Health, 
2017, p. 5). Figure 2.4 presents the financial structure of the Danish healthcare system.
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Figure 2.4 Organisational chart of the financial structure of the Danish healthcare system. 
Source: Danish Ministry of Health (2017, p. 50). 
ii) Social Security in China 
Chinese social security system includes social insurance, social assistance, social welfare, social 
special care, philanthropy and so on, with social insurance being the main body. It should be noted 
that in China, the term “social security” has a broader meaning than the term “social welfare”, which 
is different from the Scandinavian countries where “social welfare” seems a broader term. 
According to the current Social Insurance Law of P.R. China1, the social insurance system of China 
covers five types of insurances, they are basic old-age insurance, basic health care insurance, 
occupational injury insurance, unemployment insurance and maternity insurance, respectively 
(People’s Republic of China. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2010).  
Let us have a look at the evolution of the old-age insurance briefly. In 1951, the Labor Insurance 
Regulation2 was issued, which indicates the establishment of the labor insurance system with the 
social insurance and employee benefit being the main part (Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2012; see also, People’s Republic of China. Government 
Administration Council of the Central People’s Government, 1953). However, in 1960s, social 
pooling was ever cancelled, and employees’ insurance gradually became totally provided by 
employers (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 
2012). Since the second half of 1980s, various regions made reforms of the old-age insurance mainly 
characterized by the social pooling for retirement expenses (Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2012). In 1995, the old-age insurance model of 
combining social pooling accounts and personal accounts was put forward in the Notice on 
Deepening the Reform of the Endowment Insurance System for Enterprise Employees3 (Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2012). In 1997, the 
Decision on Establishing a Unified Basic Endowment Insurance System for Enterprise Employees4 
was issued (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 
2012). In 2005, the Decision on Improving the Basic Endowment Insurance System for Enterprise 
 
1 The name of the law is author’s own translation.  
2 Author’s own translation.  
3 In Chinese: 《关于深化企业职工养老保险制度改革的通知》. 
4 In Chinese: 《关于建立统一的企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》. 
The government 
The regions The municipalities 
Co-financing 
Activity based  
subsidy Block grant Block grant 
Direct tax  
collection 
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Employees1 was issued putting forward broadening the pilot programs of personal accounts, further 
extending the coverage of old-age insurance, etc. (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2012). Currently, the Chinese old-age insurance has both social 
pooling accounts and personal accounts (People’s Republic of China. Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, 2010). Recently, the basic old-age insurance system is still being 
reformed. From July 1st, 2018 on, the central system for enterprise employees’ basic old-age pension 
funds to be used inter-provincially is formally implemented in order to ensure the pension to be paid 
on time and in full.  
In addition, it is a remarkable characteristic that in China, pilot programs always go first before a 
policy is nationwide implemented. For example, a province is selected by the central government 
as a pilot province for implementing some policy for a period. After summing up some experience, 
several other selected provinces are added into the pilot program. Likewise, experience is reviewed 
and / or advices are solicited from the public afterwards. Then, a final adjusted policy will be 
nationwide implemented. – This is wise, prudent and necessary for a policy to be a good one, and 
to avoid problems in a wider scope in the course of implementation. 
According to the Annual Report of the Development of Chinese Social Insurance 20162, the number 
of people who participate old-age insurance reaches 887.77 million, who participate basic health 
care insurance reaches 743.92 million, occupational injury insurance 218.89 million, unemployment 
insurance 180.89 million, and maternity insurance 184.51 million (Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, November 24th, 2017). Economic 
development is always the base of welfare provision. As the development of Chinese economy, 
more generous and higher standard welfare policies will be provided gradually in future.  
iii) Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 
The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (MMGPI) compares the retirement income systems 
of an increasing number of countries annually since 2009. The MMGPI 2017 compares 30 countries 
and is constructed by 3 sub-indices, respectively adequacy, sustainability and integrity, further 
calculated using more than 40 indicators (Mercer, 2017, p. 5). Index values which range between 0 
and 100 are divided, unequally, into 7 categories, represented by A, B+, B, C+, C, D and E. 
According to the MMGPI 2017, the pension systems of all the Nordic countries perform 
outstandingly, especially Denmark of which the retirement income system ranks highest out of 30 
estimated countries, with an overall index grade of B+ and an overall index value of 78.9 (see, 
Mercer, 2017, pp. 6-7). Norway and Sweden follow Denmark not far away, ranking the top 3 of 
grade B with close values, while China falls into grade D (see, Mercer, 2017, p. 6). Table 2.17 
presents more detail information of the pension indices of these selected countries from the MMGPI 
2017 report.  
Table 2.17 Pension Index of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 2017 
Country Overall Index Grade (Value) Sub-Index Grades (Values) 
  Adequacy Sustainability Integrity 
 
1 In Chinese: 《关于完善企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》. 
2 The name of this report is author’s own translation.  
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Denmark B+  (78.9) B+  (76.5) B+  (79.8) A  (81.3) 
Norway B   (74.7) B+  (77.0) C+  (61.0) A  (90.3) 
Sweden B   (72.0) B   (67.7) B   (71.0) A  (80.3) 
China D   (46.5) C   (54.2) D   (38.2) D  (46.0) 
Note: The range of the values is between 0 and 100 with which desirability increases and which is 
divided into 7 grades with grade A representing values >80, B+ representing 75~80, B (65~75), C+ 
(60~65), C (50~60), D (35~50) and E (<35) (see, Mercer, 2017, pp. 6-7). 
Source: Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2017 (Mercer, 2017, pp. 5-9). 
2.3.3 Equality  
The “Denmark Canon” asked the question “Which social values, traditions or movements that have 
shaped us in Denmark will you carry through to tomorrow’s society?” to the Danish people about, 
such as, the values shaping the Danish society (Denmarkskanon, no date). The answers were 
collected through Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. After 2,425 people had given their answer, a list 
of 20 values was made out of these answers and 326,298 voted on this list. 10 values won out finally, 
they are respectively welfare society, freedom, trust, equality for the law, gender equality, the Danish 
language, associations and voluntary work, liberality/tolerance, hygge1, and the Christian heritage. 
As we see, equality was voted as one of the 10 values of Denmark, although it is not known which 
groups (such as, age groups or education groups) were more likely to vote. 
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) think that there is a circular relation between social trust, equality and 
welfare. They argue that social trust is caused by economic equality and equality of opportunity 
which can both be promoted by universal welfare like in the Scandinavian countries. However, the 
establishment and implementation of public policies also rely on both social trust and trust in 
government (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Therefore, it is not easy for a country with low social 
trust to improve social trust by public policies, which results in a social trap (Rothstein and Uslaner, 
2005). Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) and Bjørnskov and Svendsen (2013) claim that they hold the 
opposite view to Rothstein et al who argue that universal welfare could cause generalized trust. 
Bjørnskov et al (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011; Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2013) argue that the causal 
direction is from trust to universal welfare, rather than the other way around since “trusting 
populations are more likely to create and sustain large, universal welfare states” (Bergh and 
Bjørnskov, 2011, p. 1). Moreover, there is no lack of scholars who argue that the high social trust in 
the Scandinavian countries actually predates the formation of the extended welfare states. For 
example, Svendsen and Svendsen (2016, p. 198) also argue that the accumulation of social trust 
could be dated back to the Viking age when “social sanctioning by word of mouth” forming in the 
“long-distance trade practices” contributes to the “social trust accumulation” in Scandinavian 
welfare states.  
Although Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) and Bjørnskov and Svendsen (2013) argue that their view on 
the causal relation between high social trust and high welfare is opposite to that of Rothstein and 
Uslaner (2005), their opinions do not really contradict each other. Obviously, they are viewing from 
different perspectives and stressing different stages. What Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) and 
 
1 For what hygge is, see, Denmark.dk (no date c).  
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Bjørnskov and Svendsen (2013) stress is how high social trust facilitates the emergence of high 
welfare, namely the impact of high social trust before the establishment of generous welfare policies, 
while what Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) emphasizes is the possible relation of social trust and high 
welfare after the already implemented high welfare. It is not quite reasonable that social trust and 
welfare cannot have both the relations of opposite directions simultaneously. Social trust and 
welfare can benefit from each other. For example, a high trust society can possibly more easily pass 
high welfare policies, and established high welfare policies may maintain high social trust in some 
way to some extent. The fact, if it is, that high social trust predates high welfare in Scandinavia does 
not prohibit the possibility of their mutual improvement. 
The relation between equality and extended welfare states could be mutually promoted. Equality 
contributes to the final establishment of extended welfare states, and extended welfare states in turn 
create equality. However, it should be noted that the former equality and the latter do not mean the 
same kind. Thus, the relation between equality and extended welfare states just stated is not as 
pointless as it is seen at the first glance. The equality that facilitates the initiation of extended welfare 
states may be attributed to general approval of something with similar nature of citizenship among 
all the nationals, while the equality that extended welfare states result in may go more to wealth or 
income distribution and / or social status.   
When an agreement of a majority of nationals is needed, a necessary condition of the 
implementation of high welfare is probably the justification of equality among nationals. Equality 
here is that reflecting some basic and not differential characteristic of nationals, such as equality 
from basic citizenship, rather than being measured by economic or social status. Only if equality in 
citizenship is admitted and accepted in nationals’ values, can universal welfare policies be smoothly 
passed in democratic societies. Otherwise, for example, if equality in citizenship is not realized or 
equality is focused on other differential aspects, welfare could not be that universal.   
What people, especially those who are not affluent enough, generally worry about is how to support 
themselves when getting old, ill and unemployed which threats the basic and normal life of people. 
Without a certain degree of universal and comprehensive welfare, people have to pay and save for 
these situations. Possible welfare polarization and market price-setting could result in a substance 
number of people who are struggling for subsistence, cannot afford housing, treatment and food due 
to some objective reasons. Relatively universal, comprehensive and generous welfare policies, 
together with their implementations, to a large degree alleviate or eliminate people’s worries about 
these problems and protect people from getting poorer and even further into a vicious circle of 
poverty and illness. Put another way, it is a sense of safety that is behind comprehensive, universal 
and generous welfare.     
Only when compared with inequality can the advantages of equality become more prominent. 
Equality here mainly refers to that in material wealth. In an equal society, it is possible that the 
whole population is not affluent, while in an unequal society, there is probably, if not must, a 
proportion of population in poverty or encounters economic difficulties in life. In a society with a 
rather unequal distribution of wealth or income, the bad attempt to be predators, while the good fear 
being exploited and are prudent when dealing with others. Everybody familiar with his / her 
circumstance keeps a wary eye on others. The whole society is carrying on a zero-sum game. On 
contrast, in a more equal circumstance, no one has a lot more than others and no one has a lot less 
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than others; everybody is in almost the same economic status, which provides no obvious reasons 
to harbor hostility to, to take advantage of or to be wary of others.  
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) implement a cross-country empirical analysis about the relationship 
between distributive politics and economic growth. In their model, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 
hypothesize the “the distribution of income is monotonically related to the distribution of capital” 
(p. 466) and that “the distribution of assets is predetermined and remains constant” (p. 485). They 
conclude that inequality in income and wealth (measured by land ownership) distribution are 
inversely related to subsequent per capita growth rate (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). 
Table 2.18 and Table 2.19 respectively represent the Gini coefficients of market income and 
disposable income of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden in selective years from OECD data. 
China has higher Gini coefficients of both market income and disposable income than the three 
Scandinavian countries. Comparing these two tables, it is quite obvious that the three Scandinavian 
countries also have high Gini coefficients before taxes and transfers, while their income inequality 
is reduced a lot by taxes and transfers. This is normal for the three Scandinavian countries since 
their taxation policies are intended to reduce income inequality, and they manage to do that in terms 
of the data of Gini coefficients. In addition, Table 2.20 shows the Gini coefficient of equivalised 
disposable income of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from Eurostat data, which also indicates the 
equality of disposable income in Scandinavia.  
Table 2.18 Gini coefficients of market income (before taxes and transfers) of China, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. 
Year China  Denmark Norway Sweden 
2004 -- -- 0.437 - 
2008 -- -- 0.401 -- 
2009 -- -- 0.401 -- 
2010 -- -- 0.409 -- 
2011 0.548 0.433 0.409 -- 
2012 -- 0.436 0.41 -- 
2013 -- 0.442 0.412 0.427 
2014 -- 0.444 0.416 0.429 
2015 -- -- 0.432 0.432 
Notes: All Gini coefficients of market income above are from income before taxes and transfers, 
except that of China which is from income after taxes but before transfers. Gini coefficients are 
between 0 and 1, with smaller number representing relative equality. According to OECD.Stat, the 
definition of income after 2012 is different from that before 2012. The table above only keeps Gini 
coefficients calculated using income definition after 2012 and years when at least one country of 
China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden has data.   
Data source: OECD.Stat. 
Table 2.19 Gini coefficients of disposable income (post taxes and transfers) of China, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. 
Year China Denmark Norway Sweden 
2004 -- -- 0.285 -- 
2008 -- -- 0.25 -- 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
136 
 
2009 -- -- 0.245 -- 
2010 -- -- 0.249 -- 
2011 0.514 0.251 0.25 -- 
2012 -- 0.249 0.253 -- 
2013 -- 0.254 0.252 0.268 
2014 -- 0.256 0.257 0.274 
2015 -- -- 0.272 0.278 
Notes: Gini coefficients of disposable income are calculated using income after taxes and transfers. 
Gini coefficients are between 0 and 1 with smaller number representing relative equality. According 
to OECD.Stat, the income definition after 2012 is different from that before 2012. The table above 
only keeps Gini coefficients calculated using income definition after 2012 and years when at least 
one country of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden has data.   
Data source: OECD.Stat. 
Table 2.20 Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income of Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Denmark 26.9 26.9 26.6 26.5 26.8 27.7 27.4 27.7 
Norway 24.8 24.1 24.4 24.8 24.9 25.4 25.2 27.6 
Sweden 24.1 23.6 22.9 22.5 22.7 23.5 23.9 25.0 
Note: Scale from 0 to 100. 
Source: Eurostat. 
However, in terms of on which aspects the Nordic countries are exceptionally equal, Fochesato and 
Bowles (2015) have another opinion. Fochesato and Bowles (2015) take into account there three 
types of wealth, namely somatic wealth, relational wealth and material wealth. They construct a 
model from a world historical perspective that reveals “four causal mechanisms that could 
contribute to a relatively equal long-term stationary distribution of living standards” (p. 31) and 
apply “archaeological, ethnographic, and historical data” (p. 30) (including data of the Nordic 
countries and other advanced economies) to it (Fochesato and Bowles, 2015). They find that the 
Nordic economies do not show exceptionalism in terms of equality in material wealth or human 
capital (measured by years of schooling) (Fochesato and Bowles, 2015). However, the Nordic 
countries are more exceptionally egalitarian in terms of mobility in economic and social status, and 
inherited wealth from parents has a less impact on the living standards of offspring in those countries 
(Fochesato and Bowles, 2015).  
Cho (2016) empirically proves that gender equality promotes social trust. The World Economic 
Forum has launched the Global Gender Gap Index since 2006 which is constructed by four sub-
indices, namely economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, 
and political empowerment, respectively, and is in range of 0 to 1, with 0 representing imparity and 
1 parity. Table 2.21 shows the index score of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 2006 to 
2017 and their rank in all countries included. In general, all the three Scandinavian countries rank 
high for gender equity, especially Norway and Sweden, while China most of the time ranks the 
second half of all countries included. In more detail, Norway consistently ranks the top three 
throughout these 12 years, with once ranking the first, six times the second and five times the third. 
Sweden never dropped out of the top five in the lists, with twice ranking the first, once the third, 
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eight times the fourth and once the fifth. On contrast, Denmark does not perform as excellent as its 
peer Scandinavian countries. In the first eight years, Denmark wanders between the seventh and the 
eighth. In 2014, namely the ninth year, Denmark jumped to the fifth, however, following by a drop 
to the 14th in 2015, further to the 19th in 2016 and then back to the 14th again in 2017. The ranks of 
China change relatively strongly. What is more, China ranks much lower than those three 
Scandinavian countries, with the best rank being the 57th in 2008 and the worst even being the 100th 
in 2017. Especially in recently years, the rank of China obviously and consistently decreases. 
Table 2.21 Gender gap index of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 2006 – 2017 
Year Global index China Denmark Norway Sweden 
2006 Score 0.6561 0.7462 0.7994 0.8133 
 Rank 63 / 115 8 / 115 2 / 115 1 / 115 
2007 Score 0.6643 0.7519 0.8059 0.8146 
 Rank 73 / 128 8 / 128 2 / 128 1 / 128 
2008 Score 0.6878 0.7538 0.8239 0.8139 
 Rank 57 / 130 7 / 130 1 / 130 3 / 130 
2009 Score 0.6907 0.7628 0.8227 0.8139 
 Rank 60 / 134 7 / 134 3 / 134 4 / 134 
2010 Score 0.6881 0.7719 0.8404 0.8024 
 Rank 61 / 134 7 / 134 2 / 134 4 / 134 
2011 Score 0.6866 0.7778 0.8404 0.8044 
 Rank 61 / 135 7 / 135 2 / 135 4 / 135 
2012 Score 0.6853 0.7777 0.8403 0.8159 
 Rank 69 / 135 7 / 135 3 / 135 4 / 135 
2013 Score 0.6908 0.7779 0.8417 0.8129 
 Rank 69 / 136 8 / 136 3 / 136 4 / 136 
2014 Score 0.6830 0.8025 0.8374 0.8165 
 Rank 87 / 142 5 / 142 3 / 142 4 / 142 
2015 Score 0.682 0.767 0.850 0.823 
 Rank 91 / 145 14 / 145 2 / 145 4 / 145 
2016 Score 0.676 0.754 0.842 0.815 
 Rank 99 / 144 19 / 144 3 / 144 4 / 144 
2017 Score 0.674 0.776 0.830 0.816 
 Rank 100 / 144 14 / 144 2 / 144 5 / 144 
Notes: Score is in range of 0 to 1, with 0 representing imparity and 1 parity. In the cells for ranks, 
the number before the sign “/” is the rank and the number after it is the total number of countries 
considered in the report in the corresponding year.  
Source: Global Gender Gap Index 2006 – 2017 (World Economic Forum, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 
2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).
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2.3.4 Uncertainty  
“Uncertainty” is nowadays often used in not only academic works but also daily life to describe 
unpredictability of future events. It basically has two elements, one is uncertainty of events, the 
other is uncertainty of future time. Thus, in reality, there are two types of uncertainty, one is that 
both events and future time are uncertain, the other is that some event is almost certain, while the 
relatively particular time of that event is not quite certain. Generally, there are two categories of 
uncertain things by which people get influenced: one is uncertainty of policies, which is a top-down 
type; the other is uncertainty of things like when to get sick, etc. 朝令夕改 (Pinyin: zhāo lìng xī 
gǎi), an idiom in China, literally meaning to issue an order in the morning but to change it in the 
evening, is a metaphor for often changing an order, a policy, etc. and is used to express one’s 
disapproval of this kind of behavior. For the latter case, in order to defend against uncertainty, the 
most common and effective way is to save money, especially where general welfare is not provided, 
although, certainly, saving is not only for uncertainty. 
Various social protection policies play a big role in people’s life because they not only protect people 
from uncertain things but also certain ones. For example, that everyone will get old is a certain thing, 
while when to get sick is not quite certain. However, the distinction seems not quite meaningful 
here, although it is true, since they both usually are considered undesirable. Or we can think from 
another perspective. Namely, the biggest problem that people could encounter is that they may not 
be able to afford expenditures on old age, sickness, etc. in future by themselves, or get badly off 
because of those unpleasant things. Hence, (getting into) poverty becomes the major uncertainty in 
life. Various social protection policies can reduce the possibility of getting into poverty resulting 
from different sources, while poverty could induce many social problems. In a word, social 
protection policies to a large degree provide certainty for people’s life. Then another natural question 
is what guarantee the certainty of the implementation of social protection policies. 
Changes are either to a good or a bad direction. From the perspective of personal feelings, changes 
of something or some situation to a good direction are always pleasant, while those to a bad one are 
not and often unacceptable. This is a normal and common mentality. Take welfare states as an 
example of people’s reaction to changes. As aforementioned, high welfare requires good economic 
operation as a precondition in essence. Economic prosperity creates jobs, which makes tax revenues 
get guaranteed. Issuing national debts is also adopted as a means by which a country can obtain 
government revenues and use them to support domestic affairs such as welfare expenditures. 
However, supporting high welfare using national debts is not a permanent solution and could be 
risky. A sluggish economy would make it more difficult for a country to borrow money from other 
countries and the interest rate of debts would increase since it becomes riskier for the debtor nation 
to pay interests and the principal. In addition, the implementation of high welfare also depends on 
the political aims of the ruling party / parties. In a welfare state, one may find that reducing welfare 
is often opposed by nationals of that country, even when it is rational to do so for the whole country 
in some situations such as during an economic recession, since people there have already be 
accustomed to high welfare and therefore are not satisfied with a reduction in it. The dependence 
on high welfare may be based on at least four mentalities: 1) the long period of “high tax, high 
welfare” has changed the consumption idea and saving habits and people do not have many savings 
for uncertainty; 2) some people do not want to put up with a reduction in their current living standard; 
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3) people who have already contributed much to taxes for a long time but not benefited from high 
welfare much yet may feel unfair; 4) some people may have an opportunism tendency and do not 
want to work, given that they are capable, in exchange for better life.    
Changing back and forth usually harms others’ trust. In daily interpersonal interactions, a person 
always changing his / her mind could cause others trouble and is not reliable for others. Similarly, 
on the level of policy making, continuity of policies could provide certainty and a stable expectation 
for the public, while changing a policy about the same issue back and forth would cause uncertainty 
and could also damage people’s trust to politicians and people who support that policy. In reality, 
left-wing parties are the main ruling parties in the West for a long time. However, after the 2008 
financial crisis, especially in recent years, the situation has changed in some Western countries with 
right-wing parties getting in power, which brings policy changes in those countries and feelings of 
uncertainty for many people. Additionally, there are western scholars who criticize interest groups 
existing in the contemporary Western democratic countries for lobbying which has led and / or 
would lead the forthcoming policies to represent benefits of interest groups, rather than the wider 
public. 
It should be noted that (policy) changes per se do not definitely result in direct distrust in policy-
makers or possible indirect distrust to other people in society. It depends on whether (the general 
trend of) a change is good or bad, or put another way, is trust-increasing or trust-decreasing. As long 
as a policy change (or reform) is fundamentally for problem-solving, for the interest of all the people, 
and right, it will increase trust to policy-makers and improve people’s welfare and standard of life.  
In terms of the Western societies, one advantage of the Scandinavian countries could be their 
incorruption, in spite of the problems existing there. Uslaner (2005, p. 76) defines corruption as 
“illegal (or barely legal) behavior by political elites, to manipulate the affairs of state for private 
gain”. It is a common view that corruption could be detrimental to social (generalized) trust and 
economic performance. Although trust is required between corrupt persons during their corrupt 
transactions, trust in this situation is particularized, rather than generalized (Uslaner, 2005, 2013; 
You, 2012). Moreover, much research also provides empirical evidence for the negative relation 
between corruption and social trust. For example, La Porta et al (1997) demonstrate that general 
trust is significantly negatively associated with corruption. Uslaner (2005) shows that corruption 
and (general) trust are reciprocal, while change in trust leads to less change in corruption, but not 
the other way around. The empirical research of You (2012) shows that both macro-level corruption 
and individual perceived corruption are significantly negatively associated with individual general 
(social) trust across countries. Uslaner (2013) demonstrates that generalized trust and corruption 
have a reciprocal negative relation, and shape each other. What is more, Uslaner (2013) shows that 
many institutions supposed to improve general trust and restrain corruption turn out to have no 
impact on either corruption or trust: 
Note the absence of institutional effects for either corruption or trust: Neither 
democracy, centralization, parliamentary system, the form of the electoral list, the type 
of executive freedom of the press, the efficiency or the independence of the courts, the 
quality of the bureaucracy or how much public servants are paid, nor a summary 
measure of governmental effectiveness from survey of elites by the World Economic 
Forum affects corruption. No institutional factor – not even democracy – leads to more 
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trust. The omly [only] institutional variable that matters Is the fairness of the legal 
system, the perception (of elites from the Economist Intelligence Unit) that the rich and 
the poor receive equal treatment under the law. (pp. 3605-3606) 
Every year since 1995, the Transparency International, a non-governmental organization, releases 
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which is a composite index drawing on 13 data sources of 
experts’ and business people’s perceptions of corrupt behaviors in the public sector of different 
countries and territories (Transparency International, 2017). “During the past 20 years, both the 
sources used to compile the Index and the methodology have been adjusted and refined. In 2012, 
important changes were made to the methodology to allow for score comparison across time, which 
is not possible prior to 2012” (Transparency International, 2017, p. 1). However, it should be noted 
that the CPI also has shortcomings (Lin and Yu, 2014). For example, it only considers the opinions 
of foreign experts and business people, but not takes into account that of the local people (Lin and 
Yu, 2014). However, “global expert assessments have their particular predispositions and 
idiosyncrasies” (Lin and Yu, 2014, p. 153). But it does not mean that local perceptions have no 
shortcomings (see, Lin and Yu, 2014). Anyway, Table 2.22 shows the scores of the CPI of China, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 2012 to 2017. The index is scored from 0 to 100 with 0 
representing most corrupt and 100 cleanest. In 2017, 180 countries and territories are incorporated 
in this index in total. From Table 2.22, it is clear that the overall trend of the CPI of each country is 
rather steady. More specifically, the three Scandinavian countries rank in the top 10 cleanest 
countries or territories in 2017, while China ranks 77, which indicates that in general, there is a big 
gap between the corruption perceptions of China and the other three countries. 
Table 2.22 Corruption perceptions indices of China, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, 2012-2017. 
2017 
Rank 
Country 
2017 
Score 
2016 
Score 
2015 
Score 
2014 
Score 
2013 
Score 
2012 
Score 
77 China 41 40 37 36 40 39 
2 Denmark 88 90 91 92 91 90 
3 Norway 85 85 88 86 86 85 
6 Sweden 84 88 89 87 89 88 
Notes: The score of corruption perceptions index is in range 0 to 100, with 0 representing most 
corrupt and 100 cleanest.  
Source: Transparency International1. 
Where there is difference in power / authority, there is possibility of corruption. A lack of some 
authority / power may stimulate people to exchange materials, such as money, etc. for access. 
However, a well-functioning accountability system could probably be a relatively essential and 
effective method of preventing corruption.  
2.4 Social mobility and geographic mobility in China 
2.4.1 Social mobility 
 
1 For complete data of all countries, see, Transparency International (2017). 
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Social mobility refers to individual person’s mobility between different social strata within a society. 
Several questions in Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2015 are informative for the social 
mobility in the Chinese society. Specifically, it asks “In our society, some are on upper strata of the 
society, while some are on lower ones. […] The highest score ‘10’ represents the highest stratum, 
and the lowest score ‘1’ represents the lowest stratum. 1. Which stratum do you think you are 
currently / now on? […] 4. Which stratum do you think your family was on when you were at 14 
years old ?” 1  Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2015 asks two questions about socio-
economic status to interviewees. Therein, one is “Compared with peers, what do you think about 
your socio-economic status?”, with three options, “relatively high”, “almost the same” and 
“relatively low”2; The other is “Compared with three years ago, what do you think about your socio-
economic status”, also with three options, “increase”, “almost the same” and “decrease”3. CGSS 
2015 contains 10968 observations totally. Figure 2.5 compares the distribution of the interviewees’ 
subjective social stratum at their 14 years old and currently. Obviously, the interviewees’ distribution 
of subjective social stratum currently is much less right-skewed than that at 14 years old, which 
indicates that many people therein have moved upward, rather than being locked in the social 
stratum of their family. It should be noted that, currently interviewees have different age. In addition, 
the improvement of the overall living standard of China may also play some role in respondents’ 
perceived socio-economic status. Figure 2.6 presents subjective socio-economic status compared 
with peers. Most interviewees’ think that they have almost the same socio-economic status or even 
lower compared with peers, while only a small proportion consider that they have higher status. 
Figure 2.7 shows subjective socio-economic status compared with three years ago. A substantial 
proportion of the interviewees think their socio-economic status have increased, while there are also 
many people fall into the opposite situation.  
 
Figure 2.5 Subjective social stratum at 14 years old and currently. 
 
1 See question A43 in the questionnaire of CGSS 2015 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of 
China, 2015a). 
2 See question B1 in the questionnaire of CGSS 2015 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of 
China, 2015a). 
3 See question B2 in the questionnaire of CGSS 2015 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of 
China, 2015a). 
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Data source: Chinese General Social Survey 2015 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin 
University of China, 2015a, 2015b). 
 
Figure 2.6 Subjective socio-economic status compared with peers 
Data source: Chinese General Social Survey 2015 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin 
University of China, 2015a, 2015b). 
 
Figure 2.7 Subjective socio-economic status compared with 3 years ago 
Data source: Chinese General Social Survey 2015 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin 
University of China, 2015a, 2015b). 
When talking about social mobility in China, the national higher education entrance examination of 
China is worthy of mention, that is, 高考 (pinyin: gāo kǎo), written as gaokao in English. Gaokao 
has a high degree of fairness for examinees, although it has defects also. In general, gaokao provides 
examinees with equal opportunities for competition to enter different universities and majors 
according to their examination results regardless of family background, which objectively results in 
that those from families of higher socio-economic conditions are prevented from crowding out 
others because of their family advantages to some degree and that those from relatively poor families 
and the rural areas have an opportunity to improve socio-economic status via education rather than 
being firmly locked in the relatively worse conditions from generation to generation. In a word, 
gaokao, to a remarkable degree, has played and is playing an irreplaceable role in social mobility in 
China. 
Chinese people generally think highly of achieving a higher socio-economic position by personal 
effort and labor. However, due to the uneven distribution of educational resources, the inadequacy 
of educational resources of high quality, the highly positive influences of better financial condition 
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and higher educational background of family on children’s education, the severe competition in 
China, etc., those from not affluent or financially normal families and / or areas have to make much 
more effort and / or devote more time to improve their socio-economic position.  
2.4.2 Geographic mobility  
(i) China’s Huji system and Hukous 
Huji (in Chinese: 户籍) system is Chinese system of household registration and management. The 
dual huji institution classifies hukous (in Chinese: 户口) into two types: agricultural hukous and 
non-agricultural hukous. Literally, hu (in Chinese: 户) means household, and kou (in Chinese: 口) 
means mouth and refers to every individual person. Every person in a hu is registered in a same 
hukou booklet.  
At first, hukous were made only for urban residents. On July 16th, 1951, the Provisional Ordinance 
of Urban Hukou Management1 was enacted by the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s 
Republic of China and was enforced from that day on. As the name shows, this ordinance has not 
yet regulated those who live in the countryside. This first item of this ordinance also states the 
freedom of migration.  
In November, 1953, the Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government 
of P.R. China2 issued Order of the Government Administration Council of the Central People’s 
Government about the Planned Purchasing and Planned Provision of Grain which stipulates 
peasants who produce grain should sell surplus grain to the nation’s corresponding departments 
according to planned purchasing kinds of grain, purchasing price and quantity, and then urban 
residents can buy grain planned to provide from the nation’s corresponding departments (People’s 
Republic of China. Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government, 1953). 
On January 9th, 1958, Hukou Registration Ordinance of the People’s Republic of China3 was 
enacted of which Article 6 stipulates that citizens should register as a permanent resident where they 
often live, and each citizen can only at one place register as a permanent resident (People’s Republic 
of China. National People’s Congress, 1958). 
In 1963, the Ministry of Public Security of P.R. China classified hukous into agricultural hukous 
and non-agricultural hukous according to whether a household had access to community grain of 
the nation’s planned provision.  
In 1997, the State Council released the Circular of the State Council on the Pilot Reform Plan of the 
Ministry of Public Security for the Household Residential Registration System in Small Cities and 
Towns and the Proposals on Improving the Household Residential Registration System in Rural 
Areas (People’s Republic of China. State Council, 1997). The Pilot Reform Plan for the Household 
Residential Registration System in Small Cities and Towns, approved and circulated in June, 1997, 
allowed those from rural areas to register permanent urban hukou conditionally in small cities and 
 
1 Author’s own translation. In Chinese: 《城市户口管理暂行条例》. 
2 The Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government of P.R. China was established in 
October, 1949 and was dissolved in September, 1954.  
3 Author’s own translation.  
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towns, however not including large or medium-sized cities, especially megacities like Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai etc. (General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1997b, 
pp. 869-870). The Proposals on Improving the Household Residential Registration System in Rural 
Areas, which was approved at the same time with the Pilot Reform Plan in June, 1997, aimed to 
unify the Huji registration system between rural areas and urban areas (General Office of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1997c, pp. 872-873). Additionally, in the Decision on 
Abolishing Some Departmental Rules1 , which was issued on September 3rd, 2004, Provisional 
Ordinance of Urban Hukou Management issued in 1951 was abolished (People’s Republic of China. 
Ministry of Public Security, 2004). 
On July 30th, 2014, the Guideline of the State Council on Further Accelerating Huji System Reform2 
was issued, which cancelled the classification of agricultural and non-agricultural hukous, and 
unifies hukou registration system. (People’s Republic of China. State Council, 2014) 
In December, 2009, Zhongshan city in Guangdong province of China became the first to implement 
a point-based household registration system for floating population. After that, some other cities 
also followed up, including Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. For example, the Administrative 
Measures of the Point-based Household Registration of Beijing (For Trial Implementation)3 was 
issued on August 11th, 2016, and will be valid from January 1st, 2017 to December 31st, 2019 
(People’s Government of Beijing Municipality, 2016). 
In recent years, some cities make a “war of competing for population / talents” (In Chinese, “抢人
大战”), and the “war” is now ongoing. In this “war”, cities involved all provide various preferential 
measures, including looser hukou-settling policy, to attract people to stay or to come. Many cities 
have “joined” and perform actively in this “war”, especially new first-tier and second-tier cities such 
as Chengdu, Wuhan, Nanjing, Xi’an, Zhengzhou, etc. Zhongshan, the first city to implement a point-
based household registration system, has abolished that system and further implements an easier 
hukou-settling policy. Behind this “war” could be the transformation and upgrading of local industry 
and the adjustment of its economic structure supported by the human capital of inflow population 
and the demand stimulation for local real estate market supported by inflow population. Even 
megacities like Beijing, China’s national capital, and Shanghai, one of China’s financial centers, 
have also provides more preferential conditions in their point-based hukou-settling system, although 
they have not totally given it up. 
(ii) Floating population 
The term floating population is actually based on the ever dual Huji system of China. Floating 
population refers to, 
[…] the population of residence-registration inconsistency excluding those intra-city 
ones. Population of intra-city residence-registration inconsistency refer to those whose 
residing streets or towns and registered ones are inconsistent but still in the same 
municipality or prefecture city either the two are in the same district or different ones” 
 
1 Author’s own translation.  
2 Author’s own translation.  
3 Author’s own translation. 
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and population of residence-registration inconsistency refers to “those who have been 
residing in places other than the registered streets or towns and been away from their 
registration areas for over half a year. (China Statistical Yearbook – 2017, p. 51) 
Table 2.23 presents the size and annual growth rate of floating population and population of 
residence-registration inconsistency in China from 2000 to 2016. Within 17 years, the size of 
population of residence-registration inconsistency has increased from 144 million to 292 million, 
and that of floating population from 121 million to 245 million. The annual growth rate of both 
population of residence-registration inconsistency and floating population present a negative growth 
rate in 2015 and 2016. 
Table 2.23 Population of residence-registration inconsistency and floating population in China, 2000 
– 2016. 
Year 
Population of Residence-Registration 
Inconsistency 
Floating Population 
  
  Size (100 million) Annual growth rate Size (100 million) Annual growth rate 
2000 1.44 --- 1.21 --- 
2005 --- --- 1.47 21.49% 
2010 2.61 --- 2.21 50.34% 
2011 2.71 3.83% 2.3 4.07% 
2012 2.79 2.95% 2.36 2.61% 
2013 2.89 3.58% 2.45 3.81% 
2014 2.98 3.11% 2.53 3.27% 
2015 2.94 -1.34% 2.47 -2.37% 
2016 2.92 -0.68% 2.45 -0.81% 
Notes: “Data of 2000 and 2010 are based on the National Population Census and the rest are 
estimates based on annual national sample surveys of population.” (China Statistical Yearbook – 
2017, p. 32) Annual growth rates of population residence-registration inconsistency and floating 
population are author’s own calculation. 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook – 2017 (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2017, p. 32). 
(iii) Hukou and rights attached 
Not only does Hukou act as the way of household registration, but also many rights are attached to 
it, such as employment, children’s education, social security, public services and so on, although at 
first Hukou is not definitely associated with various welfare, public services, etc. (Ge, 2016) 
However, with economic development and the corresponding accelerated internal migration 
(including migrant workers), the association of Hukou and public services etc. gets more and more 
unsuited to that situation. The migrant workers are an example. As economy develops, the demand 
for migrant workers increases. They contribute a lot to urban construction and development. 
However, corresponding institutional adjustments do not follow up. Rural Hukou limits their access 
to various local public services etc. in relation to local people. Now, with the gradual Huji reform, 
situations like this have improved and are improving. Migrant workers now can get several kinds 
of subsidies, namely children’s education subsidy, high-temperature subsidies, house-purchasing 
subsidy, start-ups subsidy; migrant students can participate Gaokao in his / her current living 
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province, if the corresponding requirements of that province are met, not having to return to where 
their Huji is any more. In a word, gradually reducing limiting conditions on hukou-change, or even 
weakening limits from Huji has become a trend.  
2.5 Social capital 
2.5.1 What is social capital? 
Bourdieu (1986) thinks that:  
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which 
provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a 
‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. (pp. 248-
249)  
An obvious view that Bourdieu (1986) holds is that social capital is related to a group with a clearly 
defined boundary. Coleman (1988) thinks that the definition of social capital is function-based. He 
considers social capital as a concept capturing different entities which “consist of some aspect of 
social structures” and “facilitate certain actions of actors” (Coleman, 1988, p. S98), and proposes 
three forms of social capital, namely “obligations and expectations, information channels, and social 
norms” (Coleman, 1988, p. S95). According to Putnam et al (1993, p.167), “Social capital […] 
refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” In terms of networks, Putnam et al (1993, 
p.176) emphasize the positive role of horizontal networks of civic engagement in political and 
economic performance, compared with vertical networks. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 243), 
scholars in management, “define social capital as the sum of the actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual or social unit” and divide social capital into three (interrelated) dimensions, i.e., “the 
structural, the relational, and the cognitive” dimension. Furthermore, they classify trust, 
trustworthiness and norms etc. into the relational dimension of social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998, p. 244). Ostrom (1999, p. 176) defines social capital as “the shared knowledge, 
understandings, norms, rules, and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of 
individual bring to a recurrent activity”. Lin (2002) thinks that social capital is a kind of capital that 
is captured through social relations (p.19) and that social capital is rooted in “individual interactions 
and networking” (p.26). He views social capital as a relational asset, rather than a collective asset 
like culture, trust and norms, which is different from Coleman and Putnam (Lin, 2002, p. 26). The 
differences between the opinions on social capital of Putnam (1993) and Lin (2002) are that: 1) The 
perspective of Putnam et al (1993) is more oriented to collectivity, while that of Lin (2002) is more 
oriented to individuals; 2) The perspective of Putnam et at (1993) is backward, is a perspective of 
input; he emphasizes more what bolsters social capital. Relative to Putnam et al (1993), the 
perspective of Lin (2002) is forward, is a perspective of output; he stresses more what social capital 
can bring. Burt (2000) pays more attention to the network structure of social capital. He states that 
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the network forms of social capital boils down three types, namely entrepreneurial network, clique 
network and hierarchical network.  
Even though a unified definition of social capital has not yet been achieved, a consensus that 
scholars reach is that social capital is a kind of capital generating from social relationships (e.g., 
Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2002). From my point of view, similar with other scholars, social capital relates 
to personal relationships a lot. It is what can benefit its owner from possessing his / her personal 
relationships. By making use of social capital in a suitable way, the one possessing it can acquire, 
such as, physical, financial and emotional support and information directly from or from the 
relationships of the other end of his / her relationships. 
Arrow (1999) is not approval of the use of the term “social capital”. He said that, “More specifically, 
I would urge abandonment of the metaphor of capital and the term, ‘social capital.’” (Arrow, 1999, 
p. 4) Similarly, Solow (1999) also expresses his doubt of the use of the term “social capital” and 
thinks “it is an attempt to gain conviction from a bad analogy” (p. 6), without denying the 
importance of its underlying ideas to economic performance. In contrast, Ostrom (1999) holds a 
different opinion on social capital. She considers social capital as “a core foundation for our 
understanding of how individuals achieve coordination and overcome collective-action problems to 
reach higher levels of economic performance” rather than a fad, even though she admits that “some 
authors have exaggerated claims for the universal efficacy of social capital” (Ostrom, 1999, p.173). 
Aoki (2011) thinks that one source of the debate on whether social capital is a useful concept is that 
the proponents of social capital do not clearly distinguish between collective phenomena and 
individual actions for its accumulation.     
2.5.2 Elements of social capital 
Obviously, from an individual perspective, what we need to pay attention to a person’s relationship 
with another person where the former acquires social capital can be classified into two aspects: one 
is about the relationship; the other is about the person at the other end of the relationship.  
As to the relationship, at least four attributes should be taken into account: the existence of the 
relationship, the direction of the relationship, the sign (namely, positive or negative) of the 
relationship, and the strength of the relationship. Firstly, the existence of a relationship is the 
prerequisite for social capital. Without the presence of a relationship, one will not be able to reach 
another person from whom the former’s social capital can be used. Secondly, the direction of a 
relationship refers to from whom to whom it is and whether it is a one-way or two-way relationship. 
Social capital implies that the relationship is a two-way one since, unlike other applications of 
network theory, a one-way relationship is not sufficient for backing the use of social capital. Any 
utilization of a relationship as a source of social capital should be upgraded to a two-way one first. 
Thirdly, the sign of the relationship between two persons determines, to a large extent, whether they 
will do good to or do harm to each other, or just ignore each other. Most of the time, successfully 
utilizing social capital requires a positive relationship. Fourthly, the strength of the relationship 
determines how many efforts the other person would like to make to facilitate one person to use the 
relationship between them to acquire benefits. For example, given something that you would like 
another person to help you with, your best friend probably would like to make more efforts to help 
you than a person you just know about each other, ceteris paribus. Besides two persons and the 
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relationship between them, other characteristics of a relationship should also be considered, such as, 
what is maintaining a relationship and the nature of a relationship. Some kinds of relationships are 
relatively natural, objective and a matter of fact, while others are not that objective and more 
emotional. Examples in the former case are classmates, memberships of the same group, from the 
same birthplace, and so on; the latter refers to relationships of trust, friendship, and so on. Of course, 
in many cases, objective relationships and subjective emotions are bound together. Additionally, we 
should know that trust is a sufficient but not necessary condition of social capital. In a word, the 
total social capital one possesses hinges on both the quantity and quality of the relationships in his 
/ her egocentric network. 
Granovetter (1973) discovered a phenomenon that heterogeneous information in weak ties of one’s 
social network plays a crucial role in job searching. This case is more proper to be attributed to the 
other person at the other end of a relationship, rather than to the relationship per se. The impact of 
the person at the other end of a relationship (the requested person) on the use of the social capital of 
a person at one end (the requesting person) is at least threefold. The first is from the former person 
(the requested person) himself / herself, such as his / her own physical or financial power, human 
capital (such as professional knowledge), or information advantage etc. The second is from the 
vertical position of the former person in his / her circle. A typical example is his / her discourse 
power acquired from a vertical position and its derived influence. The third is from the social capital 
of the requested person. For example, suppose you ask your friend for help, but, unfortunately, (s)he 
is not capable of solving the problem himself / herself. However, (s)he asks another person whom 
(s)he knows and who can probably successfully deal with it. This is how the requested person 
mobilizes his / her social capital to fulfill the use of the social capital of the requesting person.  
Many scholars would emphasize the possibly crucial heterogeneous information existing in weak 
ties like Granovetter (1973). It is true and a fact. But we should also realize that the reason why 
information in strong ties gets homogeneous is that frequent contacts, communication and 
information sharing with those in strong ties have already accelerated information flow among them. 
Put another way, information in strong ties also experiences a process from heterogeneity to 
homogeneity, but just in a much quicker way. 
2.5.3 People and channels of acquiring social capital 
Individual social capital generates among the people they know. Put another way, social capital is 
contained in the network of one’s social relationships. As said in the last chapter, several 
characteristics of one’s network of social relationships can influence the social capital (s)he can 
mobilize, such as, how many people (s)he knows, heterogeneity of those people, how many people 
are in each category of heterogeneity, and the thickness of each relationship. Thus, the establishment 
of a relationship and its sustainment are the precondition for a relationship to become social capital.  
In order to visually present individual social capital in China and Scandinavia in an aggregated form 
with data, some survey questions that involve the generation of, contain or reflect social capital to 
some degree and may be attractive to scholars whose research area lies in social capital are selected 
out to show here, besides data about family structure and membership presented in a previous 
section in this chapter (see, Section 2.2.4 and 2.2.5). Note that they may be hybrid, and thus not 
perfect or direct indicators of social capital for some reasons. 
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In the data presented in this part, some only contain the three Scandinavian countries, while some 
only contain China. This is because the four countries are not always in the same datasets where 
related questions are in. This would weaken the meaning of comparison to some degree. In spite of 
this fact, respective data are illustrated since they are still informative in terms of social capital.   
(i) Number of siblings 
Coleman (1988) distinguishes two sources of social capital: social capital in the family and that 
outside the family. Family is most of the time the first, strongest and most selfless source where one 
can and does acquire social capital. We can get not just physical, financial, emotional and 
informational support from our family members. What is more, usually and normally, the strength 
of family affection does not seem to dilute due to separation of a long distance or time. Therefore, 
attempts to isolate family ties from social capital research are not reasonable since they do function 
in an important way.  
From an individual perspective, ceteris paribus, the more (not an unlimited many) relations a person 
has, the higher social capital he possesses. In terms of social capital from family, the more family 
members a person has, the more social capital he can usually get, ceteris paribus. Coleman (1988, 
p. S111), as many of us can perceive, thinks that “The number of siblings represents, in this 
interpretation, a dilution of adult attention to the child.” This fact does not influence that a tie with 
a sibling is probably much stronger than a non-sibling outside family (see Section 2.2.4 for family 
structure in Denmark and China). 
(ii) Membership 
Membership of voluntary organizations is treated as a measure of social capital (e.g., Putnam, 2000). 
In societies with a tradition of participating in various formal organizations, it could be more 
appropriate to measure social capital and compare it with each other. However, as said before, 
Chinese are not as keen as westerners on participating in various organizations; Chinese usually 
strengthen relationships during informal interactions. Thus, using membership as a cross-country 
measure of social capital is scope-limited (see Section 2.2.5 for a comparison of membership 
between Scandinavia and China). 
(iii) Frequency of meeting people – Scandinavia  
Granovetter (1973) treats frequency of meeting people as a measure of tie strength. Figure 2.8 
depicts the responses from Denmark, Norway and Sweden about the question of “How often do you 
meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?” in ESS (e.g., ESS 2014, Question C2). In 
general, it can be judged basically from that figure that Norway presents the highest frequency of 
meeting people, followed by Sweden and then by Denmark. 
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Figure 2.8 Frequency of meeting friends, relatives or colleagues, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Notes: Author’s own calculation and illustration. The original question is “How often do you meet 
socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?” (e.g., ESS 2014, Question C2) Those who do 
not give an answer are excluded. 
Data source: European Social Survey Round 1-8 (ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative 
Social Surveys, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006a, 2006b, 200bc, 2008a, 2008b, 
2008c, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; 
European Social Survey, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016). 
Obviously, that survey question depicted in Figure 2.8 is about face-to-face meeting people. 
Additionally, according to the footnote of ESS 2014 Question C2 (European Social Survey, 2014, 
p. 14), “‘meet socially’ implies meet by choice rather than for reasons of either work or pure duty.” 
Besides possible personality to meet or not to meet people, one point worth noting is about the 
possibility that a person actually wants to meet people more often, but is not allowed to do so by the 
current situation. For example, an individual cannot meet his / her friends or relatives very 
frequently due to the long distance between his / her workplace and where his / her friends or 
relatives usually live. Thus, in some situation, it is not reliable to infer something according to 
behavior. By the same token, it is also possible that behavior of meeting people cannot perfectly 
embody the thickness of a relationship. Nevertheless, usually, voluntarily meeting people, especially 
friends or relatives, with whom the relationships actually implicit a high degree of thickness, reflects 
the good status of a relationship, ceteris paribus., where relatively high trust is usually contained. 
However, it should be noted that this kind of trust should be categorized into the so-called “particular 
trust” in the literature involving types of interpersonal trust.   
(iv) Social activities compared with peers – Scandinavia  
ESS asks a question that “Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take 
part in social activities?” with four options, namely, “Much more than most”, “More than most”, 
“About the same”, “Less than most” and “Much less than most”, respectively. (e.g., ESS 2014, 
Question C4) This question does not restrict the scope of with whom the respondents are in social 
activities. In addition, whether to participate in social activities also relates to, such as, personality, 
time, etc. Figure 2.9 presents the distributions of those five answers of Denmark, Norway and 
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Sweden from 8 waves of ESS. In general, the percentage of respondents who answer “Much more 
than most” and “More than most” is higher in Denmark and Sweden than that in Norway. 
 
Figure 2.9 Frequency of taking part in social activities compared to peers. 
Notes: Author’s own calculation and illustration. The original question is “Compared to other people 
of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?” (e.g., ESS 2014, Question 
C4) Those who give no answer are excluded. In addition, Denmark is not in ESS 8 (namely ESS 
2016). 
Data source: European Social Survey Round 1-8 (ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative 
Social Surveys, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006a, 2006b, 200bc, 2008a, 2008b, 
2008c, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; 
European Social Survey, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016). 
(v) Discussing intimate matters – Scandinavia  
Those with whom one would like to discuss personal / intimate matters are usually those who are 
reliable and whom (s)he has a quite good relationship with, trusts in, turns to for help when needed, 
etc. ESS asks a question that “How many people, if any, are there with whom you can discuss 
intimate and personal matters?” with 7 options, namely “None”, “1” “2” “3” “4-6” “7-9” and “10 
or more”, respectively (e.g., European Social Survey, 2016, Question C3). This question is often 
used in empirical research and to measure social capital. When asked this question, one would 
certainly only consider the people (s)he knows and has a rapport with, such as family members and 
intimate friends; no one would think of those (s)he does not know, although it is possible and often 
happen that one confides in somebody whom (s)he is not quite familiar with or who is actually far 
away from his / her life. For example, a young man who has frustrated by something and does not 
talking about it among his familiar fellows may tell his experience, sorrows and corresponding 
feelings to an old man living in a distant village where he travels to. However, this situation is 
obviously not the intention of this question, and not what is in the mind of overwhelmingly most 
respondents (if not all) when being asked this question. 
Figure 2.10 presents how the respondents from Denmark, Norway and Sweden answer this ESS 
question. In Sweden, the percentage of respondents who choose “10 or more” is highest among the 
three countries, followed Denmark, and Norway. Sweden also has the largest proportion of 
interviewees who claim to have more than 7 persons to discuss personal matters (namely, including 
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who choose “7-9” and who choose “10 or more”). The same for Sweden for the percentage of 
respondents who choose more than 4 (namely, option “4-6”, “7-9” and “10 or more”). On contrast, 
Norway has the lowest average number of persons to whom one can talk personal matters. As we 
can see in Figure 2.10, its part of choosing less than 1 (including category “None” and “1”. Hereafter 
similarly), less than 2 and less than 3 are all largest among the three countries. 
 
Figure 2.10 Number of persons to whom one can discuss intimate or personal matters. 
Notes: Author’s own calculation and illustration. Those who do not give an answer are excluded. In 
addition, Denmark is not in ESS 8. 
Data source: European Social Survey Round 6-8 (ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative 
Social Surveys, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; European Social 
Survey, 2012, 2014, 2016). 
(vi) Social activities in leisure time – China 
Figure 2.11 depicts the frequency of having social activities in leisure time in China using data of 
CGSS 2010 – 2013 and 2015. In general, the self-reported frequency of participating in social 
activities in China has increased to some degree during those 6 years. However, more than 70% of 
the Chinese respondents sometimes or even less frequently take part in social activities in leisure 
time, with roughly 10% never participating in and 40% seldom. 
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Figure 2.11 Social activities in leisure time, China. 
Notes: Author’s own calculation and illustration. Those who give no answer are excluded. 
Data source: Chinese General Social Survey (National Survey Research Center at Renmin 
University of China, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 
2015a, 2015b). 
(vii) Diversity of occupations in social networks – China  
Being linked to people of different occupations makes it possible getting support and help from 
people from different industries or areas. One question in CGSS 2012 Questionnaire A is “Is there 
anyone who belongs to the occupations below among your relatives, friends or the people with 
whom you have ever dealt?” with 10 different occupations, namely, “University lectures”, 
“Lawyers”, “Nurses”, “Programmers”, “Middle school teachers”, “HR managers”, “Peasants”, 
“Hairdressers”, “Receptionists” and “Policemen / Policewomen”, respectively 1  (CGSS 2012, 
Questionnaire A, Question N4). Figure 2.12 plots the respective proportion of each occupation 
which the respondents’ social network involves. From that figure, the largest proportion of 
respondents have relatives or friends of or have ever dealt with “Peasants”, followed by a gradually 
reducing proportion of “Middle school teachers”, “Nurses”, “Policemen / Policewomen”, 
“Hairdressers”, “University lectures”, “HR managers”, “Programmers”, “Receptionists”, 
“Lawyers”, respectively.  
 
1 Author’s own translation from Chinese into English.  
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Figure 2.12 Occupations in social networks, China. 
Notes: Author’s own calculation and illustration. CGSS 2012 has two questionnaires, namely questionnaire A and B. The question used is from questionnaire A. The 
total number of the respondents in questionnaire A is 5819. This figure excludes those who do not give an answer. 
Data source: Chinese General Social Survey (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2012a, 2012c). 
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Figure 2.13 summarizes how many different occupations are in the respondents’ social networks 
(namely, relatives, friends and those with whom they have ever dealt) with the same survey question 
with Figure 2.12. As expected, more respondents have less diversity of occupations in their social 
network, besides those who have nobody of the ten occupations listed in that survey question in 
their social network. The number of respondents who know people from more occupations reduces 
with a gradually increasing rate as the number of the kinds of occupations in social networks 
increase. As we can see in Figure 2.13, 1577 out of 5819 respondents claim that people in their 
social network are all from one kind of occupation. On contrast, only 91 respondents have a social 
network as diverse as 10 occupations. However, it should be noted that there are more than 10 
occupations in reality.  
 
Figure 2.13 Diversity of occupations in social networks, China 
Notes: Author’s own calculation and illustration. Those who are not give an answer are excluded. 
Data source: Chinese General Social Survey (National Survey Research Center at Renmin 
University of China, 2012a, 2012c). 
2.6 Interpersonal trust 
As aforementioned, and will be mentioned repeatedly in later chapters, information about others’ 
trustworthiness, honesty, goodwill, benevolence, etc. delivered through interactions and perceived 
is an important source that influences individual social trust. In terms of trust building, the most 
effective way is that everyone acts kindly, fairly, justly, rightly, and conforms to public virtues, 
morality, etc. Take economic exchanges as an example. Sellers should not sell shoddy goods with a 
price for good-quality goods. Fruit sellers should not use harmful substances on fruit only in order 
for fruit to look fresh and attractive. However, some factors in reality may stimulate people to 
achieve non-justified interest without taking others into account. Thus, law enforcement should be 
strengthened. Since poverty could cause many social problems, economic development and various 
welfare policies could therefore prevent some social problems to a large degree. There is a famous 
statement in the Guan Zi, “仓廪实，而知礼节；衣食足，而知荣辱” (Pinyin: cāng lǐn shí ér zhī lǐ 
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jié, yī shí zú ér zhī róng rǔ), meaning that only when people’s granaries are full and people have 
enough clothes and food can people pay attention to manners, honors and shames1. This sentence 
reflects the relation between individuals’ financial status and how to act acceptably in interpersonal 
interactions. 
2.6.1 General trust  
“Generally speaking, do you think most people can be trusted?” or similar questions have become 
the standard question of general trust in various surveys, just with different options. The general 
trust question in WVS and EVS has two valid options equivalent to “Yes” and “No”. Table 2.24 
shows whether the general-trust data of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden is in a particular 
wave of WVS or EVS with an “X” mark. Data of general trust of China only exists in WVS waves, 
while that of Denmark only exists in EVS waves. Norway’s and Sweden’s data is included in either 
WVS wave or EVS wave (excluding waves not covering their data), except that both WVS 4 and 
EVS 3 contain Sweden’s data and both WVS 5 and EVS 4 contain both Norway’s and Sweden’s 
data. When data for a particular country exists in both WVS and EVS of the same period, EVS data 
will be used later for graph. 
Table 2.24 Data existence of general trust in WVS and EVS for China, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden. 
  CN DK NO  SE 
WVS-wave EVS-wave WVS EVS WVS EVS WVS EVS 
1981-1984 1981-1984  X  X  X 
1989-1993 1990-1993 X X  X  X 
1994-1998 -- X  X  X  
1999-2004 1999-2001 X X   X X 
2005-2009 2008-2009 X X X X X X 
2010-2014 -- X       X   
Notes: CN is for China, DK for Denmark, NO for Norway, and SE for Sweden. If the general-trust 
data of a particular country exists in a particular wave of WVS or EVS, corresponding cell is marked 
with an “X”. 
Data source: World Values Survey (Inglehart et al, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f), 
European Values Study (EVS, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2016). 
Figure 2.14 depicts the percentage of respondents in the four countries answering “Most people can 
be trusted” in each wave period. Generally, all the four countries have relatively high general trust 
level in the world (although other countries are not shown here). In the first two periods, Denmark 
actually has the lowest general trust level among the countries having data in those periods. However, 
in the fourth and fifth period, its general trust level rises to the highest with a percentage of 66.53% 
and 76.04% respectively. On contrast, Norway’s general trust level stays consistently high among 
the countries compared, with the lowest level being 60.86% in the first period and the highest being 
75.09% in the fifth period, although it has only four data points in the figure. Sweden is the only 
country having data points in all the six periods. Its general trust level reaches 63.02% in the last 
 
1 Author’s own translation from Chinese into English. 
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period, experiencing its lowest level of 56.59% in the third period and highest level of 70.69% in 
the fifth period. Except in the second period, China presents the lowest general trust level among 
the countries compared and having data points in corresponding periods. Its general trust level 
reaches 61.52% in the six period, experiencing its lowest level of 48.67% in the fifth period.     
 
Figure 2.14 General trust in China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Data source: World Values Survey (Inglehart et al, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f), 
European Values Study (EVS, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2016). 
Figure 2.15 presents the general trust of China from CGSS. The data is from the question “generally 
speaking, do you agree that most people in this society can be trusted?” in Chinese General Social 
Survey (CGSS) respectively in the year of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. The options are a 5-point 
Likert item with 1 representing “Strongly disagree” and 5 “Strongly agree”. In 2010, the proportion 
answering “Strongly disagree”, “Disagree” or “Neither” is 34.68%. In 2011, this percentage is 
37.33%. In 2012, 35.57%. In 2013, 44.29%. In 2015, 36.61%. 
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Figure 2.15 General trust in China from CGSS. 
Data sources: Chinese General Social Survey (National Survey Research Center at Renmin 
University of China, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 
2015a, 2015b). 
Figure 2.16 presents the general trust in Denmark, Norway and Sweden from ESS. The data is from 
the question “[…] generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people? […]” in the first 7 rounds of European Social Survey 
(ESS). The options are an 11-point item with 0 representing “You cannot be too careful” and 10 
“Most people can be trusted”. From the figure, in general, the level of Denmark’s general trust is 
higher than Norway’s, Norway’s higher than Sweden’s.
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Figure 2.16 General trust of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 2002 – 2016. 
Notes: Author’s own illustration. In addition, Denmark is not in ESS 2016. 
Data source: European Social Survey (ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006a, 2006b, 
200bc, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; European Social Survey, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012, 2014, 2016). 
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2.6.2 Trust in different kinds of people 
Figure 2.17 presents trust in people of different relationships in China and Sweden from WVS 6. 
An obvious point that the two countries have in common is that they both have high trust in family, 
while reporting much less trust in other relationships. In reality, it is common and normal for a 
person to have different trust attitude to people of different closeness and familiarity. As we see, in 
both countries, trust in family is the highest among the six groups, with 84.91% of Chinese 
interviewees and 88.97% Swedish ones say that they completely trust family, following by trust in 
neighbors, trust in “people you know personally” and trust in “people you meet for the first time” 
for Chinese interviewees, except trust in people of another religion and in people of another 
nationality, and following by trust “people you know personally”, trust in neighbors and trust in 
“people you meet for the first time” for Swedish interviewees. What is more, Swedish interviewees 
report higher trust than Chinese ones across all the six groups in general. 
One may find that the response rate about trust in people of another religion and trust in people of 
another nationality are much lower in China than in Sweden, which means a large proportion of 
Chinese interviewees choose or belong to the category of “Do not know”, “No answer” or “Not 
applicable” (see Figure 2.17). The percentages of Chinese interviewees who give a usable answer 
about these two questions are only 46.38% and 51.69% in total respectively, much lower than the 
response rate of other trust questions of the six groups, while these two numbers are as high as 93.20% 
and 93.95% for Swedish interviewees.  
The reason why the response rate of Chinese interviewees about trust in people of another religion 
is low is that, as said before, most Chinese do not have religious faith, and probably do not know 
much about various religions. However, as we see, the trust question about people in another religion 
presupposes that an interviewee has religious faith and is asked his / her trust in people of another 
religion. This question is obviously not very applicable to the situation in China. When this question 
is asked in China, a Chinese interviewee with no religious faith either cannot give a usable answer, 
or give his / her answer about trust in those with religious faith, although we do not know which 
religion is in his / her mind when answering this question. On contrast, the Lutheran Church is the 
National Church of Sweden. Thus, it is no wonder that China has such a low response rate about 
this question.  
Same for Chinese respondents with the question about trust in people of another nationality. A 
substantial proportion of Chinese have never interacted with people of another nationality. CGSS 
2012 asks a question that “Is there anybody among the people you deal with from another 
nationality?”1 with two options, “yes” and “no” (National Survey Research Center at Renmin 
University of China, 2012a, 2012c, see Question N5b). Out of 5819 respondents of this question, 
6.87% answer “yes”, 93.01% “no” and 0.12% do not give an answer, which reflects the fact that 
most Chinese have actually never dealt with people from another nationality. Conversely, Swedish 
people are a lot more likely to interact with people of another nationality. They also rank high in EF 
English Proficiency Index. For example, Sweden ranks the second in that index in 2017. That is 
 
1 Author’s own translation from Chinese into English.  
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why the response rate of this question is also not high among Chinese respondents.  
Figure 2.18 presents respondents’ trust in 13 kinds of people in social interactions without pecuniary 
benefits from data of CGSS 2015. Those among all respondents answering that the vast majority of 
their relatives can be trusted account for the largest proportion with a percentage of 42.53%, 
followed by those who said that the vast majority of their (near) neighbors, colleagues and old 
classmates and people with the same family name in their village can be trusted with 24.77%, 
14.63%, 13.88% and13.53%, respectively. 84.96%, 74.15%, 56.15%, 54.10%, and 53.48% of all 
the respondents said that the vast majority or most of their relatives, (near) neighbors, old classmates, 
colleagues and (urban) distant neighbors / block neighbors or (rural) inhabitants in their village 
besides neighbors can be trusted. Not surprisingly, 40.40%, the largest proportion, of the 
respondents thought that the vast majority of strangers cannot be trusted. On contrast, with much 
less percentages, 6.24%, 3.96%, 3.36%, and 2.86% of the respondents claimed that the vast majority 
of their non-close friends / acquaintances, people from the same place with them but met in other 
places (not within their city or county), people joining the same religious activities with them and 
people joining the same free-time activities with them, such as entertainment, fitness, further studies, 
etc. cannot be trusted. In addition, 70.85%, 30.57%, 21.69%, 16.08% and 14.09% of the respondents 
thought that the vast majority or most of strangers, non-close friends / acquaintances, people from 
the same place with them but met in other places (not within their city or county), people joining 
the same religious activities with them and people joining the same free-time activities with them, 
such as entertainment, fitness, further studies, etc., and their (urban) distant neighbors / block 
neighbors or (rural) inhabitants in their village besides neighbors cannot be trusted.
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Figure 2.17 Trust in people of different relations, China vs. Sweden. 
Notes: Categories of “Do not know”, “No answer”, and “Not applicable / Inapplicable” are not presented in this figure. 
Data source: World Values Survey 6 (Inglehart et al, 2014f). 
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Figure 2.18 Trust in different kinds of people in social interactions without pecuniary benefits.  
Notes: The survey question is “In ordinary social interactions not directly involving pecuniary benefit, how much do you think people below can be trusted?”. (CGSS 
2015, Question B10) 
A: (Near) Neighbors;  
B: (Urban) Distant neighbors / block neighbors or (rural) inhabitants in your village besides neighbors;  
C: People in your village with the same family name with you;  
D: People in your village with a different family name with you;  
E: Relatives;  
F: Colleagues;  
G: Non-close Friends / Acquaintances;  
H: Old classmates;  
I: People from the same place with you but met in other places (not within your city or county);   
J: People joining the same free-time activities with you, such as entertainment, fitness, further studies, etc.;  
K: People joining the same religious activities with you;  
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L: People joining the same social activities / public benefit activities with you;  
M: Strangers.  
1: The vast majority are untrustworthy;  
2: Most are untrustworthy;  
3: The quantity of the trustworthy and untrustworthy are equal;  
4: Most are trustworthy;  
5: The vast majority are trustworthy.  
The survey question and the corresponding options are author’s own translation from Chinese into English. In addition, the figure does not present those who do not 
give an answer. 
Data source: Chinese General Social Survey 2015 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2015a, 2015b).
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2.7 Other socio-economic performance 
2.7.1 Performance of macro-economy 
Unemployment rate, economic growth rate, price index (including consumer price index and 
producer price index) and balance of international payment are four important indicators of macro-
economic performance. In this part, relevant data about employment situation and GDP of China, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden will be presented. 
i) Labor market 
The employed tend to report higher general trust than the unemployed. Additionally, high 
employment rate also contributes to higher degree of public security and lower crime rate of a 
society. Of course, criminal records also have a negative effect on employment access (e.g. Agan 
and Starr, 2017). At the same time, unemployment rate also reflects the degree of economic 
prosperity.   
At first, let us briefly review the classification of total population for labor market. Total population 
can be divided into working-age population and non-working age population. Working-age 
population can be further divided into labor force and non-labor force. Even further, labor force can 
be divided into employed population and unemployed population (see Figure 2.19). Labor force 
participation rate, employment rate (i.e., employment-to-population ratio) and unemployment rate 
are three indicators in measuring employment. Labor force participation is calculated as the ratio of 
labor force to working-age population. Unemployment rate is the ratio of unemployed population 
to labor force, namely the sum of employed population and unemployed population. However, 
employment rate is not the ratio of employed population to labor force; usually, it actually refers to 
the so-called “employment-to-population ratio”, which is the ratio of employed population to 
working-age population.  
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Figure 2.19 Classification of working-age population. 
(a) China 
Registered urban unemployment rate The officially released unemployment rate of China has been 
registered urban unemployment rate since 1990s (Zeng, 2018). As the term shows, registered urban 
unemployment rate only takes into account the unemployed who have registered their 
unemployment status in relevant governmental organizations. Figure 2.20 displays the annual 
registered urban unemployment rate of China from 1997 to 2016. The figure indicates that the 
registered urban unemployment rate stayed stably at around 3% from 1997 to 2000, followed by a 
rise in the subsequent 3 years, and then settled at around 4% from 2003. 
 
Figure 2.20 Registered urban unemployment rate of China, 1997-2016. 
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (no date). 
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People’s Republic of China (hereafter, the NBS of China) released surveyed urban unemployment 
rate (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2018a). This is the first time 
that China have ever released surveyed unemployment rate. Moreover, the NBS of China will 
regularly release nationwide surveyed urban unemployment rate and that of 31 capital cities every 
month from April, 2018 on. (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2018b) 
It is noteworthy that the definition of employed population and unemployed population is identical 
to that of the International Labor Organization (hereafter, ILO), which guarantees the international 
comparability of this surveyed unemployment rate of China (National Bureau of Statistics of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2018b). 
According to the NBS of China, the nationwide surveyed urban unemployment rates of China of 
the first three months of 2018 are respectively 5.0%, 5.0% and 5.1%, having reduced 0.2, 0.4 and 
0.1 percentage points relative to the corresponding months of last year (National Bureau of Statistics 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2018a). Those rates of 31 capital cities of the first three months 
of 2018 are respectively 4.9%, 4.8% and 4.9%, having decreased 0.1, 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points 
respectively relative to last year’s corresponding months (National Bureau of Statistics of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2018a).  
(b) Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
Figure 2.21 depicts the unemployment rate above 15 age old of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 
2000 to 2017 from data of the ILO. In most years, Sweden has the highest unemployment rate among 
the three countries, followed by Denmark and Norway. In 2017, the unemployment rate of Sweden 
is 6.7%, that of Denmark is 5.7%, and that of Norway is 4.2%.  
 
Figure 2.21 Unemployment rate of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 2000 – 2017. 
Note: author’s own illustration.  
Data source: International Labor Organization. 
ii) Economic growth 
(a) Economic aggregate Figure 2.22 depicts the economic aggregate of China, Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden from 1960 to 2016. It can be seen that throughout those years, China performed better 
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than the other three countries in terms of economic aggregate, especially from 1980s and 1990s 
when the gap between China and the other three was getting larger. Sweden also led Norway and 
Denmark from 1960 throughout 2016. In most years from 1960 to 1999, Denmark performed better 
than Norway. However, from 2000 this situation changed with Norway exceeding Denmark. 
(b) Growth rate Figure 2.23 shows the GDP annual growth rate of the four countries from 1961 to 
2016. From 1976 on, the GDP growth rate of China leads the other three countries.  
(c) GDP per capita Figure 2.24 presents GDP per capita of the four countries from 1990 to 2016. 
Norway performed the best among the four countries. Furthermore, from 1992 on, Norway started 
to lead Denmark and Sweden in terms of GDP per capita and its GDP per capita reached about 
58790$ in 2016. The gap between Denmark and Sweden is quite small with almost the same annual 
GDP per capita throughout these years. In 2016, the GDP per capita of Denmark is about 49029$ and 
that of Sweden is about 48905$. By contrast, that figure of China is much lower than that of the 
other three countries, although from 1990 to 2016, the GDP per capita of China has increased 
steadily from 987$ to 15529$.  
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Figure 2.22 GDP (current US$) of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 1960 – 2016. 
Data source: World Bank.  
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Figure 2.23 GDP annual growth of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 1961 – 2016. 
Data source: World Bank. 
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Figure 2.24 GDP per capital, PPP (current international $) of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 1990 – 2016. 
Data source: World Bank. 
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2.7.2 Public security 
World Values Survey 6 (WVS 6) asks two questions about crime which in my view can reflect the 
public security of a society: 1) “Have you been the victim of a crime during the past years” (see, 
WVS 6, Question V179) “And what about your immediate family – has someone in your family 
been the victim of a crime during the last year?” (see, WVS 6, Question V180) Figure 2.25 – Figure 
2.28 shows the answers from Chinese and Swedish respondents to these two questions. 1996 out of 
2300, namely 86.78% of, Chinese respondents answer “No” and 89, namely 3.87%, answer “Yes” 
to the first question (see Figure 2.25). 1957 out of 2300, 85.09% of, Chinese respondents answer 
“No” and 97, namely 4.22% answer “Yes” to the second question (see Figure 2.26). Similarly, 1058 
out of 1206, about 87.73%, Swedish respondents answer “No” and 143, about 11.86%, answer “Ye” 
to the first question (see Figure 2.27). 1023 out of 1206, namely 84.83% of, Swedish respondents 
answer “No” and 174, namely about 14.43% of, Swedish respondents answer “Yes” to the second 
question (see Figure 2.28). These data reflect the fact that both China and Sweden have relatively 
high public security within the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.25 Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year? – China. 
Data source: World Values Survey 6 (Inglehart et al, 2014f). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.26 And what about your immediate family – has someone in your family been the victim 
of a crime during the last year? – China. 
Data source: World Values Survey 6 (Inglehart et al, 2014f). 
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Figure 2.27 Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year? – Sweden. 
Data source: World Values Survey 6 (Inglehart et al, 2014f). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.28 And what about your immediate family – has someone in your family been the victim 
of a crime during the last year? – Sweden. 
Data source: World Values Survey 6 (Inglehart et al, 2014f). 
2.8 Interim conclusions 
This chapter mainly talks about Scandinavia and / or China in aspects of population, network 
structures, welfare, equality, geographical mobility, social capital, trust, public security, 
performance of labor market and economic growth. It explains the possible logic between some of 
those aspects and trust, and presents and / or illustrates rich corresponding data of each aspect of 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and China.  
As stressed throughout this thesis, information of trustworthiness has a decisive impact on trust. In 
terms of population, no matter which level is considered (e.g., country level, city level, etc.), a larger 
and denser population means more pieces of interaction information of others’ trustworthiness, 
ceteris paribus. This is also the most important meaning of population on trust. The larger the 
population size, the more the strangers within the population for an individual, given that the 
population size exceeds one’s cognitive range or cognitive willingness because human cognitive 
capacity and time are limited. Besides, relatively high heterogeneity also often accompanies a large 
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population. However, heterogeneity in population characteristics is not an essential cause of distrust. 
There are deeper, more essential causes. China is a population-large country, while all of Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden are population-small countries, which determines that there are probably more 
information reflecting others’ trustworthiness in China than Denmark, Norway or Sweden.  
China and the West have different social network structures. The West has prevalent group life, 
while China does not (Liang, [1949] 2005). Chinese society is cha xu ge ju, while the Western 
societies are tuan ti ge ju (Fei, [1947] 1992; Fei, [1947] 2017). Families reflect individual closest 
social network and are an important source of individual social capital. Danish children have more 
siblings than Chinese ones. This is partly because Denmark encourages childbearing and has 
corresponding supporting (welfare) policies. Many contemporary young Chinese would not like to 
give birth to more children because of pressure from money, career, time or energy, although the 
family planning policy in China has been relaxed gradually to some degree. Memberships reflect 
individual relatively formal social networks. Scandinavians participate in more groups, and are more 
active in the groups than Chinese.  
The three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, are all outstanding 
representatives of modern welfare states. Whether a welfare state is an encumbrance or a boost for 
economic development involves the actual or potential trade-off between efficiency and fairness. 
The co-existence of universal welfare and good economic performance may pertain to the structures 
of tax revenues and expenditures. Good economic performance also underpins the implementation 
of comprehensive and generous welfare policies. Universal welfare has advantages, as well as 
disadvantages, such as its weakness in efficiency. Given the relatively normal operation of economy, 
the co-existence of universal welfare and good economic performance benefits from corresponding 
polices encouraging employment in the labor market. It should be noted that the three Nordic 
countries are capitalist, rather than socialist, although they have a large public section and universal 
welfare. Denmark, Norway and Sweden are all countries with a relatively small and homogenous 
population. Historical reason, values basis, economic basis and the policy views of the ruling party 
all contribute to the implementation and maintenance of the institution of a comprehensive and 
generous welfare state in the Nordic countries. Since different countries have their specific situation, 
other countries should consider their own situation thoroughly before learning experience from the 
Nordic Model. Take Denmark as an example. The welfare policies in Denmark are comprehensive 
and systematic, and relatively perfect. China also has been improving its social security. From data 
we can see that, also as we know, the total welfare expenditure and welfare expenditure per capita 
of Denmark, Norway and Sweden are relatively high.  
Social trust and welfare can benefit from each other. Also, equality and extended welfare states can 
be mutually promoted. However, the equality that facilitates the initiation of an extended welfare 
state and that an extended welfare state results in are not of the same kind. The former equality may 
be attributed to general approval of something with similar nature of citizenship among all the 
nationals, while the latter equality may go more to wealth or income distribution and / or social 
status. Comprehensive, universal and generous welfare give people a sense of safety. On condition 
that equality is basically one of the values of a society, equally rich would consolidate interpersonal 
trust, while equally poor would still generate various social problems since poverty per se is a source 
of social problems. A rather unequal wealth or income distribution could lead to zero-sum games in 
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a society. Taxes and transfers in Denmark, Norway and Sweden play a significant role in reducing 
the gap of disposable income among people in each of the three countries. 
In reality, there are two types of uncertainty, one is that both an event and its future occurring time 
are uncertain, the other is that some event is almost certain, while the relatively specific time of that 
event is not quite certain. One function, and also one aim, of various welfare polices is to protect 
people from uncertainty in life. Continuity of policies provides certainty and a stable expectation 
for the public. Uncertainty would cause people not to trust who “make” the uncertainty since in the 
view of others, those who “make” uncertainty are not reliable for disturbing others’ expectation and 
plans made according to their expectation. However, changes do not mean uncertainty. (Policy) 
Changes per se do not definitely result in direct distrust in policy-makers or possible indirect distrust 
to other people in society. It depends on whether (the general trend of) the change is good or bad. 
According to the corresponding data, Denmark, Norway and Sweden have relatively little 
corruption around the world, which is an advantage for them to serve the people better. 
Social mobility reflects social fairness to a large degree. So, it is conducive to social trust. It can be 
seen from CGSS 2015 that the general trend of Chinese respondents’ subjective social stratum 
increases relative to when they were 14 years old. Most interviewees think that they have almost 
the same socio-economic status or even a lower one compared with peers, while only a small 
proportion consider that they have a higher status. A substantial proportion of the interviewees think 
that their socio-economic status has increased, while there are also many people fall into the opposite 
situation. The perception of the improvement of social mobility may benefit from the improvement 
of the living conditions brought by economic development and by personal accumulation and 
achievements with age to some degree. When it comes to social mobility in China, gaokao plays an 
important and positive role in social mobility. Geographical migrants meeting some definitive 
conditions are called “floating population” in China. Floating population is defined based on the 
Huji system of China. Not only does Hukou act as the way of household registration, but also many 
rights are attached to it, such as employment, children’s education, social security, public services. 
China has been reforming its Huji system. Besides, a number of local governments also made a 
looser hukou-settling policy as one of the measures of attracting people to stay or to come. It should 
be noted that in order to retain people ever attracted there, those cities should also increase the 
supply and improve the quality of, such as, education, healthcare and infrastructure accordingly.  
From an individual perspective, social capital relates to personal relationships a lot and generates 
benefits for its owner from possessing his / her personal relationships. One can acquire physical, 
financial and emotional support and information directly from or from the social capital of the other 
end of his / her relationships. As to the necessity of the term “social capital”, there are two opposite 
opinions among scholars. Some scholars do not think the term is necessary. (e.g., Arrow, 1999; 
Solow, 1999) From an individual perspective, social capital implies that a relationship is a two-way 
one. Additionally, trust is a sufficient but not necessary condition of social capital. The total social 
capital one possesses hinges on both the quantity and the quality of the relationships in his / her 
egocentric network. The capacity, vertical position and social capital of the other person on the other 
end of a relationship play a decisive role of the quality of a person’s social capital. 
In order to reflect individual social capital in China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden using data, 
several survey questions embodying social capital in different aspects are selected to visualize. In 
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terms of the number of siblings, Danish children have more siblings than Chinese ones in average. 
In terms of memberships, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish have more formal memberships than 
Chinese, and are more active in groups. In terms of the frequency of meeting people, Norway 
presents the highest frequency of meeting people among the three Scandinavian countries, followed 
by Sweden and then by Denmark. In terms of social activities compared with peers, Norwegian take 
part in social activities compared to peers less often than Swedish, and Swedish less often than 
Danish. In terms of discussing intimate matters, Norway has the lowest average number of persons 
to whom one can talk personal matters among the three Scandinavian countries, while Sweden has 
the largest. In terms of social activities in leisure time, the self-reported frequency of participating 
social activities in China has increased to some degree during those 6 years. In terms of diversity of 
occupations in personal social network, “Peasants” among the given options of occupations 
accounts for the largest proportion of whom the Chinese respondents have dealt with, followed by 
a gradually reducing proportion of “Middle school teachers”, “Nurses”, “Policemen / Policewomen”, 
“Hairdressers”, “University lectures”, “HR managers”, “Programmers”, “Receptionists”, 
“Lawyers”, respectively. Generally, more Chinese respondents have less diversity of occupations in 
their social networks, and the number of respondents who know people from more occupations 
reduces with a gradually increasing rate as the number of the kinds of occupations in social networks 
increase. 
All of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden present high general trust around the world. By and 
large, Denmark shows the highest general trust among the four countries, followed by Norway and 
Sweden, while China the lowest. Chinese and Swedish trust in “Family”, “Your neighborhood”, 
“People you know personally”, “People you meet for the first time”, “People of another religion”, 
“People of another nationality” are also compared. In general, Swedish trust more in each kind 
above than Chinese. Moreover, both Swedish and Chinese trust “Family” most. Swedish trust 
“People you know personally” more than “Your neighborhood”, while Chinese trust “Your 
neighborhood” more than “People you know personally”. “Family”, “Your neighborhood” and 
“People you know personally” are the three kinds of people that both Swedish and Chinese trust 
most among the 6 kinds of people above. Chinese trust in 13 kinds of people in social interactions 
without pecuniary benefits in another dataset is also presented. The 13 kinds of people are 
respectively “(Near) neighbors”, “(Urban) distant neighbors / block neighbors or (rural) inhabitants 
in their village besides neighbors”, “People in your village with the same family name with you”, 
“People in your village with a different family name with you”, “Relatives”, “Colleagues”, “Non-
close friends / acquaintances”, “Old classmates”, “People from the same place with you but met in 
other places (not within your city or county)”, “People joining the same free-time activities with 
you, such as entertainment, fitness, further studies, etc.”, “People joining the same religious 
activities with you”, “People joining the same social activities / public benefit activities with you” 
and “Strangers”. “Relatives”, “(Near) neighbors”, “Colleagues” and “Old classmate” are the four 
kinds of people that Chinese trust most. “Strangers” “Non-close friends / acquaintances”, “People 
from the same place with them but met in other places (not within their city or county)” and “People 
joining the same religious activities with them” are the four kinds of people that Chinese do not trust 
most. 
The registered urban unemployment rate of China stayed stably at around 3% from 1997 to 2000, 
followed by a rise in the subsequent 3 years, and then settled at around 4% from 2003.The 
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nationwide surveyed urban unemployment rates of China of the first three months of 2018 are 
respectively 5.0%, 5.0% and 5.1%, having reduced 0.2, 0.4 and 0.1 percentage points relative to the 
corresponding months of last year. (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 
2018a) In most years, Sweden has the highest unemployment rate among the three Scandinavian 
countries, followed by Denmark and Norway. In 2017, the unemployment rate of Sweden is 6.7%, 
that of Denmark is 5.7%, and that of Norway is 4.2%.  
It can be seen that throughout those years, China performed better than the other three countries in 
terms of economic aggregate, especially from 1980s and 1990s when the gap between China and 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden in general was getting larger. From 1976 on, the GDP growth rate 
of China leads the other three countries. However, the GDP per capita of China is much lower than 
that of Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
  
Chapter 3:  What Affect General Trust? 
Perspective from Norm-Conforming, 
Opinion Similarity and Geographic 
Mobility: Empirical Evidence from China 
3.1 Introduction 
An issue that economists concern is whence economic growth comes. More and more scholars 
realize that economy is part of society. For example, Granovetter (1985) argues that economic 
behaviors are embedded in society. So far, the impact of trust (such as, general trust and inherited 
trust) on economic performance, either in a direct or indirect way, has been largely discussed (e.g., 
Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Beugelsdijk et al, 2004; Bjørnskov, 2012; Dearmon and Grier, 2009; Knack 
and Keefer, 1997; Lim, Morshed and Khun, 2018; Peiró-Palomino and Tortosa-Ausina, 
2013;Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001). In general, most empirical research tends to draw the 
conclusion that trust has a significant positive influence on economic performance. Trust is an 
indispensable ingredient in socio-economic life. It is hard to imagine how tough life would be 
without basic interpersonal trust.  
Given the importance of trust, exploring what affect trust then becomes attractive. This is not only 
the requirement for, and the important links in, understanding trust in its causality network 
illustrated in Section 1.9.2, but also the center piece of the policy implication for trust (re)building 
and the accumulation of social capital, both individual and social,1 since trust itself is not an 
operable concept. So far, as Delhey and Newton (2003) summarize, there already exist six theories 
of the origin of social trust. Empirical research on determinants or associating factors of different 
types of trust involves both interpersonal trust and institutional trust, such as general / generalized 
trust (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2006; Brown et al, 2014), trust in government 
(e.g., Zhao and Hu, 2017), trust in judicial institutions (e.g., Roussey and Deffains, 2012), trust in 
supplier relations (e.g., Sako and Helper, 1998), on-line trust (e.g., Grabner-Kräuter and Kaluscha, 
2003) and so on and so forth.  
In terms of general trust, its influencing factors discussed in empirical research involve different 
levels, such as micro level (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Blanco and Ruiz, 2013; Brown et al, 
2014), community or regional level (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Brown et al, 2014) and 
macro / national level (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2006). For example, the research of Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2002) reveals that individual experiences and community characteristics affect general trust. They 
find that those who have recent traumatic experiences, belong to a historically discriminated group 
 
1 Section 2.5 of this thesis elaborates on social capital.  
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(such as the blacks and women), have lower income and education, or live in a racially mixed or 
large-income-difference community trust less (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). When exploring the 
determinants of localized and generalized trust using Australian data on the individual, 
neighborhood and regional level, Leigh (2006) finds that both localized trust and generalized trust 
is negatively affected by linguistic and ethnical heterogeneity, with linguistic heterogeneity having 
a negative impact on localized trust for both natives and immigrants, but on generalized trust only 
for immigrants. However, You (2012) examines the impact of fairness of income distribution, 
democracy and corruption (three proxies of distributive, procedural and formal justice respectively) 
and heterogeneity (in terms of, such as, income, ethnic and cultural diversity) on social trust using 
a multi-level hierarchical logit model with data across 80 countries, and concludes that the three 
indicators of fairness are significantly positively associated with social trust and matter more than 
homogeneity / heterogeneity per se for social trust. Blanco and Ruiz (2013) provide empirical 
evidence that insecurity has a significant negative effect on trust in others in Colombia. Brown et al 
(2014) reveal that community participation is positively associated with general trust and that 
membership of community sport organizations is favor to generating general trust by using path 
analysis. Banerjee (2016) confirms that a violation of social norms has a significant negative effect 
on trust using lab experiment data.  
A noteworthy deficiency existing in some research is the inconsistency between their explanation 
of general trust in the theoretical part and the empirical measurement they take. Specifically, some 
research adopts general trust as trust in strangers at the beginning, while using the standard survey 
question of general trust in, such as WVSs (Inglehart et al, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 
2014f), that “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted” as its empirical 
measurement, without questioning the definition or testing the correlation between general trust 
measured by its standard question and trust in strangers in data. In fact, the two kinds of trust may 
present great difference in data (e.g., in distribution) among the people in a society. 
Many factors could be found influencing general trust. As reviewed above, different scholars have 
focused on different factors. Empirical analysis should be guided by theory. Hilmer and Hilmer 
(2014, p. 443) say that “there are two good starting points for determining the appropriate economic 
theory to guide our analysis: (1) our personal economic intuition and (2) the existing literature which 
demonstrates the intuition and empirical evidence of other researchers”. This chapter provides a 
perspective to consider and classify the determinants of general trust which is different from existing 
literature as far as I know. In more detail, this chapter, besides personal characteristics, mainly from 
three aspects analyzes the causes of general trust, namely the impact of norm-conforming, opinion 
similarity, and geographic mobility, respectively, using micro data from the Chinese General Social 
Survey 2013 (abbr. CGSS 2013) and the provincial data from the Sixth National Population Census 
of China in 2010.  
The rest of this chapter contains four sections: Section 3.2 elaborates on the three aforementioned 
aspects of considering the determinants of general trust; Section 3.3 introduces the data sets and 
presents the statistical description of selected variables; Section 3.4 presents the econometric models 
and regression results; Section 3.5 concludes.  
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
180 
 
3.2 Determinants of general trust: a new perspective 
General trust cannot change without reason; it comes from the perception of others’ trustworthiness 
in general. Moreover, its change may derive from information reflecting the trustworthiness or, put 
another way, from the perceived goodwill and benign of others in the society.1  This kind of 
information can be either about others’ thought or behavior that has different manifestations. 
Information about others’ behavior provides evidence of the existence and prevalence of some kind 
of behavior; information about others’ thought indicates not only its existence and prevalence, but 
also potential occurrences of related or consequent behavior. Hence, information about others’ 
trustworthiness is, to a large degree, decisive. Actually, many determinants of general trust explored 
in the existing literature may function via these two factors.  
3.2.1 Impact of others’ behavior: breaching norms 
As to information about others’ behavior in the society, the most possible factor damaging general 
trust may come from behaviors breaching norms, which is also paid special attention to in this 
chapter. Popper (2013, p. 451) also argues that norms, including moral norms, social norms and 
legal norms, all “have a role to play in enhancing social trust”. The difference between the 
information about others’ behavior and that about others’ opinion is that the former is mainly 
behavior-based expressions, while the latter is mainly language-based expressions.2 The reason 
why breaching norms and opinion divergence may influence general trust is that values are 
underlying them. What is more, the inner feelings about others’ untrustworthy behavior, such as 
aversions, disappointment, depression, anger, fear and so forth, may contribute a great deal to the 
actual influence of information about others’ behavior and opinion on general trust, which constructs, 
if it can be said like this, the emotional foundation of general trust.  
The impact of others’ violating norms may find its explanation from institutional economics. 
Humans are biological and, at the same time, social beings – this is why Kapp (2011, p. 66) prefers 
to call humans homo institutionalis, rather than homo oeconomicus. Thus, a society is a society of 
individuals with institutional traits, and the interactions of individuals are embedded in interweaved 
institutions. We humans acquire (learn) institutional traits from our ancestors, sages, and early 
generations, and pass them to our later generations. In a word briefly, intergenerational transition of 
institutional traits is a precondition of institutional consecution and persistence. Veblen ([1899] 2005, 
pp. 143-144) deems that “the institutions are, in substance, prevalent habits of thought with respect 
to particular relations and particular functions of the individual and of the community”3 These 
habits of thought not merely guide individual behavior, but also direct in which way individuals 
think others should behave. Veblen ([1899] 2005, p. 145) ever states that “the evolution of society 
is substantially a process of mental adaptation on the part of individuals under the stress of 
circumstances which will no longer tolerate habits of thought formed under and conforming to a 
 
1 When trustworthiness guides individual behavior, it is a norm. Here, trustworthiness refers to the perception about 
the behaving person. 
2 Here we do not regard language-based communication as a special case of behavior. 
3 Although in The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, Veblen ([1899] 2005) from a 
negative perspective elaborates on institutions, the quintessence of thoughts of his theory is also applicable to the 
positive aspect of institutional explanation. 
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different set of circumstances in the past”. Similarly, Denzau and North (1994) also relate 
institutions to something mental. They consider institutions as shared mental models (Denzau and 
North, 1994). It is reasonable that others’ breaching habits of thought or norms of behavior leads to 
one’s mental inadaptation, and at the same time causes him / her aversion and damages his / her 
general trust. What it boils down to is the interdependence of human behavior. Over an accumulation, 
sedimentation and evolution of millions of years, various norms of behavior have already permeated 
our daily life. Among those that people highly praise are what we call fairness, truthfulness, keeping 
one’s promise, morals and so on and so forth, although there may be overlapping among them. As 
to the relation between general trust and different norms, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and You 
(2012) find that fairness significantly impacts trust; Uslaner (2002) argues that generalized trust has 
moral foundations; Leigh (2006, p. 269) also thinks that “trust may be driven by morals and culture, 
which are likely to be correlated with individual characteristics such as income, education, 
employment and age”.  
In view of data availability, this chapter chooses three sub-aspects for the impact of others’ 
disobeying norms, or broadly, to institutions, on general trust, that is, morality, fairness and being 
taken advantage. They three have different contexts of using usually.  
(a) Morality 
The criticism of original institutional economics on neoclassical economics always involves the 
philosophical foundation of economics. Kapp (2011, pp. 19-20) criticizes neoclassical economics 
based on utilitarianism from Jeremy Bentham of being “without explicit normative or moral values 
premises” (p. 21). Humans are not pleasure machines (Hodgson, 2013); we have “moralische Gesetz 
in mir” 1  (Kant, [1788] 1968, p. 161). Original institutional economics (namely evolutionary 
institutional economics) inherits its philosophical foundation from American pragmatic philosophy 
which is founded and developed by Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey. Dewey (1922) 
argues that “morals […] is ineradicably empirical” (p. 295) and that “morals means growth of 
conduct in meaning” (p. 280).  
People in different countries could generally have different understanding about what behaviors are 
morally right and what not. Morality talked in this chapter is based on the understanding of Chinese 
since this chapter is an empirical study of China. “China is a society of ethics standard.”2 (Liang, 
[1949] 2005, p. 70) Morality, translated into Chinese, is 道德 (Pinyin: dào dé). 道德, as we see, 
consists of two Chinese words, 道 (Pinyin: dào) and 德 (Pinyin: dé), with each also having its own 
meaning, besides the meaning of the whole phrase when combined. Morality measures the 
justification of behavior. It per se is a scope. Or put another way, it is a set of norms, rather than a 
single norm. China has a long history of Confucian tradition of which the morality covers, such as, 
忠(Pinyin: zhōng), 孝(Pinyin: xiào), 仁(Pinyin: rén), 义(Pinyin: yì), 礼(Pinyin: lǐ), 智(Pinyin: 
 
1 In one of his insightful and far-reaching three critiques, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (i.e. Critique of Practical 
Reason), Kant (1788) wrote in German that “Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmender 
Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: Der bestirnte Himmel 
über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir.” (Kant, [1788] 1968, p. 161) Translated into English is “Two thins fill 
the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more frequently and persistently one’s 
meditation deals with them: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.” (Translated by Pluhar, 2002, p. 
203) It should be noted that Kant and Dewey hold quite different views on morals (see, Kant, [1785] 2002; Kant, 
[1788] 2002; Dewey, 1922). However, I will not elaborate on them here.  
2 Author’s own translation. The original text in Chinese is “中国是伦理本位的社会” (Liang, [1949] 2005, p. 70). 
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zhì), 信(Pinyin: xìn).1 Trustworthiness, truthfulness and other associated qualities as a moral norm 
appear in as early as Confucian classics of pre-Qin2 philosophy in China, i.e. Lun Yu (namely The 
Confucian Analects) of Confucius and his disciples. For several examples, “Confucius remarked, ‘I 
do not know how men get along without good faith. A cart without a yoke and a carriage without 
harness, - how could they go?’ ”3 (Confucius and his disciples, translated by Ku, 1898, p. 12) “[…] 
‘My aim,’ replied Confucius, ‘would be to be a comfort to my old folk at home; to be sincere, and 
to be found trustworthy by my friends; and to love and care for my young people at home.’”4 
(Confucius and his disciples, translated by Ku, 1898, p. 37) “Confucius through his life and teaching 
taught only four thins: a knowledge of literature and the arts, conduct, conscientiousness and 
truthfulness.”5 (Confucius and his disciples, translated by Ku, 1898, p. 54)  
Some people might tend to distinguish morality and public morality arguing that morality of daily 
use actually refers to privative morality, which I do not agree. In my view, morality in daily use 
actually covers public morality. In daily life, conforming to morality usually means not to do what 
run counter to conscience, even when punishments, formal or informal, can be circumvented, to 
seek inappropriate benefits via harming others, such as behavior threatening others’ life and health 
security. On contrast, immoral behaviors are always those that disregard bad influences on others, 
and could even be criminal offences. Specifically, for example, smoking in indoor public places is 
immoral; marital infidelity is immoral; selling unqualified products is immoral; leasing rooms where 
formaldehyde exceeds the standard to tenants is immoral; selling food processed unhygienically is 
immoral; selling fruits applied harmful chemicals to look good is immoral; spitting in subway 
stations is immoral; damaging public facilities is immoral; jumping queues is immoral, and so on 
and so forth. In these situations, people are more likely to use “immoral” to criticize misconduct, 
rather than using “unfair”, or saying that “those misconducting people are taking advantage of us”.  
(b) Fairness  
Translated from Chinese into English, 公平  (Pinyin: gōng píng) is fairness. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, one of the meanings of fairness (2013) is “impartiality, equitableness, 
justness”, which is basically the meaning in this chapter. Fairness per se is a value-type institution6 
and has different manifestations. Perception of fairness also has different scopes. What is related to 
individual perception of general trust is social fairness. In other words, in order to explore the 
influences of fairness on general trust on the micro level, social fairness should be a closer and more 
direct factor because they, i.e., general trust and social fairness, are consistent in terms of level. 
(Un)Fairness always relates to return-investment ratio and / or distribution. Investment and return 
are in terms of single persons / groups, while distribution involves more than one person / group. 
Therein, distribution involves issues like to which (group of) person(s) something should be 
distributed, and how much each direct distributee should get, given what is going to be distributed. 
The distributed objects can be opportunities, incomes, rights, punishment, responsibility, interests, 
 
1 Here is not going to explain what these Chinese words mean, which does not influence the understanding of the 
whole chapter, and even the whole book. For those who are interested, please google them on the Internet by yourself.  
2 Qin (秦) (221BCE ~207BCE) is a dynasty in Chinese history.  
3 The original text in Chinese is “子曰：‘人而无信，不知其可也。大车无輗，小车无軏，其何以行之哉？’” 
——《论语》 
4 The original text in Chinese is “子曰：‘老者安之，朋友信之，少者怀之。’”——《论语》 
5 The original text in Chinese is “子以四教：文、行、忠、信。”——《论语》 
6 For value-type institutions, see section 1.8.4. 
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honors, resources, applied standards, qualifications, and so on and so forth. Sources of fairness 
problems can be attributed to the mismatch of personal investment and return on particular things 
and the horizontal comparison of the return-investment ratio of, supposing that there is investment, 
and what is distributed to distributees. This also reflects the relativeness of fairness. Unfairness often 
exists in the situations which are relevant to oneself or his / her group, but those who have, dominate 
or have seized the distributing right are not himself / herself or his / her group, but a non-distributee 
/ non-distributees or another distributee / other distributees, which lands him / her or his / her group 
in passiveness and disadvantage in the process and results of the distribution. Of course, knowing 
information about unfair things not directly relevant to oneself could also cause sense of unfairness. 
Additionally, when talking about (un)fairness, what come into mind is usually relatively important, 
big-influencing things, even for personal life trajectory (e.g., career trajectory), rather than small, 
tiny, trivial matters in life. There are many examples of social unfairness: that wages do not match 
personal working capability and workload is unfair; gender discrimination in job-searching is unfair; 
encountering double-standards when competing for something is unfair; some people have not been 
punished as they deserve while others have is unfair, and so on and so forth.  
(c) Being taken advantage 
“Being taken advantage” is used to represent “被占便宜” in Chinese. When used in daily life, the 
most common situations could be that what belong to, and are often still useful to, somebody, usually 
something material, or money and time, are taken by some other person. It should be noted that it is 
different from helping others by providing something when they need or when they ask for and from 
being stolen something. Also, what relate to being taken advantage are usually not very big things 
in life, but big enough to cause dissatisfaction and unpleasure to the person who is taken advantage, 
although the behaviors do not physically harm him / her or influence his / her life trajectory. 
Behavior of taking advantage at least involves two parties, one is who takes advantage, the other is 
who is taken advantage. Taking advantage can be either from those who one knows or those who 
one does not know very well. Examples of being taking advantage that one could encounter in life 
could be that: someone always borrows things, even not vary valuable or expensive, from others, 
but never gives them back; somebody borrows 102 yuan from others, but only giving back 100 
yuan;1 someone never treats others back when having meals with fellows, while every other does 
at different time, given that it is common to treat others in a society when eating outside together, 
and so on. These behaviors are all not very big matters. However, encountering these behaviors, 
especially often encountering a person who is always taking advantage of others, could be 
unpleasant. However, in addition, people usually do not use “immoral” or “unfair” to describe these 
situations or the people who tend to take advantage.   
As said before, what is important for trust to change is the information that derives from interactions 
about whether others are conforming to norms of conduct. This information reveals whether some 
particular behavior exists in the society, in which situation it is opt to occur, and how likely. More 
deeply, it is the nature of events (namely, trust-increasing or trust decreasing) that decides the 
direction of the change of general trust. In general, also as aforementioned, there are two ways of 
acquiring others’ information about whether or not they are conforming to norms of conduct: one is 
via personal interactions, the other is via non-interaction methods, such as observing, word by mouth, 
 
1 Yuan is a unit of money in China. 
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media using and so on. Contrast to experiences of direct interactions, feelings from acquiring others’ 
interaction information via non-interaction methods relate to what Smith ([1759] 1966) calls 
sympathy in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments. We image what we would feel if we were one of 
the interacting parties.  
3.2.2 Impact of others’ opinion 
It is a noteworthy phenomenon that a piece of social news often arouses netizens’ wide and furious 
debate in social media nowadays. What they actually focus on is more than the social affair itself. 
More precisely, a piece of news reported merely provides an opportunity time-point when people 
can express their own opinion on all similar events, speak for themselves actually from their own 
point of view, try to make themselves to be understood better, or attempt to leave a certain 
impression on others. Further deeply, they are expressing their own value views orientation, and 
attempt to persuade others by their own arguments more or less, although they often cannot 
successfully persuade others actually.  
Personal values highly relate to cultural background (here, just call it common values), but they do 
not perfectly coincide since, for example, personal growing-up environment and personal 
experiences are different. What is more, due to different angles and depth of commenting on an 
event, people may accentuate different criteria of value judgment while at the same time it is hard 
to tell any criteria involved is essentially and admittedly wrong in every possible sense since it may 
be reasonable to some extent. Expressing opinions is a process of manifesting values through 
language or communication. People compare others’ opinions with those of themselves. The reason 
why difference in opinions may decrease one’s general trust is that those who hold different opinions 
may have behaved or behave in a way that (s)he does not approve of or that may cause damage for 
his / her (potential) interest. Dewey (1922, p. 52) ever states that “diversity does not of itself imply 
conflict, but it implies the possibility of conflict, and this possibility is realized in fact”.  
In reality, it does not rarely happen that difference in values or opinion divergence results in a 
breakdown of a relationship or collapse of cooperation. For instance, a severe divergence of values 
or opinions may lead a couple to divorce; a sharp divergence of business philosophy may lead 
partners running a company together not to cooperate any more, etc. This also applies to a wider 
social environment. When somehow incompatible opinions exist in the society and each opinion 
has a substantial number of supporters, general trust may be negatively influenced.  
3.2.3 Geographical mobility 
Zucker (1986) argues that geographical mobility tends to decrease trust. However, Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002) find that geographical mobility has an insignificant negative impact on general trust. 
The first chapter of this thesis has elaborated on geographical mobility. As mentioned there, 
geographical mobility can be viewed from different angles. At the micro level, this chapter is going 
to from the angle of the geographically moving individuals explore the impact of geographical 
mobility on individual general trust. It is supposed that individual geographical mobility tends to 
decrease general trust. What is more, geographical mobility at provincial level is also taken into 
account.  
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3.2.4  Other factors 
Besides the aforementioned factors, other micro-level factors (such as personal demographic 
characteristics) and somehow meso-level factors (such as spatial mobility) may also be associated 
with general trust. At the micro-level, in terms of demographic characteristics, their impact on 
general trust does not display a consistent influence in empirical research. For example, the research 
of Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) reveals that general trust increases with age at a declining rate, 
while Leigh (2006) finds no significant association between age or age square and generalized trust. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that females significantly trust less than males in the US. On 
contrast, Leigh (2006) does not find statistically significant association between gender and either 
localized trust or generalized trust in Australia. In spite of these differences in empirical findings, 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Leigh (2006) both demonstrate that education is positively 
associated with trust. At the meso-level, Leigh (2006) at first finds that linguistic fractionalization 
at neighborhood-level is negatively associated with localized trust for both natives and non-natives, 
but negatively associated with generalized trust only for non-natives. However, this impact seems 
not to be consistent and stable (Leigh, 2006). What is more, it should be noted that language 
proficiency probably heavily relates to education, ceteris paribus. Consider the natives of a country 
which has different languages and accents. People with a higher level of education tend to master a 
more general language and / or a more standard accent in this country, given that there is a dominant 
language and accent.  
Putnam (2000, pp. 138-139) notices that inhabitants in big cities express less social trust than those 
living in small towns. Glaeser et al (2000) find that the social trust in big cities of the U.S. with a 
population more than 1 million is much lower than that in cities below that size. The difference of 
general trust between rural and urban inhabitants is in the same vein. Rural settlements are usually 
small in population size. Population there are relatively stable and interpersonal relationships there 
are more systematic and closer. These make rural settlements societies of familiars. In many rural 
settlements, the population size is so small that it forms a full-connected network with everyone 
knowing every other. Disobeying norms in rural settlements, one would have to bear more pressure 
from the network of interpersonal relationships like exclusion, which makes the networks of 
interpersonal relationships a strong constraint on untrustworthy behavior. On contrast, urban 
settlements are usually larger in population size. They have a denser population and a more rapid 
population mobility. Urban settlements are societies of strangers, and are more likely for 
untrustworthy things to happen. More importantly, the degree of trustworthiness of a person’s local 
social circumstance probably has a significant weight in his / her expression of general trust. 
Therefore, whether an interviewee is interviewed in a rural or urban area is taken into account, and 
it is expected that rural inhabitants express higher general trust than urban ones on average.      
Besides, different family origins create different life conditions and local social environments. 
Childhood also plays an important role in shaping personal characteristics. Thus, family origin may 
also affect general trust in some way. 
In addition, individual judgment ability about which principle should be used in which concrete 
situation may also influence general trust. One of the main interested factors in this chapter good 
for general trust is others’ norm-conforming behavior. Institutions, broadly, to a large degree involve 
issues of accepted principles. If one is not clear about which principle should be the criterion of 
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judging the justification of behavior and from which perspective to judge, (s)he would have a 
different scope of reasonable, proper behavior in his / her mind given his / her other characteristics, 
which could lead to a changed scope of what (s)he thinks is untrustworthy. 
3.3 Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
3.3.1 Data set overview 
Data used in this chapter is mainly from the Chinese General Social Survey (abbr. CGSS) in the 
year of 2013 (abbr. CGSS 2013). CGSS has been conducted in China since 2003 and it “is the 
earliest national representative continuous survey project run by academic institution in China 
mainland”1 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, ©2019). CGSS 2013 
contains two questionnaires, Questionnaire A and Questionnaire B, which comprise not all the same 
questions (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013a, 2013b). 
Questionnaire A contains four sections, section A, B, C and Z, while Questionnaire B contains 
section A, B, D and Z (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013a, 
2013b). What is used in this chapter is mainly CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B since one variable of 
interest is from section D of Questionnaire B but is not included in Questionnaire A. The two 
questionnaires of CGSS 2013 are in the same dataset. 2  CGSS 2013 dataset contains 11438 
observations in total, within 5772 observations for Questionnaire A and 5666 observations for 
Questionnaire B (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013a, 2013b, 
2013c). Different data formats of CGSS 2013 data set are provided on the official website of CGSS. 
What is used in this chapter is for Stata below version Stata 14. In addition, provincial level data of 
resident population and inter-provincial immigration from the Sixth National Population Census of 
P.R. China is also used (Office of the Sixth National Population Census of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011) (see, Appendix B). 
3.3.2 Variable selection and construction 
From CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B, some variables are chosen for empirical analysis. After deleting 
observations with invalid values, namely those recorded as “Refuse to answer”, “Don’t know” or 
“Not applicable” for all variables from CGSS 2013, 5356 out of 5666, about 94.53%, observations, 
are left for further analysis. Appendix A presents the translation from Chinese into English of the 
original survey questions and their corresponding options of the variables used from CGSS 2013 
except highest education. Moreover, the percentage of inter-provincial immigration of each province 
is calculated through dividing inter-provincial immigration by resident population whose data is 
from the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (see, Appendix B). In summary first, the 
dependent variable is general trust; the core explanatory variables are being taken advantage, social 
fairness, moral satisfaction, opinion similarity, non-local and percentage of interprovincial 
 
1 For more information about the Chinese General Social Survey, visit the official website of the Chinese General 
Social Survey, see also, e.g., Bian and Li (2012).  
2 The dataset is provided as three versions: one version is for Stata version earlier than Stata 14.0, one version is for 
Stata 14.0, and one version is for SPSS. The dataset version used in this chapter is below Stata 14.0.  
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immigration; and the control variables are gender, age group, highest education, rural, precept and 
social class at 14 years old.  
Table 3.1 shows variables chosen or constructed from CGSS 2013 data. Variable general trust refers 
to the survey question that “generally speaking, do you agree that most people can be trusted in this 
society?”, and is the dependent variable which is a 5-point Likert type item with 1 representing 
“Strongly disagree”, 2 “Disagree”, 3 “Neither”, 4 “Agree” and 5 “Strongly agree” (CGSS 2013, 
Questionnaire B, Question A33). Variable being taken advantage, fairness and moral satisfaction 
are chosen or constructed for the impact of violating norms which can be classified into impact from 
others’ behavior. Therein, being taken advantage is a 5-point Likert type item with 1 representing 
“Strongly disagree” and 5 “Strongly agree”. Social fairness is a 5-point Likert type item with 1 
indicating “Completely unfairness” and 5 “Completely fair”. Moral satisfaction is a 5-point Likert 
type item with 1 indicating “Very dissatisfied” and 5 “Very satisfied”. Opinion similarity, which is 
also a 5-point Likert type item with 1 representing “Very rarely” and 5 “Very frequently”, is chosen 
for the impact of others’ expressed opinions, viewpoints, etc. Non-local and percentage of inter-
provincial immigration are for the impact of geographical mobility at the micro and provincial level, 
respectively. At the micro level, variable non-local is a dummy with 0 representing that a respondent 
has been living where (s)he is interviewed since born and 1 representing that a respondent moved 
there and therefore is a non-local person. At the provincial level, the percentage of inter-provincial 
resident immigration in the total resident population of each provincial-level administrative unit1 is 
employed to search for some empirical evidence of the impact of spatial mobility on general trust 
on a province level. According to the Office of the Sixth National Population Census of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Department of Population and Employment 
Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics (2011),  
Resident population of a given town/street include: people living in the current 
town/street where their household registration is located or with their household 
registration to be settled; people living in the current town/street and leaving the 
town/street of their household registration for over 6 months; people leaving the 
town/street of their household registration for less than 6 months or working or studying 
overseas, with their household registration located in the current town/street. (p. 49) 
Similar definition applies to resident population of a province-level administrative division. Inter-
provincial resident immigration refers to those who live in the current province for more than 6 
months with a hukou of another province. The corresponding data about resident population and 
inter-provincial resident immigration of provincial-level administrative divisions are provided in 
Appendix B.  
Three demographic variables are included, namely age group, gender and current highest education. 
Therein, age group is a single ordinal variable constructed by calculating age first by subtracting 
2013, the survey year, from the birth year of all respondents, then dividing age into 10 almost equal 
 
1  P.R. China has 34 provincial-level administrative units, including 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 
municipalities directly administrated by the central government, and 2 special administrative regions. More 
information about the administrative divisions of P.R. China can be found at the official website of the Central 
People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (in Chinese): 
http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2005-09/13/content_5043917.htm, accessed on 27th Oct., 2017. 
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intervals1 and finally valuing the ascendingly sorted intervals from 1 to 10, respectively. Gender is 
a dummy variable with 1 representing “female” and 0 representing “male”. Originally in the 
questionnaire, current highest education contains 14 optional categories with the 14th category 
being “other”. These 14 categories are combined into 5 categories in this chapter with category 
“other” having been omitted. The 5 categories are “less than elementary education”, “elementary 
education”, “secondary education – middle”, “secondary education – high” and “tertiary education” 
respectively. 4 dummies are generated from the 5 categories with 1 representing each of the last four 
categories and 0 otherwise. Rural is a dummy variable with 1 representing “rural area” indicating 
whether a respondent is living in the rural areas when being interviewed and 0 otherwise. The 
variables mentioned above are all from the micro (personal) level. In addition, the empirical analysis 
of this chapter also takes into account the spatial mobility at both the micro (personal) level and the 
province level. Subjective social class at 14 years old is treated as a proxy of family origin and is 
integers in range [1, 10]. Precept is selected for controlling for individual judgment about which 
principle should be used in different situations, and is a 5-point Likert type item with 1 representing 
“Strongly disagree” and 5 “Strongly agree”. What is more, Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics 
for all variables used in the empirical analyses in this chapter from CGSS 2013. 
It should be noted that not all variables (including control and core explanatory variables) appearing 
in the research of other scholars and having an influence on general trust as the dependent variable 
are suitable for being controlled in this chapter; selection of control variables needs to take into 
consideration the core explanatory variables to be tested, and is constrained by the availability of 
corresponding data. By the way, the core explanatory variables, especially those reflecting norm-
conforming and opinion-similarity, in this chapter are all relatively close and essential factors for 
general trust. What is more, Ray (2003, pp. 4,6,13,15,20) summarizes five guidelines about the 
selection of control variables: (a) “Do not control for intervening variables”; (b) “Distinguish 
between complementary and competing explanatory factors”; (c) “Do not introduce factors as 
control variables merely on the grounds that they have an impact on the dependent variable”; (d) 
“Do not control for variables that are related to each other or the key explanatory factor by 
definition”; (e) “Control for possible differences between across space and over time relationships”. 
(For details, see, Ray, 2003) In addition, it is possible that different empirical research turns out to 
draw different conclusions because different data sets have their own characteristics, and different 
variables are chosen for different purposes, given a dependent variable. 
 
1 Because the range of age is not divisible by 10.  
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Table 3.1 Variable selection and construction from CGSS 2013. 
Type Variables Question number; 
Variables name 
How variables are constructed from CGSS 2013 variables 
Dependent variable General trust A33; a33 Same with the options and coding of corresponding question in CGSS 2013. 
Core explanatory variable Being taken advantage A34; a34 Ditto. 
 Social fairness A35; a35 Ditto. 
 Moral satisfaction D1; d1 Reverse the original scores. Namely, 5 = Very satisfied; 4 = Satisfied; 3 = Neither; 2 = Dissatisfied; 1 = Very dissatisfied 
 Opinion similarity B4; b4 Same with the options and coding of corresponding question in CGSS 2013. 
 Non-local A25; a25 0 = "I have been living here since I was born"; 1 = otherwise. 
Control variables Gender A2; a2 1 = Female; 0 = Male 
 Age group A3; a3 Age = 2013 – birthyear. Age group = 1 if age in [18, 25). Similarly, 2 = [25, 33), 3 = [33, 41), 4 = [41, 49), 5= [49, 57), 
6 = [57, 65), 7 = [65, 73), 8 = [73, 81), 9 = [81, 89), 10 = [89, 96]. 
 Current highest education A7a; a7a Classify highest education into five categories first: less than elementary education, elementary, secondary middle, 
secondary high and tertiary. Then, 4 dummies are constructed. Reference: less than elementary. 1 = elementary; 0 = 
otherwise. 1 = Secondary middle; 0 = otherwise. 1 = Secondary high; 0 = otherwise. 1 = tertiary; 0 = otherwise. 
 Living locality - rural 5a; s5a 1 = the living locality is rural; 0 = otherwise. 
 Social class at 14 years old A43d; a43d Same with the options and coding of corresponding question in CGSS 2013. 
 Precept B3; b3 Ditto. 
Notes: In the third column, what is before the semicolon is the question number in the CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B; what is after the semicolon is the corresponding 
variable name in the CGSS 2013 dataset which is or is used to constructed the micro variable in the second column. In addition, for the translation from Chinese into 
English of almost all original questions from CGSS 2013 Questionnaire B used in this chapter, see Appendix A. 
Source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 2013c). 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of micro variables from CGSS 2013. 
Var. Freq. (N=5356) Min. 1st qu. Median Mean 3rd qu. Max. S.d. 
  0 1               
General trust   1.000 2.000 4.000 3.276 4.000 5.000 1.0198 
Being taken advantage   1.000 2.000 3.000 3.055 4.000 5.000 1.0096 
Social fairness   1.000 2.000 3.000 2.994 4.000 5.000 1.0386 
Moral satisfaction   1.000 3.000 3.000 3.104 4.000 5.000 0.8638 
Opinion similarity   1.000 3.000 4.000 3.458 4.000 5.000 0.7660 
Non-local  1386 3970       0.4380 
Gender 2706 2650        
Age group   1.000 3.000 4.000 4.432 6.000 10.000 2.0375 
Highest education - less than elementary 4656 700        
Highest education - elementary 4241 1115        
Highest education - secondary middle 3781 1575        
Highest education - secondary high 4300 1056        
Highest education - tertiary 4446 910        
Rural 3339 2017        
Precept   1.000 2.000 3.000 2.844 3.000 5.000 0.8412 
Social class at 14 years old     1.000 2.000 3.000 3.094 4.000 10.000 1.7855 
Notes: Author’s own calculation using R (R Core Team, 2017). R-package foreign (R Core Team, 2016) and reshape (Wickham, 2007) are also used.  
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 2013c). 
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3.4 Econometric models and results 
3.4.1 Ordered logit model 
According to the characteristic of the data used that the dependent variable general trust is an ordinal, 
categorical variable with more than two levels, ordered logit regression, also known as proportional 
odds model which is proposed by McCullagh (1980), becomes the first choice for the econometric 
analysis in this chapter.1 The ordered logit model is set as below:  
logit [P(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑝 ≤ 𝑗)| 𝐱]   
=  −(𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽6𝑝𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝  + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠14𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽12𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽13𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽14𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽15𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑝)      (𝑗 = 1,2,3,4) 2 
Or written like this: 
logit [P(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑝 ≥ 𝑗)| 𝐱]   
= 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽6𝑝𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝  + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑝
+  𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠14𝑖𝑝
+  𝛽11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑝
+  𝛽12𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑝
+  𝛽13𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑝
+  𝛽14𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽15𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑝       (𝑗 = 2,3,4,5) 3 
In the formula above, x represents the set constructed by all independent variables (including both 
core explanatory variables and control variables). Subscript i indicates individual persons, and 
subscript p provinces. 𝛽0𝑗 (j = 1,2,3,4 in the first formula or j= 2,3,4,5 in the second formula) are 
the intercepts, 𝛽1 ~ 𝛽6 are the coefficients of core explanatory variables, and 𝛽7 ~ 𝛽15 are the 
coefficients of control variables. j indicates the categories of the dependent variable general trust. 
On the right hand side of the equation, the 6 core explanatory variables are respectively being taken 
advantage (a 5-point Likert type item), social fairness (a 5-point Likert type item), moral 
 
1 Note that ordered logit regression takes proportional odds as its assumption, which means that the analysis using 
ordered logit regression unfolds under that assumption. In addition, for more knowledge about analysis of ordinal 
categorical data, see e.g., Agresti (2010). For more knowledge about discrete response models, see, e.g., Wooldridge 
(2002). 
2 The signs on the righthand side of the model are adapted according to the latent model estimated latter using the 
R-package VGAM (Yee, 2017), a package which is used for economic analysis in this chapter, in order for my model 
and the results outputted by VGAM to be consistent in explanation. 
3 Ditto. 
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satisfaction (a 5-point Likert type item), opinion similarity (a 5-point Likert type item), non-local 
(a dummy) and percentage of inter-provincial immigrants (provincial level data); the 9 control 
variables are respectively gender female (a dummy), age group (a 10-point variable), highest 
education elementary (a dummy), highest education secondary middle (a dummy), highest 
education secondary high (a dummy), highest education tertiary (a dummy), social class at 14 years 
old (a 10-point Likert type item), precepts (a 5-point Likert type item), rural (a dummy). As seen, 
being independent variables (either core explanatory variables or control variables), all five-point 
Likert type items are treated as single predictors, rather than separate dummies.1  
3.4.2 (Multi)Correlation between explanatory variables 
Socio-economic variables are unavoidably correlated to or associated with each other to some 
degree. As in linear regression, logit regressions, including binary logistic regression, multinomial 
logit regression and ordered logit regression, which are non-linear regressions developed based on 
linear regression and are also classified as generalized linear models, also suffer from 
(multi)collinearity2 (e.g., Allison, 2012; Midi, Sarkar and Rana, 2010). (Multi)collinearity would 
result in biased coefficient estimates and inflated variances and standard errors of individual 
parameter, especially for small and moderate samples, and cause overfit, without reducing the 
explanatory power of the whole model (e.g., Midi, Sarkar and Rana, 2010). High degree of 
(multi)collinearity could change the statistical significance of individual parameter from significant 
to insignificant and even the sign to the opposite. In order to have a look at which explanatory 
variables have (multi)collinearity and the degree of (multi)collinearity, and to dispel misgivings 
about this issue of some readers, pairwise and partial correlations between explanatory variables 
and the VIF of each explanatory variable are presented respectively. In addition, no linear relations 
does not mean no non-linear relations.  
 (i) Pairwise simple correlations 
Before econometric analysis is implemented, pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between all 
independent variables and their corresponding p-values are presented in Table 3.3 in order to detect 
the pairwise linear relations between them.3 For convenience, use X1 ~ X15 to represent all the 
independent variables, respectively. Specifically, X1 represents being taken advantage, X2 social 
fairness, X3 moral satisfaction, X4 opinion similarity, X5 non-local, X6 percentage of 
interprovincial immigration, X7 female, X8 age group, X9 rural, X10 social class at 14 years old, 
X11 highest education – elementary, X12 highest education – secondary middle, X13 highest 
education – secondary high, X14 highest education – tertiary, and X15 precept. From Table 3.3, the 
variable pairs of which the absolute values of the correlation coefficients are in range [0.3, 0.4) are 
X2 and X3 (p = 0.0000), X6 and X9 (p = 0.0000), X8 and X14 (p = 0.0000), X11 and X12 (p = 
 
1 For more discussion about whether parametric statistics can be used with Likert type items, see, e.g., Norman 
(2010). Norman (2010, p. 631) argues that “parametric statistics can be used with Likert data, with small sample 
sizes, with unequal variances, and with non-normal distributions”. In the area of economics, Likert type item is also 
treated as a single independent variable in top journals. For example, Blanco and Ruiz (2013) use insecurity which 
is a 4-point scale type item as a single explanatory variable. Another example, Cornwell et al (2008) treat self-
reported health which is a 5-point Likert type item as a single independent variable. 
2 Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 15) classifies the three models of binary logistic model, multinomial logit model, and 
ordered logit model, into what he calls discrete response models. 
3 Since Pearson’s r is robust to non-normality and ordinal data (Norman, 2010), it is adopted to measure the 
relationship between these variables, rather than using Spearman’s rho or Kendall’s tau b.  
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0.0000), and X12 and X13 (p = 0.0000); the variable pairs of which the absolute values of correlation 
coefficients in range [0.2, 0.3) are that of X5 and X9 (p = 0.0000), X6 and X10 (p = 0.0000), X6 
and X14 (p = 0.0000), X9 and X10 (p = 0.0000), X9 and X11 (p = 0.0000), X9 and X13 (p = 0.0000), 
X9 and X14 (p = 0.0000), and X10 and X14 (p = 0.0000); and the variable pairs of which the 
absolute values of correlation coefficients in range [0.1, 0.2) are X1 and X2 (p = 0.0000), X1 and 
X3 (p = 0.0000), X2 and X8 (p = 0.0000), X2 and X9 (p = 0.0000), X3 and X8 (p = 0.0000), X3 
and X9 (p = 0.0000), X3 and X14 (p = 0.0000), X5 and X6 (p = 0.0000), X5 and X10 (p = 0.0000), 
X5 and X14 (p = 0.0000), X6 and X11 (p = 0.0000), X6 and X13 (p = 0.0000), X10 and X11 (p = 
0.0000), and X10 and X13 (p = 0.0000). It can be seen that the simple correlation coefficients 
between the dummy variables of education are high. However, it should not be a problem.   
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Table 3.3 Correlation between independent variables. 
    X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15  
C
or
re
la
ti
on
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
X1  0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0597 0.0001 0.0006 0.0015 0.0000 0.3298 0.1595 0.3965 0.0226 0.9726 0.0000 
P
 value 
X2 -0.12  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3950 0.0000 0.0000 0.7286 0.0000 0.0059 0.0000 0.0002 0.0358 
X3 -0.13 0.32  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3860 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0000 0.4830 0.0012 0.0000 0.1382 
X4 -0.05 0.08 0.08  0.1966 0.0421 0.6091 0.0141 0.0285 0.0000 0.6950 0.5038 0.3691 0.2565 0.2711 
X5 -0.03 0.05 0.08 -0.02  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6598 0.4001 0.0000 0.0141 
X6 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.18  0.1450 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6007 
X7 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.02  0.0003 0.0481 0.0003 0.0565 0.0004 0.0000 0.0010 0.0568 
X8 -0.04 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.05  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3846 
X9 -0.06 0.14 0.19 0.03 0.22 -0.36 0.03 0.11  0.0000 0.0000 0.0264 0.0000 0.0000 0.0495 
X10 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.06 -0.11 0.22 0.05 -0.20 -0.23  0.0000 0.5166 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 
X11 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.16 0.03 0.18 0.24 -0.15  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
X12 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.33  0.0000 0.0000 0.8425 
X13 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.06 -0.13 -0.20 0.10 -0.25 -0.32  0.0000 0.3117 
X14 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 0.02 -0.10 0.27 -0.04 -0.30 -0.29 0.23 -0.23 -0.29 -0.22  0.0000 
X15 0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.07  
Notes: Author’s own calculation using R (R Core Team, 2017), R-package foreign (R Core Team, 2016), R-package reshape (Wickham, 2007) and R-package Hmisc. 
(Harrell Jr. et al, 2016). X1: Being taken advantage; X2: Social fairness; X3: Moral satisfaction; X4: Opinion similarity; X5: Non-local citizen; X6: Percentage of 
interprovincial immigration; X7: Gender - female; X8: Age group; X9: Rural; X10: Social class at 14 years old; X11: Highest education – elementary; X12: Highest 
education – secondary middle; X13: Highest education – secondary high; X14: Highest education – tertiary; X15: Precept. The lower triangular cells are correlation 
coefficients and the upper triangular cells are p values.  
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office 
of the Sixth National Population Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
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(ii) Partial correlations 
Moreover, because there are more than two explanatory variables in the model in this chapter, 
pairwise simple correlation coefficients are not as suitable as partial correlation coefficients which 
take into consideration the influences of other variables. Therefore, partial correlations are also 
going to be given. 
Still, for convenience, use X1 ~ X15 to represent all the independent variables like in the simple 
correlation coefficients above. Table 3.4 presents Pearson partial correlation coefficients between 
all independent variables and their corresponding p-values. From Table 3.4, the absolute values of 
the partial correlation coefficients between X11~X14 are the largest, all in range [0.5845, 0.7226] 
with p = 0.0000. The partial correlation coefficient between X8 and X14 is -0.4629 (p = 0.0000), 
between X8 and X13 is -0.3915 (p = 0.0000), and between X8 and X12 is -0.3736 (p = 0.0000). The 
variable pairs of which the absolute values of the partial correlation coefficients are in range [0.2, 
0.3) are X2 and X3 (p = 0.0000), X6 and X9 (p = 0.0000), X7 and X12 (p = 0.0000), X7 and X13 
(p = 0.0000), X7 and X14 (p = 0.0000), X9 and X13 (p = 0.0000), X9 and X14 (p = 0.0000); the 
variable pairs of which the absolute values of the partial correlation coefficients are in range [0.1, 
0.2) are X5 and X6 (p = 0.0000), X5 and X9 (p = 0.0000), X6 and X8 (p = 0.0000), X6 and X10 (p 
= 0.0000), X6 and X13 (p = 0.0000), X6 and X14 (p = 0.0000), X7 and X8 (p = 0.0000), X7 and 
X11 (p = 0.0000), X8 and X9 (p = 0.0000), X10 and X13 (p = 0.0000), X10 and X14 (p = 0.0000). 
Still, the partial correlation coefficients between the dummy variables of education are high, which 
should not be a problem. 
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Table 3.4 Partial correlation between explanatory variables. 
    X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15   
P
ar
ti
al
 c
or
re
la
ti
on
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
X1   0.0000  0.0000  0.0497  0.4097  0.0042  0.0003  0.0095  0.1246  0.0960  0.6193  0.5272  0.6315  0.0375  0.0000  
P
 value 
X2 -0.0677    0.0000  0.0005  0.5159  0.0357  0.9487  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.2909  0.0083  0.0353  0.5982  0.0176  
X3 -0.0980  0.2810    0.0000  0.0044  0.0132  0.6600  0.2633  0.0000  0.7336  0.2433  0.0124  0.0110  0.0000  0.0686  
X4 -0.0269  0.0479  0.0613    0.0386  0.0049  0.4104  0.0000  0.0237  0.0000  0.0191  0.0006  0.0029  0.0000  0.7204  
X5 -0.0113  0.0089  0.0390  -0.0283    0.0000  0.0000  0.2033  0.0000  0.0243  0.3984  0.3308  0.2663  0.7244  0.0214  
X6 0.0391  -0.0287  0.0339  -0.0385  -0.1048    0.7655  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.2512  0.0010  0.0000  0.0000  0.0032  
X7 -0.0490  -0.0009  -0.0060  0.0113  -0.0835  0.0041    0.0000  0.0894  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1939  
X8 -0.0355  0.0674  0.0153  0.0556  0.0174  0.1053  -0.1454    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0164  
X9 -0.0210  0.0668  0.0965  0.0309  0.1488  -0.2127  -0.0232  -0.1116    0.0000  0.0024  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.5334  
X10 -0.0228  0.0543  0.0047  0.0646  -0.0308  0.1198  0.0778  -0.0793  -0.0889    0.0022  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1137  
X11 -0.0068  -0.0145  -0.0160  0.0321  -0.0116  0.0157  -0.1385  -0.2148  -0.0415  0.0418    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.6179  
X12 -0.0087  -0.0361  -0.0342  0.0470  -0.0133  0.0448  -0.2034  -0.3736  -0.1617  0.0955  -0.6722    0.0000  0.0000  0.0029  
X13 -0.0066  -0.0288  -0.0348  0.0407  0.0152  0.1031  -0.2079  -0.3915  -0.2459  0.1173  -0.6192  -0.7226    0.0000  0.0005  
X14 -0.0285  -0.0072  -0.0673  0.0562  -0.0048  0.1670  -0.2061  -0.4629  -0.2597  0.1504  -0.5845  -0.7089  -0.7106    0.0000  
X15 0.0655  -0.0325  0.0249  -0.0049  0.0315  0.0403  0.0178  -0.0328  -0.0085  -0.0216  -0.0068  -0.0407  -0.0473  -0.0741    
Notes: Author’s own calculation using R (R Core Team, 2017), R-package foreign (R Core Team, 2016), R-package reshape (Wickham, 2007) and R-package ppcor 
(Kim, 2015). The partial correlation coefficient is the correlation coefficient between two variables in a set of variables while controlling other variables in that set of 
variables. X1: Being taken advantage; X2: Social fairness; X3: Moral satisfaction; X4: Opinion similarity; X5: Non-local citizen; X6: Percentage of interprovincial 
immigration; X7: Gender - female; X8: Age group; X9: Rural; X10: Social class at 14 years old; X11: Highest education – elementary; X12: Highest education – 
secondary middle; X13: Highest education – secondary high; X14: Highest education – tertiary; X15: Precept. The lower triangular cells are correlation coefficients 
and the upper triangular cells are p values. 
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office 
of the Sixth National Population Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
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(iii) Variance inflation factors 
Both simple and partial correlation coefficients measure the linear relation between two variables, 
while multicollinearity involves linear relation of more than two variables. Moreover, 
multicollinearity is linear dependence which means that one variable in a set of variables is a linear 
combination of other variables. For non-linear regressions like binary logistic regression, degree of 
multicollinearity can also be detected in virtue of multicollinearity diagnostics of linear regression, 
such as variance inflation factors (abbr. VIFs)1 of independent variables (Midi, Sarkar and Rana, 
2010). A VIF reflects “how much the variance of a coefficient is ‘inflated’ because of linear 
dependence with other predictors” relative to “if that predictor was completely uncorrelated with all 
the other predictors” (Allison, 2012, para. 3). Following Midi, Sarkar and Rana’s (2010) suggestion, 
a linear regression model is constructed with general trust as a single interval variable being the 
dependent variable and the original independent variables in the ordered logit regression being 
predictors. Then the VIF of each explanatory variable is calculated after the linear model is fitted 
using ordinary least squares. The VIF of all the explanatory variables (including the core 
explanatory variables and control variables) are presented in Table 3.5. Midi, Sarkar and Rana (2010) 
suggest that in weaker models like logistic regression, a VIF larger than 2.5 should be treated as a 
signal of multicollinearity, although in normal linear regression, a VIF larger than 10 is often thought 
as a warning. Allison (2012) also treats a VIF exceeding 2.50 as a warning of multicollinearity. From 
Table 3.5, the VIF of all the explanatory variables used in the chapter are less than 2.50, except three 
dummies of highest education (i.e., secondary middle, secondary high and tertiary). However, this 
should not be a problem since the three dummies are constructed from the same variable. Allison 
(2012) also holds a similar opinion. Allison (2012, para. 6, 8, 9) enumerates three situations when 
multicollinearity indicated by high VIFs can be safely ignored: (a) “The variables with high VIFs 
are control variables, and the variables of interest do not have high VIFs.” (para. 6) (b) “The high 
VIFs are caused by the inclusion of powers or products of other variables.”  (para. 8) (c) “The 
variables with high VIFs are indicator (dummy) variables that represent a categorical variable with 
three or more categories.” (para. 9) 
 
  
 
1 VIF =  1
1−𝑅2
 , R is the coefficient of determination.  
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Table 3.5 VIFs of explanatory variables. 
Explanatory variable VIFs 
Being taken advantage 1.0375  
Fairness 1.1482  
Morality satisfaction 1.1672  
Opinion similarity 1.0225  
Non-local 1.0801  
Percentage of interprovince migration 1.2516  
Gender - female 1.0740  
Age group 1.4016  
Rural 1.4139  
Social class at 14 years old 1.1682  
Highest education - Elementary 2.1912  
Highest education - Secondary middle 2.8954  
Highest education - Secondary high 2.7724  
Highest education - Tertiary 3.0791  
Precept 1.0188  
Notes: R-package “car” (Fox and Weisberg, 2011) is used for calculating VIFs of explanatory 
variables. 
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 
2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office of the Sixth National Population 
Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and 
Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
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3.4.3 Regression results of ordered logit model 
Three regressions directly relevant to the ordered logit model of general trust above are implemented: 
1) regression on intercepts and core explanatory variables (for results, see, Table 3.6); 2) regression 
on intercepts and control variables (for results, see, Table 3.7); 3) regression on intercepts, core 
explanatory variables and control variables (for results, see, Table 3.8). The results of the third 
regression (namely, Table 3.8) are going to be elaborated on.  
In Table 3.8, in general, all the core explanatory variables and the control variables appeared in other 
research have the expected signs. Specifically, for the core explanatory variables, being taken 
advantage has a strongly significant negative impact on general trust (𝛽1≈ -0.29, significant at 0.001 
level), social fairness has a strongly significant positive impact on general trust (𝛽2  ≈ 0.57, 
significant at 0.001 level), moral satisfaction has a strongly significant positive impact on general 
trust (𝛽3≈ 0.21, significant at 0.001 level), opinion similarity has a strongly significant positive 
impact on general trust (𝛽4≈ 0.29, significant at 0.001 level), non-local has a strongly significant 
negative impact of general trust (𝛽5≈ -0.20, significant at 0.01 level), percentage of interprovincial 
immigration, however, has an insignificant negative impact on general trust (𝛽6≈ -0.37, significant 
at 0.01 level). Among the 6 core explanatory variables, one unit’s change of social fairness has the 
biggest positive influence on odds holding other variables constant. Given a particular level of 
general trust, the log odds of the probability higher than or equal to this particular level against the 
probability lower than this particular level increases by about 0.78 when social fairness increases 
one unit (improves one level) (see column “Exp. coef.” in Table 3.8). Opinion similarity and moral 
satisfaction respectively improve log odds by about 0.34 and 0.23 when they increase by 1 level. In 
contrast, non-local, being taken advantage and percentage of interprovincial immigration decrease 
log odds respectively by about 0.18, 0.25 and 0.41 respectively when they increase by 1 unit.  
Additionally, still in Table 3.8, for the control variables, female has a significant negative impact on 
general trust (𝛽7≈ -0.11, significant at 0.05 level) and decreases log odds by about 0.12 compared 
with males. Age group has a strongly significant positive impact on general trust (𝛽8 ≈ 0.10, 
significant at 0.001 level) and increases log odds by about 0.10 when increasing 1 unit. Rural has a 
significant positive impact on general trust (𝛽9≈ 0.31, significant at 0.001 level) and increases log 
odds by about 0.36 relative to non-rural. Social class at 14 years old has an insignificant negative 
impact on general trust (𝛽10≈ -0.03, insignificant even at 0.05 level) and decreases log odds by about 
0.03 when increasing by 1 level. Compared with highest education – less than elementary education, 
highest education - elementary, - secondary middle, - secondary high and - tertiary are all have a 
positive impact on general trust, but with different significance. Highest education – secondary 
middle and – tertiary are significant respectively at the 0.05 and 0.001 significance level compared 
to highest education – less than elementary, while highest education – elementary and – secondary 
middle are not significant even at 0.05 level. Additionally, they respectively increase log odds by 
about 0.10, 0.19, 0.39 and 0.64 relative to the reference education level. Precept has a significant 
positive impact on general trust (𝛽15≈ 0.11, insignificant even at 0.001 level) and improves log odds 
by about 0.12. 
Likelihood ratio tests can be used for comparing two nested models. Table 3.9 applies likelihood 
ratio tests between four pairs of nested regressions: the regression with core explanatory variables 
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(and intercepts) and with intercepts only; the regression with control variables (and intercepts) and 
with intercepts only; the regression with all independent variables (and intercepts) and with 
intercepts only; and the regression with all independent variables (and intercepts) and with control 
variables (and intercepts). The results show that all more complex models with more variables in 
each comparison pair hold with high significance at the 0.001 significance level.   
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Table 3.6 Ordered logit regression (Core explanatory variables only). 
  Estimate Std. error z value Pr (>|z|) Sign. Exp. coef. 
Intercept:1 1.0711 0.1978 5.416 0.0000 ***   
Intercept:2 -1.4311 0.1913 -7.481 0.0000 ***  
Intercept:3 -2.2446 0.1928 -11.645 0.0000 ***  
Intercept:4 -5.6107 0.2073 -27.061 0.0000 ***  
Being taken advantage -0.2914 0.0267 -10.917 0.0000 *** 0.7472 
Social fairness 0.5828 0.0276 21.109 0.0000 *** 1.7910 
Morality satisfaction 0.2267 0.0324 7.001 0.0000 *** 1.2544 
Opinion similarity 0.2955 0.0345 8.561 0.0000 *** 1.3439 
Non-local citizen -0.1175 0.0610 -1.925 0.0542 . 0.8892 
Percentage of interprovince migration -0.4907 0.2263 -2.169 0.0301 * 0.6122 
Deviance 12733.22      
Log likelihood -6366.608      
AIC 12753.22      
Pseudo R2 (McFadden)1 0.0672           
Number of observations 5356           
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office 
of the Sixth National Population Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
Notes: Significance code: 0~0.001 “***”; 0.001~0.01 “**”; 0.01~0.05 “*”; 0.05~0.1 “.”. Ordered logit regressions are implemented with R package VGAM (Yee, 
2017). Name of linear predictor in each model is respectively logit(P[Y≥2]), logit(P[Y≥3]), logit(P[Y≥4]), logit(P[Y≥5]). For more knowledge of using R for 
econometric analysis, see, e.g., Heiss (2016).  
 
1 𝑅𝑀𝑎𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛
2 = 1 − ln 𝐿(𝑀𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙) ln 𝐿(𝑀𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙)⁄  
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Table 3.7 Ordered logit regression (Control variables only). 
  Estimate Std. error z value Pr (>|z|) Sign. 
Exp. 
coef. 
Intercept:1 2.1571 0.1823 11.835 0.0000 ***  
Intercept:2 -0.1688 0.1722 -0.98 0.3270   
Intercept:3 -0.8967 0.1726 -5.196 0.0000 ***  
Intercept:4 -4.0154 0.1840 -21.82 0.0000 ***  
Gender – female -0.0525 0.0529 -0.993 0.3209  0.9488 
Age group 0.1288 0.0149 8.656 0.0000 *** 1.1374 
Rural 0.5192 0.0604 8.599 0.0000 *** 1.6807 
Social class at 14 years old 0.0076 0.0153 0.498 0.6183  1.0077 
Highest education – elementary 0.0868 0.0947 0.917 0.3593  1.0907 
Highest education – secondary middle 0.0968 0.0963 1.006 0.3145  1.1017 
Highest education – secondary high 0.1544 0.1072 1.441 0.1496  1.1670 
Highest education – tertiary 0.3987 0.1183 3.37 0.0008 *** 1.4899 
Precept 0.0671 0.0307 2.188 0.0286 * 1.0694 
Deviance 13479.91      
Log likelihood -6739.955      
AIC 13505.91      
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.0125           
Number of observations 5356           
Notes: Significance code: 0~0.001 “***”; 0.001~0.01 “**”; 0.01~0.05 “*”; 0.05~0.1 “.”. Ordered logit regressions are implemented with R package VGAM (Yee, 
2017). Name of linear predictor in each model is respectively logit(P[Y≥2]), logit(P[Y≥3]), logit(P[Y≥4]), logit(P[Y≥5]).  
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office 
of the Sixth National Population Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
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Table 3.8 Ordered logit regression. 
  Estimate Std. error z value Pr (>|z|) Sign. Exp. coef. 
Intercept:1 0.3311 0.2572 1.288 0.1979   
Intercept:2 -2.1872 0.2530 -8.644 0.0000 ***  
Intercept:3 -3.0120 0.2546 -11.832 0.0000 ***  
Intercept:4 -6.4196 0.2682 -23.937 0.0000 ***  
Being taken advantage -0.2940 0.0269 -10.945 0.0000 *** 0.7453 
Social fairness 0.5738 0.0279 20.593 0.0000 *** 1.7750 
Morality satisfaction 0.2071 0.0329 6.301 0.0000 *** 1.2301 
Opinion similarity 0.2890 0.0347 8.318 0.0000 *** 1.3351 
Non-local citizen -0.1960 0.0623 -3.148 0.0016 ** 0.8220 
Percentage of 
interprovince 
migration 
-0.3716 0.2485 -1.495 0.1348  0.6897 
Gender – female -0.1116 0.0544 -2.052 0.0402 * 0.8944 
Age group 0.0993 0.0154 6.458 0.0000 *** 1.1044 
Rural 0.3067 0.0648 4.73 0.0000 *** 1.3589 
Social class at 14 years 
old 
-0.0296 0.0159 -1.862 0.0626 . 0.9709 
Highest education – 
 elementary 
0.0914 0.0970 0.942 0.3462  1.0957 
Highest education –  
secondary middle 
0.1733 0.0990 1.751 0.0800 . 1.1892 
Highest education – 
 secondary high 
0.2532 0.1106 2.288 0.022124 * 1.2881 
Highest education – 
tertiary 
0.4921 0.1233 3.99 6.61E-05 *** 1.6358 
Precept 0.1150 0.0316 3.642 0.000271 *** 1.1219 
Deviance 12643.75           
Log likelihood -6321.873      
AIC 12681.75      
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.0737         
Number of 
observations 
5356           
Notes: Significance code: 0~0.001 “***”; 0.001~0.01 “**”; 0.01~0.05 “*”; 0.05~0.1 “.”. Ordered 
logit regressions are implemented with R package VGAM (Yee, 2017). Name of linear predictor in 
each model is respectively logit(P[Y≥2]), logit(P[Y≥3]), logit(P[Y≥4]), logit(P[Y≥5]). 
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 
2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office of the Sixth National Population 
Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and 
Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
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Table 3.9 Likelihood ratio test between ordered logit regressions. 
  #Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq) Sign. 
Core explanatory variables only 21414 -6366.6     
Intercept only 21420 -6825.1 6 917.06 <2.2e-16 *** 
Control variables only 21411 -6740     
Intercept only 21420 -6825.1 9 170.36 <2.2e-16 *** 
All independent variables 21405 -6321.9         
Intercept only 21420 -6825.1 15 1006.5 <2.2e-16 *** 
All independent variables 21411 -6740         
Control variables only 21405 -6321.9 6 836.17 <2.2e-16 *** 
Notes: Significance code: 0~0.001 “***”; 0.001~0.01 “**”; 0.01~0.05 “*”; 0.05~0.1 “.”. 
Implemented with R-package VGAM (Yee, 2017). 
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 
2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office of the Sixth National Population 
Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and 
Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
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Test for proportional odds assumption 
Since proportional odds models have the parallel lines assumption requiring that every parameter is 
the same for the dichotomous logistic regressions at different cut-off points in an ordered logit 
regression, Brant test, a Walt test developed by Brant (1990), is used to test ex post whether the 
parameters in the previous ordered logit regression in this chapter violate the assumption and which 
independent variable(s) do(es). The results of Brant test are presented in Table 3.10 in which we can 
see that variable being taken advantage, percentage of interprovincial immigration, age group, 
highest education – secondary middle, highest education – secondary high and precept do not meet 
the parallel lines assumption at the 0.05 significance level.   
Table 3.10 Testing parallel lines assumption for ordered logit regression using Brant test. 
Test for χ2 df probability 
Omnibus 80.4589  45 0.0009  
Being taken advantage 10.5957  3 0.0141  
Fairness 5.9684  3 0.1132  
Morality satisfaction 3.1144  3 0.3743  
Opinion similarity 0.3656  3 0.9473  
Non-local citizen 3.7618  3 0.2884  
Percentage of interprovince migration 9.3153  3 0.0254  
Gender - female 0.2160  3 0.9750  
Age group 10.5265  3 0.0146  
Rural 0.7587  3 0.8593  
Social class at 14 years old 3.6863  3 0.2974  
Highest education - elementary 7.1096  3 0.0685  
Highest education - secondary middle 8.2972  3 0.0403  
Highest education - secondary high 9.5696  3 0.0226  
Highest education - tertiary 4.3220  3 0.2287  
Precept 11.7041  3 0.0085  
Notes: Null hypothesis of Brant test is that parallel regression assumption holds. The Brant test is 
implemented with R-package “brant” (Schlegel and Steenbergen, 2018). Additionally, since the 
package is based on R-package “MASS” (Venables and Ripley, 2002), the ordered logit regression 
is re-estimate using R-package “MASS” (Venables and Ripley, 2002) before Brant test using R-
package “brant” (Schlegel and Steenbergen, 2018) is used. 
Data Source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 
2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office of the Sixth National Population 
Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and 
Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
When an ordered logit regression does not meet the parallel lines assumption, there are four different 
ways to turn to: (a) The first is ignoring it and sticking to the ordered logit model. (b) The second is 
to change to a binary logistic model. This way condenses the ordinal dependent variable which is 
more than two categories into a two-category one and therefore causes information loss. (c) Anther 
often suggested choice is to turn to a multinomial logit model which applies to the situation that the 
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dependent variable is a nominal categorical one. However, it should be noted that a multinomial 
logit model has the underlying assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives which 
“requires the data to possess the characteristic that if one of the possible outcomes of the dependent 
variable is eliminated, the relative probabilities of the remaining possible outcomes do not change” 
but an ordinal categorical independent variable does not meet (Hilmer and Hilmer, 2014, pp. 364-
365). Therefore, applying a multinomial logit model to where the dependent variable is ordinally 
categorical will lead to wrong estimators (Hilmer and Hilmer, 2014, p. 365). In addition, applying 
a multinomial logit model to ordinal categorical dependent variable also causes information loss 
since the former does not take into account the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, and the 
parameters to be estimated in the multinomial logit regression will multiply according to the 
categorical number of the dependent variable. (d) The fourth choice is to turn to a partial 
proportional odds model proposed by Peterson and Harrell Jr. (1990) or non-proportional odds 
model, both of which apply to an ordinal categorical dependent variable and allow different 
estimation at different cut-off points for variables of which the parameter violates the parallel lines 
assumption. The difference is that the former allows a part of parameters to violate but other 
parameters to meet the assumption, while the latter treats all parameters as not meeting the 
assumption. Furthermore, a partial proportional odds model can be either unconstrained or 
constrained (Peterson and Harrell Jr., 1990). What is going to be used in this chapter is the former 
one.  
Partial proportional odds model 
According to the Brant test above, variable being taken advantage, percentage of interprovincial 
immigration, age group, highest education – secondary middle, highest education – secondary high 
and precept violate the parallel line assumption. Then, partial proportional odds model is used to re-
estimate the previous ordered logit model with their parameters different but other parameters the 
same across the estimation of different cut-off points of dependent variable general trust. Therefore, 
the partial proportional odds model is: 
logit [P(𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑝 ≥ 𝑗)| 𝐱]   
= 𝛽0,𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑗𝐵𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽6,𝑗𝑝𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝  + 𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽8,𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠14𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽12,𝑗𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽13,𝑗𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑝
+ 𝛽14𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑝 +  𝛽15,𝑗𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑝       (𝑗 = 2,3,4,5) 1 
Table 3.11 presents the results of using partial proportional model to re-estimate the interested 
regression model after relaxing the parallel lines assumption for the variables violating the parallel 
line assumption. Comparing Table 3.8 and Table 3.11, it can be seen that the coefficients and log 
odds basically almost do not change. The sign, significance and on which significance level is 
 
1 The signs on the righthand side of the model are adapted according to the latent model estimated latter using the 
R-package VGAM (Yee, 2017), a package which is used for economic analysis in this chapter, in order for my model 
and the results outputted by VGAM to be consistent in explanation.  
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significant of the independent variables meeting the parallel assumption do not change. When j=2, 
namely when logit[P(GeneralTrust) ≥ 2|x], being taken advantage has a significant negative impact 
on general trust (𝛽1,2≈ -0.43, significant at 0.001 level), percentage of provincial immigrants has an 
insignificant negative impact on general trust (𝛽6,2≈ -0.37, insignificant at 0.05 level), age group 
has an insignificant positive impact on general trust (𝛽8,2≈ 0.01, insignificant at 0.05 level), highest 
education – secondary middle has an insignificant positive impact on general trust  (𝛽12,2≈ 0.15, 
insignificant at 0.05 level), highest education – secondary high has an insignificant positive impact 
on general trust (𝛽13,2≈ 0.37, insignificant at 0.05 level), and precept has an insignificant negative 
impact on general trust (𝛽15,2≈ -0.04, insignificant at 0.05 level) (see, corresponding variables with 
“:1” after the variable names in Table 3.11).  
When j=3, namely when logit[P(GeneralTrust) ≥ 3|x], being taken advantage has a strongly 
significant negative impact on general trust (𝛽1,3≈ -0.37, significant at 0.001 level), percentage of 
provincial immigrants has an insignificant negative impact on general trust ( 𝛽6,3 ≈ -0.13, 
insignificant at 0.05 level), age group has a strongly significant positive impact on general trust 
(𝛽8,3≈ 0.11, significant at 0.001 level), highest education – secondary middle has an insignificant 
positive impact on general trust (𝛽12,2 ≈ 0.14, insignificant at 0.05 level), highest education – 
secondary high has an insignificant positive impact on general trust (𝛽13,2≈ 0.22, insignificant at 
0.05 level), and precept has a strongly significant positive impact on general trust (𝛽15,2≈ 0.18, 
significant at 0.001 level) (see, corresponding variables with “:2” after the variable names in Table 
3.11). 
When j=4, namely when logit[P(GeneralTrust) ≥ 4|x], being taken advantage has a stronly 
significant negative impact on general trust (𝛽1,4≈ -0.27, significant at 0.001 level), percentage of 
provincial immigrants has a strongly significant negative impact on general trust (𝛽6,4 ≈ -0.72, 
insignificant at 0.01 level), age group has a strongly significant positive impact on general trust 
(𝛽8,4 ≈ 0.10, significant at 0.001 level), highest education – secondary middle has a significant 
positive impact on general trust ( 𝛽12,4 ≈ 0.23, significant at 0.05 level), highest education – 
secondary high has a strongly significant positive impact on general trust  (𝛽13,4≈ 0.33, significant 
at 0.01 level), and precept has a strongly significant positive impact on general trust (𝛽15,4≈ 0.11, 
insignificant at 0.01 level) (see, corresponding variables with “:3” after the variable names in Table 
3.11). 
When j=5, namely when logit[P(GeneralTrust) ≥ 5|x], being taken advantage has a strongly 
significant negative impact on general trust (𝛽1,5≈ -0.17, significant at 0.01 level), percentage of 
provincial immigrants has an insignificant positive impact on general trust (𝛽6,5≈ 0.46, insignificant 
at 0.05 level), age group has a strongly significant positive impact on general trust (𝛽8,5≈ 0.11, 
significant at 0.001 level), highest education – secondary middle has an insignificant positive impact 
on general trust (𝛽12,5≈ 0.08, insignificant at 0.05 level), highest education – secondary high has an 
insignificant negative impact on general trust (𝛽13,5≈ -0.04, insignificant at 0.05 level), and precept 
has an insignificant positive impact on general trust (𝛽15,5≈ 0.04, insignificant at 0.05 level) (see, 
corresponding variables with “:4” after the variable names in Table 3.11). 
Now let us have a look at the goodness of fit of the ordered logit model (abbr. OLM) and the partial 
proportional odds model (abbr. PPOM). Four indicators of goodness of fit are compared, namely 
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pseudo R2 (MacFadden), deviation and Akaike information criterion (abbr. AIC)1. The higher the 
pseudo R2 and the smaller the deviation, AIC and BIC, the better the fit of a regression model. From 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.11, we can see that the PPOM has smaller deviance and larger pseudo R2, AIC 
and BIC than the OLM. What is more, since OLMs are PPOMs’ nested models with the former 
being the sub-model of the latter, the OLM and PPOM are compared with likelihood ration test (see 
Table 3.12) which indicates that the PPOM is significantly better than the OLM (at the 0.001 
significance level).   
 
1 AIC = 2k – 2ln(L), k is number of parameters and L is likelihood function. 
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Table 3.11 Results of proportional odds model. 
  Estimate Std. error z value Pr (>|z|) Sign. Exp. coef. 
Intercept:1 1.6218  0.4528  3.582 0.0003 ***  
Intercept:2 -2.2041  0.2716  -8.114 0.0000 ***  
Intercept:3 -3.1122  0.2637  -11.803 0.0000 ***  
Intercept:4 -6.6149  0.3904  -16.943 0.0000 ***  
Being taken advantage:1 -0.4345  0.0754  -5.761 0.0000 *** 0.6476  
Being taken advantage:2 -0.3654  0.0331  -11.05 0.0000 *** 0.6939  
Being taken advantage:3 -0.2665  0.0301  -8.864 0.0000 *** 0.7661  
Being taken advantage:4 -0.1715  0.0612  -2.802 0.0051 ** 0.8424  
Social fairness 0.5719  0.0280  20.459 0.0000 *** 1.7716  
Moral satisfaction 0.2058  0.0329  6.25 0.0000 *** 1.2286  
Opinion similarity 0.2938  0.0348  8.441 0.0000 *** 1.3416  
Non-local -0.1997  0.0624  -3.204 0.0014 ** 0.8190  
Percentage of interprovince migration:1 -0.3665  0.5830  -0.629 0.5296  0.6932  
Percentage of interprovince migration:2 -0.1336  0.2882  -0.463 0.6431  0.8750  
Percentage of interprovince migration:3 -0.7199  0.2731  -2.636 0.0084 ** 0.4870  
Percentage of interprovince migration:4 0.4602  0.5545  0.83 0.407  1.5843  
Gender - female -0.1130  0.0545  -2.073 0.0382 * 0.8931  
Age group:1 0.0082  0.0369  0.223 0.8236  1.0083  
Age group:2 0.1095  0.0181  6.057 0.0000 *** 1.1157  
Age group:3 0.1033  0.0168  6.161 0.0000 *** 1.1088  
Age group:4 0.1120  0.0314  3.564 0.0004 *** 1.1185  
Rural 0.3104  0.0652  4.763 0.0000 *** 1.3640  
Social class at 14 years old -0.0290  0.0159  -1.819 0.0690 . 0.9714  
Highest education - elementary 0.0981  0.0968  1.013 0.3109  1.1031  
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  Estimate Std. error z value Pr (>|z|) Sign. Exp. coef. 
Highest education - secondary middle:1 0.1541  0.1814  0.849 0.3956  1.1666  
Highest education - secondary middle:2 0.1385  0.1081 1.281 0.2003  1.1486  
Highest education - secondary middle:3 0.2296  0.1038  2.211 0.0270 * 1.2581  
Highest education - secondary middle:4 0.0781  0.1634  0.478 0.633  1.0812  
Highest education - secondary high:1 0.3685  0.2120  1.739 0.0821 . 1.4456  
Highest education - secondary high:2 0.2159  0.1208  1.788 0.0738 . 1.2410  
Highest education - secondary high:3 0.3262  0.1164  2.801 0.0051 ** 1.3856  
Highest education - secondary high:4 -0.0442  0.2025  -0.218 0.8272  0.9568  
Highest education - tertiary 0.4993 0.1234  4.048 0.0001 *** 1.6475  
Precept:1 -0.0439  0.0816  -0.538 0.5909  0.9571  
Precept:2 0.1836  0.0384  4.782 0.0000 *** 1.2015  
Precept:3 0.1131  0.0356  3.18 0.0015 ** 1.1198  
Precept:4 0.0423  0.0725 0.583 0.5602   1.0432  
Deviance 12587.68           
Log likelihood -6293.838      
AIC 12661.68      
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.0778            
Number of observations 5356           
Notes: Significance code: 0~0.001 “***”; 0.001~0.01 “**”; 0.01~0.05 “*”; 0.05~0.1 “.”. Ordered logit regressions are implemented with R package VGAM. (Yee, 
2017) Name of linear predictor in each model is respectively logit(P[Y≥2]), logit(P[Y≥3]), logit(P[Y≥4]), logit(P[Y≥5]) 
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office 
of the Sixth National Population Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
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Table 3.12 Likelihood ratio test: ordered logit model vs. partial proportional odds model. 
  #Df LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq) Sign. 
Ordered logit model 21405 -6321.9     
Partial proportional odds model 21387 -6293.8 -18 56.069 8.69E-06 *** 
Notes: Significance code: 0~0.001 “***”; 0.001~0.01 “**”; 0.01~0.05 “*”; 0.05~0.1 “.”. 
Implemented with R-package VGAM (Yee, 2017). 
Data source: CGSS 2013 (National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b, 
2013c); the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China (Office of the Sixth National Population 
Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Department of Population and 
Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, pp. 48-49). 
3.5 Interim conclusions 
This chapter is the empirical part of the whole thesis. The main aim of this chapter is to quantitatively 
explore the impact of three aspects on general trust: 1) others’ behaviors of conforming to or 
breaching norms; 2) others’ opinion; 3) geographical mobility. Data from Chinese General Social 
Survey 2013 and the Sixth National Population Census of P.R. China is used for further empirical 
analysis. In regression models in this chapter, general trust is the dependent variable; being taken 
advantage, social fairness, moral satisfaction, opinion similarity, non-local and percentage of 
interprovincial immigration are the core explanatory variables, with the first three variables for the 
impact of norm conforming and the last two for that of geographical mobility; and gender, age 
group, highest education, rural, precept and social class at 14 years old are the control variables.  
Since the dependent variable general trust is a 5-point Likert type item which is an ordinal 
categorical variable type, ordered logit regression is first chosen for econometric analysis. As 
ordered logit models also suffer from multicollinearity, simple and partial correlation coefficients 
and variance inflation factors are used respectively to detect the degree of (multi)collinearity 
between and among those independent variables. Except for some dummies derived from the same 
variable highest education, which is not a problem, no high degree of multicollinearity among 
independent variables is found.  
In the ordered logit regression, as to the core explanatory variables, it is found that being taken 
advantage has a strongly significant negative impact on general trust at the 0.001 significance level, 
social fairness, moral satisfaction and opinion similarity have a strongly significant positive impact 
on general trust at the 0.001 significance level, non-local has a significant negative impact on 
general trust at the 0.01 significance level, while percentage of interprovincial immigration has an 
insignificant negative impact on general trust even at the 0.05 significance level. In addition, proved 
again, the degree of multicollinearity detected before does not generate serious consequences for 
the regression. Moreover, likelihood ratio tests show that the model with all independent variables 
and intercepts significantly holds (at the 0.001 significance level) relative to both the null model 
with only intercepts and the model with only intercepts and control variables.  
However, ordered logit models assume parallel lines across all the cut-points of the dependent 
variable for all independent variables. In order to detect whether the parallel line assumption is 
violated by any independent variable, Brant test is used for this purpose, finding that 6 independent 
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variables (that is, being taken advantage, percentage of interprovincial immigration, age group, 
highest education – secondary middle, highest education – secondary high, and precept) of which 
two are core explanatory variables do not meet the assumption, Therefore, a partial proportional 
odds model is applied to amend the previous ordered logit model by allowing the parameters of 
those variables violating the assumption to be estimated differently at different cut-points of the 
dependent variable. With other independent variables which do not violate the assumption not 
changing in terms of sign, significance and at which significance level is significant in the regression 
results of the partial proportional odds model, being taken advantage remains to present a strongly 
significant negative impact on general trust across all cut-points of general trust at least at the 0.01 
significance level; percentage of interprovincial immigration has a negative impact on general trust 
at the first three cut-points of general trust and a positive impact at the fourth cut-point, but only 
significant (at the 0.01 significance level) at the third cut-point. Moreover, the goodness of fit of the 
partial proportional odds model improves relative to the ordered logit model in terms of their 
deviances, pseudo R2s (McFadden) and AICs. Then, a likelihood ratio test is applied to compare the 
partial proportional odds model and the ordered logit model, finding that the former significantly 
holds (at the 0.001 significance level).  
In summary, what is certain is that others’ conforming to norms and opinion similarity with others 
have a strongly significant positive impact on micro general trust, while geographical mobility has 
a significant negative impact on general trust. Moreover, the first two factors, namely norm-
conforming and opinion similarity, are actually very essential and direct causes. As to provincial-
level geographical mobility, it tends to have an impact of different significances and directions 
across different cut-points of the categories of general trust, but basically, a negative impact. 
Therefore, empirical research of general trust in future is suggested to take into account the impact 
of the three aspects proposed by this chapter. In addition, given the dependent variable is an ordinal 
multi-categorical variable, whether a corresponding partial proportional odds model is needed and 
for which independent variables dependent on the specific data characteristics to some degree.  
It should be noted that although this chapter from three aspects explores what affect general trust, 
not every aspect is suitable for policy implication. Actually, only the first aspect, namely violating 
norms of conduct, is appropriate for policy implication. For example, designing more fair 
mechanisms, educating people to behave morally more, providing more secure public environment, 
and strengthening legislation and law-enforcement are among the alternatives to improve general 
trust. 
  
Chapter 4:  Between Trust and 
Performance: An Information-driven 
Socio-Economic Mechanism on Directed 
Weighted Regular Ring with Agent-Based 
Modeling 
4.1 Introduction  
Trust permeates almost every aspect of social and economic life. It typically functions on human 
individuals and is reflected on their social and economic interactions. From an individual 
perspective, different personal experiences (including direct interaction experiences and observation 
experiences) may drive different trust of individuals. At the same time, individual diverse traits may 
lead to that their trust gets influenced to different degrees by even the same trust-influencing events. 
Put another way, individuals would not react to the same degree to external information; there exist 
people who more easily tend to be influenced. Thus, trust is heterogeneous across individuals. 
The micro interactions can be and are often modeled by games, such as Prisoners’ Dilemmas or 
coordination games et cetera. Cooperation in dilemma-like payoff structure is a remarkable research 
topic in game theory (e.g., Axelrod, 1984). In research of trust by modeling micro interactions as a 
non-cooperative Prisoners’ Dilemma, diachronic share of cooperation in the whole society (number 
of cooperation pair over population size) is often adopted as a measure for (social) trust. One 
possible disadvantage of this method is that given the payoff structure, it cannot distinguish the 
different degrees of influences on an agent of trust-increasing and trust-decreasing events. It implies 
trust-decreasing events have an equivalent absolute impact with trust-increasing events (just in the 
opposite direction). But generally speaking, trust is produced harder but can be destroyed easily. 
Slovic (1993, p. 677) also states, “It (Trust) typically created rather slowly, but it can be destroyed 
in an instant by a single mishap or mistake”. However, this characteristic of trust has rarely been 
considered into formal models.   
Trustworthiness, as an inseparable aspect of trust research, can be reflected not only on the chosen 
strategy, but also on the chosen payoff structure. Given a payoff structure, unilateral defection 
destroys partners’ trust; when an individual enlarges the payoff difference between a unilateral 
cooperator and a unilateral defector of the original payoff structure, his / her unilateral defection 
probably to a larger extent destroys his / her partners’ trust than in the original payoff structure. 
Imagine a situation that a consumer is going to buy baby formula. The bad situation (s)he has known 
or (s)he can imagine is that at worst the formula is not worth the price (s)he has paid. However, the 
consequence turns out to be that the baby of the consumer gets very sick after drinking the formula. 
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The game is still the same one, namely “buying baby formula”, however the payoff structure is not 
consistent with the original one. Thus, it can be said that social trustworthiness also mirrors 
institutional quality: in a society with a relatively perfect institutional system, probably less events 
destroying public trust happen.  
Additionally, people do not definitely participate in a potential interaction. They can make a 
decision not only on which strategy and payoff structure to use in an interaction, but also on whether 
or not to be involved in an interaction (Macy and Skvoretz, 1998). Trust, therein, is a crucial factor 
to enable interactions (Elsner and Schwardt, 2015).  
As to interactions, the probability of encountering different persons is not the same, which is an 
important characteristic of social interactions. The random-pairing mechanism actually implies 
equal probability of meeting any other in the whole simulated population. Macy and Skvoretz (1998, 
p. 642) argue that random-pairing and one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma experiments overlook “the 
embeddedness of the game in social networks”. High degree of embeddedness, in the paper of Macy 
and Skvoretz (1998), means high probability to reencounter each other. Thus, players, in their paper, 
are endowed with two types of relationships, namely neighbors and strangers, and interactions with 
neighbors are set with a high degree of embeddedness while those with strangers with a low degree 
of embeddedness (Macy and Skvoretz, 1998). This is a much more realistic pairing mechanism 
since interactions are locally dense in individual interaction network.  
Interaction density exists, both between neighbors and strangers and within neighbors.  Hence, 
even within neighborhood, interactions also always accompany partner selection. Besides that one’s 
relationships with others are with “to exist or not to exist”, they are also with different link weights 
(Newman, 2004). Strength of social ties is a significant characteristic of social relationships. When 
an individual has an opportunity to interact with one of his / her neighbors, (s)he probably would 
like to interact with those relatively trustworthy.  
Interactions are relatively direct experiences while non-interactions (for simplicity, observation1) 
provide another way to get others’ interaction information. Information both from direct interactions 
and observations is channels that an individual gets to know about the status of the whole society. 
An obvious phenomenon about information diffusion in contemporary era is that its channels get 
more, its coverage gets larger and its speed gets faster. Besides traditional mass media, the 
technological support of improving information technology and internet access, the popularization 
of personal computers and mobile terminals, the emergent new media and the diverse on-line social 
platforms extremely largely improve the probability that an individual acquires information. 
Information acquired through observations (here means non-interactions) which is about others’ 
interactions and contains information of others’ trustworthiness in the society shapes the information 
receivers’ trust. 
It has been realized that taking individual heterogeneity into account in economic research coincides 
with evolutionary thinking. Gowdy et al (2016, p. 327) argue that the average behavior of 
representative agents is one of the causes that make the modern economics non-evolutionary. 
Modeling heterogeneity is the very strength of agent-based modeling (ABM) and is also the core 
 
1 For simplicity, “observation” is used here to refer to all non-interactive ways of acquiring others’ interaction 
information. 
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difference between ABM and other methodologies, such as systematic dynamics. ABM places “a 
strong emphasis on heterogeneity and social interactions” (Banisch, Lima and Araújo, 2012, p. 549). 
So far, ABM, as a methodology (Niazi and Hussain, 2011), gets more and more adopted in research 
in different fields and topics of social sciences (e.g., Axelrod, 1997; Elsner, Heinrich and Schwardt, 
2015, Chapter 9; Epstein, 1999; Gilbert, 2008; Macy and Willer, 2002; Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006, 
among others). Research on trust with agent-based modeling also emerges (e.g., Kim, 2009; Chen, 
Chie and Zhang, 2015). 
In this chapter, agents’ heterogeneity is reflected on three main aspects below: 1) agents’ trust 
(namely, their willingness to participate in a potential interaction in this chapter) and their 
trustworthiness (i.e., their probability to cooperate in an actual interaction in this chapter); 2) agents’ 
capabilities of acquiring others’ interaction information both from his / her neighbors and non-
neighbors, respectively; 3) agents’ trust-updating weights of different acquired interaction 
information (of mutual neighbors or mutual non-neighbors, and from personal interactions or 
observations). As to social interactions, an interaction contains (at least) the decision-makings below: 
1) whether to initiate (or participate in) a potential interaction; 2) which partner to choose if the 
potential interaction is within neighborhood; 3) which (pure) strategy to use in the actual interaction; 
4) which payoff matrix to apply. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the evolution of interaction and cooperation supported by 
individual changing trust and trustworthiness on a directed weighted regular ring network under 
different conditions of environment from the angle of micro scope via designing an agent-based 
model. Additionally, what is presented in the experimental design in this chapter also provides 
useful insights in research of the decline of trust. 
Section 4.2 enumerates some interested parameters and their concrete meaning in my agent-based 
model. Section 4.3 describes the experimental design in detail. Section 4.4 presents results. Section 
4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Interested parameters 
Before presenting experimental design, it is necessary to figure out some parameters and their 
meaning used to explore the socio-economic process underlying trust in our agent-based simulation. 
In a word, they are all about with whom to interact and how, essentially. 
Embeddedness in social network Inspired by Macy and Skvoretz (1998), embeddedness in one’s 
social network here refers to the probability that a potential interaction will be with an immediate 
neighbor. What is more meaningful, social embeddedness can also be used to indicate geographical 
mobility.  
Mutated payoff matrix Mutated payoff matrix is a mutated version of the original and popular payoff 
matrix. Interactions are modeled as symmetric non-cooperative prisoners’ dilemmas in this chapter.1 
The original and the mutated payoff matrix have the same payoff values for pure strategies against 
 
1 It is simply not be distinguished so much between utility payoff and monetary payoff in this chapter; they can be 
distinguished in different actual and concrete situations. 
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themselves, but have different payoff values for pure strategies against the different pure strategies. 
The mutated payoff matrix is endowed with a larger interest conflict and is used as an ingredient of 
indicating relative degree of exploitation of the mutated payoff matrix over the original payoff 
matrix.  
Mutation probability of payoff structure It is the probability that the original payoff matrix is 
changed to the mutated payoff matrix by the initiator of a potential interaction on condition that the 
initiator has decided to play “Defection” in the forthcoming actual interaction. This is an indicator 
for institutional quality in this chapter. 
Probability of interaction information diffusing in neighbors It is the probability that the interaction 
information, including the strategies and payoffs of the interaction parties, gets spread in agents who 
are neighbors of either of the interaction parties. 
Probability of interaction information diffusing in non-neighbors It is the probability that the 
interaction information, including the strategies and payoffs of the interaction parties, gets spread 
in agents who are neighbors of neither of the interaction parties.  
4.3 Experimental design 
4.3.1 Artificial society and network structure 
Consider an artificial society with n agents. The set of all agents is denoted by a finite set N = {ai | 
1≤ i ≤ n, i ∈ N+} with the subscripts representing the unique identity of a given agent. All agents 
are arranged on a directed weighted regular ring sequentially with an equal number of neighbors. 
ai’s neighbors are those who are nearest to him / her on the ring. Let Neigi be ai’s neighborhood, 
then NeigiC = N - Neigi - {a} represents ai’s non-neighbor set. All agents can memorize the identity 
of their neighbors but cannot memorize that of non-neighbors.1 
4.3.2 Initialization of agents’ attributes  
Some important attributes of agents and their initialization are stressed here, although there exist 
some other attributes. Their specific usage will be illustrated in 4.3.3 in detail. 
(i) Trust and trustworthiness 
Both trust and trustworthiness are a float number in range [0, 1].2 If an agent’s trust is equal to or 
higher than 1/2, (s)he is treated as a high trust agent. An agent with probability pHTr (namely 
proportion of high trust agents in the whole population) is initialized as a high trust agent. Agents’ 
trust in ranges [0, 1/2) and [1/2, 1] follows uniform distribution in the corresponding ranges, 
respectively. That is, 
 
1 The set of agents, every agent’s set of neighbors and every agent’s set of non-neighbors are shuffled at the 
beginning of each simulation run after being created.  
2 A direct relation between an agent’s trust and his / her own trustworthiness is not presupposed. This is also in 
accordance with an experimental research of Kiyonari et al (2006) which suggests that trust does not beget 
trustworthiness.  
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  𝑇𝑟𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 ~ {
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𝑡𝑟 ∈ [0, 𝑝𝐻𝑇𝑟)
U (0,
1
2
)      if  𝑟𝑖
𝑡𝑟 ∈ [𝑝𝐻𝑇𝑟, 1]
                     (1) 
𝑇𝑟𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is agent ai’s initial trust. 𝑟𝑖
𝑡𝑟 is a pseudo random number following uniform distribution in 
range [0, 1]. 𝑝𝐻𝑇𝑟 is proportion of high trust agents in the whole population. Similar with trust, an 
agent’s trustworthiness is randomly chosen from uniform distribution [0, 1]. Namely,  
𝑇𝑟𝑤𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  ~ U(0, 1)                            (2) 
𝑇𝑟𝑤𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  is ai’s initial trustworthiness. Trust represents willingness to interact and trustworthiness 
refers to probability to cooperate in an actual interaction. 
(ii) Probability of information acquisition 
Information acquisition here means that an agent acquires others’ interaction information by means 
of non-interaction (e.g., by observing, watching TV news, or surfing the Internet, etc1). An agent’s 
probability of information acquisition indicates his / her capability to obtain and his / her attention 
paid to others’ interactions.  
Each agent has two probabilities of information acquisition: a) probability of acquiring information 
from his / her neighbors, 𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁; b) probability of acquiring information from his / her non-neighbors, 
𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑛. They are both randomly chosen from uniform distribution in range [0, 1] and do not change 
across time. That is, 
𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁 ~ U(0, 1) 
𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑛 ~ U(0, 1) 
Now, let ai be an observing agent temporarily. When a piece of interaction information gets diffused 
within the neighborhoods of two interaction parties, as long as one of the two interaction parties is 
the observing agent’s neighbor, the observing agent ai would following 𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁 observe; when the 
piece of interaction information gets diffused within non-neighborhoods of the interaction parties, 
if neither of the two interaction parties is the observing agent’s neighbor, the observing agent ai 
would following 𝑝𝑖
𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑛 observe.  
(iii) Weights of four kinds of information sources 
It is assumed that there are four kinds of information sources on which an agent can depend to adjust 
his / her trust: a) interactions with neighbors, b) interactions with non-neighbors, c) observing 
interactions between two mutual neighbors, and d) observing interactions between two mutual non-
neighbors.  
Let 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 denote ai’s weight of information about mutual neighbors, let 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 be ai’s weight 
of information about mutual non-neighbors, let 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 represent ai’s weight of information acquired 
through interactions and let 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 indicate ai’s weight of information acquired via observations. All 
 
1 Hereafter, for convenience, I only use “observing” or “observation” to generally refer to ways of acquiring others’ 
interaction information by means of non-interaction.  
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of an agent’s four weights are randomly chosen from uniform distribution on range [0, 1] and do 
not change across time (see Table 4.1). The weights of the four kinds of information sources in trust-
updating are four linear combinations of either 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 or 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠and either 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 or 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 (see 
Table 4.1).1 For example, the weight of interacting with neighbors in ai’s trust-updating is a linear 
combination of 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠  and 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 ; the weight of observing interactions between two mutual 
neighbors in ai’s trust-updating is a linear combination of 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 and 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠. Specifically, we set 
the weights of the four kinds of information sources as follows (see Table 4.1): 
Table 4.1 Weights of four kinds of information sources in ai’s trust-updating. 
 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒~ U(0, 1) 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠~ U(0, 1) 
𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠~ U(0, 1) 0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠) 0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠) 
𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠~ U(0, 1) 0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠) 0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 + 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠) 
(iv) Unilateral link weights 
Unilateral link weights are what an agent, say ai, depends on to actively choose a neighbor as a 
potential interaction partner when his / her scope of choosing is within neighborhood, and unilateral 
link weights do not change within single time periods. A neighbor to whom ai assigns a larger 
unilateral link weight is with a higher probability to be chosen as a potential interaction partner. All 
weights that an agent assigns to his / her neighbors sum up to 1. In the first time period, each 
neighbor of ai is assigned with equal weight by ai and therefore with equal probability to be chosen 
as a potential interaction partner if ai’s choosing scope is within neighbors.  
4.3.3 Micro-level process 
Each time period contains 20 sub-time periods. The micro-level process in each time period contains 
three main tasks: a) in each sub-time period, all agents one by one have an opportunity to actively 
make an interaction request (described in 4.3.3 (i)) and this rotation repeats for 20 times; b) all 
agents one by one update trustworthiness for the next time period (described in 4.3.3 (ii)); c) all 
agents one by one update unilateral link weights for the next time period (described in 4.3.3 (iii)) 
(see also Figure 4.1). 
 
1 Here an implicit assumption is that 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠, 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠, 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒  and 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 are mutually independent.  
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Figure 4.1 An overall framework for micro-level process. 
(i) Interaction, information diffusion and trust-updating 
This part includes 7 steps (see Figure 4.2). As mentioned before, this loop is repeated for 20 times 
before trustworthiness updating.   
(i) Interaction, 
information diffusion 
and trust-updating 
(Repeated for 20 
times)
(ii) To update 
trustworthenss
(iii)To update 
unilateral link 
weights
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
220 
 
 
Figure 4.2 A flow chart for “Interaction, information diffusion and trust-updating” in each sub-time 
period. 
Before we go further, I would like to talk about potential interactions. A potential interaction is 
acquired whenever an agent has an opportunity to interact, however has not yet actually interacted. 
Thus, the number of potential interactions of an agent i in time period t can be calculated in two 
different ways: a) It equals the number of potential interactions with neighbors 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝐼,𝑁 plus the 
number of potential interactions with non-neighbors 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝐼,𝑁𝑛, or b) it equals ai’s active interaction 
requests 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑃𝐼 plus interaction requests from others (passive interactions) 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼. 
a) Interaction decision for an active potential interaction 
For each sub-time period in a time period, every agent in turn in a shuffled order has an opportunity 
to actively make an interaction request to others. Whether an agent will grasp this opportunity to 
enter the next step of choosing a potential interaction partner is determined by his / her willingness 
to interact, namely his / her own trust. That is, ai with a probability equal to his / her trust continues 
to choose a potential interaction partner.  
b) To choose a potential interaction partner   
a) Interaction 
decision for an 
active  potential 
interaction
b) To choose a 
potential 
interaction 
partner
c) Strategy 
decision
d) Payoff matrix 
mutation
e) To play the 
game
f) Diffusion of 
interaction 
information
g) To update 
trust
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From neighbors or non-neighbors? 
Following Macy and Skvoretz (1998), in this chapter, degree of embeddedness in social network is 
also assumed. Degree of embededness in social network, as a parameter, is represented by a float 
number in range [0, 1]. When ai is going to actively propose an interaction request, his / her potential 
interaction partner will be chosen either from his neighborhood with a probability equal to the 
degree of embeddedness in social network or from his / her non-neighborhood with a probability 
equal to 1 minus the degree of embeddedness in social network.1  
Which partner to choose to interact?  
If ai’s potential interaction partner is definitely going to be chosen from neighborhood, which 
neighbor on earth will be chosen hinges on ai’s unilateral link weights that ai assigns to his / her 
neighbors in the current time period. On contrast, if ai’s potential interaction partner is definitely 
from outside of his / her neighborhood, a non-neighbor will be randomly chosen among ai’s non-
neighbors with equal likelihood.  
Will the chosen partner agree to interact? 
Whether ai’s chosen potential interaction partner aj (either a neighbor or a non-neighbor) would like 
to participate in the interaction then depends on the chosen partner aj’s willingness to interact which 
is determined by aj’s own trust. Only if aj agrees to interact, the interaction will actually happen, 
and ai and aj enter the next step of strategy decision; otherwise, the actual interaction won’t happen, 
and ai and aj cannot enter the next step.  
c) Strategy decision 
Each agent uses a mixed strategy for actual interactions. Whether an agent will cooperate or not in 
the forthcoming actual interaction is determined by the agent’ trustworthiness. An agent cooperates 
with a probability equal to his / her trustworthiness and defect with a probability equal to 1 minus 
his / her trustworthiness.  
d) Payoff matrix mutation 
Marginal rate of exploitation and relative exploitation degree 
The actual interaction process is modeled by non-cooperative and symmetric prisoners’ dilemmas.2 
Denote matrix Ag as a general form of payoff matrixes of prisoners’ dilemma and set 
𝑨𝑔 =  [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
]                              (3) 
a11 is an agent’s payoff when both (s)he and his / her partner apply strategy “Cooperation”; a12 is an 
agent’s payoff when (s)he alone uses strategy “Cooperation” while his / her partner uses strategy 
“Defect”; a21 is an agent’s payoff when (s)he plays strategy “Defect” and his / her partner plays 
 
1 “Degree of embeddedness in social network” here only represents the probability that an agent encounters a 
neighbor in a potential interaction; it does not represent an agent’s subjective willingness to interact with a neighbor. 
2 Even though a classical game “Prisoners’ dilemma” in game theory is adopted, strategy updating (trustworthiness 
updating in this chapter) is not directly associated with comparison of utility function in this chapter.  
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strategy “Cooperation”; a22 is an agent’s payoff when both players apply strategy “Defect”. Then, 
the elements of payoff matrix Ag should satisfy 𝑎21 >  𝑎11  >  𝑎22  >  𝑎12 and 𝑎11  >  
𝑎21+ 𝑎12
2
 for 
a game to be a prisoners’ dilemma.  
What is more important for trust-updating later in this chapter, we define marginal rate of 
exploitation (MRE) of a given payoff matrix Ag as 
𝑀𝑅𝐸Ag,𝐶/𝐷 =
𝑎11 −𝑎12
𝑎21 −𝑎11 
                            (4) 
𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑔,𝐶/𝐷 represents marginal rate of exploitation of pure strategy “Defection” to pure strategy 
“Cooperation” under payoff matrix Ag. It measures how much a defector can gain from deviating 
one unit of payoff from pure strategy “Cooperation” on the loss of his / her game partner who is a 
cooperator. MRE is positive. 
Consider two symmetric prisoners’ dilemmas with A and Amut having different numerical payoffs1: 
𝑨 =  [
𝑎11
𝐴 𝑎12
𝐴
𝑎21
𝐴 𝑎22
𝐴 ]              and          𝑨
𝑚𝑢𝑡 =  [
𝑎11
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 𝑎12
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡
𝑎21
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 𝑎22
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡]        (5) 
Therein, Amut is a mutated version of A. Thus, the marginal rate of exploitation of payoff matrix A 
is: 
𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 =
𝑎11
𝐴 −𝑎12
𝐴
𝑎21
𝐴 −𝑎11
𝐴                             (6) 
Besides the general conditions a prisoners’ dilemma should satisfy, A and Amut in this chapter also 
satisfy 𝑎11
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 = 𝑎11
𝐴  , 𝑎22
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 = 𝑎22
𝐴  , 𝑎21
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 > 𝑎21
𝐴  and 𝑎12
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 < 𝑎12
𝐴  to ensure that the mutated 
payoff matrix Amut enlarges the exploitation degree of unilateral defection compared to the original 
payoff matrix A, and to have comparability as well.  
At the same time, we denote relative exploitation degree (RED) of payoff matrix Amut over A as 
𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡/𝐴 =  
𝑎21
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡−𝑎12
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡
𝑎21
𝐴 −𝑎12
𝐴                           (7) 
Relative exploitation degree is constructed to measure to which degree a mutated payoff matrix Amut 
enlarges the interest conflict of the original payoff matrix A.  
Numerically, A = [3 1
4 2
] in this chapter and Amut is a parameter with different candidate values. 
For example, when Amut = [3 0
5 2
], we get 
 
1  It is not specified in this chapter whether the payoffs are utility or monetary payoffs, nor it involves the 
comparability of cardinal utility or ordinal utility; they become more concrete and meaningful in specific situations 
more or less. The meaning behind is obvious in real world. However, thanks to Dr. Rebecca Schmitt for pointing 
this out.  
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𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 =
𝑎11
𝐴 − 𝑎12
𝐴
𝑎21
𝐴 − 𝑎11
𝐴 =
3 − 1
4 − 3
= 2 
𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡/𝐴 =  
𝑎21
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡 − 𝑎12
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡
𝑎21
𝐴 − 𝑎12
𝐴 =  
5 − 0
4 − 1
=
5
3
 
Payoff matrix decision 
Payoff matrix decision comes after pure strategy decision. The interaction initiator (the active 
interactive party) of a potential interaction has an exclusive right to unilaterally change payoff 
matrix from A to Amut with probability pAmut on condition that the interaction initiator has already 
decided to apply “Defection” for this forthcoming actual interaction.1 As long as no payoff matrix 
mutation happens, the interaction will carry on with the original payoff matrix A. That is,  
𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 = {
𝐴         if 𝑟𝑃𝑀 ∈ [0, 𝑝𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡]
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡    if 𝑟𝑃𝑀 ∈ (𝑝𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡, 1)
                         (8) 
𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡,𝜏 represents ai’s payoff matrix decision for his / her active potential interaction in sub-time 
period 𝜏 in time period t. 𝑟𝑃𝑀 is a pseudo random number. Due to the specific conditions that A 
and Amut should satisfy in this chapter, it is assumed that when an active actor chooses Amut: a) the 
passive actor cannot discover (s)he is under Amut unless the passive actor plays “Cooperation”; b) 
observers cannot either detect their observed interaction is under Amut unless the observed interaction 
is unilateral defect. 
e) To play the game 
After a specific action and payoff matrix for the forthcoming interaction have been decided, the two 
interaction parties begin to play the game. What each of both interacting parties should record 
through each actual interaction in the current time period is two aspects: a) counting his / her own 
actual interactions (including both active ones and passive ones) and “Cooperation” (no matter his 
/ her partner cooperates or not) no matter whether his / her partner is a neighbor or a non-neighbor; 
b) counting actual interactions happening with each of his / her neighbors and “Cooperation” that 
each of his neighbors applies to him / her according to his / her neighbors’ identity. All these are 
reset to zero at the beginning of every time period (not sub-time period). Therein, a) is for 
trustworthiness updating and b) is for unilateral link weights updating.  
f) Diffusion of interaction information (Observed by others) 
It is possible that others who are not interacting parties get informed of the situation and result of 
an interaction. Except the two interaction parties, say ai and aj, other agents in the artificial society 
are separated into two sets: one is the union-neighbor set UNeigij in which the agents are neighbors 
of either of the interaction parties; the other is set DNeigij in which agents are neighbors of neither 
of the interaction parties. Thus, when the interaction parties ai and aj are mutual neighbors,  
𝑈𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 ∪ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑗 − {𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗}                      (9) 
 
1 Although mutation probability is very small in nature (Seltzer and Smirnov, 2015), it is not set that small in this 
chapter. 
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𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁 − (𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 ∪ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑗)                         (10) 
When the interaction parties ai and aj are mutual non-neighbors, 
𝑈𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 ∪ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑗                           (11) 
𝐷𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁 − (𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖 ∪ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑗) − {𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗}                     (12) 
The probability that the interaction information of ai and aj diffuses in these two interacting parties’ 
neighborhoods UNeigi,j is pIDN, and the probability diffusing in their non-neighborhoods DNeigi,j is 
pIDNn. Both pIDN and pIDNn are random numbers following uniform distribution in range [0,1] and act 
as parameters.  
Then, the interaction information of ai and aj starts “diffusing” separately in UNeigi,j and DNeigi,j. 
Whether an outside agent ak (an agent who is not one of the interacting parties) will get informed of 
the just happening interaction depends on whether (s)he belongs to UNeigi,j or DNeigi,j, and his / her 
own probability of information acquisition from neighbors 𝑝𝑘
𝐼𝐴𝑁 and from non-neighbors 𝑝𝑘
𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑛. 
What an observing agent will get informed about others’ interaction is: a) the strategy combination, 
that is whether the observed interaction is “mutual cooperation”, “unilateral defection” or “mutual 
defection”; b) the relationship between the observed interacting parties, namely “mutual neighbors” 
or “mutual non-neighbors” and c) the specific payoff matrix, that is whether the payoff matrix is a 
mutated one. Note that Amut can only manifest itself in the situation of unilateral defection because 
Amut has the same values with A in situations of “mutual cooperation” and “mutual defection” 
according to the settings in this chapter. 
g) To update trust 
Trust-updating directions (qualitative trust-updating) 
Changes of trust have three directions: increase, decrease and remain unchanged. In order to clarify 
how trust changes and when, it is necessary for us to at first distinguish trust-increasing events, 
trust-destroying events and trust-invariant events. This is analyzed from two angles: interacting 
agents and observing agents. 
·Interacting agents 
For the two interacting agents, in the situation of mutual cooperation, both agents’ trust increase; in 
the situation of unilateral defection, the cooperative agent’s trust decreases while the defective 
agent’s trust remains unchanged; in the situation of mutual defection, both agents’ trust keeps 
invariant (see Table 4.2). 
·Observing agents 
For an observing agent, (s)he first images which (pure) strategy (s)he would have applied if (s)he 
had been in the interaction. An observing agent’s imagined pure strategy with a probability equal to 
his / her trustworthiness is “Cooperation”. If his / her imagined (pure) strategy is “Cooperation”, his 
/ her trust will increase when (s)he observes mutual cooperation, and his/ her trust will decrease 
when (s)he observes unilateral defection or mutual defection. If his / her imagined (pure) strategy 
is “Defection”, his / her trust will not change. (See Table 4.2) 
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Table 4.2 Trust-updating directions. 
Information acquiring 
method 
Strategy Trust-updating direction 
Interaction self partner self partner 
C C ↑ ↑ 
C D ↓ ---- 
D C ---- ↓ 
D D ---- ---- 
Observation Observed strategy 
combination 
Observer’s imaged strategy 
C D 
Mutual cooperation ↑ ---- 
Unilateral defection ↓ ---- 
Mutual defection ↓ ---- 
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Quantitative trust-updating 
Quantitative trust-updating is based on a certain amount ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 which equals 0.005. How much 
exactly an agent will update his / her trust hinges on: a) marginal rate of exploitation of payoff 
matrix A (namely, 𝑀𝑅𝐸A,𝐶/𝐷 ), b) relative exploitation degree of Amut compared to A (namely, 
𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡/𝐴), and c) ai’s own weights for the four kinds of information sources (the four possible 
combinations of either 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠or 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 and either 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒or 𝑤𝑖
𝑂𝑏𝑠 shown in Table 4.1).  
·Interacting agents 
Assume ai interacts with his / her neighbor aj. If both ai and aj apply “Cooperation”,  
𝑇𝑟𝑖 ← min (𝑇𝑟𝑖 + 0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 + 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒) ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 1)                (13) 
If ai unilaterally uses “Cooperation” under payoff matrix A,  
𝑇𝑟𝑖 ← max (𝑇𝑟𝑖 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝐸
𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 + 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒) ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 0)          (14) 
If ai unilaterally uses “Cooperation” under payoff matrix Amut,  
𝑇𝑟𝑖 ← max (𝑇𝑟𝑖 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝐷
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡/𝐴 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 ∗ (𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 + 𝑤𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒) ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 0)     (15) 
When ai’s interaction partner is a non-neighbor aj, 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 should replace 𝑤𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠. At the same 
time, aj should also update his / her trust according to the same rule. 
·Observing agents 
Assume ak observes the interaction between two mutual neighbors ai and aj. If both ai and aj apply 
“Cooperation” and ak’s imaged pure strategy is also “Cooperation”, 
𝑇𝑟𝑘 ← min (𝑇𝑟𝑘 + 0.5 ∗ (𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 + 𝑤𝑘
𝑂𝑏𝑠) ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 1)               (16) 
If not both ai and aj apply “Cooperation”, when ak’s imaged pure strategy is “Cooperation” and the 
observed payoff matrix is not Amut, 
𝑇𝑟𝑘 ← max (𝑇𝑟𝑘 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝐸
𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 ∗ (𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 + 𝑤𝑘
𝑂𝑏𝑠) ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 0)          (17) 
If not both ai and aj apply “Cooperation”, when ak’s imaged pure strategy is “Cooperation” but the 
observed payoff matrix is Amut, 
𝑇𝑟𝑘 ← max (𝑇𝑟𝑘 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝐷
𝐴𝑚𝑢𝑡/𝐴 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴,𝐶/𝐷 ∗ (𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 + 𝑤𝑘
𝑂𝑏𝑠) ∗ ∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 0)    (18) 
When ak observes an interaction happening between two mutual non-neighbors, 𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 should 
replace 𝑤𝑘
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠.  
(ii) To update trustworthiness 
Agents’ updating of their own trustworthiness is considered as a process of strategy learning. We 
constrain the objects of an agent’s strategy-learning within his / her neighbors. Every agent updates 
his / her trustworthiness near the end of a time period. What needs to be done for an agent ai is 
searching out his / her neighbor, say 𝑎𝑗0, with the highest number of passive potential interactions 
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from neighbors  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼,𝑁 in the current time period. If 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼,𝑁 is larger than ai’s own number 
of passive potential interactions 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼,𝑁 and if j0’s number of actually interaction is not 0, ai 
would switch his / her trustworthiness to 𝑎𝑗0’s cooperation rate of  𝑅𝑗0,𝑡
𝐶 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝐶
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝐴𝐼     (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝐴𝐼 ≠
0) in the current time period t and take it as his / her (mixed) strategy for the next time period; 
otherwise, ai would maintain his / her current trustworthiness over to the next time period. The 
reason why the base of strategy learning is set at agents’ cooperation rate of a current time period t 
rather than agents’ probability of cooperation in an interaction is that it is assumed that an agent’s 
probability of cooperation in an interaction is not observable for other agents while his / her 
cooperation rate is, on contrast. 
Formally, let Neigi represent the set of ai’s neighbor set in which his / her strategy-learning 
candidates are in time period t and aj be an arbitrary element in Neigi. The agent aj0 with the highest 
number of passive potential interactions in the current time step t in Neigi satisfis 
𝑗0 = argmax𝑗{ 𝑗 |  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼,𝑁, 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑖}                     (19) 
Thus, 
𝑇𝑟𝑤𝑖,𝑡+1 =  {
𝑅𝑗0,𝑡
𝐶         if 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼,𝑁 >  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼,𝑁
𝑇𝑟𝑤𝑖,𝑡                                otherwise
                   (20) 
Therein 
𝑅𝑗0,𝑡
𝐶 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝐶
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝐴𝐼     (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝐴𝐼 ≠ 0)                        (21) 
𝑅𝑗0,𝑡
𝐶  represents agent j0’s cooperation rate in time period t, 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝐶  represents agent j0’s total times 
of cooperation in time period t and 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗0,𝑡
𝐴𝐼  represents agent j0’s total times of actual (not potential) 
interactions in time period t.  
(iii) To update unilateral link weights 
At the end of each time step t, each agent updates his / her unilateral link weights for the next time 
step t+1. At first, ai evaluates each of his / her neighbors’ cooperation rate only to him / her according 
to 
𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗 =  {
𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝐼     (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝐼 ≠ 0)
   𝛼       (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝐼 = 0)
          (𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑖)                 (22) 
𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗  represents ai’s evaluation on his / her arbitrary neighbor aj’s cooperation rate to him / her in 
the end of time period t. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗  is the times that ai’s neighbor aj applies “Cooperation” to ai in 
time period t. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝐼  is the times of ai’s actual interactions with his / her neighbor aj in time period 
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t. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠 is ai’s number of neighbors. α is the default cooperation rate estimation and equals 
0.2 which is used as a proxy for 𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗  whenever ai has no actual interaction records of his / her 
neighbor aj in time period t. 
Then ai updates his / her link weights for the next time period t+1 according to the mechanism below:  
𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1,𝜏
𝐴𝑃𝐼 =  
𝑅
𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗
+𝛿
∑ (𝑅
𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗
+𝛿)
𝑖+
𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
2
𝑗=𝑖−
𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
2
=
𝑅
𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗
+
1
𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
∑ (𝑅
𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝐶𝑗
+
1
𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠)
𝑖+
𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
2
𝑗=𝑖−
𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠
2
     
        (23) 
(𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑖 , 0 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑖,𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒 and 𝜏 ∈ N+) 
𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1 represents the unilateral link weight that ai assigns to his / her neighbor aj for the next time 
period. 𝑝𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1,𝜏
𝐴𝑃𝐼  represents the probability that ai actively chooses his / her neighbor 𝑎𝑗 as his / her 
potential interaction partner when ai should choose an potential interaction partner within his / her 
neighborhood in any sub-time period 𝜏  of time period t+1. What is more, we define 𝛿  as 
relationship maintenance strength which is a constant and whose direct purpose is matrix 
completion since the denominator of each element may be zero. It can also be used for: a) controlling 
to which degree a relationship is maintained over to the next time period even if an agent’s neighbor 
defects in all actual interactions between them in the current time period; b) and at the same time 
for an agent to attach enough importance on neighbors’ cooperation rate in the actual interactions 
between them in the current time period. The link-weights updating rule is created like this because 
embeddedness in social network is an interested parameter in this chapter and, hence, it is 
undesirable to totally delete any relationship forever. In this chapter, we set 𝛿 = 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡=1 =
1
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖
𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑠, 
namely ai’s initial unilateral link weight to his / her arbitrary neighbor aj, in order to keep consistent 
with the fact that, generally, a neighbor is with less probability to be chosen in a larger neighborhood. 
Change of link weights reflects heterogeneity of links. 
4.4 Results and analysis 
Parameter values are listed in Table 4.3. Numbers or matrices for compared parameters in Table 4.3 
with a short horizontal line underneath are the parameter values used in baseline simulation. 
Comparison of candidate values of each parameter is based on base-line simulation. For every 
parameter value portfolio under investigation, I am interested in the evolution of: 1) the sum of 
number of actual interaction of all agents ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1 , 2) the sum of number of cooperation of all 
agents ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1   and 3) the difference between them.
1  All simulations in this chapter are 
implemented 800 runs.
 
1 Since each interaction involves 2 agents and each time period contains 20 sub-time periods, the max values of 
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  is 4000. 
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Table 4.3 Parameter values. 
Parameters Value / Candidate values 
Unchanged parameters   
Network size 100 
Number of immediate neighbors 6 
Boundary between low trust and high trust 1/2 
Original payoff matrix [3 1
4 2
] 
Proportion of high trust agents 0.8 
Base of trust updating (∆𝑇𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒) 0.005 
Default cooperation rate estimation (α) 0.2 
Relationship maintenance strength (𝛿) 1/6 
Number of time periods 50 
Number of sub-time periods 20 
Number of simulation runs 800 
Compared parameters   
Degree of embeddedness in social network (se) 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
Mutation probability of payoff structure (mppm) 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 
Mutated payoff structure (Amut) [3 −3
8 2
] , [
3 −2
7 2
] , [
3 −1
6 2
] , [
3 0
5 2
] 
Probability of information diffusion in neighbors (pidn) 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0 
Probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors (pidnn) 0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 
Note: The abbreviations in the parentheses for the six compared parameters are what will be used in legends in graphics 
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4.4.1 Baseline simulation 
Before the comparisons of some groups of parameter values are presented, let us have a quick look 
at the baseline simulation. Figure 4.3 illustrates the baseline simulation with the min, max, median 
and mean of 800 simulation runs. In the baseline simulation, median and mean values of both 
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  of 800 runs decrease first and then soar. The distance of their max 
values and min values are gradually spanning the whole range. Median of the differences between 
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  decreases first then enlarges and then shrinks again, while its mean 
is relatively stable. 
 
Figure 4.3 Baseline simulation. 
4.4.2 Degree of embeddedness in social network  
Four different values are compared for degree of embeddedness in social network, namely se=0.6, 
0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 with the other parameters having the same value with those in the baseline 
simulation. The results of 800 runs are exhibited in Figure 4.4. Under the experimental design in 
this chapter, ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  perform better (have higher values) as degree of 
embeddedness in social networks. In the worst situation of se = 0.6, median of both ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  
and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  of 800 runs even collapse. 
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Figure 4.4 Comparing degrees of embeddedness in social networks. 
When degree of embeddedness in social network is higher, interactions more likely happen within 
neighborhood, ceteris paribus. Thus, when degree of embeddedness in social network is higher, on 
the one hand, an agent’s trust-updating relates stronger to his / her fixed neighbors’ trustworthiness; 
on the other hand, an agent has more samples of the interactions with each neighbor, and more 
values of cooperation rate estimation for each neighbor, and more chances for him / her to update 
trustworthiness, which avoid being locked in low trustworthiness trap. Learnt trustworthiness, then, 
is reflected on interactions. Degree of embeddedness in social network represents an opposite of 
geographical mobility to some extent. Thus, as geographical mobility accelerates, both trust and 
trustworthiness decrease and may collapse.  
As to the relatively stable gap between the mean of ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  of 800 runs, it 
may be attributed to: 1) Information acquisition capability. Assume an agent whose current trust is 
low. If his / her information acquisition capability via observing (both neighbors and non-neighbors) 
is at the same time low, then (s)he has fewer chances to increase trust and will always not participate 
in actual interactions. 2) Unilateral link weights updating. An agent’s most defective neighbor has 
less likelihood to be chosen as a potential interaction partner if other neighbors are more cooperative.  
4.4.3 Mutation probability of payoff matrix 
Four candidates are compared for mutation probability of payoff matrix, namely 0.0, 0.1, 0.2 and 
0.3 with the other parameters having the same value with the baseline simulation. The results are 
shown Figure 4.5. Both ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1   and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1   soar even with different speeds. They 
perform better for mppm = 0 and 0.1 than for mppm = 0.2 and 0.3. 
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Figure 4.5 Comparing mutation probabilities of payoff structures. 
The reason why ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1   and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1   increase under all candidates of mutation 
probability of payoff matrix is that mppm is a conditional probability. That is, it is the probability 
of the original payoff matrix being changed to a mutated one by an initiator of a potential interaction 
on condition that the initiator has already decided to play “Defection” in the forthcoming actual 
interaction, as mentioned before. Therefore, as agents learn to be more trustworthy, they choose 
fewer times of “Defection” for actual interactions. Consequently, the probability of changing payoff 
matrix also gets lower. Because payoff values of a mutated payoff matrix enter trust-updating via 
relative exploitation degree (RED), a mutated payoff matrix renders trust-decreasing more severe 
for a unilateral cooperative party than the original payoff matrix. Therefore, it takes more time for 
trust to recover and arise when mppm is higher, ceteris paribus.  
4.4.4 Mutated payoff matrix 
Four different candidates are compared for mutated payoff matrix, namely [3 −3
8 2
] , [
3 −2
7 2
] ,
[
3 −1
6 2
]  and [
3 0
5 2
] with the other parameters having the same value with the baseline simulation. 
The results are presented in Figure 4.6.  
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Figure 4.6 Comparing mutated payoff matrices. 
As the conflict between a unilateral cooperator and a unilateral defector narrows, both ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  
and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1   soar with a faster speed. It is because relative exploitation degree (RED) 
amplifies the degree of trust-decreasing as ex post conflict of mutated payoff matrix gets stronger, 
which causes trust to decrease more severely for a unilateral cooperator, cetera paribus.  
4.4.5 Probability of information diffusion in neighbors 
Four candidates are compared for probability of information diffusion in neighbors, namely pidn = 
0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.0 with other parameters taking the same value with baseline simulation. Results 
are shown in Figure 4.7. Roughly, under the experimental design and parameters value selection, as 
probability of information diffusion in neighbors gets larger, both ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  
take off faster.  
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Figure 4.7 Comparing probabilities of information diffusion in neighbors. 
As aforementioned, observing is an important channel of acquiring information about others’ 
interactions and, at the same time, trust-updating. A characteristic of information diffusion within 
neighborhoods is that information coverage is relatively small but information arrival is relatively 
frequent. That is, the impact of information diffusion within neighborhoods is mainly local. 
Therefore, agents are more likely to have heterogeneous information via observing neighbors.  
However, it should be mentioned that the impact of information diffusion, both in neighbors and 
non-neighbors, is a subtle issue. The decisive factor of information diffusion may not be the 
probability but the nature of the events getting diffused, namely whether the observed event is a 
trust-increasing one or a trust-decreasing one. As pidn increases, both the chances of observing trust-
increasing events and trust-decreasing events rise, while trust-decreasing events have a larger impact 
on agents’ trust than trust-increasing ones. Thus, the effect of a certain number of trust-decreasing 
events needs a larger quantity of trust-increasing events to compensate. That is, the impact of pidn 
on ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  may depend on the number contrast between trust-increasing 
events and trust-decreasing events. Only when trust-increasing events are observed as many times 
as enough can the two variables of interest soar. The impact of information diffusion is embodied 
more obviously for non-neighbors which is analyzed below. 
4.4.6 Probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors 
Four candidates are compared for probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors, namely 
pidnn = 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 with other parameters sharing the same value with the baseline simulation. 
Results are plotted in Figure 4.8. It can be seen that ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  are more 
sensitive to probability of information diffusion in non-neighbor than in neighbors. As probability 
of information diffusion in non-neighbors gets larger, ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1   and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1   take off 
slower. In the worst situation of pidnn = 0.15, median of ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐼100
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶100
𝑖=1  of 800 
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runs even collapse.  
 
Figure 4.8 Comparing probabilities of information diffusion in non-neighbors. 
As mentioned above, the decisive factor of information diffusion lies in the nature of events getting 
diffused, namely whether the observed event is a trust-increasing one or a trust-decreasing one. This 
kind of impact is amplified for information diffusion in non-neighbors.  
4.5 Interim conclusions 
This chapter explores the evolution of interaction and cooperation, supported by individuals’ 
changing trust and trustworthiness respectively, on a directed weighted regular ring from the angle 
of micro scope by using agent-based modeling. This agent-based model takes into account agents’ 
heterogeneity on: 1) trust and trustworthiness; 2) capabilities of acquiring information from 
neighbors and non-neighbors; 3) weights of different kinds of information sources. It also integrates 
several considerations below via relatively delicate experimental design: 1) a characteristic of trust 
is that trust is destroyed easily and built harder (Slovic, 1993); 2) trustworthiness may be reflected 
on both strategy decision and payoff structure decision; 3) individuals can decide whether or not to 
be involved in an interaction; 4) interaction density exists, not only between neighbors and strangers 
(Macy and Skvoretz, 1998), but also within neighbors; 5) information diffusion.   
This agent-based model regard trust as the decisive factor of willingness to interact and 
trustworthiness as the decisive factor of probability to cooperate, and applies somehow relatively 
plausible trust-updating, trustworthiness-updating and link-weight-updating mechanism. Marginal 
rate of exploitation of original payoff matrix and relative exploitation degree between two payoff 
matrices are stressed in their influence of trust-destroying; influence of observing is introduced via 
imagined strategy; a relationship is maintained through relationship maintenance strength. 
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This chapter probes the impact of degree of embeddedness in social network, mutation probability 
of payoff matrix, mutated payoff matrix, proportion of high trust agents and probabilities of 
information diffusion within neighborhood and among non-neighbors in socio-economic process on 
the sum of number of actual interactions and number of cooperation of all agents on the base of a 
baseline simulation. Under the experimental design and parameter values selection in this chapter, 
basically as degree of embeddedness in social network, proportion of high trust agents 1  and 
probability of information diffusion in neighbors increase and as mutation probability of payoff 
matrix, conflict of mutated payoff matrix and probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors 
decrease, simulation performs better. 
 
1 There is an exception in the impact of proportion of high trust agents, as mentioned above.  
  
Chapter 5:  Summary and Conclusions, 
with Some Thoughts on Information, 
Education and Formal Institutions 
5.1 Summary and conclusions 
This thesis tries to establish first a comprehensive and realistic theoretical system in which trust 
changes, and then explores different interesting issues using different methods like comparison 
analysis, econometric analysis and agent-based modeling. The theoretical system restored in this 
thesis integrates a series of realistic factors in socio-economic environment besides trust, like 
information, social learning, network, institutions, geographical mobility and so on, and covers 
gradually increasing levels from individual thoughts and behavior, to interactions, to networks, and 
to multi-networks. The underlying logic of linking those realistic factors is: Trust, especially its 
change, is subject to the perception of trustworthiness. Information reflecting trustworthiness plays 
a decisive role in trust changing. Not conforming to institutions is an important embodiment of 
untrustworthiness, and is therefore a significant factor causing distrust. Moreover, trustworthiness 
per se is an institution. Information process and social learning process overlap to a substantial 
degree. Ways of acquiring information coincide with that of social learning. Through social learning, 
behavior can directly be acquired (such as, trustworthy behavior), which makes social learning play 
an important role in nurturing institution-conforming behavior. What is more, social learning can 
also change thoughts (such as, change cognition to social environments), and then guides conscious 
behavior (such as, to trust according to trustworthiness). Information functions through personal 
psychology eventually. Social networks are where information is acquired, social learning is going 
on, behavior is output and information is diffused subsequently. Geographical mobility changes 
individual local interaction network.  
This thesis contains six sections in total: an introduction and 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is the theoretical 
part; Chapter 2 is basically the comparison part between China and three Scandinavian countries – 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden; Chapter 3 is the empirical part using survey data from China; and 
Chapter 4 is the simulation part using the cutting-edge method of agent-based modeling, also 
involving some knowledge of network theory and game theory.  
Chapter 1 is the theoretical part of this thesis. It integrates the factors of trust, information, social 
learning, network, institutions, geographical mobility, etc. guided by the logic stated above, and 
basically unfolds along the line of individuals, interactions, networks and multi-networks. It can be 
viewed as composed of three big plates: first, basics of trust; second, trust and trustworthiness per 
se; third, other factors mentioned above (namely, information, social learning, network, institutions, 
geographical mobility) constituting the realistic system where trust changes.    
In terms of basics of trust, this chapter first discusses some conceptual aspects of trust, that is, its 
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connotation, characteristics, types, distinctions between general trust, group trust and trust in 
strangers, the mechanism of the formation and function of individual general trust, and current 
measurements of (generalized) trust from different perspectives and in different levels. Individual 
trust is a corresponding and reactive attitude based on one’s perception of others’ trustworthiness. 
Trust is conditional on trustworthiness, relies on information, is risk-relevant ex ante, and is slow to 
establish, fast to decline and hard to rebuild. Individual general trust is his / her overall assessment 
of the trustworthiness of unspecified others in the society. From an individual perspective, the 
difference between general trust and particular trust lies in whether the trust object(s) is / are 
specified; The difference between general trust and group trust lies in whether there is a definitive, 
clear characteristic or criterion to define a certain group; and the difference between general trust 
and trust in strangers lies in whether there is the explicit distinction of the distance of personal 
relationships. The generalization of trust can be treated as a subjective referred result from a sample 
of population to the whole population. The generalization of trust is to a large extent experience-
oriented, or backward-looking, while its output is expectation-oriented, or forward-looking. When 
functioning, general trust is reflected in a particular way. After being experienced, uncertainty will 
turn into established facts and certainty. The impact of consistency of expectation and a later fact on 
trust also depends on whether the expected thing is desirable or undesirable. Experience can be 
categorized as childhood and adulthood experience, personal and non-personal experience, and 
positive and negative experience. Expectation can be positive or negative, self-based or cause-based, 
and quantitative or qualitative. Existing measures of general trust include measuring general trust 
using micro-level or aggregate macro-level survey data, measuring social trust using the cooperation 
share in evolutionary game theoretical agent-based models, and representing micro trust using 
probability. 
In terms of trust and trustworthiness, this chapter illustrates trust at individual (micro) level from 
the two aspects of thoughts and behavior from the perspective of a trustor, the relation between trust 
and trustworthiness, the costs of trustworthiness, the role as a trustor and a trustee, and explains trust 
and trustworthiness between 2 persons and how to understand the supply and demand of trust and 
trustworthiness. Thoughts, from the perspective of an individual trustor, stress the psychological or 
mental process of how a trustor in his / her mind processes information of others’ trustworthiness. 
To which degree a person would react to trustworthiness information depends largely on personal 
preference, opinion, emotional attitude, etc. Human capabilities of reasoning, inference and 
association etc. also play a crucial role in one’s trust in future similar situations or in other people 
with common and / or similar characteristics. Behavior is an expression of the results of one’s 
thinking process to a large extent. An interaction of two parties can either involve unilateral trust or 
bilateral mutual trust. An interactive trusting-trusted relationship necessitates the consent to an 
interaction and the specific implementation process afterwards. Interactions are the most important 
channel that trustors show their trust attitude. An interaction involves a bunch of decisions through 
which a trustor can influence and shape the interaction. Trustworthiness is not only the basis of trust, 
but also reacts to it. Costs of untrustworthiness to others can be both individual and social. Individual 
costs from untrustworthiness of others can be a direct monetary loss, unwillingness to future 
potential interactions, or searching costs for a reliable interactor. Distrust may also trigger more use 
of existing individual social network. Social costs of untrustworthiness lie in its detriment to value 
creation. The roles of a trustor and a trustee in a 2-person trusting-trusted relationship represent 
either correspondence or superposition. One may also adjust his / her trustworthiness according to 
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others’ trustworthiness. The supply of trust means to trust, and the demand for trust means the 
demand for being trusted; the supply of trustworthiness means being trustworthy while behaving, 
and the demand for trustworthiness means the demand for the trustworthiness of others’ behavior. 
The supply and demand of trust and trustworthiness can be compared without specific quantity.    
In terms of some essential, decisive factors pushing the functioning of trust mechanism and 
underpinning the change and coevolution of trust and trustworthiness, this chapter pays attention to 
information, social learning, networks, geographical mobility and institutions. Behavior is the 
fundamental source of information of one’s own trust and trustworthiness. Behavior can be solo or 
interactive, and internalization-based or internalization-lacking. Information reflecting others’ 
trustworthiness is crucial for one’s trust. Information can be categorized as solo behavior or 
interactive behavior information, personal interaction or non-personal interaction information, 
individual-particular or phenomenon-particular information, natural-personal or media information, 
or personal interaction and observation information, or direct and indirect information. Social 
learning is an important channel for acquiring both thoughts and behavior, including trust and 
trustworthiness. Social learning can be direct or indirect learning, forward or reverse learning, 
learning from the same standpoint or from the counter standpoint, and active or passive learning. It 
can be from parents, neighbors or even strangers. Immediate interaction network, temporary 
interactions, observation, verbal delivered information, written records could all become channels 
for social learning. A shorter distance – geographical, social or psychological – facilitates 
interactions. So does being involved in the same interaction platform. Interaction platforms can form 
based on geographical locations, organizations, social roles, events, technology, or era. Flows should 
also be treated as a basic element of networks, besides nodes and links. For micro individuals to 
generate macro phenomena, four steps, namely endowment / networking process, micro effects, 
synthetization process and macro-level presentation, may be experienced. The reason why macro 
network phenomena are rich and constantly changing in reality lies in the driving of heterogeneity. 
The heterogeneity of networks may be embodied on nodes, links, flows, game types / structures, 
interaction platforms, and network structures. Geographical mobility changes individual local 
interaction network, and has a time and distance dimension. Three kinds of trust decline may be 
caused by geographical mobility: different background mindsets, different standpoints, and the 
coexistence of a large and dense population in an area and high mobility which creates conditions 
for untrustworthy behavior. In addition, geographic mobility may also accompany social mobility. 
Not conforming to institutions is a non-negligible cause for distrust. Institutions can be categorized 
as problem-solving, problem-avoiding, influence- / problem-controlling and blame-apportioning, or 
as values-type institutions and constructed institutions, according to different criteria. 
Trustworthiness per se, as an institution, is values-type. Problems are the prime target of institutions 
usually, which requires the manifestation of problems as a prerequisite. Institutions centering around 
problems may touch different depths of problems. Behavioral requirements on others and the 
changeability of the relatively advantageous role in various interactions push the origin of 
institutions. Continuous geographical distribution of population and population mobility favor the 
diffusion of institutions. An institution’s prevalence from generation to diffusion presents three 
patterns of special structure at least, that is, single-point radiation, multi-points outburst and 
diffusion in virtue of population mobility. Besides the reasons stressed by Axelrod (1986) and 
Posner (1997), people may also conform to institutions because complying with institutions is easier 
and more convenient, makes one the right party in normal cases, implies an exchange for others’ 
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institution-obeying behavior, or is motivated by the changeability of the relatively advantageous 
role in various interactions. Among all the reasons, reputation outstands for its strong dependence 
on information process. It can be said that trust and its change are in an interwoven system composed 
of institutional networks, causality networks and personal information networks.  
Economic life is part of social life. In the socio-economic system, economic transactions are a 
specific, important form of interpersonal interactions. In economic transactions, individual (dis)trust 
may cause a series of effects of compression effect, substitution effect, brand-reliance effect, search 
effect, “experts” effect, self-provision effect and mismatch effect. Therein, substitution effect may 
be horizontal, vertical or cross substitution. Through a series of effects like these, trust shapes 
economy at the micro-level, which will be reflected on its macro-level performance through a 
bottom-up process. 
Chapter 2 compares or contrasts or presents several socio-economic aspects of China and three 
Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The selected socio-economic aspects for 
comparison or presentation include population, network structures, welfare, equality, geographical 
mobility, social capital, trust, public security, performance of labor market, and economic growth. 
Not only the possible logic between these aspects and trust (except trust per se) is explained; rich 
corresponding data of each aspect of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and China is also presented for a 
relatively comprehensive understanding of the four countries.  
The prime reason for stressing population is the volume of information reflecting others’ 
trustworthiness associated with population size. A larger and denser population means more pieces 
of interaction information of others’ trustworthiness, ceteris paribus. Also, a larger size of 
population associates with more strangers and a higher degree of heterogeneity in population 
characteristics, although heterogeneity in population characteristics is not a deep and essential cause 
of distrust. China is a population-large country, while all of Denmark, Norway and Sweden are 
population-small ones, which determines to a large degree that there are probably more pieces of 
information reflecting trustworthiness of others within China than in Denmark, Norway or Sweden. 
However, as said in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, information can be positive or negative, which for 
trust can be trust-increasing or trust-decreasing. The final effect of information on individual trust 
attitude lies in the relative strength of the two kinds of information functioning on people. 
Network structures reflect interaction structures to a large degree. Individual social network is the 
source of individual social capital. China and the West present different social network structures. 
The West has prevalent group life, while China does not (Liang, [1949] 2005). The Chinese society 
is cha xu ge ju, while the Western societies are tuan ti ge ju (Fei, [1947] 2017). One’s family is 
usually his / her closest social circle. Taking sibling numbers as a proxy for family structure, Danish 
children have more siblings than Chinese ones. Denmark encourages childbearing and has 
corresponding supporting (welfare) policies, while many contemporary young Chinese would not 
like to give birth to more children because of pressure from money, career, time or energy, although 
the family planning policy in China has been relaxed gradually. Memberships reflect individual 
relatively formal social network. Danish, Norwegian and Swedish participate in more formal groups, 
and are more active in various groups than Chinese. In fact, Chinese more would like to be involved 
in informal social circles where a rapport with others is established gradually in naturally occurring 
interactions.  
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Denmark, Norway and Sweden are outstanding representatives of modern welfare states, and are all 
countries with a small-size and relatively homogenous population. The subtle balance between 
efficiency and fairness may influence whether welfare states can benefit economic performance. 
The structure of tax revenues and expenditures play a role therein. Moreover, good economic 
performance provides an economic foundation for the implementation of comprehensive and 
generous welfare policies. Universal welfare has both advantages and disadvantages. Given the 
relatively normal operation of economy, polices encouraging employment benefit the co-existence 
of universal welfare and good economic performance. Historical reasons, values basis, economic 
basis and the ruling party all contribute to the implementation and maintenance of the relatively 
comprehensive and generous welfare policies in the Nordic countries. From data, we can see that 
the total welfare expenditure and welfare expenditure per capita of Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
are relatively high. In addition, China has been improving its social security via reforms. 
Social trust and welfare can benefit from each other. Also, equality and extended welfare states can 
be mutually promoted. However, the equality that facilitates the initiation of an extended welfare 
state and that an extended welfare state leads to are not of the same kind. Comprehensive, universal 
and generous welfare gives people a sense of safety. Given that equality is basically one of the 
values of a society, equally rich and equally poor may have an opposite impact on interpersonal 
trust. Taxes and transfers in Denmark, Norway and Sweden play a significant role in reducing the 
gap of disposable income among people in the three countries, and good economic performance 
makes them avoid the state of being equally poor. 
Two types of uncertainty may exist in reality: one is that both an event and its future occurring time 
are uncertain; the other is that some event is almost certain, while the relatively specific occurring 
time of that event is not quite certain. Welfare policies are conducive to protecting people from 
uncertainty in life to some degree. Continuity of policies provides certainty and a stable expectation 
for the public, while uncertainty causes people to distrust uncertainty-makers. It should be noted 
that change does not mean uncertainty. (Policy) Changes per se do not definitely result in direct 
distrust in policy-makers or possible indirect distrust to other people in the society. It depends on 
whether (the general trend of) the change is good or bad. Additionally, according to corresponding 
data, Denmark, Norway and Sweden have relatively little corruption around the world, which is an 
advantage for them to serve the people better. 
Social mobility reflects social fairness to a large degree. Social fairness is a value-type institution 
violating which will harm social trust. In general, Chinese feel that both their subjective social 
stratum and their subjective socio-economic status increase when compared with past oneself. In 
contrast, a vast majority of Chinese feel that their subjective socio-economic status is the same with 
or lower than peers. The perception of upward social mobility may benefit from the improvement 
of living conditions brought by economic development as time goes on and by personal wealth 
accumulation and achievement with age to a large degree. Additionally, gaokao plays an important 
and positive role in social mobility in China. Moreover, geographical mobility often accompanies 
social mobility and local interaction network, as figured out in Chapter 1, as well as local socio-
economic and policy environment. Geographical mobility in China often involves the issue of hukou 
to which employment, children’s education, social security, public services and so on are attached. 
China has been reforming its Huji system. A number of local governments have made a looser 
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hukou-settling policy as one of the measures of attracting people to stay or to come. To retain people 
ever attracted there, those cities should also increase the supply and improve the quality of education, 
healthcare, infrastructure, etc. accordingly.  
Individual social capital relates to personal relationships and benefits its owner. One can acquire 
physical, financial and emotional support, information and even more social capital from his / her 
own social capital. However, there are two opposite opinions among scholars as to the necessity of 
the term “social capital”. For example, Arrow (1999) and Solow (1999) do not think the term is 
necessary. Individual social capital implies a two-way relationship. Additionally, trust is a sufficient 
but not necessary condition of social capital. The total social capital one possesses hinges on both 
the quantity and the quality of the relationships in his / her egocentric network. The capacity, vertical 
position and social capital of the other person on the other end of a relationship plays a decisive role 
of the quality of a person’s social capital. Data of frequency of meeting people, social activities 
compared with peers, discussing intimate matters, social activities in leisure time, diversity of 
occupations in personal social network, besides number of siblings and membership, of China, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden is selected to reflect the social capital in the four countries. 
Norwegian present the highest frequency of meeting people among the three Scandinavian countries, 
followed by Swedish and then by Danish. However, Norwegian take part in social activities 
compared to peers less often than Swedish, and Swedish less often than Danish. Norwegian have 
the lowest average number of persons to whom one can talk personal matters among the three 
Scandinavian countries, while Swedish have the largest. The self-reported frequency of participating 
social activities in China has increased to some degree during those 6 years. Peasants among the 
given options of occupations account for the largest proportion of whom people in China have dealt 
with, followed by a gradually reducing proportion of middle school teachers, nurses, policemen / 
policewomen, hairdressers, university lectures, HR managers, programmers, receptionists and 
lawyers, respectively. Generally, more people in China have less diversity of occupations in their 
social networks, and the number of respondents who know people from more occupations reduces 
with a gradually increasing rate as the number of the kinds of occupations in social networks 
increase. 
All of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden present high general trust around the world. Denmark 
shows the highest general trust among the four countries, followed by Norway and Sweden. 
Moreover, Swedish also show higher trust of different relationships than Chinese in general. Chinese 
trust in 13 kinds of people in social interactions without pecuniary benefits in another dataset is also 
presented. These 13 kinds of people better reflect relationships in Chinese mind. In these 13 kinds 
of people, “Relatives”, “(Near) neighbors”, “Colleagues” and “Old classmate” are the four kinds of 
people that Chinese trust most, while “Strangers”, “Non-close friends / acquaintances”, “People 
from the same place with them but met in other places (not within their city or county)” and “People 
joining the same religious activities with them” are the four kinds of people that Chinese distrust 
most. Additionally, it is natural and normal for people to trust more those with whom they have a 
closer relationship, no matter of which country the people are. 
All the four countries of China, Denmark, Norway and Sweden perform well in unemployment rate. 
China represents a relatively low unemployment rate, either in terms of registered urban 
unemployment rate or nationwide surveyed urban unemployment rate. Norway among the four 
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countries has the lowest unemployment rate, while Sweden the highest. China performs better than 
the other three countries in terms of economic aggregate. However, the GDP per capita of China is 
much lower than that of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Chapter 3 quantitatively, empirically explores the impact of others’ norm-conforming behavior, 
others’ opinion and geographical mobility on individual general trust using micro data from Chinese 
General Social Survey 2013 and the provincial data from the Sixth National Population Census of 
P.R. China. In this chapter, being taken advantage, social fairness, moral satisfaction, opinion 
similarity, non-local and percentage of interprovincial immigration reflecting the three interested 
aspects are chosen or constructed as the core explanatory variables, with general trust being the 
dependent variable, and gender, age group, highest education (split into several dummies), rural, 
precept and social class at 14 years old the control variables. In the 6 core explanatory variables, 
the first three variables are for the impact of norm-conforming and the last two for geographical 
mobility. 
Due to the ordinal categorical nature of the dependent variable general trust, ordered logit regression 
is first chosen for econometric analysis. In order to detect the degree of (multi)collinearity between 
and among those independent variables beforehand, simple and partial correlation coefficients and 
variance inflation factors are calculated, finding no serious multicollinearity among independent 
variables. In the ordered logit regression, almost all core explanatory variables present an expected 
impact and strength: being taken advantage and non-local have a strongly significant negative 
impact on general trust, and social fairness, moral satisfaction and opinion similarity have a strongly 
significant positive impact on general trust; however, percentage of interprovincial immigration’s 
negative impact on general trust is not significant. Moreover, likelihood ratio tests also show that 
the model with all independent variables (and intercepts) strongly significantly holds relative to both 
the null model with only intercepts and the model with only control variables (and intercepts).  
Subsequently, Brant test is used to see whether the parallel odds assumption is violated by any 
independent variable. It is found that some independent variables, of which two are core explanatory 
variables of interest (that is, being taken advantage and percentage of interprovincial immigration) 
do not meet the assumption. Therefore, a partial proportional odds model is applied to amend the 
previous ordered logit model by relaxing the assumption for the parameters of those variables 
violating the assumption. It is found that being taken advantage remains to present a strongly 
significant negative impact on general trust across all cut-points of general trust at least; percentage 
of interprovincial immigration has a negative impact on general trust at the first three cut-points of 
general trust and a positive impact at the fourth cut-point, but only significant at the third cut-point. 
More importantly, those independent variables not violating the assumption do not change in terms 
of sign, significance and at which significance level is significant. Furthermore, the partial 
proportional odds model has a higher pseudo R2 (McFadden) and a lower deviance and AIC than 
the ordered logit model, and the likelihood ratio test also shows the partial proportional odds model 
significantly holds.  
In a word, the empirical research of this chapter proves evidence for the significant impact of others’ 
norm-conforming behavior, similarity degree of opinion with others and individual geographical 
mobility on general trust.  
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Chapter 4 explores the evolution of interaction and cooperation, supported by individuals’ changing, 
information-driven trust and trustworthiness respectively, on a directed weighted regular ring using 
agent-based modeling. The model takes into account agents’ differences in trust, trustworthiness, 
capabilities of acquiring information from neighbors and non-neighbors, and weights of different 
kinds of information sources. It integrates several considerations via delicate experimental design: 
a) a characteristic of trust is that trust is destroyed easily and built harder (Slovic, 1993); b) 
trustworthiness may be reflected on both strategy decision and payoff structure decision; c) 
individuals can decide whether or not to be involved in an interaction; d) interaction density exists, 
not only between neighbors and strangers (Macy and Skvoretz, 1998), but also within neighbors; e) 
information diffusion.   
This agent-based model regards trust as the decisive factor of willingness to interact and 
trustworthiness as the decisive factor of probability to cooperate, and applies somehow relatively 
plausible trust-updating, trustworthiness-updating and link-weight-updating mechanism. Marginal 
rate of exploitation of original payoff matrix and relative exploitation degree between two payoff 
matrices are stressed in their influence of trust-destroying; influence of observing is introduced via 
imagined strategy; a relationship is maintained through relationship maintenance strength. 
This chapter probes the impact of degree of embeddedness in social network, mutation probability 
of payoff matrix, mutated payoff matrix, and probabilities of information diffusion within 
neighborhood and among non-neighbors in socio-economic process on the sum of number of actual 
interactions and number of cooperation of all agents on the base of a baseline simulation. Under the 
experimental design and parameter values selection in this chapter, basically as degree of 
embeddedness in social network, proportion of high trust agents1 and probability of information 
diffusion in neighbors increase and as mutation probability of payoff matrix, conflict of mutated 
payoff matrix and probability of information diffusion in non-neighbors decrease, simulation 
performs better.  
5.2 Some thoughts on information, education and formal 
institutions 
5.2.1 About information 
With the increasing improvement of information technology and the popularity of the Internet, 
personal computers and mobile devices, what are playing the role of media has not been only limited 
to the traditional mass media. It is often said that this is an era in which everyone is self-media or 
we-media. Social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Weibo, WeChat, etc. have 
increasingly become important channels for people to post and acquire information quickly. Given 
that supporting infrastructure and devices are ready, registering an account, people can post 
messages, including exposing undesirable phenomenon in the society which may involve individual 
persons, companies / firms, other organizations, events, behavior and so on, freely at any time and 
place within the permission of laws. At the same time, acquisition of information also has already 
 
1 There is an exception in the impact of proportion of high trust agents, as mentioned above.  
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transcended the (online) social interactions with people in one’s close social circles, such as parents, 
relatives, friends and acquaintances.   
In view of the characteristics of information’s diffusion on the Internet (especially on social media 
platforms), the two points below should be better done about posting information on the Internet 
and the information posted on the Internet: First, information posters should ensure the truth of the 
posted information, not deliver pseudo information or spread rumors, not deliberately distort facts 
or posted information, and refute rumors promptly. Illegal behavior or other undesirable 
phenomenon should be posted out of social justice to reveal problems in the operation of the society. 
Second, relevant administrative superintending departments should take active actions to duly 
handle the exposed problems. Laws, regulations, etc. should be enacted or perfected when necessary 
in order to deal with future similar issues.   
Suppose that exposed information is true, or at least the truth is gradually unfolding, and it is 
exposed out of social justice. Then, as to exploded undesirable phenomenon in society, there could 
be at least three kinds of exposure effects: First, follow-up exposure effect, which means to timely 
follow up the unfolding of an exposed, socially undesirable event. Second, similarity exposure effect, 
which means that an exposed undesirable event causing wide social attention may also cause similar 
events in society of other subjects to expose, especially intensively in a short-term afterwards and / 
or intermittently in a relatively long term after the original strong emotion of the public has faded. 
Third, full exposure effect, which means that once a subject has been exposed to some untrustworthy 
behavior, other untrustworthy behavior of it may also be exposed subsequently, maybe by other 
exposers, if there are.  
As to information, one point is noteworthy. Incomplete information, especially lack of key detail 
information, could lead to incorrect inference, even one opposite to actual situation. Likewise, lack 
of key detail information about trustworthiness could probably lead to a mistaken judgment on 
trustworthiness, subsequently an unblinded but mistaken trust. 
5.2.2 About education 
Different people, such as parents, teachers, etc., may have influenced one’s thoughts and behavior, 
with different degrees, as (s)he grows up. Indeed. Human society has developed for such a long time 
that there are many things that we do not have to learn lessons through personal experience of 
failures. Humans have already accumulated a lot of wisdom to guide the contemporary people and 
to pass on from generation to generation. Undoubtedly, in general, school education (including 
kindergarten and preschool education here) plays a significant role in shaping one’s values and 
personal qualities. Normally, formal school education is usually throughout the relatively early stage 
of one’s life, say, from 4 to 20 plus years old, namely from kindergarten to doctor. Furthermore, 
individual integrity education is always in the former part of his / her formal school education, such 
as in the preschool, elementary and junior secondary education. Admittedly, individuals’ opinion, 
values, etc. may change with later experience, and some people might learn some so-call socially-
adapted behavior which actually breaches socially acceptable behavioral norms. However, it does 
not deny the importance of the early stages of one’s life like childhood, teenage, etc. which are the 
critical periods for the formation of ones’ values, personality, disposition, and so on. 
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The contents of school education can be generally categorized as two aspects: one is the knowledge 
of different disciplines; the other is how to conduct oneself. Thus, in formal school education, 
especially the relatively early preschool, elementary and junior secondary education, not only 
knowledge should be taught, but also right values, view of morality, what is wrong and what is right, 
what behavior is socially acceptable, what behavior is legal and what is not, and so on should be 
consciously infused so that a child can grow up to be a person with good qualities, say trustworthy, 
with a larger probability in future.  
From an individual perspective, education not only favors individual human capital, but also 
personal quality. In view of the two important points of the meaning of education, we can increase 
the penetration rate of education, regulate a lowest length of schooling, and improve the quality of 
teachers. Although education is a long-term investigation and cannot be accomplished overnight, 
obviously, it must be paid enough attention all the time. 
5.2.3 About formal institutions 
In order to achieve better social outcomes, people nowadays often turn to institutions to solve 
coordinate problems. The scope of institutions’ influence can be geographically very large and cover 
a large number of people. Policies, as a specific form of institutions, also have the characteristic of 
not changing with population mobility, within the scope of their influence, to a large degree. That is 
to say, institutions have resistance to geographic population mobility. Therefore, institutions should 
be made to play a larger role when geographic population mobility is high. Thus, in order to achieve 
better social outcomes, some degree of the courage of “creative destruction” of formal institutions 
is often needed. However, when making a policy, at least two problems should be tried to avoid in 
order for the policy to be smoothly implemented and to achieve the expected aim. Both the two 
problems may happen in the implementation process.         
First, the premise of a good policy to have the expected effects, given that it does have those effects, 
is for it to get implemented first. Therefore, precautions should be taken to prevent a good policy 
from not being actually implemented by some people due to their countermeasures against the 
policy out of seeking for individual interests in the implementation process. Those rule-breakers 
with socially disapproved behavior may take some measures which appear obedient to the policy, 
but actually are ways to circumvent it to avoid loss of, or even increase, their personal interests. This 
kind of behavior would lead the policy to stay virtually nominal to a considerable degree.     
Second, even when a formal rule is implemented as expected and its loopholes, if any, are not 
deliberately exploited, there could still be problems in the implementation process. For example, 
some policies could have been made not very thoughtfully only focusing on the problem per se at 
hand and without giving enough consideration about related supporting measures and / or deeper 
causes, leading to institutional blanks and causing new coordinate problems due to lack of 
institutional basis. Therefore, in order to prevent this kind of problems in the implementation process 
of a policy, more thoughtful should be policy-makers when making a policy, and more than one step 
should be taken into consideration.  
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Appendix A:  Selected questions from CGSS 2013 
Questionnaire B1 
Section A: 
A2. Gender 
Male …… 1 
Female …… 2 
A3. What is your birth date? 
____Year__Month__Day 
A24. In which year was your hukou transferred into this locality (this district/county/county-level 
municipality)? (Please fill in the specific number on the lines below) 
Record: [ _ | _ | _ | _ ] year 
9997. I have been in this locality since I was born 
A25. In which year did you come to live here (this district/county/county-level municipality)? 
(Please write the specific number on the lines below) 
Record: [ _ | _ | _ | _ ] year 
9997. Have been living here since born. → Skip to A27 
A33. Generally speaking, do you agree that most people can be trusted in this society? 
Strongly disagree …… 1 
Disagree …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Agree …… 4 
Strongly agree …… 5 
A34. In general, do you agree that in this society others would try to take advantage of you if you 
are not careful enough? 
Strongly disagree …… 1 
Disagree …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Agree …… 4 
Strongly agree …… 5 
A35. Generally speaking, do you think the current society is fair? 
Completely unfair …… 1 
Unfair …… 2 
Neither …. 3 
Fair …. 4 
Completely fair …… 5 
A43. In our society, some people are on upper class of the society while some are on lower class. 
[…] The highest score ‘10’ represents the highest class while the lowest score ‘1’ refers to the lowest 
class.  
 
1 Author’s own translation from Chinese to English. For the original questionnaires and the dataset of CGSS 2013, 
see, National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China (2013a, 2013b, 2013c). 
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    …… 
A43d. Which class do you think your family was at when you were 14 years old? 
A49. How good do you think your mandarin listening? 
Completely cannot understand …... 1 
Poor …… 2 
Fair …… 3 
Good …… 4 
Very good …… 5 
A50. How good do you think your mandarin speaking? 
Completely cannot speak …... 1 
Poor …… 2 
Fair …… 3 
Good …… 4 
Very good …… 5 
Section B: 
B3. Do you agree with the statement that “It is very hard for me to choose what precepts to follow.” 
Strongly disagree …… 1 
Disagree …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Agree …… 4 
Strongly agree …… 5 
B4. According to your general impression, how often do you hold the same opinions and views with 
the public on some important things? 
Very rarely …… 1 
Rarely …… 2 
Average …… 3 
Frequently …… 4 
Very frequently …… 5 
Section D: 
D1. To what degree are you satisfied with the moral status in our country? 
Very satisfied …… 1 
Satisfied …… 2 
Neither …… 3 
Dissatisfied …… 4 
Very dissatisfied …… 5 
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Appendix B:  Resident population and inter-provincial 
immigration of selected provincial administrative 
divisions of P.R. China, 2010 
Provincial 
administrative 
divisions 
Resident population 
Inter-provincial 
resident immigration 
Pct. of inter-
provincial 
immigration 
Beijing 19612368 7044533 0.359188294 
Tianjin 12938224 2991501 0.231214191 
Hebei 71854202 1404673 0.019548933 
Shanxi 35712111 931653 0.026087873 
Inner Mongolia 24706321 1444181 0.058453907 
Liaoning 43746323 1786530 0.040838404 
Jilin 27462297 456499 0.016622754 
Heilongjiang 38312224 506397 0.013217635 
Shanghai 23019148 8977000 0.389979681 
Jiangsu 78659903 7379253 0.093812129 
Zhejiang 54426891 11823977 0.21724513 
Anhui 59500510 717463 0.012058098 
Fujian 36894216 4313602 0.11691811 
Jiangxi 44567475 599942 0.013461431 
Shandong 95793065 2115593 0.022085033 
Henan 94023567 592134 0.006297719 
Hubei 57237740 1013612 0.017708805 
Hunan 65683722 724982 0.011037468 
Guangdong 104303132 21497787 0.206108739 
Guangxi 46026629 841806 0.018289543 
Chongqing 28846170 945194 0.032766707 
Sichuan 80418200 1128573 0.014033801 
Guizhou 34746468 763294 0.021967528 
Yunnan 45966239 1236549 0.026901244 
Shaanxi 37327378 974362 0.026103146 
Gansu 25575254 432833 0.016923898 
Qinghai 5626722 318435 0.056593342 
Ningxia 6301350 368451 0.058471756 
Note:  
1. Since CGSS 2013 dataset, which is used for empirical analysis in this chapter, cover most but not 
all provincial-level administrative divisions of China, the table here also only presents 
corresponding data of those provincial-level administrative divisions existing in CGSS 2013.  
2. The fourth column of this table is author’s own calculation according to the second and third 
column.  
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Source: Office of the Sixth National Population Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China, Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics 
(2011, pp. 48-49). 
Bibliography 
251 
 
Bibliography 
Agan, A., Starr, S., 2017. The Effect of Criminal Records on Access to Employment. American 
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 107, No. 5, pp. 560-564. 
Agresti, A., 2010. Analysis of Ordinal Categorical Data. 2nd edition. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley.  
Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E., 2002. Who Trusts Others? Journal of Public Economics, Vol.85, No. 2, 
pp.207-234. 
Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1994. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 465-490. 
Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., 2010. Inherited Trust and Growth. American Economic Review, Vol. 100, No. 
5, pp. 2060-2092. 
Allison, P., Sep. 10th, 2012. When Can You Safely Ignore Multicollinearity? [online]. Statistical 
Horizons. [Viewed 9 January 2019]. Available from: 
https://statisticalhorizons.com/multicollinearity 
Andersen, T.M., 2015. The Welfare State and Economic Performance. Bilaga 4, 
Långtidsutredningen, Sveriges Regering, Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU 2015:53. 
Aoki, M., 2011, “Individual” Social Capital, “Social” Networks, and Their Linkages to Economic 
Game. In: Justin Yifu Lin and Boris Pleskovic (Eds.), Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics – Global 2010: Lessons from East Asia and the Global Financial Crisis. 
Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. 
pp. 157-173. 
Arrow, K.J., 1974. The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton. 
Arrow, K.J., 1999. Observations on Social Capital. In: Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Eds) 
Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. pp. 3-5. 
Arthur, W.B., 1994. Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality. The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Sixth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association, pp. 406-411. 
Arthur, W.B., Holland, J.H., LeBaron, B., Palmer, R., Tayler, P., 1996. Asset Pricing Under 
Endogenous Expectations in an Artificial Stock Market. Santa Fe Institute Paper No. 96-12-093. 
Axelrod, R.M., 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Axelrod, R., 1986. An Evolutionary Approach to Norms. American Political Science Review, Vol. 
80, No. 4, pp. 1095-1111. 
Axelrod, R.M., 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
252 
 
Collaboration. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Bandura, A., 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Banerjee, R., 2016. Corruption, Norm Violation and Decay in Social Capital. Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 137, pp. 14-27.  
Banisch, S., Lima, R., Araújo, T., 2012. Agent based models and opinion dynamics as Markov 
chains. Social Networks, Vol.34, pp.549-561. 
Barabási, A.-L., Albert, R., 1999. Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. Science, Vol. 286, 
No. 5439, pp. 509-512. 
Belsley, D.A., Kuh, E., Welsch, R.E., 1980. Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data 
and Sources of Collinearity. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe,, K., 1995. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and 
Economic Behavior, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 122-142. 
Bergh, A., Bjørnskov, C., 2011. Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the Welfare State. 
KYKLOS, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 1-19. 
Beugelsdijk, S., de Groot, H.L.F., van Schaik, A.B.T.M., 2004. Trust and Economic Growth: A 
Robustness Analysis. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 118-134. 
Bhattacharya, R., Devinney, T.M., Pillutla, M.M., 1998. A Formal Model of Trust Based on 
Outcomes. The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 459-472. 
Bian, Y., Li, L., 2012. The Chinese General Social Survey (2003-8): Sample Designs and Data 
Evaluation. Chinese Sociological Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 70-97. 
Bicchieri, C., Xiao, E., Muldoon, R., 2011. Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not. 
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 170-187. 
Bjørnskov, C., 2006. Determinants of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison. Public 
Choice, Vol. 130, No.1-2, pp. 1-21. 
Bjørnskov, C., 2012. How Does Social Trust Affect Economic Growth? Southern Economic Journal, 
Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 1346-1368. 
Bjørnskov, C., Svendsen, G.T., 2013. Does Social Trust Determine the Size of the Welfare State? 
Evidence Using Historical Identification. Public Choice, Vol. 157, No. 1-2, pp. 269-286. 
Blanco, L., Ruiz, I., 2013. The Impact of Crime and Insecurity on Trust in Democracy and 
Institutions. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 103, No. 3, pp. 284-288. 
Bogardus, E.S., 1925. Social Distance and Its Origins. Journal of Applied Sociology, Vol. 9, pp. 
216-226. 
Bogardus, E.S., 1947. Measurement of Personal-Group Relations. Sociometry, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 
Bibliography 
253 
 
306-311. 
Bohnet, I., Zeckhauser, R., 2004. Trust, Risk and Betrayal. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 467-484. 
Bohnet, I., Greig, F., Herrmann, B., Zeckhauser, R., 2008. Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, 
China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. American Economic Review, Vol. 98, 
No. 1, pp. 294-310. 
Bonabeau, E., 2002. Agent-Based Modeling: Methods and Techniques for Simulating Human 
Systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 99, 
No. 10, Supplement 3, pp. 7280-7287. 
Borger.dk, no date a. Om pension [online]. Borger.dk. [Viewed 18 May 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.borger.dk/pension-og-efterloen/Pensionssystemet-i-Danmark/Om-pension. 
Border.dk, no date b. Om ATP Livslang Pension [online]. Borger.dk. [Viewed 18 May 2018]. 
Available from: https://www.borger.dk/pension-og-efterloen/ATP-Livslang-pension-oversigt/ATP-
Livslang-Pension.  
Bourdieu, P., 1986. The Forms of Capital. In: J.G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education, New York: Greenwood, pp. 241-258. 
Bourdieu, P., 1989. Social Space and Symbolic Power. Sociological Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 14-
25. 
Brant, R., 1990. Accessing Proportionality in the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Logistic 
Regression. Biometrics, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 1171 – 1178.  
Brenner, T., 2006. Agent Learning Representation: Advice on Modelling Economic Learning. In: 
Tesfatsion, L. and Judd, K.L. (Eds.), Handbook of Computational Economics Volume 2: Agent-
Based Computational Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 895-947. 
Brien, A., 1998. Professional Ethics and The Culture of Trust. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 17, 
No. 4, pp. 391-409. 
Brown, K.M., Hoye, R., Nicholson, M., 2014. Generating Trust? Sport and Community 
Participation. Journal of Sociology, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 437-457. 
Burt, R.S., 2000. The Network Structure of Social Capital. Research in Organizational Behaviour, 
Vol. 22, pp. 345- 423. 
Bush, P.D., 1987. The Theory of Institutional Change. Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
Evolutionary Economics I: Foundations of Institutional Thought, pp. 1075-1116. 
Chen, S.-H., Chie, B.-T., Zhang, T., 2015. Network-Based Trust Games: An Agent-Based Model. 
The Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 18(3)5, 
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/3/5.html>. 
Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Katz, L.F., 2016. The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
254 
 
Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment. American Economic Review, 
Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 855-902. 
Cho, S.-Y., 2016. Does Gender Equality Promote Social Trust? An Empirical Analysis. World 
Development, Vol. 88, pp. 175-187. 
Christensen, R.H.B., 2015. ordinal - Regression Models for Ordinal Data. R package version 
2015.6-28. http://www.cran.r-project.org/package=ordinal/. 
Coleman, J.S., 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 94, Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic 
Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure, pp. S95-S120.  
Coleman, J.S., 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Colesca, S.E., 2009. Understanding Trust in e-Government. Engineering Economics, Vol. 63, No. 
4, pp. 7-15. 
Cornwell, B., Laumann, E.O., Schumm, L.P., 2008. The Social Connectedness of Older Adults: A 
National Profile. American Sociological Review, Vol. 73, No, 2, pp. 185-203. 
Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., 1997. Evolutionary Psychology, A Primer [online]. [Viewed 20 July 2018]. 
Available from: https://www.cep.ucsb.edu/primer.html.  
Costa, L. da F., Rodrigues, F.A., Travieso, G., Villas Boas, P.R., 2007, Characterization of Complex 
Networks: A Survey of Measurements, Advances in Physics, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp.167-242. 
Cox, J.C., 2009. Trust and Reciprocity: Implications of Game Triads and Social Contexts. New 
Zealand Economic Papers, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 89-104. 
Dai, S., 2015. Networks of Institutions: Institutional emergence, social structure and national 
systems of policies. London, UK, New York, NY: Routledge. 
Dai, S., Elsner, W., 2015. Declining Trust in Growing China: A Dilemma between Growth and 
Socio-Economic Damage. Working Papers on East Asian Studies, No. 101/2015, University of 
Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), Duisburg. 
Danish Ministry of Health, 2017. Healthcare in Denmark: An Overview [online], Danish Ministry 
of Health. [Viewed 15 January 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.sum.dk/English/~/media/Filer%20-%20Publikationer_i_pdf/2016/Healthcare-in-dk-
16-dec/Healthcare-english-V16-dec.ashx. 
Danish Ministry of Health, © 2018. Danish Ministry of Health. [Viewed 15 January 2018]. Available 
from: https://www.sum.dk/English.aspx. 
Dearmon, J., Grier, L., 2009. Trust and Development. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 210-220. 
Delhey, J., Newton, K., 2003. Who Trusts?: The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies. 
Bibliography 
255 
 
European Societies, Vol.5, No.2, pp. 93-137. 
Delhey, J., Newton, K., 2005. Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or 
Nordic Exceptionalism? European Sociological Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 311-327. 
Denmark. Folketinget [Parliament], 2013. The Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 5th 1953 
[online]. Folketinget. [Viewed 14 January 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/~/media/PDF/publikationer/English/The_Constit
utional_Act_Of_Denmark_2013.pdf.ashx.  
Denmarkskanon [Denmark Canon], no date. No Title [The 10 Values]. Denmarkskanon. [Viewed 
13 January 2018]. Available from: https://www.danmarkskanon.dk/om-danmarkskanonen/english/. 
Denmark.dk, no date a. Facts and Statistics [online]. Denmark.dk. [Viewed 14 January 2018]. 
Available from: http://denmark.dk/en/quick-facts/facts.  
Denmark.dk, no date b. It’s All About Denmark [online]. Denmark.dk. [Viewed 25 March 2019]. 
Available from: http://serbien.um.dk/en/about-
denmark//~/media/Serbien/Documents/DK%20factsheet.pdf. 
Denmark.dk, no date c. What do We Mean by “Hygge”? [online]. Denmark.dk. [Viewed 5 March 
2019]. Available from: https://denmark.dk/people-and-culture/hygge. 
Denzau, A.T., North, D.C., 1994. Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions. KYKLOS, Vol. 
47, No. 1, pp. 3-31. 
Dewey, J., 1922. Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology. Henry Holt & 
Co.: New York 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., 2012. The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk 
and Trust Attitudes. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 2012, No. 79, pp. 645-677. 
Elsner, W., 2007. Why Meso? On “aggregation” and “Emergence”, and why and How the Meso 
Level is Essential in Social Economics. Forum for Social Economics, Vol.36, No.1, pp.1-16. 
Elsner, W., 2010. The Process and a Simple Logic of ‘Meso’. Emergence and the Co-evolution of 
Institutions and Group Size. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol.20, No.3, pp.445-477. 
Elsner, W., Heinrich, T, 2009. A Simple Theory of ‘Meso’. On the Co-evolution of Institutions and 
Platform Size – With an Application to Varieties of Capitalism and ‘Medium-Sized’ Countries. The 
Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 843-858. 
Elsner, W., Heinrich, T., 2011. Coordination on ‘Meso’-Levels: On the Co-evolution of Institutions, 
Networks and Platform Size. In S. Mann (Ed.), Sectors matter! Exploring mesoeconomics. Berlin: 
Springer. pp. 115-163. 
Elsner, W., Heinrich, T., Schwardt, H., 2015. The Microeconomics of Complex Economies: 
Evolutionary, Institutional, Neoclassical, and Complexity Perspectives. Amsterdam: Elsevier.  
Elsner, W., Schwardt, H., 2014. Trust and Arena Size: Expectations, Institutions, and General Trust, 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
256 
 
and Critical Population and Group Sizes. Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 
107-134. 
Elsner, W., Schwardt, H., 2015. From Emergent Cooperation to Contextual Trust, and to General 
Trust: Overlapping Meso-Sized Interaction Arenas and Cooperation Platforms as a Foundation of 
Pro-Social Behavior. Forum for Social Economics, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp.69-86. 
Epstein, J.M., 1999. Agent-Based Computational Models and Generative Social Science. 
Complexity, Vol.4, No.5, pp.41-60. 
Epstein, J.M., Axtell, R., 1996. Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2002a. ESS Round 1, Denmark 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 29 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=1.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2002b. ESS Round 1, Norway 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 29 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=1.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2002c. ESS Round 1, Sweden 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 29 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=1.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2004a. ESS Round 2, Denmark 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=2. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2004b. ESS Round 2, Norway 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=2. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2004c. ESS Round 2, Sweden 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=2.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2006a. ESS Round 3, Denmark 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 24 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=3.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2006b. ESS Round 3, Norway 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 24 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=3. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2006c. ESS Round 3, Sweden 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 24 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=3. 
Bibliography 
257 
 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2008a. ESS Round 4, Denmark 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 24 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=4.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2008b. ESS Round 4, Norway 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 24 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=4. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2008c. ESS Round 4, Sweden 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 24 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=4. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2010a. ESS Round 5, Denmark 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=5.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2010b. ESS Round 5, Norway 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=5. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2010c. ESS Round 5, Sweden 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=5. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2012a. ESS Round 6, Denmark 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 14 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2012b. ESS Round 6, Norway 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 14 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2012c. ESS Round 6, Sweden 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 14 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2014a. ESS Round 7, Denmark 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=7.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2014b. ESS Round 7, Norway 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=7. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2014c. ESS Round 7, Sweden 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 30 
November 2016]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=7. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2016a. ESS Round 8, Denmark 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
258 
 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 3 
May 2018]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=8.  
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2016b. ESS Round 8, Norway 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 3 
May 2018]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=8. 
ESS ERIC Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, 2016c. ESS Round 8, Sweden 
[data set]. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. [Viewed 3 
May 2018]. Available from: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=8. 
European Commission, 2017a. European Innovation Scoreboard [online]. European Commission. 
[Viewed 9 December 2017]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-
figures/scoreboards_en.  
European Commission, 2017b. Your Social Security Rights in Denmark [online], European 
Commission. [Viewed 25 January 2018]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1107&langId=en.  
European Social Survey, 2002. ESS Round 1 Source Questionnaire. London: Centre for 
Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. 
European Social Survey, 2004. ESS Round 2 Source Questionnaire. London: Centre for 
Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. 
European Social Survey, 2006. ESS Round 3 Source Questionnaire. London: Centre for 
Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. 
European Social Survey, 2008. ESS Round 4 Source Questionnaire. London: Centre for 
Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. 
European Social Survey, 2010. ESS Round 5 Source Questionnaire. London: Centre for 
Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. 
European Social Survey, 2012. ESS Round 6 Source Questionnaire. London: Centre for 
Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. 
European Social Survey, 2014. ESS Round 7 Source Questionnaire. London: ESS ERIC 
Headquarters, Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University London. 
European Social Survey, 2016. ESS Round 8 Source Questionnaire. London: ESS ERIC 
Headquarters c/o City University London. 
Eurostat, ©2018. [online]. Eurostat. [Viewed 4 June 2018]. Available from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat.  
EVS, 2011a. EVS - European Values Study 1981 - Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, 
Cologne. ZA4438 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.10791 
EVS, 2011b. EVS - European Values Study 1990 - Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, 
Bibliography 
259 
 
Cologne. ZA4460 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.10790 
EVS, 2011c. EVS - European Values Study 1999 - Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, 
Cologne. ZA3811 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.10789 
EVS, 2016. European Values Study 2008: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2008). GESIS Data Archive, 
Cologne. ZA4800 Data file Version 4.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12458 
Fahr, R., Irlenbusch, B., 2000. Fairness as a Constraint on Trust in Reciprocity: Earned Property 
Rights in a Reciprocal Exchange Experiment. Economics Letters, Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 275-282. 
Fairness, n.6., December 2013. In: OED Online. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[Viewed 23 December 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67729?redirectedFrom=fairness#eid. 
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., Kirchsteiger, G., 1997. Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: 
Experimental Evidence. Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 833-860. 
费孝通  [Fei, X.], [1947] 2017. 乡土中国  [Xiangtu Zhongguo]. Beijing: People’s Publishing 
House. 
Fei, X., [1947] 1992. From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society – A Translation of Fei 
Xiaotong’s Xiangtu Zhongguo, with an Introduaction and Epilogue by Gary G. Hamilton and Wang 
Zheng. Translated from Chinese by Gary G. Hamilton, Zheng Wang. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Fochesato, M., Bowles, S., 2015. Nordic Exceptionalism? Social Democratic Egalitarianism in 
World-Historic Perspective. Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 127, pp. 30-44. 
Fox, J., Weisberg, S., 2011. An {R} Companion to Applied Regression, Second Edition. Thousand 
Oaks CA: Sage. URL: http://socserv.socsci.mcmaster.ca/jfox/Books/Companion.  
Gambetta, D., 1988a. Foreword. In: Diego Gambetta, ed. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. ix-xii. 
Gambetta, D., 1988b. Can We Trust Trust? In: Diego Gambetta, ed. Trust: Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 213-237. 
Gardner, M., October 1970. Mathematical Games: The Fantastic Combinations of John Conway’s 
New Solitaire Game “Life”. Scientific American, Vol. 223, Issue 4, pp. 120-123. 
葛道顺 [Ge, D.], 2016. 落户政策重在公共服务改革 [The Key Point of Hukou-Settling Policy 
lies in the Reform of Public Services]. People’s Daily. 13 January. p. 5. 
General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1997a. Circular of the State 
Council on the Pilot Reform Plan of the Ministry of Public Security for the Household Residential 
Registration System in Small Cities and Towns and the Proposals on Improving the Household 
Residential Registration System in Rural Areas. Gazette of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, No., 20 (1997), pp. 869.  
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
260 
 
General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1997b. Pilot Reform Plan 
for the Household Residential Registration System in Small Cities and Towns. Gazette of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, No., 20 (1997), pp. 869-872.  
General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1997c. Proposals on 
Improving the Household Residential Registration System in Rural Areas. Gazette of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, No., 20 (1997), pp. 872-874.  
Gilbert, N., 2008. Agent-Based Models. Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. 
SAGE Publications, No.153. 
Gilbert, N., Bankes, S., 2002. Platforms and Methods for Agent-Based Modeling. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), Vol. 99, No. suppl. 3, 
pp. 7197-7198. 
Glaeser, E.L., Henderson, V., Inman, R.P., 2000a. The Future of Urban Research: Nonmarket 
Interactions [with Comments]. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, pp. 101-149. 
Glaeser, E.L., Laibson, D.I., Scheinkman, J.A., Soutter, C.L., 2000b. Measuring Trust. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 3, pp. 811-846. 
Goffman, E., [1963] 1986. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: Simon 
& Schuster, Inc. 
Gowdy, J., Mazzucato, M., van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., van der Leeuw, S.E., Wilson, D.S., 2016. 
Shaping the Evolution of Complex Societies. In: Wilson, D.S., Kirman, A. (Eds.), Complexity and 
Evolution: Toward a New Synthesis for Economics. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts/ 
London, England, pp.327-350. 
Grabner-Kräuter, S., Kaluscha, E., 2003. Empirical Research in On-line Trust: A Review and 
Critical Assessment. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, Vol. 58, No. 6, pp. 783-
812. 
Granovetter, M.S., 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 
6, pp. 1360-1380.  
Granovetter, M., 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 481-510. 
Hardin, R., 1996. Trustworthiness. Ethics, Vol. 107, No. 1, pp. 26-42. 
Hardin, R., 2003. Gaming Trust. In: Elinor Ostrom and James Walker (Eds), Trust and Reciprocity: 
Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 80-
101. 
Harrell Jr., F.E., with contributions from Dupont, C. and many others, 2016. Hmisc: Harrell 
Miscellaneous. R package version 4.0-2. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=Hmisc. 
Hayek, F.A., [1960] 2011. The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition. In: Ronald Hamowy 
Bibliography 
261 
 
(Ed.), The Collected Words of F.A. Hayek, Volume XVII. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Heiss, F., 2016. Using R for Introductory Econometrics. CreateSpace. Companion website: 
http://www.URfIE.net.  
Helliwell, J., Layard, R., Sachs, J., (Eds.) De Neve, J.-E., Huang, H., Wang, S., (Associate Eds.) 
2017. World Happiness Report 2017 [online]. World Happiness Report. [Viewed 11 March 2019]. 
Available from: https://s3.amazonaws.com/happiness-report/2017/HR17.pdf.  
Hilmer, C.E., Hilmer, M.J., 2014. Practical Econometrics: Data Collection, Analysis, and 
Application. McGraw-Hill Education, New York. 
Hodgson, G.M., 2013. From Pleasure Machines to Moral Communities: An Evolutionary 
Economics without Homo Economicus. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, 
E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (Eds.). 2014a. World Values Survey: Round One - Country-Pooled 
Datafile Version: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV1.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems 
Institute.  
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, 
E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (Eds.). 2014b. World Values Survey: Round Two - Country-Pooled 
Datafile Version: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV2.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems 
Institute.  
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, 
E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (Eds.). 2014c. World Values Survey: Round Three - Country-Pooled 
Datafile Version: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV3.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems 
Institute.  
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, 
E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (Eds.). 2014d. World Values Survey: Round Four - Country-Pooled 
Datafile Version: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV4.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems 
Institute. 
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, 
E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (Eds.). 2014e. World Values Survey: Round Five - Country-Pooled 
Datafile Version: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp. Madrid: JD Systems 
Institute.  
Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, 
E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (Eds.). 2014f. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled 
Datafile Version: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp. Madrid: JD 
Systems Institute. 
International Labour Organization, ©2018. International Labour Organization. [Viewed 13 June 
2018]. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/global/lang--en/index.htm.  
Isaac, A.G., 2008. Simulating Evolutionary Games: A Python-Based Introduction. Journal of 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
262 
 
Artificial Societies and Social Simulation. Vol. 11, No. 3 8 
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/11/3/8.html>. 
Jackson, M.O., 2008, Social and Economic Networks. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Kant, I., [1785] 2002, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Allen 
W. Wood, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Kant, I., [1788] 1968. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Kants Werke Adakemie Textausgabe V, 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 
Kant, I., [1788] 2002. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis / 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 
Kapp, K.W., 2011. The Foundations of Institutional Economics. Edited by Sebastian Berger and 
Rolf Steppacher. London and New York: Routledge. 
Kim, S., 2015. ppcor: Partial and Semi-Partial (Part) Correlation. R package version 1.1. 
https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=ppcor.  
Kim, W.-S., 2009. Effects of a Trust Mechanism on Complex Adaptive Supply Networks: An 
Agent-Based Social Simulation Study, The Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 12 
(3) 4, <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/12/3/4.html>. 
Kiyonari, T., Yamagishi, T., Cook, K.S., Cheshire, C., 2006. Does Trust Beget Trustworthiness? 
Trust and Trustworthiness in Two Games and Two Cultures: A Research Note. Social Psychology 
Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 270-283. 
Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1997. Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country 
Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.112, No.4, pp. 1251-1288. 
Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P.J., Fischbacher, U., Fehr, E., 2005. Oxytocin Increases Trust in 
Humans. Nature, Vol. 435, No. 7042, pp. 673-676. 
Ku, H.-M., 1898. Discourses and Sayings of Confucius: A New Special Translation, Illustrated with 
Quotations from Goethe and Other Writers. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh Limited.  
Kuhnle, S., 2000. The Scandinavian Welfare State in the 1990s: Challenged but Viable. West 
European Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 209-228. 
Kumlin, S., Rothstein, B., 2005. Making and Breaking Social Capital: The Impact of Welfare-State 
Institutions. Comparative Political Studies. 38. pp. 339-365. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. Trust in Large Organizations. 
American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 333-338. 
Leigh, A., 2006. Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity. The Economic Record, Vol. 82, No. 
258, pp. 268-280. 
Lewicki, R.J., Bunker, B.B., 1995. Trust in Relationships: A Model of Development and Decline. 
Bibliography 
263 
 
In: B. B. Bunker, J. Z. Rubin, & Associates (Eds.), Conflict, Cooperation and Justice: Essays 
Inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 133-173. 
Lewis, J.D., Weigert, A., 1985. Trust as a Social Reality. Social Forces, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 967-985. 
梁漱溟 [Liang, S.], [1921] 1999, 东西文化及其哲学 [The Eastern and Western Culture, and their 
Philosophy]. Beijing: The Commercial Press. 
梁漱溟 [Liang, S.], [1949] 2005. 中国文化要义 [The Essence of Chinese Culture]. Shanghai: 
People’s Publishing house of Shanghai.  
Liberman, N., Trope, Y., Stephan, E., 2008. Psychological Distance. In: Kruglanski, A.W. and 
Higgins, E.T. (Eds), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles, Vol. 2. New York, NY: 
Guilford Press, pp. 353-383. 
Lim, S., Morshed, A.M., Khun, C., 2018. Trust and Macroeconomic Performance: A Two-Step 
Approach. Economic Modelling, Vol. 68, pp. 293-305. 
Lin, N., 2002. Social Capital: A theory of Social Structure and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lin, M.-W., Yu, C., 2014. Can Corruption Be Measured? Comparing Global Versus Local 
Perceptions of Corruption in East and Southeast Asia. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: 
Research and Practice, Vol. 16, No. 2., pp. 140-157. 
Macy, M.W., Skvoretz, J., 1998. The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation between Strangers: A 
Computational Model. American Sociological Review, Vol.63, No.5, pp. 638-660. 
Macy, M.W., Willer, R., 2002. From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and Agent-Based 
Modeling. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 28, pp. 143-166. 
Mantzavinos, C., North, D.C., Shariq, S., 2004. Learning, Institutions, and Economic Performance. 
Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 75-84. 
Marx, K., [1867] 2011. Capital, Volume One: A Critique of Political Economy. Translated by 
Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. Edited by Friedrich Engels. Mineola. New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc.  
Mayer, R., Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D., 1995. An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust. 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No.3, pp. 709-734. 
McAllister, D.J.,1995. Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal 
Cooperation in Organizations. The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 24-59.  
McCullagh, P., 1980. Regression Models for Ordinal Data. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 
Series B (Methodological), Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 109-142. 
Mercer, 2017. The Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2017 [online]. Mercer. [Viewed 3 
February 2018]. Available from: https://australiancentre.com.au/projects/melbourne-mercer-global-
pension-index/.  
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
264 
 
Midi, H., Sarkar, S.K., Rana, S., 2010. Collinearity Diagnostics of Binary Logistic Regression 
Model. Journal of Interdisciplinary Mathematics, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 253-267. 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2012. 中国
的社会保障 [Social Security in China] [online]. Central People’s Government of the People’s 
Republic of China. [Viewed 8 April 2018]. Available from: http://www.gov.cn/test/2012-
04/20/content_2118401.htm#.  
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, November 
24th, 2017. 《中国社会保险发展年度报告 2016》发布 [China’s Social Security Development 
Annual Report 2016 Released] [online]. Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the 
People’s Republic of China. [Accessed 7 April 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/buneiyaowen/201711/t20171124_282237
.html. 
Nahapiet, J., Ghoshal, S., 1998. Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational 
Advantage. The Academy of Management Review, Nol. 23, No. 2, pp. 242-266. 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, November 2nd, 2001a. 第四次全
国人口普查公报（第 1号） [Gazette of the Fourth National Population Census (No. 1)] [online]. 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 10 May 2018]. Available 
from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/200204/t20020404_30320.html.  
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, May 15th, 2001b. 第五次全国人
口普查公报（第 1号） [Gazette of the Fifth National Population Census (No. 1)] [online], National 
Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 10 May 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/200203/t20020331_30314.html.  
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2009. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2009 [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  [Viewed 
4 June 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexch.htm. 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2010. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2010 [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  [Viewed 
4 June 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexch.htm.  
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, April 28th, 2011a. 2010年第六次
全国人口普查主要数据公报（第 1号）[Gazette of the Sixth National Population Census (No. 1)] 
[online], National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 10 May 2018]. 
Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/201104/t20110428_30327.html. 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2011b. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2011 [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  [Viewed 
4 June 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2011/indexch.htm.  
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2012. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2012 [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  [Viewed 
4 June 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/indexch.htm.  
Bibliography 
265 
 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2013. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2013 [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  [Viewed 
4 June 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexch.htm.  
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2014. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2014 [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  [Viewed 
4 June 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexch.htm. 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2015. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2015 [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China.  [Viewed 
4 June 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015/indexch.htm.  
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2016. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2016 [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 
4 June 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexch.htm.  
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (Compiled), 2017. China Statistical 
Yearbook – 2017. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, April 17th, 2018a. 一季度国民经
济实现良好开局 [A Good Start of the National Economy Achieved in the First Quarter] [online]. 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 22 April 2018]. Available 
from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201804/t20180417_1594310.html. 
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, April 17th, 2018b. 国家发展改革
委副主任、国家统计局局长宁吉喆就发布城镇调查失业率有关问题答记者问 [Ning Jizhe, the 
Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission and Director General of the 
National Bureau of Statistics, Answers Questions from Reporters on Releasing the Surveyed Urban 
Unemployment Rate] [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 
[Viewed 22 April 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/sjjd/201804/t20180417_1594334.html.  
National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, no date. National Bureau of 
Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. [View 22 April 2018]. Available from: 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01&zb=A040N&sj=2016.  
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2010a.中国综合社会调查
（CGSS）2010年度调查问卷（居民问卷）[Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2010 Annual 
Questionnaire (Family)] [online]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 28 February 
2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=15553986. 
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2010b. 中国综合社会调查 2010
原始数据（stata14.0以下版本） [Chinese General Social Survey 2010 Original Data (For Stata 
Version Earlier Than Stata 14.0)] [Data set]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 18 
March 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=15553986.  
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2011a. 2011年中国社会调查调
查 B卷 [Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2011 Annual Questionnaire B] [online]. Chinese 
National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 28 February 2019]. Available from: 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
266 
 
http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=12791319. 
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2011b. 中国综合社会调查 2011
原始数据（stata14.0以下版本）[Chinese General Social Survey 2011 Original Data (For Stata 
Version Earlier Than Stata 14.0)] [Data set]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 18 
March 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=12791319.  
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2012a.中国综合社会调查
（CGSS）2012年度调查问卷（居民问卷）A卷 [Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2012 
Annual Questionnaire (Family A)] [online]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 28 
February 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=85111874.  
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2012b.中国综合社会调查
（CGSS）2012年度调查问卷（居民问卷）B卷 [Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2012 
Annual Questionnaire (Family B)] [online]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 28 
February 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=85111874. 
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2012c. 中国综合社会调查 2012
原始数据（stata14.0以下版本） [Chinese General Social Survey 2012 Original Data (For Stata 
Version Earlier Than Stata 14.0)] [Data set]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 18 
March 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=85111874.  
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013a.中国综合社会调查
（CGSS）2013年度调查问卷（居民问卷）A卷 [Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2013 
Annual Questionnaire (Family A)] [online]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 28 
February 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=93281139.  
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013b.中国综合社会调查
（CGSS）2013年度调查问卷（居民问卷）B卷 [Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2013 
Annual Questionnaire (Family B)] [online]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 28 
February 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=93281139. 
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2013c. 中国综合社会调查 2013
原始数据（stata14.0以下版本）[Chinese General Social Survey 2013 Original Data (For Stata 
Version Earlier Than Stata 14.0)] [Data set]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 28 
February 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=93281139. 
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2015a.中国综合社会调查
（CGSS）2015年度调查问卷（居民问卷）[Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2015 Annual 
Questionnaire (Family)] [online]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 18 March 2019]. 
Available from:http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=62072446. 
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, 2015b. 中国综合社会调查 2015
原始数据（stata14.0以下版本） [Chinese General Social Survey 2015 Original Data (For Stata 
Version Earlier Than Stata 14.0)] [Data set]. Chinese National Survey Data Archive. [Viewed 18 
March 2019]. Available from: http://cnsda.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=projects/view&id=62072446.  
National Survey Research Center (NSRC) at Renmin University of China, ©2019. Chinese General 
Bibliography 
267 
 
Social Survey – Digital Chronicle of Chinese Social Change [online]. Chinese General Social 
Survey. [Viewed 24 March 2019]. Available from: 
http://cgss.ruc.edu.cn/index.php?r=index/index&hl=en. 
Newman, M.E.J., 2004. Analysis of Weighted Networks. Physical Review E 70, 056131. 
Niazi, M., Hussain, A., 2011. Agent-based Computing from Multi-agent Systems to Agent-based 
Models: A Visual Survey. Scientometrics, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 479-499. 
Nikolai, C., Madey, G., 2009. Tools of the Trade: A Survey of Various Agent Based Modeling 
Platforms. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Vol. 12, No. 2 2 
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/12/2/2.html>. 
Nooteboom, B., 2002. Trust: Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures and Figures. Cheltenham, 
UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Nordic Co-operation, no date a. Facts about the Nordic Countries [online]. Nordic Co-operation. 
[Viewed 5 March 2019]. Available from: https://www.norden.org/en/information/facts-about-
nordic-countries.  
Nordic Co-operation, no date b. Social Policy and Welfare [online]. Nordic Co-operation. [Viewed 
5 March 2019]. Available from: https://www.norden.org/en/information/social-policy-and-welfare.  
Norman, G., 2010. Likert Scales, Levels of Measurement and the “Laws” of Statistics. Advances in 
Health Sciences Education, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 625-632. 
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
North, D.C., Summerhill, W., Weingast, B.R., 2000. Order, Disorder and Economic Change: Latin 
America vs. North America. In: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton Root (Eds.), Governing for 
Prosperity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. pp. 17-58. 
Norway. Stortinget [Parliament], 2018. The Constitution [online]. Stortinget. [Viewed 1 June 2018]. 
Available from: https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/english/constitutionenglish.pdf. 
Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, January 2017. The Norwegian Social Insurance 
Scheme 2017, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-norwegian-social-insurance-scheme-
2017/id2478621/. Accessed on January 28th, 2018.   
OECD, 2017. Pensions at a Glance 2017: Country Profiles – Denmark, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/public-pensions/PAG2017-country-profile-Denmark.pdf. Accessed on 
May 17th, 2018. 
Office of the Sixth National Population Census of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics 
(Compiled), 2011. Major Figures on 2010 Population Census of China. Beijing: China Statistics 
Press. 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
268 
 
Ostrom, E., 1999.Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept? In: Dasgupta, P., Serageldin, I., 
(Eds) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. The World Bank, pp. 172-214. 
Ostrom, E., 2003. Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation. In: 
Elinor Ostrom and James Walker (Eds), Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons for 
Experimental Research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 19-79. 
Ostrom, E., Ahn, T.K., 2009. The Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to Collective Action. In: 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen and Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen (Eds), Handbook of Social Capital: 
The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics. Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, 
USA: Edward Elgar, pp. 17-35.   
Park, R.E., 1924. The Concept of Social Distance as Applied to the Study of Racial Attitudes and 
Racial Relations, Journal of Applied Sociology. Vol. 8, pp. 339-344. Also available on: 
https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Park/Park_1924.html, accessed on December 6th, 2018. 
Pedersen, A.W., Kuhnle, S., 2017. The Nordic Welfare State Model. In: Knutsen, Oddbjørn P. (Ed.), 
The Nordic Models in Political Science: Challenged, but Still Viable? pp. 219-238. Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, 2017. (ISBN 978-82-450-2175-2) 
Peiró-Palomino, J., Tortosa-Ausina, E., 2013. Can trust effects on development be generalized? A 
response by quantile. European Journal of Political Economy. Vol.32, pp. 377-390. 
People’s Government of Beijing Municipality, 2016. 北京市积分落户管理办法（试行）[The 
Administrative Measures of the Point-based Household Registration of Beijing (For Trial 
Implementation)] [online]. The People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. [Viewed 18 March 
2019]. Available from: 
http://www.beijing.gov.cn/zhengce/wenjian/192/33/50/438650/79206/index.html. 
People’s Republic of China. Government Administration Council of the Central People’s 
Government, 1953. 中央人民政府政务院关于实行粮食的计划收购和计划供应的命令 [Order 
of the Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government about the Planned 
Purchasing and Planned Provision of Grain] [online]. News of the Communist Party of China. 
[Viewed 5 March 2019]. Available from: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66658/4492870.html#. 
People’s Republic of China. Ministry of Public Security, 2004. 关于废止部分部门规章的决定 
[Decision on Abolishing Some Departmental Rules] [online]. Ministry of Public Security of the 
People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 5 March 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.mps.gov.cn/n2254314/n2254409/n2254443/n2254452/c3708293/content.html. 
People’s Republic of China. Government Administration Council of the Central People’s 
Government, 1953. 中华人民共和国劳动保险条例 [Labor Insurance Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China] [online]. Database of Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China. 
[Viewed 3 June 2018]. Available from: 
http://search.chinalaw.gov.cn/law/searchTitleDetail?LawID=334760&Query=%E5%8A%B3%E5
%8A%A8%E4%BF%9D%E9%99%A9%E6%9D%A1%E4%BE%8B&IsExact=.  
Bibliography 
269 
 
People’s Republic of China. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 1958. 中华人
民共和国户口登记条例  [Hukou Registration Ordinance of the People’s Republic of China] 
[online]. National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 20 September 
2017]. Available from:  http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/10/content_5004332.htm. 
People’s Republic of China. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, December 29th, 
2001. 中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法  [Law of Population and Family Planning of the 
People’s Republic of China] [online]. Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. [Viewed 9 May 2018]. Available from: http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-
08/21/content_25059.htm.  
People’s Republic of China. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, October 28th, 
2010. 中华人民共和国社会保险法 [Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
[online]. State Council of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 30 January 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.gov.cn/zxft/ft209/content_1748773.htm.  
People’s Republic of China. State Council, July 8th, 1971. 国务院转发卫生部军管会、商业部、
燃料化学部“关于做好计划生育工作的报告” [The State Council Forwards the “Report on Doing 
the Work of Family Planning Well” of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Fuel and Chemistry] [online]. State Council of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 
9 May 2018]. Available from: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-11/19/content_10304.htm#.  
People’s Republic of China. State Council, 1997. Circular of the State Council on the Pilot Reform 
Plan of the Ministry of Public Security for the Household Residential Registration System in Small 
Cities and Towns and the Proposals on Improving the Household Residential Registration System 
in Rural Areas [online]. In: General Office of the State Council of People’s Republic of China (ed.), 
Gazette of the State Council of the People’ Republic of China. Issue No. 20. Beijing: General Office 
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. pp. 869-874. [Viewed 5 March 2019]. 
Available from: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1997/gwyb199720.pdf.  
People’s Republic of China. State Council, 2014. 国务院关于进一步推进户籍制度改革的意见
[Guideline of the State Council on Further Accelerating Huji System Reform] [online]. State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 5 March 2019]. Available from: 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-07/30/content_8944.htm.  
People.cn, July 29th, 2015. 从人民日报历史数据看我国生育政策演变史  [Looking at the 
Evolution of the Fertility Policy of Our Country from the Historical Data of the People’s Daily] 
[online]. People.cn. [Viewed 9 May 2018]. Available from: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0729/c1001-27375674.html.  
Peterson, B., Harrell Jr., F.E., 1990. Partial Proportional Odds Models for Ordinal Response 
Variables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series C (Applied Statistics), Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 
205-217. 
Popper, M., 2013. Social Trust, Norms and Morality. Human Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 443-457. 
Population Census Office under the State Council, Department of Population and Employment 
Statistics National Bureau of Statistics (Compiled), 2012. Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
270 
 
of the People’s Republic of China (Book I, Book II, Book III). China Statistics Press: Beijing.  
Posner, R.A., 1997. Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach. The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fourth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association, pp. 365-369. 
Putnam, R.D., 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: 
Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. 
Putnam, R., Leonardi, R., Nanetti, R.Y., 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in 
Modern Italy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
R Core Team, 2016. foreign: Read Data Stored by Minitab, S, SAS, SPSS, Stata, Systat, Weka, 
dBase, …. R package version 0.8-67. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=foreign.  
R Core Team, 2017. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL https://www.R-project.org/. 
Ray, J.L., 2003. Explaining Interstate Conflict and War: What Should Be Controlled for? Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 1-31.  
Rotenberg, K.J., 1995. The Socialisation of Trust: Parents’ and Children’s Interpersonal Trust. 
International Journal of Behavioral Development, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 713-726.  
Roth, F., 2009. Does Too Much Trust Hamper Economic Growth? KYKLOS, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 103-
128. 
Rothstein, B., Uslaner, E.M., 2005. All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust. World Politics, 
Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 41-72. 
Rousseau, D.M., Sitkin, S.B., Burt, R.S., Camerer, C., 1998. Not so Different after All: A Cross-
Discipline View of Trust. The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 393-404. 
Roussey, L., Deffains, B., 2012. Trust in Judicial Institutions: An Empirical Approach. Journal of 
Institutional Economics, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 351-369. 
Sabel, C.F., 1993. Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy. 
Human Relations, Vol. 46, No. 9, pp. 1133-1170. 
Sako, M., Helper, S., 1998. Determinants of Trust in Supplier Relations: Evidence from the 
Automotive Industry in Japan and the United States. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 387-417. 
Sapienza, P., Toldra-Simats, A., Zingales, L., 2013. Understanding trust. The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 123, No. 573, pp. 1313-1332. 
Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2012. A Trust Crisis. International Review of Finance, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 
123-131. 
Schelling, T.C., 1971. Dynamic Models of Segregation. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 
Bibliography 
271 
 
Vol.1, No.2, pp. 143-186. 
Schlegel, B., Steenbergen, M., 2018. brant: Test for Parallel Regression Assumption. R package 
version 0.2-0. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=brant.  
Seltzer, N., Smirnov, O., 2015. Degrees of Separation, Social Learning, and the Evolution of 
Cooperation in a Small-World Network. The Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 
18(4)12, <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/4/12.html>. 
Slovic, P., 1993. Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy. Risk Analysis, Vol.13, No.6, pp.675-682. 
Smith, A., [1759] 1966. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. New York: Augustus M. Kelley. 
Socialization, n.1., September 2009. In: OED Online. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[Viewed 29 June 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183747?redirectedFrom=socialization#eid. 
Solow, R.M., 1999. Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance. In: Dasgupta, P., 
Serageldin, I., (Eds) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. The World Bank, pp.6-10. 
Strand, S., Cadwallader, S., Firth, D., 2011. Using Statistical Regression Methods in Education 
Research [online]. ReStore. [Viewed 30 December 2017]. 
http://www.restore.ac.uk/srme/www/fac/soc/wie/research-new/srme/index.html. 
Statistics Denmark, ©2017. Statistics Denmark. [Viewed 14 September 2017]. Available from: 
https://www.dst.dk/en.  
Statistics Denmark, 2017a. Immigrants and Their Descendants [online]. Statistics Denmark. 
[Viewed 14 September 2017]. Available from: http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/befolkning-og-
valg/indvandrere-og-efterkommere. 
Statistics Denmark, 2017b. Population and Population Projections [online]. Statistics Denmark. 
[Viewed 14 September 2017]. Available from: http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/befolkning-og-
valg/befolkning-og-befolkningsfremskrivning. 
Statistics Norway, ©2017. Statistics Norway. [Viewed 23 September 2017]. Available from: 
http://www.ssb.no/en/beftett. 
Statistics Norway, 2016. This is Norway 2016: What the Figures Say [online]. Statistics Norway. 
[Viewed on September 23rd, 2017]. Available from: https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-
publikasjoner/_attachment/277893?_ts=15709f114e8. 
Statistics Norway, 2017a. Attitudes towards Immigrants and Immigration [online]. Statistics 
Norway. [Viewed 23 September 2017]. Available from: 
http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvhold. 
Statistics Norway, 2017b. Church of Norway [online]. Statistics Norway. [Viewed 24 September 
2017]. Available from:  http://www.ssb.no/en/kultur-og-fritid/statistikker/kirke_kostra. 
Statistics Norway, 2017c. Immigrants and Norwegian-Born to Immigrant Parents [online]. Statistics 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
272 
 
Norway. [Viewed 24 September 2017]. Available from: 
http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvbef.  
Statistics Norway, 2017d. Migration [online]. Statistics Norway. [Viewed 24 September 2017]. 
Available from: http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/flytting. 
Statistics Norway, 2017e. Persons with Refugee Background [online]. Statistics Norway. [Viewed 
24 September 2017]. Available from: http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/flyktninger.  
Statistics Norway, 2017f. Population. [online]. Statistics Norway. [Viewed 24 September 2017]. 
Available from: https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/folkemengde. 
Statistics Norway, 2017g. Religious Communities and Life Stance Communities [online]. Statistics 
Norway. [Viewed 24 September 2017]. Available from: http://www.ssb.no/en/kultur-og-
fritid/statistikker/trosamf. 
Statistics Sweden, ©2017. Statistics Sweden. [Viewed 25 September 2017]. Available from: 
http://www.scb.se/. 
Statistics Sweden, 2017a. Domestic Migration by Type, Age and Sex [online]. Statistics Sweden. 
[Viewed 25 September 2017]. Available from: 
http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__BE0101__BE0101J/Flyttningar
Inrk/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=9019098f-3479-4f4b-9667-5b485f8ec03c.  
Statistics Sweden, 2017b. Immigrations and Emigrations by Country of Birth and Sex [online]. 
Statistics Sweden. [Viewed 25 September 2017]. Available from:  
http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__BE0101__BE0101J/ImmiEmiF
od/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=4ed61111-087a-4cfc-8a8d-611153e0403e.  
Stolle, D., Nishikawa, L., 2011. Trusting Others – How Parents Shape the Generalized Trust of Their 
Children. Comparative Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 281-314. 
Svendsen, G.L.H., Svendsen, G.T., 2016. How did Trade Norms Evolve in Scandinavia? Long-
Distance Trade and Social Trust in the Viking Age. Economic Systems, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 198-205. 
Sweden. Sveriges Riksdag [Swedish Parliament], 2016. The Constitution of Sweden: The 
Fundamental Laws and the Riksdag Act 2016 [online]. Sveriges Riksdag. [Viewed 14 January 2018]. 
Available from: http://www.riksdagen.se/globalassets/07.-dokument--lagar/the-constitution-of-
sweden-160628.pdf.  
Tesfatsion, L., Judd, K.L. (Eds.), 2006. Handbook of Computational Economics Volume 2: Agent-
Based Computational Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Transparency International, 2017. Corruption Perceptions Index 2017: Technical Methodology Note 
[online]. Transparency International. [Viewed on April 18th, 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017.  
Trust, no date. In: OED Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Viewed 12 April 2018]. Available 
from: http://www.oed.com/search?searchType=dictionary&q=trust&_searchBtn=Search. 
Bibliography 
273 
 
Trust, n., December 2015. In: OED Online. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Viewed 
12 April 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/207004?rskey=emjAC6&result=1#eid. 
Uslaner, E.M., 2000. Producing and Consuming Trust. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 4, 
pp. 569-590. 
Uslaner, E.M., 2002. The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Uslaner, E.M., 2005. Trust and Corruption. In: Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube and Matthias 
Schramm (Eds.), The New Institutional Economics of Corruption. London: Routledge, pp. 76-92. 
Uslaner, E.M., 2013. Trust and Corruption Revisited: How and Why Trust and Corruption Shape 
Each Other. Quality & Quantity. Vol. 47, No. 6, pp. 3603-3608. 
Uzzi, B., 1997. Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 35-67. 
Value, n.II.6.d. September 2011. In: OED Online. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[Viewed 24 June 2018]. Available from: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/221253?rskey=BJaGF0&result=1#eid.   
Veblen, T., 1898. Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science? The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 373-397. 
Veblen, T., [1899] 2005. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions. Delhi: 
Aakar Books. 
Venables, W.N., Ripley, B.D., 2002. Modern Applied Statistics with S. Fourth Edition. Springer, 
New York. ISBN 0-387-95457-0.  
Watts, D.J., Strogatz, S.H., 1998, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks. Nature, Vol. 
393, pp. 440-442. 
Wäckerle, M., Rengs, B., Radax, W., 2014. An Agent-Based Model of Institutional Life-Cycles. 
Games, Vol.5, No.3, pp.160-187. 
Weber, M., [1930] 2005. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London and New York: 
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Translated by Talcott Parsons. With an introduction by Anthony 
Giddens. 
Whiteley, P.F., 2000. Economic Growth and Social Capital. Political Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 
443-466. 
Wickham, H., 2007. Reshaping Data with the Reshape Package. Journal of Statistical Software, Vol. 
21, No. 12. 
Williams, R., 2006. Generalized Ordered Logit / Partial Proportional Odds Models for Ordinal 
Dependent Variables. The Stata Journal. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 58-82. 
Trust and Development: The Deep Structure of Institutions-Building and Socio-Economic Performance 
274 
 
Williamson, O.E., 1993. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization. The Journal of Law & 
Economics, Vol. 36, No. 1, Part 2, John M. Olin Centennial Conference in Law and Economics at 
the University of Chicago, pp. 453-486. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. 
World Bank Group, ©2018. The World Bank. [Viewed 11 June 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.worldbank.org/.  
World Economic Forum, 23 November, 2006. The Global Gender Gap Report 2006. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2006. Accessed on March 27th, 2018.  
World Economic Forum, 2007. The Global Gender Gap Report 2007. 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2007.pdf. Accessed on March 27th, 
2018.  
World Economic Forum, 1 June, 2009. The Global Gender Gap Report 2008. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2008. Accessed on March 27th, 2018.  
World Economic Forum, 23 June, 2011a. The Global Gender Gap Report 2009. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2009. Accessed on March 27th, 2018. 
World Economic Forum, 2011b. The Global Gender Gap Report 2011. 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-2011/. Accessed on March 27th, 2018.  
World Economic Forum, 12 October, 2010. The Global Gender Gap Report 2010. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2010. Accessed on March 27th, 
2018.  
World Economic Forum, 22 October, 2012. The Global Gender Gap Report 2012. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2012. Accessed on March 27th, 2018. 
World Economic Forum, 20 October, 2013. The Global Gender Gap Report 2013. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2013. Accessed on March 27th, 2018. 
World Economic Forum, 20 October, 2014. The Global Gender Gap Report 2014. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2014. Accessed on March 27th, 2018. 
World Economic Forum, 19 November, 2015. The Global Gender Gap Report 2015. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2015. Accessed on March 27th, 2018 
World Economic Forum, 26 October, 2016. The Global Gender Gap Report 2016. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2016. Accessed on March 27th, 
2018. 
World Economic Forum, 2 November, 2017. The Global Gender Gap Report 2017. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017. Accessed on March 25th, 
2018. 
Bibliography 
275 
 
Xenophon, [Approx. 362 BC] 1897. Oeconomicus [The Economist] [online]. Translated by H.G. 
Dakyns as “The Economist”, in: The Works of Xenophon. London: Macmillan and Co. [Viewed 28 
November 2018]. Available from: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20081007062158/http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au:80/x/xenophon/x
5oe/,  
Yamagishi, T., Yamagishi, M., 1994. Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan. 
Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 129-166.  
Yee, T.W., 2017. VGAM: Vector Generalized Linear and Additive Models. R package version 1.0-
3. URL https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=VGAM. 
You, J.-S., 2012. Social Trust: Fairness Matters More Than Homogeneity. Political Psychology, Vol. 
33, No. 5, pp. 701-721. 
Zak, P.J., Knack, S., 2001. Trust and Growth. The Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 470, pp. 295-
321. 
曾湘泉 [Zeng, X.], April 17th, 2018. 调查失业率统计是促进更高质量和更充分就业的科学举
措 [Surveyed Unemployment Rate is A Scientific Measure of Promoting Higher-Quality and Fuller 
Employment] [online]. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. [Viewed 22 
April 2018]. Available from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/sjjd/201804/t20180417_1594329.html.  
张涛  [Zhang, T.], 2017. 列女传译注  [Translation and Annotation of the Biographies of 
Exemplary Women]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House.  
Zhao, D., Hu, W., 2017. Determinants of Public Trust in Government: Empirical Evidence from 
Urban China. International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 358-377. 
Zucker, L.G., 1986. Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economics Structure 1840 to 1920. 
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 8, pp. 53-111. 
  
 
Declaration 
 
I declare that this thesis is my own work, was conducted without unauthorized assistance.  
I declare that this thesis has not been submitted under consideration for any degree or examination 
in any university. 
I declare that only the referenced sources and aids were used. 
I declare that direct quotations from the published or unpublished work of another are clearly 
identified.  
I consent that my thesis submitted to the University of Bremen for Doctorate can be checked for 
plagiarism using appropriate software tools. 
 
 
 
 
Lin Gao 
Bremen, Germany 
March 25th, 2019 
 
